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INTRODUCTION 
Two modern events, the 1947 creation of Pakistan out of India and the 1978-
79 Iranian revolution, underline the importance of religion as an element of 
state formation in West and South Asia. One could almost speak of "Muslim 
nationalism," but it has recently been suggested that it might be better to 
substitute an uncontaminated phrase such as "political identity" for the 
vaguer "nationalism."[1] Whatever we wish to label it, Muslim separatism and 
Muslim state-building on a religious basis have profoundly influenced the 
modern history of Asia, in sharp contrast to the rise of secular government 
in modern Europe. 
How far back to look for the roots of Muslim separatism and religious state 
building has become a central debate in the study of Asian Islam. The two 
major approaches to the problem have been called the "instrumental" and 
the "primordial." The extreme instrumentalist might say, for instance, that 
ethnicity is "the pursuit of interest and advantage for members of groups 
whose cultures are infinitely malleable and manipulable by elites."[2] He would 
argue that pre-1947 Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent differed little 
from one another, but that different rates of mobilization and the claims of 
elites to advantage created a split. The primordialist would counter that 
Islamic religious conceptions so profoundly shape community identity that 
"the formation of separatist movements on the basis of religious confession, 
the assertion of a political identity on the basis of religion... does seem to be 
an especial characteristic of Muslims."[3] 
Neither of these approaches is often held in its pure form. Instrumentalists 
can point to many places where religion has not played a major role in 
separatist movements. Clearly, communities can "imagine" themselves 
variously 
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in national terms. Yet the imagination must work with symbols drawn from 
a collective past, and historical experience and cultural tradition can at least 
help explain why religious separatism has been more important in North 
India than in the south, and more important in the Middle East than in East 
Asia. In North India, even an instrumentalist found that local nationalisms, 
whether Sikh, Muslim, or Maithili, succeeded best when religious rather than 
only linguistic bases were used for political identity.[4] 
In some ways, of course, the debate between instrumentalists and primor-
dialists centers on the relative weight of short-term causes for political 
identity formation versus long-term ones. I believe that although the short-
term causes are more important in, say, the creation of Pakistan, we must not 
lose sight of the long and medium durée. An approach taking the primordial 
seriously will require a study of cultural tradition and lead one further into 
the past. Since Muslim separatism as a political movement developed earliest 
on the Gangetic plain (now the province of Uttar Pradesh), the cultural 
history of Muslims there becomes especially important to an understanding 
of their attitudes to communal conflict. A large portion of this area was ruled 
from 1722 to 1856 by a Shi`i Muslim ruling house, and one of the questions 
raised here is what Shi`i rule and religious ideas meant for communalist 
traditions in the area. 
In studying this Shi`i Muslim-ruled region of North India, I aim at 
illuminating both some roots of Muslim communalism in the Gangetic plain 
and some of the historical con text for the rise of clerical dominance in Shi`i 
Iran. I ask whether one form of preindustrial religious organization is more 
likely to produce modern communalism than another, arguing that in North 
India a process of community formation, promoted by Shi`i learned men 
(‘ulama') and notables, formed an essential background to later politicization. 
By looking at the formation of ulama ideology, I make a contribution to our 
understanding of the conceptual bases for their contemporary activism. 
This study of Shi`i Islam and its clerics and organization in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries treats several themes beyond the important one of 
the roots of religious communalism. It asks about the role of religion in 
expressing indigenous Asian cultural values at a time of widening European 
influence, and about the impact of social and economic change on religious 
institutions and values. It looks at the power relationship between religious 
experts and officers of the state in a patrimonial bureaucracy. It illuminates 
the processes whereby a small, powerless sect can become a "church," or 
formal religious establishment. The approach seeks to combine social history 
and the historical sociology of religion. Important for the background of 
religious communalism, the study raises the question of what impact the 
transi- 
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tion to a religious establishment had on relations with other religious 
communities. 
In the course of my research I became convinced that my data could be better 
elucidated with reference to the sociology of religion, deriving ultimately 
from seminal ideas of Max Weber. This conviction was confirmed, not only 
in the course of my own writing, but by the appearance, while I was revising 
this book, of Arjomand's excellent Weberian treatment of Shi`ism in Iran, 
1501-1890.[5] Still, questions of approach remained. Weber has been 
interpreted variously, and the very terms he made famous, such as "sect" and 
"church," have been given different content by a host of authors; moreover, 
their application to a non-Christian milieu raises further questions. I was 
helped most by the work of Bryan Wilson and Benton Johnson, who have 
clarified key conceptions in the sociology of religion. An unresolved 
question, it seems to me, is the role of the state in defining groups as sects 
and churches, an issue upon which this book dwells. 
I also found most useful the work of two "Left Weberians," Bryan S. Turner 
and Frank Parkin. Both argue for the continued relevance of some Weber-
Jan conceptions, even to neo-Marxist debates. I found Parkin's development 
of the idea of "social closure" especially helpful as a means of understanding 
both professionalization among nineteenth-century Shi`i clerics and the 
setting up of increasing communal boundaries between Shi`i Muslims and 
other religious communities. Turner has criticized students of Muslim 
societies for stressing vertical stratification (the mosaic model of competing 
religious groups, tribes, and city quarters) often to the exclusion of analysis 
based on horizontal stratification (social classes as determined by relationship 
to the means of production).  Social stratification plays an important part in 
my analysis, including my approach to the vexed question of "sect and 
church." Although modern social classes obviously did not exist in 
preindustrial South and West Asia, orders or premodern classes (tabaqat) 
certainly did. The division of Shi`is into (1) a ruling stratum of large 
landholders, tax-farmers, and rich merchants, (2) an intermediate stratum of 
middle and smaller landholders and skilled artisans in the bazaars, and (3) the 
masses of poorer tradespeople and laborers, clearly had a great impact on 
their social networks and religious practices.[6] Still, in studying a religious 
group and its clerics, this book emphasizes the importance of vertical 
cleavages. To ignore social closure based on religion in West and South Asia 
would be 
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rather like attempting to analyze South African society without taking full 
account of race. 
For all their importance, little has been written about the history of Imami 
Shi`i communities in most of West and South Asia. The Imami, or Twelver, 
Shi`i branch of Islam, encompassing ten percent of the world's Muslims, has 
since 1500 often demonstrated a startling dynamism. Shi`is overwhelmingly 
predominate in Iran, constitute a majority in Iraq, and form large and 
important minorities in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, 
Afghanistan, and the subcontinent. 
Shi`ism in early Islamic times has attracted scholarly attention, since the 
question of the Prophet's successor comes up in any discussion of the early 
Muslim community. Although Imami Shi`ism developed over two centuries, 
its seeds lay in an early contest for leadership between the Prophet's cousin 
and son-in-law, `Ali, and the elders of Quraysh elected by an oligarchic 
council. Most early Muslims believed that after the Prophet's death his 
successor was rightfully the Caliph Abu Bakr, followed by ‘Umar and then 
by ‘Uthman. `Ali finally became the fourth caliph, but was soon assassinated, 
after which his enemies the Umayyads came to power for a century. The 
partisans (Shi`ah) of `Ali believed that he and his descendants should have 
rightfully ruled the Islamic empire. The Shi`is evolved into an alternative 
branch of Islam, often challenging the established government of the time. 
Several sectarian divisions emerged among the Shi`is, depending on which of 
`Ali's descendants they accepted as the legitimate successor to the Prophet. 
Imami Shi`is believed that eleven of `Ali's descendants succeeded him as 
rightful leaders of the Muslim community, prevented from ruling by the 
Orthodox caliphs and then the Umayyad and Abbasid monarchies. They 
particularly mourned the death of the third Imam, Husayn (d. A.D. 680), slain 
on the battlefield of Karbala in Iraq after his unsuccessful bid to oppose the 
Umayyad king Yazid. Imami Shi`is held that the last of the successors to the 
first Imam, the Twelfth Imam, vanished as a child into a mystical realm from 
which he secretly ruled the world immortally, and would return at some 
future time.[7] Imamis before 1500, largely political quietists, awaited the 
return of the Imam from his Occultation, or supernatural disappearance. 
Modern scholars have written much less about the religions; later medieval 
and early modern development, which witnessed the establishment of Shi`i-
ruled states in Iran and India. Most recently, the spectacle of the clerically 
dominated parliament and cabinet in Iran exercising a near-monopoly over 
political power has bewildered the secular West and pro- 
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voked a flurry of publications. Important questions have been raised about 
the uniqueness in the Islamic world of Imami Shi`i clerical institutions and 
ideology. Is this form of Islam more incompatible with secular government 
than are others, and does it contain a special impetus toward theocracy? Such 
a question can be answered only with historical studies of clericalism in 
Imami Shi`ism. 
Controversy over the role of that originally informal body of religious experts 
known as the "learned" (‘ulama ') has emerged in every Imami-ruled state in 
history: the Buyid, the Safavid, and the Qajar in Iran; the Qutb-Shahi in 
medieval South India; and the Nishapuri in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century North India. Sounder generalizations about the nature of the Shi`i 
religious and cultural tradition can only be attained through detailed study of 
the relationship between the government and the religious establishment in 
each of these historical Twelver Shi`i-dominated states. The present study 
treats Shi`ism in post-Mughal North India, where a Shi`i dynasty ruled the 
state of Awadh (or Oudh, in the older British orthography). This work essays 
comparisons with contemporary developments in Iraq and Iran and 
emphasizes the intricate international networks created by ulama 
immigration, pilgrimage, visitation, and travel for study. 
Several hotly debated issues have dominated recent writing on the role of the 
Shi`i ulama. Some have to do with the role of the clergy according to the 
Imamis' own scriptural corpus, whereas others focus on the historical actions 
of the ulama. Joseph Eliash has forcefully argued that the early Shi`i canonical 
collections of oral reports from the Prophet and the Imams contain no 
designation of authority from the Imams to the clergy, and that although 
relaters (sing. muhaddith) of the Imams' oral reports were charged with acting 
as informal judges in disputes between Shi`is, the community could reverse 
their decisions if they found them to be based on oral reports not widely 
accepted as authentic.[8] 
Norman Calder has recently traced the development of Imami jurisprudence 
from the tenth through the fifteenth century. He showed that after the 
Occultation of the Twelfth Imam most Shi`is held that state-related 
functions could not be carried out until his return. Eleventh-century Imamis 
largely held that only the Imam could collect and distribute religious taxes, 
lead Friday congregational prayers, and head up holy war (jihad) campaigns, 
and that in his absence such functions of the Islamic state had lapsed. But 
the scholars adhering to the rationalist Usuli school of jurisprudence 
gradually assumed the right to act for the Imam as proxies in these and other 
areas.[9] 
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The Usulis advocated the use of independent reason (ijtihad) and limited sorts 
of syllogism in deriving legal judgments and counted the consensus of 
jurisprudents a source of Islamic law. As rationalists, they trusted in the 
human intellect and Greek philosophical tools to discover the will of the 
hidden Imam. Since they insisted that laymen emulate their rulings, they 
emerged as more than legal scholars, approximating a clergy. They were 
opposed by Imami scholars of the conservative Akhbari school, who limited 
legal technique to a literal interpretation of oral reports transmitted from the 
Imams and forbade the use of rationalist tills both in theology and in 
jurisprudence. 
An issue generating controversy has been the relations of the clergy to the 
state. Some have argued that the Shi`i ulama in the modern period played an 
oppositional role to the government, emerging as popular leaders against a 
tyrannical Qajar state (1785-1925), which increasingly came under hated 
foreign domination. A corollary proposition stated that the Shi`i clergy saw 
the Qajar monarchy in Iran as illegitimate and shunned association with the 
state.[10] Willem Floor and others have recently argued that, on the contrary, 
"the revolutionary character ascribed to the Shi`i ulama in Iran has been 
greatly exaggerated, and that the ulama's perception of the socioeconomic 
and political structure of Iranian society often did not basically differ from 
that of the secular power elite."[11] 
One problem has been the "liberal" approach to Shi`i intellectual history 
adopted by scholars like Algar. The issue of the role of the ulama is not simply 
one in the history of ideas, a struggle of a few great minds abstracted from 
any social context. The clergy, a status group, came from specific social 
classes. Their views of certain kinds of law, and of their own roles as defined 
by their principles of jurisprudence, constituted a kind of "political 
knowledge," or ideology, which can only be studied fruitfully in its social 
context.[12] On the other hand, such knowledge cannot be reduced to simple 
economic interest. 
An analysis of the kinds of religious organizations a social group creates can 
be made by looking at the class background of its members and the de- 
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gree of tension that exists between the group and the prevailing values of the 
state and society. This framework, derived from the sociology of religion, 
would class a religious organization as "sectarian" where it was in great 
tension with the outside society, and as a formal religious establishment, or 
"church," where the tension was minimal. In the twentieth century the heavy 
influence over Iranian governments by Western imperialists and, later, the 
rise of a secularist state policy led some prominent members of the clerical 
establishment to distance themselves from the state.[13] But how legitimate is 
it to project this state of affairs back into the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries? 
One way to test the thesis that the Shi`i ulama, because of their scriptural 
tradition and training, generally shunned the state, which they considered 
illegitimate, is to look at Shi`i communities outside Iran. For this and other 
reasons, this book concentrates on developments in the Shi`i community of 
North India, never before studied academically in the formative period 1722-
1859. Indeed, Shi`ism in Awadh has been thrice orphaned in modern 
historiography. The eighteenth century, a period of seeming political chaos 
in the Islamic East, has not attracted the same interest as did the integral 
Mughal Empire in its heyday. As a regional phenomenon, Awadh tended to 
be passed over (except at Lucknow University) in favor of a concentration 
on events in Delhi. Its state religion, Imami Shi`ism, has been little studied 
in its Indian environment. Yet a survey of the role of its ulama can fill out 
Indian, as well as Shi`i, history. 
By looking at about 250 Shi`i clerics in North India over three generations, I 
contribute to our understanding of the social history of the region, still an 
embryonic field. The little work on the regional history of North India 
produced earlier in this century focused on the reigns of the nawabs of 
Awadh. More recently, T. Metcalf has investigated the great landholders, 
Barnett has written on government administrators, and Bayly has delineated 
the role of Hindu merchants and Muslim middle strata.[14] The history of Shi`i 
Muslim religious structures in the nineteenth century, set in the context of 
social and economic developments, can illuminate changes in the little-
studied Muslim intermediate strata from which the clerical personnel were 
largely drawn. Like Bayly's urban merchants building new commercial 
networks in the shadow of the East India Company, or like Metcalf's large 
landholders 
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carving out estates in the interior of Awadh, the Shi`i ulama formed a distinct 
social group that reacted in novel ways to social change—from the rise of 
Awadh as an independent post-Mughal state to the rise of European 
imperialism and industrial capitalism. 
The need for study of such minority but regionally important movements as 
Shi`ism in Awadh is beginning to be recognized. The standard surveys of 
Islam in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century India have narrowly focused on 
leaders of the Naqshbandi order of Sufi mystics based in Delhi: Shah 
Valiyu'llah, his son Shah ` Abdu'l-‘Aziz, and the latter's disciple Sayyid Ahmad 
of Rai Bareli. The Naqshbandi order, with its greater emphasis on strict 
legalism and on drawing sharp boundaries between Sunni Muslims and 
others, has struck many scholars, both Western and Muslim, as a precursor 
of modern Islamic reform and separatism. Yet this approach at the very least 
ignores a quantitative issue, insofar as Naqshbandis made up a tiny minority 
of North Indian Muslims throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century. Of course, even a tiny movement could be influential. But the very 
influence of this tradition among most nineteenth-century Muslims has been 
brought into question by recent research.[15] Moreover, the "orthodox" 
content of Naqshbandi Sufi practice and thought has probably been 
exaggerated. Showing a greater recognition of diversity even within the 
Islamic great tradition in the subcontinent, scholars have been investigating 
local religious movements and regional institutions beyond Delhi that do not 
so easily fit the "Naqshbandi paradigm," from Sufi leaders of the Chishti 
order in the Punjab, to the Qadiri learned and holy men of Lucknow's 
Farangi Mahall, to the reformists of the Deoband schools.[16] 
The sources for the present work on the development of Shi`ism in Awadh 
from 1722 to 1859, many never before used by a modern historian, include 
biographies and biographical dictionaries of the clergy, court chronicles, 
rulings and legal and theological works by the ulama, Iranian and European 
travelers' accounts, Awadh government documents that survived the events 
of 1857-58, and British archival records. The most important single 
repository of manuscript material open to me was the Nasiriyyah Library, a 
Shi`i-endowed institution in Lucknow, which few modern scholars have used 
at all, and none intensively. 
This book concentrates on changes in religious practices, structures and 
 
 
  
― 9 ― 
ideas. But both because the field is so unfamiliar and because some 
institutions are more fruitfully studied as they develop over time, I have 
provided a certain amount of narrative. The study is divided into four parts. 
In Part 1 the background of Imami Shi`ism in the Middle East and in South 
Asia is sketched, and the rise of a Shi`i-ruled state in Awadh examined. Part 
2 explores the social origins of the Shi`i community in North India and the 
growth of folk religious practices. 
Part 3 deals with the rise of Usuli Shi`ism in Awadh, the struggle of its 
rationalist jurisprudents to displace literalist Akhbari and mystical Sufi rivals, 
and the development of formal institutions, beginning with Friday 
congregational prayers in 1786 and culminating in the founding of a seminary 
and a judicial system in the 1840s. This process is discussed in terms of 
church-sect theory and the neo-Weberian theory of social closure. Changes 
in ulama views on the principles of jurisprudence and on their own place in 
society are analyzed as ideology. The chapters in Part 3 also treat the 
patronage system whereby high notables associated with the Awadh state 
provided funds to the ulama in return for services rendered. Emphasis is laid 
on the ways in which this patronage system changed, from a prebendal-feudal 
bestowal of tax-free villages in the eighteenth century to stipends sometimes 
ultimately deriving from interest on loans or dividends from modern 
securities. The social origins of the ulama are also explored. 
Finally, Part 4 describes and analyzes the relations between the Shi`is and 
their clerical leaders and the other major groups in Awadh: the Sunnis, the 
Hindus, and the British. This section discusses the roots of religious 
communalism on the Gangetic plain in the nineteenth century. Finally, the 
Europeans are a constant behind-the-scenes presence in this study, since the 
way in which industrial capitalism and colonialism influenced the course of 
Awadh's history and its development as a state made a fascinating and fateful 
impact also on the clergy and their institutions. British intervention in 
religious groups' relations also proved crucial for communal identity and 
violence throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. 
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THE RISE OF A SHI`I STATE IN AWADH 
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1 
 
Middle Eastern Roots of Awadh Shi`ism 
 
To provide a background to an understanding of its place in eighteenth-
century North India, Iran, and Iraq, it will be necessary to put Shi`ism in its 
historical context. But first, in order better to comprehend the role of Shi`i 
Islam in the cultural conflict between Asian societies and the imperial West, 
some general features of Middle Eastern and South Asian history since 1500 
may be recalled. Although most Westerners think of the period after 1492 as 
a time of untrammeled Christian European expansion, they focus solely upon 
the New World and the oceanic trade empires, first of the Portuguese and 
Spanish, then of the Dutch, and finally of the French and British. If one 
concentrated instead on the Afro-Asian land mass, one would be struck by 
the startling rise of prosperous, dynamic Muslim empires. True, these 
empires (with the partial exception of the Ottomans) based their power on 
land, neglecting the maritime periphery—to their ultimate peril.[1] 
From 1500 to 1600 the Ottoman Empire expanded from Anatolia into 
eastern Europe and conquered Syria (1516), Egypt (1517), and Iraq (1534). 
The Safavid Empire, based in Azerbaijan, subdued the Iranian plateau. The 
Mughal Empire reached from Kabul down into the Gangetic plain, uniting 
most of northern India. These three Muslim states, their power based 
partially on borrowed Chinese and European technical advances in artillery, 
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The Shi`i World in 1582 
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each originated in a tribal alliance, which rulers replaced in time by settled 
bureaucracies and standing armies. They provided a Pax Islamica to the 
southern regions of the Old World, which encouraged trade and security, 
allowing a population increase in sixteenth-century Anatolia and probably 
elsewhere, certainly in some Arab cities. In the sixteenth century these 
Muslim empires experienced economic advances, territorial expansion, and 
religious revival.[2] 
Ottoman Istanbul, Safavid Isfahan, and Mughal Agra dazzled travelers with 
their splendor in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their wealth, based 
primarily on agriculture and only secondarily on trade and manufactures, is 
indisputable. But their rulers and craftsmen borrowed technology from 
Europe instead of innovating, so that they gave the world few new 
developments in weaponry or industry. From at least the fifteenth century, 
Europe produced more made goods, including, for instance, silk textiles, 
whereas the Middle East and South Asia sent raw materials (raw silk, spices 
such as pepper) to Europe. But the western European edge in mechanical 
inventiveness and the ability to accumulate capital only manifested itself with 
full force after 1760. Until the late eighteenth century, manufacturing and 
agricultural productivity, and transportation costs and speed, did not improve 
dramatically in Europe. 
The political and economic flowering of the three sixteenth-century Muslim 
empires in South and Southwest Asia had a religious impact. The Ottomans 
promoted the Hanafi rite of Sunni Islam as their state religion, developing a 
highly institutionalized and bureaucratic religious establishment. The 
Safavids and their Shi`i Turkoman followers from Anatolia made Twelver 
Shi`ism the religion of state and heavy-handedly imposed it on Sunni Iran. 
They brought in Arab Shi`i clerics from southern Lebanon and southern Iraq 
to man the fledgling religious institution and relied also on notable clerical 
families within Iran who embraced Shi`ism. The Mughals, originating in 
largely Turkish-speaking Central Asia, promoted Hanafi Sunnism. Religious 
ideology and a corps of ulama organized around institutions useful to the 
state played an important political role in each of the three Muslim empires. 
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Of these religious ideologies, Twelver Shi`ism is the least known. Twelver 
Shi`is dwelt in each of the empires. Under the Ottomans, they lived in Jabal 
‘Amil (now in Lebanon) and in Iraq. In the Ottoman Arab lands the Twelvers 
maintained a form of their religion that might be called sectarian, in that they 
experienced a high degree of friction with the state and with the majority 
Sunni society around them. They also avoided the development of a great 
degree of religious organization and structure. Twelver Shi`is, originally a 
minority community in Iran, came to form a majority of Iranians under the 
Safavids, where they elaborated a formal religious establishment, which for 
the most part cooperated with the Shi`i state. Organized Safavid Shi`ism, 
with its professional clerics and its legitimation of the state, differed starkly 
from the conservative creed held in most Arab Shi`i communities. 
In South Asia, Twelver Shi`ism spread on two levels. Iranian merchants and 
immigrants promoted it among Muslim notables in southern India, so that 
Shi`i dynasties came to power in Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, and Golconda. 
Likewise, a Shi`i dynasty ruled briefly in sixteenth-century Kashmir. Urban 
tradespeople and some peasants also created their own form of Twelver 
Shi`ism, based especially on mourning rites for the Prophet's martyred 
grandson, Husayn. The rise of Sunni Mughal power circumscribed the south 
Indian Shi`i states and deprived Shi`is in northern India of governmental 
protection. The Sunni Mughal Empire gradually absorbed the Shi`i-ruled 
polities of the south into itself, disestablishing the rival branch of Islam in 
the subcontinent. 
Early Shi`ism 
Twelver Shi`i jurisprudence probably began in the eighth century A.D., when 
men close to the Imams began arbitrating disputes within their 
communities.[3] Gradually a body of men grew up who had memorized the 
oral reports attributed to Muhammad and to the Imams. These believers 
likewise studied the legal reasoning employed by the sixth Imam, Ja`far as-
Sadiq (d. A.D. 765). Roy Mottahedeh has pointed out that the "learned," or 
ulama, included not only professional religious officials who taught or gave 
legal judgments, but also part-time scholars and even hobbyists.[4] Out-of-
power Shi`is were even more likely to have "informal," part-time ulama than 
the dominant groups who evolved into the Sunnis. Partisans of the Imams 
endured the hostile rule of the Umayyads until the middle of the eighth 
century A.D. 
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when a Shi`i-tinged revolution brought the Abbasids to power. The Abba-
sids, however, also refused to recognize the right of the Imams to rule, and 
often kept them under house arrest as dangerous rivals. 
The events following the death of the eleventh Imam, Hasan al-‘Askari, in 
Abbasid Iraq in A.D. 873 or 874, are obscure and yet of great importance for 
the history of Twelver Shi`ism. Several schisms occurred, with some groups 
saying that Imam Hasan al-‘Askari had left no heir. Others, especially wealthy 
Shi`is close to the Abbasid court, proclaimed that the Imam had had a small 
son, who supernaturally disappeared and who would one day return to 
restore the world to justice. A series of agents (wakils) arose to lead the 
Twelvers, saying that they transmitted messages from the hidden child-
Imam. After the death of the last special agent, Imami Shi`is found 
themselves cut off from any direct charismatic authority. Yet during the time 
of the agents a saying attributed to the hidden Twelfth Imam began to 
circulate, declaring that men who related oral reports from the Imams had 
the deputyship (niyabah) of the Imams.[5] Obviously, the relaters (muhaddithun) 
of Imami oral reports were making a claim to leadership of the community 
in the wake of the Imam's disappearance. They did not assert as close a 
relationship to the Imams as did the four agents, since their only link to the 
Imams was through the Imami sayings as this body of believers had 
memorized and transmitted them. 
The end of the line of Imams came as a powerful shock to the Twelver 
community. Early Shi`i thinkers living after the Occultation, or 
disappearance, of the Imam felt leaderless. In the absence of the infallible 
Imam, they believed that no one could conduct Friday congregational 
prayers, lead believers in an aggressive holy war (jihad), or collect certain types 
of land taxes (kharaj).[6] In short, they felt a profound alienation from the 
world and generally adopted a quietist political policy. 
Under the Shi`i Buyid dynasty (A.D. 932-1055) in Iraq and Iran, Twelver 
scholars freely collected and studied the oral reports from the Imams. They 
came from the old Shi`i centers of Kufa and Qumm to the Buyid capital of 
Baghdad. In Baghdad, some wealthy Shi`i intellectuals began employing the 
cosmopolitan tools of Greek rationalism in Imami theology. But most Shi`i 
scholars rejected rationalism in favor of simply quoting the sayings of the 
Imams as their authority. In this period, the rationalist theologians began to 
be called Usulis, whereas those rejecting human reasoning in favor of a 
literalist 
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adherence to the words of the Imams became known as Akhbaris. Akhbaris 
were almost certainly the great majority. At that time, it is important to note, 
most Shi`i scholars agreed on the invalidity of such Greek rationalist tools as 
syllogism in deriving legal judgments. The dispute centered on their use in 
theology.[7] 
The more cosmopolitan, rationalist theologians often had good relations with 
the Buyid state. Although they considered secular governments to be 
ultimately unjust (ja'ir), Shi`i scholars sometimes felt that there was no 
objection to working fox the state so long as one's principles were not 
compromised.[8] The victory of the Saljuq Sunni Turks over the Shi`i Buyids 
in the middle of the eleventh century scattered Shi`i scholars for a time, 
denied them patronage, and forced them into a low profile. Gradually, 
however, Shi`i communities under the Saljuqs reorganized themselves and 
placed considerable wealth in the hands of their ulama for religious 
institutions. 
The Mongol conquest of Iran and Iraq two centuries later freed Twelvers in 
many ways from the restrictions placed upon them by the strongly Sunni 
Saljuqs. In the second half of the thirteenth century, some wealthy Shi`i 
scholars, who enjoyed the patronage of the Mongols and based themselves 
in the Iraqi trading center of al-Hillah, began applying the tools of Greek 
rationalism to law, rather than solely to theology. This probably reflected the 
need of dynamic Twelver communities, such as that of al-Hillah in the 
Mongol era, for a more flexible law. From this period the rationalist Usulis 
and the strict-constructionist Akhbaris constituted rival schools of 
jurisprudence. 
The conflict between the Akhbaris and the rationalist Usuli jurisprudents 
centered on two sets of issues. The first concerned the sources of law, with 
the Akhbaris restricting them to the Qur'an and oral reports (akhbar) from 
the Prophet and the Imams. The rationalists saw the consensus of the 
jurisprudents as another source of legal judgment, as they did the 
independent reasoning (ijtihad) of the jurist. The Usulis divided all Shi`is into 
formally trained jurisprudents (mujtahids) and laymen, stipulating that the 
ordinary believers must emulate the mujtahids in matters of subsidiary 
religious laws. 
The rationalists asserted that the mujtahids, as general representatives of the 
Hidden Imam, could substitute for him in performing such tasks as giving 
legal judgments, implementing rulings, collecting and distributing alms (zakat 
and khums), mandating defensive holy war, and leading Friday congregational 
prayers. Although Akhbaris allowed the relater of oral reports from the 
Imams to perform judicial functions, they often disallowed some or all of the 
other functions in the absence of an infallible Imam. Akhbaris further re- 
 
― 19 ― 
jected any division of believers into laymen and mujtahid-exemplars, holding 
that all Shi`is must emulate the Twelve Imams. In practice, of course, 
Akhbaris also made interpretations. 
Safavid Iran: Shi`ism, State, and Society 
During the Safavid period the Usuli school, associated with the ruling 
establishment, burgeoned. In 1501 Shah Isma`il, chief of the militant Safavi 
Sufi order, became Shah of Iran with the aid of Turkish-speaking Shi`i 
tribesmen from Anatolia. The new rulers imposed Twelver Shi`ism on Iran, 
ideologically reinforcing their territorial victory. They required that 
imprecations be ritually pronounced upon caliphs holy to Sunnis, burned 
Sunni mosques, and expropriated the land of Sunnis. Shi`i folk practices 
spread in Iran, such as the feast of the killing of Umayyad commander ‘Umar 
b. Sacd, an enemy of Imam Husayn. Meetings (rawzah-khvani) for the 
recitation of the sufferings and death of Imam Husayn began to be held. 
Religious processions began to be taken out during the mourning month of 
Muharram, commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn on the tenth day 
(`Ashura’).[9] 
From the reign of Shah Tahmasp (1533-76), the second Safavid monarch, a 
corps of Shi`i ulama attracted from southern Lebanon and Iraq began making 
extensive changes in the practice of Twelver Shi`ism which reflected the 
change in the religion's status from persecuted minority to reigning 
orthodoxy. The immigrant Arab Twelver clerics went far beyond the Hilli 
school, or the simple recognition of independent legal reasoning in 
jurisprudence. They permitted the central functions of the state to be 
undertaken by someone other than a divinely appointed Imam, making 
themselves general proxies for the Imam and legitimizing the Shi`i Safavid 
regime. They also moved toward the creation of a Shi`i religious hierarchy, 
staffed largely by Arabs and based mostly on the newly created offices of 
Shi`i prayer leader and Shaykhu'l-Islam (jurisconsult). Safavid Usulism 
became the ideology of the Arab immigrant ulama within Iran, who wanted 
upward mobility and the implementation of a new vision of Imami Shi`ism 
in cooperation with the Safavid monarchy—an activist, dominating Twelver 
Shi`ism rather than the quietist, sectarian version of the religion that had 
largely predominated before 1500.[10] 
Prominent among these innovators was Shaykh ` Ali al-Karaki (d. 1534), from 
Jabal ‘Amil.[11] In the first year of Shah Tahmasp's reign al-Karaki 
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ordered that a Shi`i prayer leader be appointed in every town and village. 
Since many Shi`i ulama held Friday congregational prayers invalid in the 
absence of the Twelfth Imam, this move dismayed conservatives, especially 
Arab Shi`is who still for the most part labored under Sunni rule. But al-Karaki 
wished to create a religious institution under his own authority. The Safavids 
cooperated in the endeavor, since Shi`i Friday prayer leaders throughout Iran 
said blessings on the Shi`i monarchs in the Friday afternoon sermon. Al-
Karaki also allowed the collection of land tax (kharaj) in the Imam's absence, 
and wrote instructions for Safavid tax collectors. In so doing he opened up a 
source of revenue for the fledgling Twelver state. He ordered that Shi`is stop 
dissimulating (taqiyyah) their faith out of fear of Sunnis, since they now had 
government protection, and instituted the public cursing of the first two 
Sunni caliphs on a country-wide scale. 
Two groups opposed these institutional innovations. Within Iran, Ar-jomand 
has demonstrated, the old Iranian families in charge of religious institutions 
such as judgeships and pious endowment supervision, many of whom 
embraced Shi`ism, resented the immigrant Arab clerics.[12] Moreover, the 
Shi`is of the Arab world found many of al-Karaki's innovations inappropriate 
to their own situation. Typical of the Arab Shi`is outside Iran (until the 
sixteenth century probably the majority of Twelvers) was Shaykh Ibrahim al-
Qatifi.[13] A former student turned enemy of al-Karaki, he cautiously accepted 
the necessity of independent legal reasoning (ijtihad) and so could be 
categorized as an Usuli. But al-Qatifi, from the Sunni-dominated Persian 
Gulf, advocated a conservative Usulism that would not exacerbate Sunni 
persecution of Shi`is and clung to the conservative political culture of 
minority Shi`ism. He rejected the legitimacy of holding Friday prayers during 
the absence of the Imam of collecting kharaj land taxes, and of associating 
with rulers. After 1530 the Sunni Ottomans conquered Iraq, including the 
Shi`i shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf where al-Qatifi and many other Arab 
Twelvers were based. Thereafter the shrine dries remained centers of a more 
cautious, conservative kind of Shi`ism similar to that advocated by al-Qatifi. 
In Iran, the rationalist, establishmentarian Usulism of al-Karaki largely won 
out. Isfahan's Imarn-Jum`ahs (Friday congregational prayer leaders) from 
Shaykh `Abdu'l-`Ali al-Karaki on adhered for the most part to Usulism, at 
least until the late seventeenth century. The mujtahids gained further power 
through becoming wealthy supervisors of pious endowment properties in the 
seventeenth century, and through revenue-free grants of land made to them 
by the Safavid shahs.[14] The Safavid capital, Isfahan, became the cyno- 
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sure of the Shi`i clerisy, a center of learning with 48 colleges and 162 
mosques, and a place where important career contacts could be made.[15] 
The clergy became so powerful that a few openly preached the necessity for 
the ruler to be not only a Sayyid but also a mujtahid, or senior jurispru-dent 
trained in Twelver law. This stance disputed the claim of the Safavids, laymen 
given often to loose morals, though the shahs asserted their descent from the 
Prophet. The dominant Shi`i view supported the legitimacy of Safavid rule 
against clerical pretenders.[16] Not everyone trusted the ulama, as a 
seventeenth-century folk saying from Isfahan testifies: "Keep a wary eye in 
front of you for a woman, behind you for a mule, and from every direction 
for a mulla."[17] 
Most of the clergy neither enjoyed great wealth nor refused to associate with 
the government, since they believed it legitimate to work for the state 
whenever they would otherwise fear for their lives or whenever they felt they 
could thereby help the Shi`i community. Clerical support for the Safavids led 
the Shi`i monarchs often to persecute the enemies of the ulama, particularly 
the leaders of mystical Sufi orders, who competed with them for the spiritual 
allegiance of the masses. Since most Sufis were also Sunnis, and had a form 
of mass organization outside both the Safavid state and the Shi`i religious 
establishment, Usuli ulama saw them as a threat.[18] 
The main opposition to the Usuli school came from Akhbari revivalism. 
Akhbarism, as was noted above, rejected the legitimacy of independent legal 
reasoning and denied the need of laypersons to emulate mujtahids. A major 
intellectual figure in the revival of this strict-constructionist approach to 
Shi`ism, Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d. 1624), attacked the mujtahids from 
his base in Medina, in the Arab world.[19] Astarabadi's reformulation of 
conservative Shi`i jurisprudence found great acclaim in the shrine cities of 
Iraq and, as Arjomand demonstrated, in Iran among ethnically Iranian 
religious officials in competition with the ethnically Arab mujtahids. 
Although Usulism probably predominated in the Safavid capital of Isfahan, 
the situation outside Isfahan in the late seventeenth century is harder to 
gauge. In some provincial centers Akhbaris remained influential. The Imam-
Jum`ah and Shaykhu'l-Islam of Qumm under Sulayman Shah (1667-94), 
Muhammad Tahir, a committed Akhbari brought up in Najaf, caused a row 
with the court by censuring the monarch's morals. Al-Hurr al-‘Amili (d. 1708 
or 1709) immigrated to Mashhad from Syria, becoming Shaykhu'l-Islam. 
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A staunch Akhbari, he disallowed the use of reason and wrote against 
rationalist theology. The family of the Akhbari Nicmatu'llah Jaza'iri (d. 1701) 
settled in the small Iranian town of Shushtar, in Khuzistan, as Akhbari prayer 
leaders.[20] Southwestern Iran was a major center of Akhbarism. As was 
noted, the Akhbari school had found favor with many ulama in the shrine 
cities of Iraq as well. 
The Safavid conquest of Iran and promulgation of Twelver Shi`ism 
represented the most startling cultural revolution in the Islamic world for 
centuries. Neither the Ottoman Turks nor the Mughal Timurids did nearly 
as much to change the religious beliefs of the people they ruled. The rise of 
Twelver Shi`ism is comparable in scope—though emphatically not in 
content—to the Protestant Reformation in Europe. In both Protestantism 
and Safavid Shi`ism, regional rulers' desire for political autonomy coincided 
with the wish of a clerically led group, branded heretics, to establish new 
religious institutions. Bloody religious and political wars ensued, dividing a 
cultural area (western Europe, southwest Asia) that had previously been 
religiously more uniform. 
The Deccan Shi`i States 
Indian Ocean trade routes linked the Persian Gulf with southern India, 
encouraging a migration of people and ideas between the two areas. Iranian 
notables, administrators, military men, and literati flooded into southern 
India, or the Deccan, during the Mongol invasions of Iran in the thirteenth 
century, and thereafter. Especially after the Safavid victory, these Iranian 
elites often adopted Shi`ism. Diplomatically and in its elite culture southern 
India became a dependency of Iran in the sixteenth century. Iranian notables 
carried with them their new conviction in Usuli Shi`ism, providing patronage 
for Friday congregational prayer mosques and other Usuli Twelver 
institutions. 
The longest-lasting of the Shi`i-ruled states in southern India, the Qutb-Shahi 
(1512-1687), began with the political rise in Golconda of a Turkoman 
adventurer from Hamadan, Iran, named Sultan-Quli Qutbu'd-Din. The 
rulers in his line gave extensive patronage to Shi`i ulama and built mosques, 
buildings (`ashur-khanah) for the commemoration of Imam Husayn's 
martyrdom, seminaries, and Shi`i burial grounds. They had the Friday prayer 
sermons said in the name of the Twelve Imams and of the Safavids. Iranians 
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immigrated in large numbers, many as merchants attracted by the diamond 
trade, and some local adoption of Shi`ism occurred. Twelver ulama of the 
Usuli school predominated in Golconda. In 1636 the Mughal emperor, Shah 
Jahan, forced the Qutb-Shahis to cease their Shi`i forms in the Friday 
congregational prayer sermons, including the mention of the Safavids. In 
1687 the capital of Hyderabad fell to the Sunni Mughals, who extinguished 
Shi`i Qutb-Shahi rule.[21] 
The role of emigrant Shi`i scholars from Iran in spreading Twelver ideas in 
sixteenth-century southern India is exemplified by Shah Tahir Isma`ili From 
a prominent Isma`ili family in Iran, he became a Twelver and later emigrated 
for political reasons to the domains of Burhan Nizam Shah (1508-53) in 
Ahmadnagar, southern India. There he convinced the monarch to become a 
Twelver Shi`i and became a minister in his government. Shi`ism remained 
influential in elite culture for several generations thereafter. The Ahmadnagar 
Nizam Shahs lost their independence when Akbar made them pay tribute, 
and Shah Jahan formally absorbed the area into the Mughal Empire in 
1633.[22] 
The southwestern Deccani kingdom of Bijapur also experienced Shi`i rule 
and Iranian influence in the sixteenth century, 1502-34 and 1558-83, under 
the `Adil Shahi dynasty. Shi`i Iranian merchants plied the horse trade from 
the Persian Gulf to Bijapur, and Shi`i notables achieved high office there. 
Yusuf `Adil Shah (1489-1510), an Ottoman Turkish exile with tics to the 
Safavid Isma`il, proclaimed Shi`ism the state religion in Bijapur in 1502, on 
hearing of the Safavid victory. This proclamation encouraged even more 
Iranians to immigrate, and the `Adil Shahis employed them as administrators 
or military men. The Shi`i monarchs hired three hundred Iranians to curse 
the first three caliphs. 
The `Adil Shahis recognized the Safavids as their ultimate sovereigns, though 
given their distance from Iran, this recognition remained a mere formality. 
Shi`i ulama and notables often came into violent conflict with Sunnis, 
including local Sufi leaders, and Sunni-Shi`i riots became endemic during the 
month of Muharram when Shi`is cursed the caliphs. From 1583 local Sunni 
elites came back into power. The Mughal emperor, Shah Jahan, com- 
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pelled the Bijapuris to pay tribute to him from 1636, and Awrangzib annexed 
Bijapur into the Mughal Empire in 1686.[23] 
Although the sixteenth might be rightly called the Twelver century in the 
Indo-Iranian cultural sphere, Shi`is won only limited and temporary victories 
outside Iran. Only in Iran did Shi`i rulers succeed in making their creed into 
a mass religion, by a combination of brutal persecution, the lavishing of 
wealth on Twelver institutions, and their appeal to a widespread folk cult of 
the Prophet's family. Southern India's population, however, clung to its 
Hinduism, and most Sunni notable families stubbornly resisted the call to 
curse the caliphs. The Deccani Shi`i ruling classes, with their Persian literary 
inclinations and their threnodies for the Imams in the new language of Urdu, 
remained insulated from the Dravidian, Hindu masses. The Mughal Timurid 
emperors gradually reduced the Shi`i states of the south to vassals of a Sunni 
emperor, then finally they absorbed those territories and dethroned the Shi`i 
monarchs. 
Shi`ism in Northern India under the Mughals 
Twelver Shi`ism in northern India under the Mughals, sometimes barely 
tolerated and at others fiercely persecuted. has left far fewer traces in the 
chronicles than it did in the south.[24] The importance of Iranian immigrants 
in spreading Safavid-style Twelver Shi`ism seems indisputable, although hard 
to trace except at the very top of the social hierarchy. Regions of northern 
India, particularly Kashmir, had more Shi`is than others. The popular classes 
developed creative ways of mourning the wronged Family of the Prophet, 
although the Mughals sometimes suppressed such displays of proto-Shi`i 
piety. 
The Mughal, or Timurid, dynasty was begun by Babur (d. 1530), a Chaghatai 
Turk who originally sought to establish his own state in his native central 
Asia. Blocked in central Asia by the Uzbeks, he established himself in Kabul 
and invaded India from this base in Afghanistan. His son Humayun, expelled 
from India by the Afghan Suri rulers, took refuge in Safavid Iran. There 
Humayun gained Safavid help in reestablishing his Indian domains, at the 
price of pretending to embrace Shi`ism, for which he never showed any 
actual enthusiasm. Given the great surpluses expropriated by ruling elites in 
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the agrarian bureaucracies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had 
Humayun actually adopted Shi`ism he could have done much to spread it in 
northern India. Humayun's son Akbar (1556-1605) put the Mughal Empire 
on a sound footing, making coalitions with regional Hindu elites and 
adopting a syncretic religion of his own invention, which combined elements 
of Islam, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism. Akbar tolerated but did not 
promote Twelver Shi`ism, appointing the renowned Nuru'llah Shushtari, a 
Shi`i cleric from Iran, chief judge (qazi) of Lahore. Tolerance of Shi`ism in 
Mughal India often fluctuated according to relations with Iran. The 
sixteenth-century Mughal-Safavid alliance gave way in the seventeenth to 
disputes over Qandahar, leading to restrictions on Shi`is in India.[25] 
The only instance of state adoption of Shi`ism in northern India occurred in 
Kashmir, where the Shi`i Chak ruling house (1561-89) came briefly to power. 
Shi`ism came to Kashmir from Iran, and was embraced by some Sayyids and 
by the Chak clan. Members of the Nurbakhshiyyah Sufi order came to 
Kashmir from Iran in the years just before the Safavid victory in Azerbaijan. 
With the rise of Shi`i power in Iran, the pro-Shi`i Nurbakhshis formally 
became Twelvers. Shi`i Chak rule caused Sunni-Shi`i clashes in Kashmir, 
however, which the Mughal Akbar made a pretext to annex the region into 
his empire. A minority Shi`i community continued to exist in Kashmir, as did 
Sunni-Shi`i violence. Firishtah noted continuing Shi`i influence in the 
Kashmiri military.[26] 
The European traveler Manucci wrote that Akbar initiated a deliberate policy 
of receiving even Shi`i Iranians who fell from political favor under the 
Safavids and fled to India. He said that Akbar and his successors gave these 
political refugees official grants (mansabdari) and sent them to the province of 
Kashmir, where they led a comfortable life. When one of them died, rather 
than repatriating his stipend to the central government, the Iranian Shi`i 
political refugees divided it up among the survivors. Ultimately Awrangzib 
put a stop to this "inheritance" of the mansabdari .[27] Since Kashmir had been 
ruled by the Shi`i Chak dynasty and had a minority Shi`i population, it was a 
logical place for the Mughals to send the Iranian refugees of whom they 
hoped to make political use. The wealth and standing of this group probably 
helped Shi`ism in Kashmir and the neighboring Punjab. 
Rizvi has quoted a central Asian traveler's account of Muharram in Lahore 
around 1635, which reported that the first five days of the month were given 
over to merrymaking to celebrate the happy portions of the Imams' lives, 
with male and female singers and dancers giving frequent perform- 
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ances. From the sixth through the tenth of the month believers mourned, 
and Shi`is cursed the enemies of the Imams. On the tenth of Muharram itself, 
Shi`is and Hindus stayed at home, but rival Sunni groups took out 
processions with placards, often, clashing violently.[28] 
The French traveler Tavernier noted the many Iranian nobles and military 
men in the service of the Sunni Mughals, comparing their numbers to those 
in Bijapur, which had been Shi`i-ruled. He wrote of these Iranian social 
climbers: 
It is true that although they regarded the Sunnis with horror they, nevertheless 
follow, in outward show, the religion of the monarch, believing that to make 
or secure their fortune they might conceal their true belief, and that it sufficed 
for them to cherish it in their hearts . . . . Although [Awrangzib] had, as I 
have said, numerous Persians in his service, he did not allow them to 
celebrate the festival of Hosen and Hosein, sons of All.[29] 
Other travelers in the late seventeenth century also remark the presence of 
Muharram processions of mourning for the Imam Husayn in southern India, 
and their forbidden character in Awrangzib's northern India.[30] In 1668, 
Awrangzib prohibited such mourning processions, during which urban 
groups paraded decorated wood or bamboo replicas of the Imam's tomb, on 
the grounds that the custom had resulted in a major riot in Burhanpur among 
rival groups of mourners.[31] 
Not only military adventurers and political refugees went to India from Iran. 
At least two members of the preeminent clerical family in seventeenth-
century Isfahan, the Majlisis, emigrated to Awrangzib's India. A grandson of 
Muhammad Taqi Majlisi, Aqa Muhammad Sacid Mazandarani, emerged as a 
favored court poet in Delhi, with the pen name "Ashraf."[32] His brother, Aqa 
Hasan `Ali, followed in his footsteps. For sons of Shi`i ulama to succeed 
socially in the strongly Sunni atmosphere of the Mughal court they had to 
concentrate on literary or medical pursuits, which they did with some success. 
Shi`ism thereforc had a furtive character in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Mughal India, which makes its culture difficult to recover. Shi`ism 
spread to a slight extent among the ordinary folk, probably from Iran and by 
way of transplanted Iranian notables and Iranian long-distance merchants. 
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Most Shi`is in northern India, Akhbaris, opposed the holding of Friday 
congregational prayers in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. A minority in 
Multan and Sindh embraced Twelver Shi`ism after 1500, and the eighteenth-
century Sunni Afghan domination of these areas and Kashmir forced many 
Shi`is to migrate southward to Delhi or Awadh. Late in the seventeenth 
century, after Awrangzib's conquest of Shi`i-ruled Hyderabad, Deccani Shi`is 
came north to join Mughal service, spreading their rituals in Delhi.[33] 
Eighteenth-Century Political Transitions and Their Effect on Shi`ism 
In the eighteenth century the three great Islamic empires that had straddled 
southern and western Asia and North Africa suffered political reversals both 
externally and internally. Local tribal and peasant groups, suffering from high 
taxation, pursued successful rebellions against the centralized empires and 
their standing armies, leading to a decline of bureaucracy in favor of tribal 
power based on mobility, guerrilla tactics, and hand-held firearms Empires 
gave way to decentralization, to be replaced by provincial powers. As will be 
discussed later, the Mughal Empire declined at the center and regional 
successor states emerged. As the century wore on, the political influence of 
the British East India Company grew enormously as it swallowed up Bengal 
and other territories. 
The Safavids fell to invading Afghan Sunni tribal armies in 1722, and the 
Persian Gulf gradually became a British lake. Only one of the three empires, 
the Ottoman, survived, partially because the European powers could not 
agree among themselves how to divide it up. Still, the Ottomans suffered loss 
of control over outlying parts of the empire, such as Egypt and Iraq, with 
slave-soldier (mamluk) local regimes taking effective power. These political 
and economic changes strongly influenced the fortunes of Imami Shi`ism, 
disestablishing or crippling clerical institutions in Iran for decades, giving 
greater autonomy to the Shi`i shrine cities in southern Iraq under the weak 
Mamluks, and providing an opportunity for Shi`i governors in Bengal and 
Awadh to make a bid for regional independence from the Mughals in India. 
Moreover, Shi`i ideological developments in Iraq and Iran had a fateful 
impact on north Indian Shi`ism later in the eighteenth century. 
The political and financial support that the Safavids gave Shi`ism and its 
institutions tied the fortunes of the religion to those of the dynasty. Shah 
Sultan Husayn (1694-1722) presided over the dissolution of the Safavid 
Empire. The Shah's secular policies led to weakness, and only in the religious 
sphere did he take forceful action, giving free reign to the bigotry of clerics 
such as Shaykhu'l-Islam Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1699). The last Safavid 
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ordered forced conversions of Jews and Zoroastrians, the expulsion of 
thousands of Hindu merchants from Isfahan, and the persecution of Sunni 
tribal groups, such as the Kurds. Changes in provincial administration and 
neglect of the military made Iran vulnerable to Baluchi tribal raids and 
incursions by the tribal Ghilzay Afghans, who seized Qandahar in 1709. An 
Afghan army of twenty thousand took Kirman in 1721 and marched on to 
Isfahan, which fell, after a long and terrible siege, to the Ghilzays in 1722. 
Iran also began to feel military pressure from the Russia of Peter the Great, 
and from the Ottomans. 
Tahmasp II, a Safavid aspirant to the throne now occupied by the Afghans, 
found a military strategist to support him in Nadir Afshar. But once Nadir 
defeated the Afghans, he claimed the throne for himself in 1736. Nadir's 
military policies barked back to those of Timur ("Tamerlane") or the early 
Safavids, in that he put together a coalition of tribal Afghan and Qizilbash 
armies instead of depending on a bureaucratically ordered standing army. The 
tribal forces. pastoralists, could only be paid in booty and pasturage, which 
required constant movement and conquest. Nadir invaded Iraq twice, in the 
early 1730s and the early 1740s, meeting defeat at the hands of the Ottomans 
both times, and in the late 1730s undertook a long campaign to India, where 
he conquered Lahore and Delhi and made the Mughal emperor his vassal for 
a time. But tribal factionalism between the Sunni Afghan and the Shi`i 
Qizilbash wings of his army led to Nadir Shah's assassination in 1747. 
Regional contests for power divided for a decade and a half the area that had 
been Safavid Iran, with the Shiraz-based Zands emerging victorious west of 
Khurasan. Karim Khan Zand's pragmatic rule (1763-79) reunited Iran and 
aimed at capturing revived Persian Gulf trade by conquering Basra, Ottoman 
Iraq's port city. Upon Karim Khan Zand's death the Qajar tribe gained 
political preeminence, creating a new Shi`i state, which ruled throughout the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth. 
Qajar. Iran (1785-1925), unlike Mughal India or the Ottoman Empire, 
regained central-government control by the end of the eighteenth century 
over most of the territories held in the seventeenth. The Zands and Qajars 
benefited from the preoccupation of the Afghans with the Punjab, and of 
the British with Bengal, so that two centrifugal forces besetting the Mughals 
were deflected from Iran. But Iran's economy was disrupted for much of the 
period 1722-97, and growing Russian and British economic and military 
power chipped away at its territories and the Qajars diplomatic independence 
throughout the nineteetnth century.[34] 
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These political trends made a major impact upon the Shi`i ulama.[35] Under 
the last Safavid ruler, Shah Sultan Husayn, the high ulama favoring the 
rationalist Usuli school of jurisprudence, enjoyed great influence, position, 
and wealth. But the Afghan conquest of Isfahan in 1722 displaced hundreds 
of scholarly families and delivered a mortal blow to the dynasty that had 
assured their fortunes. The Sunni Ghilzays and Nadir Shah expropriated the 
endowments supporting the clergy, leading to a relative impoverishment and 
a decline in the influence of this group. During the second quarter of the 
eighteenth century great numbers of Shi`i clergymen and merchants fled Iran 
for the shrine cities of Ottoman Iraq, adding a new ethnic component to the 
Arab quarters of these cities. 
Isfahan, although its population may have declined from 250,000 to only 
50,000, remained one of Iran's larger cities and a center of rationalism and 
mysticism throughout this period, exercising a countervailing influence in 
those directions. Iranian centers of Usulism remained, though we simply do 
not know much about intellectual currents in Shiraz, Tabriz, and other 
centers in this period. The frequent description of the eighteenth century as 
one of Akhbari dominance appears to derive mainly from the experience of 
Isfahani emigrants to largely Akhbari Iraq, rather than from actual Akhbari 
hegemony over most major Iranian centers (though Kirman, Qumm, and 
Khuzistan appear to have favored Akhbarism). 
The Shi`i ulama of Iran adopted varying strategies to deal with the 
vicissitudes that struck their status group in the eighteenth century. These 
included emigration to the Iraqi shrine cities, where a constant stream of 
pilgrims and long-distance merchants provided them with a livelihood as 
legal advisers and supervisors of charitable contributions and pious 
endowments. Some managed to retain religious office in a declining Isfahan; 
others intermarried with rich merchants or well-off artisans when possible. 
With the decline of court patronage for scholars and the expropriation of 
endowments, more were probably forced into low-status trades—becoming 
cotton or silk weavers, smiths, dyers, bleachers, and hat makers—than would 
normally have been the case. Many settled in Iran's small towns and large 
villages, where local tribal leaders came into prominence with the decline of 
central government. The smaller centers were less likely to attract marauding 
invaders, prospering as local trade depots even as some large cities declined. 
Members of the Majlisi family colonized high religious office in several 
provincial cities and small towns. Finally, some sought employment in Bengal 
(governed 
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by a Shi`i family from 1740 to 1757) as literary men, civil servants, and 
physicians.[36] 
In this period one often sees mullas, clerics, tying themselves to the richer 
classes of the bazaar, seeking new forms of economic security when their 
links to the court were so disrupted from 1722 to the rise of the Zands. Their 
bazaar links and the relative political independence this fostered were to 
prove crucial to the growth of ulama power in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.[37] 
Crucial developments also occurred in Iraq during the eighteenth century. 
The Ottoman governor, Hasan Pasha, governed Iraq firmly (1702-24), but 
Iraq suffered disruptive Iranian incursions under Nadir Shah during Ahmad 
Pasha's governorship. Thereafter Sulayman Abu Laylah Pasha (1750-62) 
created a new, regionally based Mamluk state, which continued under his 
slave-ruler successors until the reassertion of direct Ottoman rule in 1831. 
The Mamluk state gained independence in all but name.[38] 
The Iraqi shrine cities laboring under Sunni Ottoman rule, had remained 
centers of the more conservative Akhbari school. With the collapse of Shi`i 
rule in Iran and the anticlericalism of the new rulers, the ulama in any case 
lost much of their previous opportunity for an active social role. The 
congregation of hundreds of Iranian clerical families in the Akhbari 
strongholds brought them under the conservative influence of that school. 
The decline of the great Shi`i clerical centers in Iran lent the shrine cities even 
more glamour in the rest of the Shi`i world, and Nadir Shah had won from 
the Ottomans pledges not to tax the pilgrims who frequented them. The 
pilgrimage trade brought wealth into Iraq from Iran and India, and the 
Mamluks granted the shrine cities much relative autonomy in view of the 
dangers of another Iranian invasion should the Shi`is there feel mistreated. 
All this gave the Shi`i ulama based in Najaf, Karbala, Kazimayn, and Samarra 
great wealth, power, and independence late in the eighteenth century. 
Political decentralization and realignments had a differential impact upon 
Shi`ism in various regions of the Middle East. In Iran, the fall of the Safavids 
helped disestablish the Shi`i ulama, reducing them to comparative 
powerlessness and poverty. In Iraq, however, the influx of clerical families 
fleeing Nadir Shah, Iranian attempts to annex the shrine cities, continued pil- 
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grimage and trade, and the emergence of a regional Mamluk regime all 
contributed to the greater autonomy and wealth of the Shi`i ulama. 
Neo-Akhbari Dominance, 1722-1763, in Iraq 
Against a backdrop of geographical and class dislocation, the ulama of the 
eighteenth century fought out a decisive battle on the interpretation of 
Shi`ism.[39] The old struggle between the Usulis and the Akhbaris revived in 
a new guise. The Akhbarism of the eighteenth century was less conservative 
than pre-Safavid Akhbarism had been, most Akhbaris in Iran and Iraq having 
accepted the validity of, for instance, Friday congregational prayers in the 
Occultation. But Akhbaris still preferred a more conservative approach to 
juridical decision-making, excluding the rationalist techniques of the Usulis. 
The Usuli-Akhbari conflict has too often been seen in liberal terms as a battle 
of great minds. In fact, the ideological struggle reflected the competition of 
ulama families and of regions, and social and economic forces affected its 
outcome. 
Shaykh Yusuf al-Bahrani (1695-1772), a key figure in the intellectual 
development of Shi`ism, grew up in Safavid Bahrain in a family of Usuli 
clerics who also worked as pearl merchants.[40] He fled first to Shiraz from 
the 1717 Omani invasion of Bahrain, then to Karbala from the Afghan 
conquest of Iran. Al-Bahrani adopted the Akhbari school, rejecting his early 
schooling in Bahrain. As a refugee from Iran in Karbala, he would at first 
have been dependent on the largesse of Akhbari religious dignitaries. 
Moreover, the same political instability that expelled him from his homeland 
and deposed the Safavids apparently made an establishment-oriented school 
of jurisprudence like Usulism less appealing. As time went on, al-Bahrani 
moved away from a strict Akhbarism to a neo-Akhbari position that had 
Usuli elements. Nevertheless, he rejected Usuli principles of legal reasoning, 
the syllogistic logic Usulis allowed in interpreting the law, and the legitimacy 
of holy war during the Occultation of the Imam.[41] With the influx of Iranians 
into Karbala from Isfahan and other Iranian cities, the Akhbari teachers in 
the shrine cities em- 
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ployed their prestige and patronage to convince them to adopt the Akhbari 
school. 
The trend to Akhbarism after 1722 may be witnessed in another major 
eighteenth-century figure, Aqa Muhammad Baqir b. Muhammad Akmal 
(1705-90), born in Isfahan and descended on his mother's side from the 
prominent Majlisi clerical family. His kin and social networks reached beyond 
the mosque, since he had half-brothers working in Isfahan and Tehran as 
money changers (sarraf) and in Zand Shiraz as money coiners (zarrabi). The 
young Aqa Muhammad Baqir, emigrating to Karbala in 1722, came under 
Akhbari influences there and changed for a while to that. school from his 
Isfahani Usulism.[42] 
Aqa Muhammad Baqir traveled early in the 1730s to Bihbahan on the border 
of the Iranian provinces of Khuzistan and Fars. Many Isfahani scholarly 
families scattered to such small towns (qasabahs) in southern Iran, which, 
though relatively near to the shrine cities, offered greater security in this 
period than large cities. Aqa Muhammad Baqir found the religious 
institutions in Bihbahan dominated by ulama from Bahrain who had newly 
adopted Akhbarism. Although he may at first have gotten along with them, 
at some point he reverted to his Isfahani Usulism and engaged in bitter 
polemics with the Akhbaris. He emerged as a popular prayer leader and 
teacher and remained for thirty years.[43] 
The Usuli elite of Isfahan, dispersed to the Akhbari-dominated shrine cities 
and to conservative small towns in the 1720s, suffered in the 1730s further 
disestablishment by Nadir Shah (1736-47), who supplanted both Afghans 
and Safavids. He made it one of the cornerstones of his policy that Iranians 
should renounce the Shi`i. practice of cursing the first two caliphs of Sunni 
Islam, and tried to have Shi`ism incorporated into Sunnism as a fifth legal 
rite. This policy allowed him to keep loyal to himself both his Afghan troops 
and his Qizilbash cavalry the former fierce Sunnis and the latter staunch 
Shi`is. Nadir Shah forced the Shi`i ulama to agree to this compromise. 
Wherever they felt it necessary, they went along, but the assent of many surely 
represented no more than pious dissimulation (taqiyyah). In addition, Nadir 
sought to weaken the clergy and defang any potential clerical opposition to 
his policies by confiscating the rich endowments that had supported the 
seminaries and mosques of Isfahan.[44] 
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The Usuli Revival in the Zand Period, 1763-1779 
Aqa Muhammad Baqir returned to Iraq sometime in the early 1760s. 
Bihbahani, as he was now known, found the shrine cities an extremely hostile 
environment for an Usuli. Shaykh Yusuf al-Bahrani, in his late sixties and ten 
years senior to the newcomer, presided over the religious establishment in 
Karbala as the dean of Shi`i scholarship. Al-Bahrani's neo-Akhbaris 
considered Usulis to be ritually impure, touching Usuli works only with a 
handkerchief to shield their fingers from its polluting effects. More serious, 
anyone walking in the street with Usuli literature beneath his arm risked 
violent assault.[45] The power structure in the shrine cities consisted of an 
Arab landholding elite, a number of mafia-type gangs, and the leading clerics. 
Any important figure among the ulama would have to make alliances with 
the Sayyid landholders and with the chief gangsters who ran protection 
rackets in the bazaars. At this point, the Akhbaris had the important gangster, 
or luti, contacts, and could employ these to intimidate Usuli rivals. 
Bihbahani at first faced so many difficulties in Karbala that he seriously 
considered returning to Iran. But he soon began teaching Usuli texts secretly 
in his basement to a select and trusted number of students, many of them 
former pupils of al-Bahrani. These included his own nephews. When the 
Iranians had originally come to the shrine cities in the 1720s, many of them 
penniless refugees, they had been integrated into the Akhbari ideology of 
their Arab hosts and benefactors. Forty years later the founding of an Usuli 
cell in Karbala led by members of the Majlisi aristocracy signaled the 
increasing financial and social independence of the ethnically Iranian quarters 
in the shrine cities.[46] Although the Iranian scholarly families originally 
depended heavily on government land grants and emoluments in Iran, which 
many of them lost after 1722, the history of the Majlisi family suggests that 
they increasingly forged links with merchants and skilled artisans in the 
bazaars, which gave them a new financial base. Though fallen from their 
notable status and dispossessed of their lands around Isfahan, many Iranian 
expatriates could increasingly compete with the wealth of merchant-ulama 
like al-Bahrani. The partial upturn in ulama fortunes in the Zand period, 
moreover, coincided with the economic rebound of the artisan and merchant 
classes, to whom they had become tied.[47] 
Wealth underpinned the success of a great teacher, since he attracted students 
by providing them with stipends to live on. It also ensured that the 
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gangster bosses took his side. Aqa Muhammad Baqir's wealth probably 
derived from merchant in-laws, brothers-in-law serving as high 
administrators in Bengal, and wealthy legal clients. At some point Bihbahani 
began to feel that he had enough students, monetary support, and security to 
challenge al-Bahrani openly, an event that led to the polarization of the 
scholarly community in Karbala during the 1760s. In 1772, when al-Bahrani 
expired, Bihbahani had attained such a prestigious position that he read the 
funeral prayers for his late nemesis. Shaykh Yusuf's demise removed the most 
vigorous Akhbari leader from the field, allowing Aqa Muhammad Baqir, then 
sixty-seven, to spend his last clear-minded decade in consolidating his 
position. A number of other former students of al-Bahrani, including 
Bihbahani's nephews the young Tabataba'is, and some Arab scholars, now 
forsook neo-Akhbarism for the Usuli school.[48] These in turn helped their 
aging mentor to train a whole new generation of youthful mujtahids, who 
came from Iran to the shrine cities in the last years of Zand dominance and 
the opening years of Qajar rule. 
The Usuli revival was, in Iranian terms, a largely Zand-period phenomenon, 
.which the Qajars came to support later on. In the shrine cities themselves 
the Usuli victory coincided with the rise of local Shi`i power and the decline 
of central Ottoman control, so that Usuli principles, such as the holding of 
Shi`i congregational prayers, could be gradually implemented, something the 
Ottomans had not tolerated when they had a firmer hand in Iraq. Usulism 
was promoted in particular by ethnically Iranian immigrant families in the 
Arab shrine cities, but the school attracted the support of local Arab scholars 
as well in the 1770s. The Zands provided new patronage and economic 
security in Iran, encouraging the revival of activist, rationalist Usuli 
jurisprudence. 
Conclusion 
The fortunes of Imami Shi`ism in Iraq and Iran from its inception depended 
upon two forces. The first, popular-class heterodoxy and love for the family 
of the Prophet, allowed it to survive among urban artisans in Iraqi and 
Iranian cities and among the marsh Arabs of Iraq, and to spread among the 
Turkoman pastoralists of Anatolia. The second, ruling-class support or 
tolerance, aided the religion in the Buyid period, part of the Mongol period, 
and under the Safavids and Zands. Popular-class adoption of the religion 
helped it spread even under hostile governments, such as the Sunni 
Ottomans and Mughals, though it suffered setbacks in such situations. In 
seventeenth- 
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century southern India, ruling-class support for Imami Shi`ism allowed the 
development of sophisticated religious and cultural institutions, but failed to 
secure allegiance to the faith by the masses of Hindus and Sunnis. 
The late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century witnessed political 
setbacks to Imami Shi`ism of considerable scope. The Sunni Mughals 
dethroned the remaining Shi`i monarchs of southern India, the Ottomans 
ruled the Shi`i areas of southern Lebanon and southern Iraq, forces from 
Muscat conquered Shi`i Bahrain, and Sunni Afghans swept into Iran, 
dethroning the Safavids. Everywhere Imami Shi`ism as a religion of the ruling 
class met defeat, the wealth of its ulama was expropriated, and only the 
devotion of the common people kept the faith alive. But the second half of 
the eighteenth century saw a reversal of the Sunni revival. The Mughals grew 
weak, allowing their Shi`i governors in Awadh and Bengal to become nearly 
autonomous. The Zands restored Shi`i rule to Iran. The declining Ottomans 
allowed a Sunni Mamluk regime to come to power in Iraq, which granted 
greater freedom to the Shi`i shrine cities. The Shi`i ulama took advantage of 
the improving political climate in the second half of the eighteenth century 
to promote their own interests, expressed in the clerical ideology of Usuli 
Shi`ism. 
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2 
Shi`i State Formation in Awadh and the 
Ulama 
 
The Emergence of Successor States to the Mughals 
The eighteenth century witnessed the disruption of political order in much 
of the Islamic world and the emergence of regionally based successor states 
to the three great Islamic empires that had held sway from the sixteenth 
century. The Ottoman Empire met frequent defeat in military encounters 
with European states, and the Mamluks in Egypt and Iraq showed 
independence from the Ottomans in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. In Iran, Afghan tribal armies invaded and defeated the imperial 
forces. Out of the chaos emerged Nadir Shah (1736-47), who reunited Iran, 
assaulted Ottoman Iraq, and invaded India. The Mughal center at Delhi, 
already weak, never recovered from this blow, thereafter suffering Afghan 
incursions, attacks from south Indian Maratha armies, and assaults by the 
British East India Company. 
The political decline of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals cannot be 
explained monocausally, though it seems likely that economic forces played 
a major part. But as Owen argued in the case of the Ottomans, political 
decline does not necessarily imply that an absolute economic decline 
occurred (as opposed to a relative economic backwardness compared with 
Europe).[1] In Iran, the silk trade declined in the eighteenth century, but the 
decline was caused by rather than being the cause of insecure conditions 
during tribal and elite contests for central power. Halil Inalcik has suggested 
that, just as 
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the introduction of cannon early in the sixteenth century had a centralizing 
effect, so the spread of hand-held firearms among the general populace in 
subsequent decades contributed to decentralization.[2] For India, Irfan Habib 
argued that the Mughal nobles progressively overtaxed their peasantry, 
provoking peasant revolts in the eighteenth century, which proved so costly 
to put down that they permanently weakened the system. M. Athar All, 
among others, has suggested that such macroeconomic phenomena as the 
influx of New World silver and the depreciation of currency could help 
explain the simultaneous political weakening of the Mughals, the Safavids, 
and the Ottomans[3] 
From the early 1970s some historians began suggesting an alternative to 
finding causes for the political decline at the center in the three empires. They 
began to see political decentralization not as a decline of the center but as a 
rise of the region. Thus, the appearance of independent-minded elites in 
eighteenth-century Egypt was depicted as a consequence of increased wealth 
among the Egyptian notable, merchant, and ulama classes, deriving from the 
coffee trade and other economic activities.[4] In Iran, Thomas Ricks found 
that eighteenth-century regional elites showed a marked continuity even 
during instability at the center, and John Perry showed how the Zands, based 
in southwestern Iran, parlayed their regional power into national 
dominance.[5] Barnett has discussed how, with the rise of successor states to 
the Mughals in India, more revenue remained in the provinces, with local 
benefits.[6] The successor states often provided adequate security to allow 
long-distance trade and local agriculture to flourish. This approach shows the 
regional and 
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limited perspective of the image of unmitigated decline projected upon all of 
eighteenth-century northern India by Delhi-based Mughal historians as well 
as by contemporary Europeans. 
In India, several successor states to the Mughals emerged. Bengal became 
increasingly independent, failing to a Shi`i Muslim elite, until its nawab 
succumbed to the British in 1757. The Durrani Afghan state swallowed 
Kabul and much of the Punjab and Kashmir. The old Mughal province of 
Awadh, southeast of Delhi and northwest of Bengal, with the Himalayas and 
the Jamuna River as its natural boundaries, became a regional base for the 
powerful Nishapuri family. In the south, Hyderabad became the autonomous 
realm of the Nizam, a Mughal-appointed governor and the Hindu Maratha 
federation ruled much of the Deccan. 
The social and urban history of eighteenth-century India supports the 
argument that the decline of the Delhi-based Mughal Empire and the rise of 
a regional elite in Awadh, for instance, reflected a shift in resources rather 
than monolithic decline. H. K. Naqvi described how urban centers west of 
the Jamuna River, in the regions near the Mughal seat of power, lost 
population in the course of the eighteenth century, whereas the area (Awadh) 
east of the river became more urbanized.[7] C. A. Bayly demonstrated that the 
decline of Delhi, Agra, and Lahore (each with populations of about 400,000 
in 1700, down to 100,000 in 1800) was partially offset by the rapid emergence 
of Awadh's Lucknow and Banaras, both with populations of 200,000 or more 
in 1800. He found about sixty towns of more than 10,000 in eighteenth-
century. North India, the number remaining stable from 1730 to 1800, 
though some declined and others grew. Again, tile small centers (qasabahs) of 
about 3,000 suffered losses in the west, but many new settlements grew up 
in Awadh during that period. Bayly further showed that climatic changes 
speeded the shift of resources from Delhi and Agra to Lucknow and Banaras, 
the area west of the Jamuna suffering dry spells in the late eighteenth century 
while in Awadh the fertile Baiswara area received ample rainfall.[8] 
State formation in many of the successor states to the Mughals involved new 
local ruling coalitions and the promotion of regional culture. In Awadh, the 
ethnically Iranian ruling house and many of the notables associated with it 
favored the Imami Shi`i branch of Islam. As the province became 
increasingly autonomous, Shi`i notables more openly supported the scholars 
and institutions of their religious community. The declining Sunni elites in 
Delhi saw both the Awadh nawabate and Shi`ism as manifestations of 
decadence, when in reality a shift simply occurred in cultural resources. 
39 
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The Rise of the Awadh Successor State 
In the period 1722-75 three nawabs reigned through several phases of state 
formation in Awadh. The. state has been described as "a distinct realm of 
structured political relations that is defined by contention along its 
boundaries and among politicians and bureaucrats who, in competing for 
office and influence, rework social and economic conflict into political 
terms," and emphasis has shifted in the scholarly study of state making from 
static institutions to the "structured relations between the state and other 
spheres of society."[9] The question arises of what social forces influenced the 
rise of the nawabs to regional autonomy in Awadh. As Iranian Shi`is, the 
nawabs, originally temporary Mughal appointees, seem at first glance an elite 
group unlikely to assert strong authority over the Hindu peasants and Sunni 
townsmen of Awadh. How they made Shi`i rule at all palatable to Awadh's 
population must occupy us as a central question. Moreover, it might be asked 
if there are any parallels between the rise of Shi`i rule in Awadh and that of 
the Safavids earlier in Iran. 
The emergence of the province of Awadh as a Shi`i-ruled state depended in 
part on developments at the Timurid court, where the Mughal administrative 
elite allowed Iranian Shi`i immigrants to rise as provincial governors. On the 
one hand, pohtical instability in Iran encouraged large numbers of Iranian 
notables to go to India; on the other, the mood at court after the passing of 
Awrangzib (d. 1707) grew decidedly more tolerant of Shi`ism. Awrangzib's 
successor, Bahadur Shah (d. 1712), leaned heavily toward Shi`i Islam.[10] The 
Shi`i Barhah Sayyids, mere Delhi courtiers, made and unmade Mughal 
emperors, further demonstrating growing Shi`i power. Greater tolerance at 
court allowed more elite recruitment of avowed Shi`is to high office, 
The Iranians made an impact, not only on the Delhi court, but on North 
India as a whole. Mir Muhammad Amin Nishapuri (d. 1739), the first nawab 
of Awadh, began a dynasty that ruled for 136 years. Nishapuri. known as 
Burhanu'l-Mulk, derived from a family of Islamic judges (qazis) in Khurasan, 
whom Shah Isma`il Safavi of Iran transplanted there from Najaf as part of 
his campaign to make Iran Shi`i.[11] Nishapuri came to India in 1708, where 
he worked himself up the bureaucratic ladder to emerge as a power broker 
in Delhi. He helped free the Mughal emperor, Muhammad 
 
 
 
 
― 41 ― 
Shah, of the political control of the Barhah Sayyids in 1720, receiving as a 
reward the governorship of Agra.[12] 
In 1722, after Burhanu'l-Mulk failed to subdue peasant uprisings, the 
emperor demoted him to the less remunerative governorship of Awadh. 
There he overcame and co-opted the Sunni Shaykhzadah landholders based 
in the strategic town of Lucknow, who then collaborated in the emergent 
Awadh state. Awadh never achieved a high degree of governmental 
centralization, making the cooperation of such local elites essential to 
political stability. Burhanu'l-Mulk then brought within his orbit the Hindu 
Rajput Mohan Singh of Tiloi, who dominated the southern part of Rai Bareli. 
The Nishapuri satrap spent the next decade and a half establishing stronger 
central rule in Awadh, greatly increasing its revenue. In something of a 
declaration of independence, he resisted the Mughal emperor's one attempt 
to transfer him to the governorship of another province, Malwa.[13] 
In January of 1739 Nadir Shah of Iran took Lahore, invading through 
Afghanistan. Burhanu'l-Mulk brought his forces into the fray on the side of 
the Mughal emperor, but was defeated and captured. The nawab, after 
negotiating an Iranian withdrawal, felt disappointed by the Mughal emperor's 
subsequent political appointments and treasonably suggested to Nadir Shah 
that it would be quite facile and highly rewarding to take Delhi. The Iranian 
conqueror, delighted to take up the suggestion, victoriously marched into the 
city, the savage looting of the capital later perpetrated by his troops 
constituting one of the century's great disasters. Nadir reduced the Mughal 
emperor to a vassal of Iran, making Burhanu'l-Mulk imperial regent. The 
nawab of Awadh committed suicide on 19 March 1739, either because of his 
debilitating leg cancer or because Nadir Shah humiliated him.[14] 
Unlike Isma`il the Safavid. Burhanu'l-Mulk did not acquire his country, solely 
by conquest. His authority derived from a Mughal appointment, and he used 
Mughal troops to assert his power. He gradually did achieve an autonomy of 
sorts, and his behavior with Nadir Shah indicates rather weak loyalty to the 
Mughal court. But his attempts to restructure Awadh society 
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took place within the framework of Mughal administrative traditions. He co-
opted local large landholders instead of strongly dominating or destroying 
them, which allowed a polyglot cultural system rather than the wholesale 
conversion to Shi`ism undertaken by the Safavids. But Burhanu'l-Mulk did 
make an assault on Sunni ulama and Sufi holders of revenue-free land grants. 
Changes in the Status of Sunni Institutions 
Secular opposition to the accumulation of religious lands, as Weber noted, 
often arose in preindustrial societies.[15] The new nawab's determination to 
carve out a personal power base in Awadh, his Shi`ism, and the region's 
exceptionally numerous Sunni revenue-free holdings, all contributed to the 
conflict. An eighteenth-century observer wrote that in the latter part of the 
seventeenth century Mughal rulers granted many Muslim scholars in the 
provinces of Awadh and Allahabad stipends and land revenues (madad-i 
ma`ash) for their support. Mosques, seminaries. and Sufi centers proliferated, 
and great scholars and teachers arose. "Students went in droves from town 
to town and were everywhere received with helpful sympathy."[16] 
The writer, Bilgrami, asserted that when Burhanu'l-Mulk of Nishapur became 
the governor of Awadh and much of Allahabad under Muhammad Shah, he 
confiscated the stipends and land grants of both the old established and the 
parvenu families. The Muslim notables grew anxious about their affairs, 
financial worries compelling many students to forsake the classroom for full-
time employment. The decline in learning and in the state subvention of 
education continued under Burhanu'l-Mulk's successors, who extended the 
confiscations to all of Allahabad, ruining many madrasahs, or Muslim 
institutions of higher learning. Another historian described Burhanu'l-Mulk's 
1728 resumption of land grants supporting old Sunni families and institutions 
in the southern district of Jaunpur.[17] Major exceptions to the Nishapuri 
family's policy of disendowing Muslim schools included Salon and 
Lucknow's Farangi Mahall, which received their revenues from Mughal 
grants throughout this period.[18] Such cities as Allahabad, Lucknow, and 
Banaras also continued to possess important schools. 
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The Nishapuris' policy of establishing their regional control by calling in land 
grants to Sunni educational and mystical institutions that had become 
hereditary hurt the Muslim notables and medium landholders, who relied on 
these institutions for the training necessary to manage their estates, practice 
their religion, and celebrate their culture. Yet, as was noted, some prominent 
Muslim schools survived, chief among them the Farangi Mahall. 
The school earned the sobriquet of the "Europeans' Mansion" among the 
inhabitants of Lucknow's chowk bazaar area because Dutch merchants first 
built it. In 1692 a group of landholders from his own village murdered Mulla 
Qutbu'd-Din Sihalavi, a Sunni religious scholar of Sihala near Lucknow, in a 
dispute over land and the mulla's influence at the Mughal court. In 
compensation, the Mughal emperor Awrangzib bestowed the Farangi Mahall 
on the martyr's orphans. One of the younger sons, Nizamu'd-Din Ahmad, a 
major Sunni scholar, taught with his relatives at home and received land 
grants and stipends from Mughal emperors. Partially because the nawabs put 
pressure on the school to train bureaucrats, many of them not Sunni, the 
students might be Shi`is or even Hindus, though the teachers, as descendants 
and disciples of Mulla Qutbu'd-Din, adhered to Hanafi Sunnism. The 
method of teaching perfected by Mulla Nizamu'd-Din, emphasizing the 
rational sciences, wore a nonsectarian aspect. Mathematics and Avicennian 
metaphysics could, after all, be studied with profit by persons from all 
backgrounds.[19] 
The works most often used in the Nizami method are analyzed in table 1. 
Most of the works or commentaries and glosses used in the Nizami method 
were written in Iran between A.D. 1200 and 1600. Also represented were 
some seventeenth-century north Indian figures.[20] This method, 
concentrating on thought rather than on rote learning, evoked admiration for 
the speed with which it allowed a student to complete the course of study 
and for its ability to train Muslim ulama, judges, and administrators to think 
clearly and to derive solutions to problems.[21] The highly rationalist emphasis 
of the study list reflects the seminary's latent function of producing 
bureaucrats for land- 
 
 
 
 
 
― 44 ― 
Table 1 
Subjects Stressed in the Nizami Method 
Subject Number of Works 
Logic 5 
Mathematics 5 
Dialectical Theology 4 
Philosophy 3 
Arabic Rhetoric 2 
Islamic Jurisprudence 2 
Qur'an Commentary 2 
Principles of 
Jurisprudence 
1 
The Prophet's Oral 
Traditions 
1 
revenue administration. The middle landholders, Shaykh and Sayyid families 
based in the small towns of North India, wanted some of their sons to go 
into government service. As nawabi rule grew more regionally centered and 
more autonomous from Delhi, and as the province's revenues increased, 
more opportunities arose for government service locally. Farangi Mahall 
produced a rationalist culture useful to the Muslim and Islamized Hindu 
notable and service classes who administered their own estates or served in 
the bureaucratic arm of the prebendal state, and its method spread widely in 
India. 
The first phase of Awadh state formation saw the Mughal appointment of 
an Iranian Shi`i governor, who used Mughal troops to assert military power 
in the region and made the province a personal power base from which he 
refused to allow the Mughal center to dislodge him. He co-opted local big 
landed elites by drawing them into revenue administration. He released 
revenue to his government by resuming on a large scale revenue-free grants 
of land made by Mughal rulers to Sunni scholarly and mystical families, 
making a frontal assault on the privileges of the Sunni clerical notables. This 
policy in some respects recalls that of the Safavids. Burhanu'l-Mulk pursued 
it, however, not primarily for religious purposes, but for financial and 
administrative ones. He freed up alienated land for distribution as patronage, 
and for an enlarged tax base. His Shi`i faith, however, probably made him 
less loathe to institute such changes, which were damaging to Sunni 
institutions. The policy was not a blanket one, as the survival of Farangi 
Mahall and other Sunni-staffed institutions attests, nor is there evidence of 
Burhanu'l-Mulk's having promoted Shi`i schools in the stead of the Sunni 
ones. 
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Patrimonial Bureaucracy versus Tribal Conquest 
Could the Nishapuris become something other than mere foreign governors 
appointed over Awadh temporarily from the Mughal center? To do so would 
require them to establish their legitimacy among regional Sunni and Hindu 
elites, to build their own bureaucracy and military, and to meet the outside 
challenge of Maratha Hindu warriors, of pastoral invaders from Afghanistan, 
and of Bangash and Ruhilah Afghan tribespeople settled in the upper Doab. 
Burhanu'l-Mulk paid Nadir Shah Rs. 20 million to assure the succession to 
Awadh's governorship for his nephew, Safdar Jang. That one family could 
retain control over a Mughal subah, or province, for two successive 
generations, rare during the zenith of the Mughals' agrarian bureaucracy, 
shows the decline of the central government. Earlier, Mughal emperors 
rotated provincial governors at will, preventing them from building up a 
regional power base, and although local bureaucracies and elites existed, the 
center retained control over decisions involving revenues· Hereditary 
Nishapuri rule in Awadh ultimately allowed the family to become 
independent of the Mughals altogether. 
Safdar Jang established his power base by fighting and co-opting the Rajputs 
in Awadh from 1739 to 1741. He acquired an armed force loyal to himself 
by hiring six or seven thousand Shi`i Qizilbash cavalrymen away from Nadir 
Shah's army before the latter withdrew from India.[22] In Lucknow, he 
cultivated the local elite, so trusting the Farangi Mahall that he required even 
Shi`is to present a diploma from it before he would hire them in the 
bureaucracy. He appointed members of the Farangi-Mahalli family to judicial 
posts.[23] Leaders of the Shaykhzadahs in the capital, such as Mu`izzu’d-Din 
Khan and Qutbu'd-Din Muhammad Khan, became Shi`is in order to cement 
their relations with the nawab. 
The Mughal emperor called Awadh's nawab to Delhi in 1743, promoting him 
the following year and adding to his responsibilities the governorship of 
Kashmir. Many Shi`is from Kashmir joined his military, affecting Persian 
language and dress but receiving less pay than the Qizilbash horsemen. In 
February 1745 Safdar Jang showed his mettle when he and his forces 
accompanied Muhammad Shah against tile Ruhilah Afghan `Ali Muhammad 
Khan, whose growing power north of Awadh and east of Delhi posed a 
threat to both. The Ruhilahs, Sunni Puhktun tribespeople, emigrated from 
the mountain fastnesses around Peshawar down into the lush Gangetic plain 
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throughout the medieval period. Safdar Jang's impressive show of force 
intimidated the Ruhilah, who came to terms with the emperor. His legitimacy 
as the emperor's standard-bearer also helped him: the ulama of North India 
gave legal rulings in favor of the emperor's cause, influencing some Ruhilahs 
to desert their leader.[24] 
The year 1748 gave India a new Mughal emperor, Ahmad Shah Timuri, and 
a new chief minister, Safdar Jang. In the first years of his ministry he struggled 
against the Afghani Bangash clans settled in the Doab, who, in the summer 
and fall of 1750, occupied Awadh.[25] The martial Bangash, Pukhtuns like the 
Ruhilahs, had also emigrated into village North India from largely pastoral 
Afghanistan. Safdar Jang put together a new political confederation against 
the Bangash tribes, receiving unexpected support in this campaign from 
Awadh's urban Sunni Shaykhzadahs, who conducted a remarkable citizens' 
revolution against the invading tribesmen. The Bangash Afghans who 
occupied the important Awadh town of Bilgram treated its notables roughly 
and sacked the town when the locals retaliated by wounding some Afghans. 
In the streets and quarters, people prepared to defend themselves. In 
Lucknow, fearful Iranians stored their wealth with Shaykhzadah leader 
Mu`izzu'd-Din Khan, and the haughtiness of the new conquerors and the 
harshness of their exactions provoked sanguinary riots between the Afghans 
and the Shaykhzadahs. After a night of rioting in one quarter of the city, 
seven hundred Afghans assembled against four hundred Shaykhzadahs, the 
citizens of Lucknow routing the Bangash men and suffering a third fewer 
casualties. 
The Shaykhzadah leader Mu`izzu'd-Din Khan, a Shi`i with strong ties to the 
Iranians and a man particularly close to Safdar Jang, called a conference of 
notables, raising an army of live to six thousand men and forcing the Afghans 
to withdraw. Mu`izzu'd-Din Khan then wrote his clansmen in other large 
towns, detailing the incident and warning of possible Bangash reprisals. In 
Lucknow and Hardoi districts the "republican" influence of the many large 
towns historically diluted landed power, leading to a scarcity of very large 
landlords and a proliferation of small holdings.[26] The urban-based 
Shaykhzadah middle landholders expelled the Afghans and formed an army 
to fight for Safdar Jang's restoration. 
Once again, the ulama rallied to the imperial forces. Maliku'l-`Ulama’gave a 
ruling in favor of the emperor at Safdar Jang's behest. In Sandilah the Shi`i 
logician Mawlavi Hamdu'llah, although he did not join the militia, 
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publicly espoused the nawab-vizier's cause, under the banner of which the 
town's newly militant citizenry gradually rid it of Afghans. The same pattern 
recurred in Bilgram and Kakori. Safdar Jang completed the task of expelling 
and overcoming the Bangash forces by forming an alliance with the Hindu 
Marathas and jointly subduing North India.[27] 
The conflict at one level centered on whether Awadh would be incorporated 
into a patriarchal state presided over by Bangash clansmen or would continue 
to evolve as a semiautonomous satrapy with a patrimonial-bureaucratic 
administration inherited from the Mughal Empire. The Sunni middle 
landholders based in small towns chose the Shi`i Safdar Jang over the Sunni 
Bangash tribesmen because his rule offered more continuity of political 
culture and revenue structure than did that of the coarse new conquerors. 
However new and alien the development of nawabi Shi`i rule in Lucknow 
may appear against the backdrop of Mughal traditions of tight Sunni rule 
from the center, the nawabs were perceived to participate in Mughal 
legitimacy as the appointees of the emperor. The first minister, though 
victorious, squandered his remaining years in office on a fruitless power 
struggle in Delhi, which he lost to the Turanian forces. 
The second phase of Awadh state formation saw the further definition of 
state boundaries through conflict with outside forces. The Awadh state 
developed its own, distinctively Shi`i-tinged military. Further political 
bonding of local Sunni political elites to the ruling Nishapuri house occurred 
through an independent social movement of Muslim townsmen to defend 
Nishapuri Awadh from extraregional military attackers. The struggles with 
the Ban-gash demonstrated to the Nishapuri family that they could 
successfully defend a regional, hereditary power base with the aid of their 
Qizilbash Shi`i cavalry and Muslim and Hindu troops, and that a dependable 
coalition against outsiders could be built with local elites, such as the 
Shaykhzadahs. The destructive struggles in the Mughal capital, along with 
growing Durrani Afghan and Maratha challenges, cast doubt on the value of 
devoting so much time to the affairs of the center. Nishapuri. Awadh began 
to be born. 
State Formation and Sunni-Shi`i Tension 
In the third stage of Awadh state formation, the intervention of a new outside 
power, the British East India Company, proved decisive. Military conflict 
with the Europeans further demarcated Awadh's borders to the south and 
east, and military defeat at the hands of the EIC imposed limitations on the 
Awadh military that led both to internal decentralization and to external 
dependence on the alliance with the British. The process of subordinating 
Sunni 
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religious institutions to Shi`i priorities continued, witnessed especially in 
conflict between the regional court and the Farangi Mahall. Finally, nawabi 
patronage began subventing Shi`i scholars and institutions. 
Shuja`u'd-Dawlah, Safdar Jang's eldest son and deputy governor of Awadh 
in Lucknow, succeeded his father as nawab in 1754. In the first half of his 
reign he joined with Ahmad Shah Durrani of Afghanistan in defeating the 
Marathas, became Mughal chief minister in his own right, added the province 
of Allahabad to his power base, and attempted to expel the British from 
Bengal. In the last fateful endeavor he failed, and from that defeat in 1764 he 
showed increasing willingness to make an autonomous Awadh his power 
base, forsaking any dream of reinvigorating the Mughal Empire in Delhi. The 
British imposed restrictions on the size of his military that made him 
increasingly dependent upon them for Awadh's security, and required from 
him payments of tribute that eventually mortgaged his realm to them.[28] 
From 1766 Shuja`u'd-Dawlah changed his provincial capital from Lucknow 
to nearby Faizabad and instituted an ambitious building program, with his 
engineers and workers completing many of these projects within two years. 
The establishment of a provincial court of great wealth at Faizabad 
constituted a major cultural and social event. Artisans and scholars flocked 
there from all over India, its bazaars attracting numerous long-distance 
traders from Iran, central Asia, China, and Europe. With the peasant-
generated tax monies of Awadh and Allahabad flowing into the city, its tax-
farming notables and highly paid administrators helped support masses of 
skilled workers and retailers, who provided them with luxury goods. The new 
capital grew with remarkable rapidity during the last nine years of the nawab's 
life.[29] 
The nawab's attack in 1774 in concert with the British on the neighboring 
Afghan Ruhilah ruler Hafiz Rahmat Khan defanged a potential military threat 
to the north, filled state coffers with booty, and added to the territory under 
his control.[30] Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's governorship, from 1754 to 1775, marked 
a watershed in the emergence of a semiautonomous, Shi`i-ruled state in 
Awadh and Allahabad. Sunni religious leaders became less secure. Although 
Shi`i scholarship and institutions showed no efflorescence in the first half of 
the reign, in the Faizabad period substantial patronage became available to 
scholars belonging to the ruler's branch of Islam. 
The French traveler Laureston found Bengal and North India remarkably 
free of sectarian rancor in the 1750s. He wrote: 
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Muslims are enthusiastic about their religion, but here the sectarian followers 
of ‘Umar and `Ali never dispute among themselves for the purpose of 
establishing which was the true successor to the caliphate. There are few 
mosques, even fewer mullas, and the nobles, although they are punctual 
enough in performing their own devotions, hardly ever go to the mosques.[31] 
This idyllic portrait may have been accurate in the 1750s, but Sunni-Shi`i 
disputes increased as the Awadh state took on a Shi`i aspect. 
Though Farangi Mahall retained its intellectual leadership, the school's 
relationship with the government sometimes grew troubled. After Mulla 
Nizamu'd-Din's passing in 1748, his young son `Abdu'l-`Ali gradually 
asserted himself as head of the institution. About ten years later, Sunni-Shi`i 
tensions in Lucknow put his life in danger. With a Shi`i potentate ruling the 
province from Lucknow, `Abdu'l-`Ali felt that he could expect no 
governmental support against the militant partisans of Imam `Ali, and when 
the Sunni Ruhilah chief of nearby Shahjahanpur, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, 
offered him patronage, he accepted it.[32] 
The challenge of rising Shi`i militancy in the old Sunni stronghold of 
Lucknow, coupled with the political dominance of a Shi`i ruling house, also 
bedeviled the next head of the school, Mulla Hasan Farangi-Mahalli. At the 
height of his eminence in Lucknow, Shi`i-Sunni tensions again rose, two 
students being killed in rioting sometime after 1766. Mulla Hasan led a 
delegation of teachers to the new capital, Faizabad, where they protested to 
Nawab Shuja`u'd-Dawlah the government's failure to stop the violence. 
When the delegation proved unsuccessful, Mulla Hasan decided to join Mulla 
`Abdu'l-`Ali in Shahjahanpur rather than continue to risk his life in 
Lucknow.[33] 
During Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's rule Sunni-Shi`i clashes ostracized two successive 
leaders of the major Sunni-staffed institution of learning in his dominions. 
In both cases the government sided, at least tacitly, with the Shi`is. Although 
neither of these major Sunni ulama could be assured of their own lives and 
property under Shuja`u'd-Dawlah, most Farangi-Mahallis remained in 
Lucknow, future leaders accommodating themselves better to an Imami 
government. 
Barnett has outlined the major criteria of regional autonomy in 
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eighteenth-century India.[34] Tile governor acquired the ability to appoint his 
own revenue officials and successors to the governorship; governors seldom 
remitted revenues to the center and began to conduct independent 
diplomatic activity. Then regional ruling families established provincial courts 
with a distinctive architecture. Finally, coins were minted in the name of the 
local ruler, and the emperor's name was deleted from the sermon (khutbah) 
at the Friday congregational prayers. In Awadh, all but the last two criteria 
for independence had been met by 1775. 
Shuja`u'd-Dawlah as regional governor in Awadh from 1754 to 1775 
remitted very little revenue to the imperial center. A combination of adverse 
economic conditions and destructive Iranian, Afghan, and Maratha 
incursions had enervated the power of Delhi. Until his death in 1775 
Shuja`u'd-Dawlah "still minted coins and had the Khutbah read in the 
Emperor's name for the sake of protocol, but for all practical purposes he 
was an independent prince."[35] A further declaration of independence could 
only come when Friday prayers sermons were read in the name of the 
Nishapuris; but that required the emergence of a Shi`i ulama corps loyal to 
this regional dynasty. 
The Beginnings of Shi`i Scholarship in Awadh 
Shi`i rule in Awadh necessitated the development of a class of Shi`i religious 
experts. Yet, surprisingly, this development took place very slowly. Until the 
1780s most Shi`i scholars in Awadh fell into two categories. They were 
middle landholding Sayyids in the lineage centers or they served as poets, 
physicians, or tutors at regional courts. In both cases they resembled 
gentlemen scholars more than professional clergy. Let us examine the 
pressures that created a trained, specialized corps of ulama receiving 
patronage from Awadh's Shi`i ruling group. 
Until 1766, when Nawab Shuja`u'd-Dawlah settled down to rule Awadh and 
Allahabad from Faizabad, he made little patronage available to Shi`i scholars. 
Imamis pursued their scholarship on an informal basis, lacking any major 
institution comparable to Farangi Mahall. Some Shi`i scholars, such as 
Mawlavi Sayyid ‘Ata' Husayn Zangipuri, sought and received cash gifts and 
land grants from Mughal ruler Muhammad Shah, but the increasing 
confusion at the Mughal center made this form of wealth less and less 
stable.[36] Scholars functioned as independent agents, taking advantage of 
political decentralization in North India to find patronage with local 
magnates in Awadh, in Bengal, or even in Hindu-ruled Banaras. 
 
 
― 51 ― 
The Hindu raja of Banaras gave patronage to the greatest Shi`i scholar in 
North India in this period, Shaykh Muhammad `Ali "Hazin" Gilani (1692-
1766). He was given a land grant and cash gifts. For instance, when Jit Singh 
replaced his father, Balwant Singh, as ruler, he gave Hazin 40,000 ashrafis.[37] 
Hazin, an Iranian poet and scholar from an elite family in Isfahan, fled Iran 
for India in 1734 after becoming embroiled in an insurrection against Nadir's 
governor of Lar province. 
Hazin lived in Multan, Lahore, and Delhi. After 1739 he grudgingly 
reconciled himself to remaining in Delhi as a teacher, but the ridicule he 
heaped on India and Indians earned him so many enemies in the Mughal 
capital that he headed southeast toward Bengal in 1748. He arrived in Banaras 
in 1750, settling there for the last sixteen years of his life and building two 
mosques and a tomb for himself. Although Hazin accepted the patronage 
and land grant of a petty ruler, such as Raja Balwant Singh, he earlier refused 
to pay court to the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah and even refused the 
latter's offer of high office. His haughtiness as an upper-class Iranian caused 
him to live out his life in a predominantly Hindu provincial city. Still, elite 
Hindus there cultivated Persian, and the surrounding districts boasted a 
relatively large Shi`i population, which provided him with some religious 
students in his last years.[38] 
Hazin's thought and his role in society were both important for the north 
Indian Shi`i tradition. Unlike most Shi`is in Awadh and Allahabad, he 
belonged to the Usuli school, believing that a religious scholar had the right 
to make independent judgments in law based on his own reasoning (ijtihad). 
Some of his rulings on religious issues made while in India formed the basis 
of questions submitted by the faithful to mujtahids even in the nineteenth 
century. Deeply interested in science and philosophy, he also wrote 
commentaries on the works of mystical thinkers. In India he devoted the 
most of his efforts to writing and teaching Persian poetry, without, however, 
giving up religious subjects. Hazin transported into one of Shuja`u'd-
Dawlah's cities the intellectual ambience of late Safavid court culture.[39] 
Since Banaras constituted part of the nawab's dominions, Hazin lived 
ultimately under a Shi`i ruler, Nawab Safdar Jang, who showed him respect. 
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When in 1756 Shuja`u'd-Dawlah came to Banaras to put down the rebellious 
Raja Balwant Singh, the nawab conferred with Hazin. The poet-mujtahid 
urged him to come to terms with the raja, and political events led Shuja`u'd-
Dawlah to follow this advice.[40] In 1764 Shuja`u'd-Dawlah and Shah `Alam 
II visited Hazin in Banaras before their close defeat by the British at the 
Battle of Baksar. The great Shi`i thinker reportedly gave them the unwelcome 
advice that they should not attempt to fight the British, but if they chose to 
do so, they should depend on their cavalry. On that occasion, Hazin only 
haft-bowed to Shuja`u'd-Dawlah, saying that a full bow is reserved for kings 
and that escorting is reserved for mujtahids and the ulama. This 
demonstration of the pride of a Shi`i mujtahid before temporal authority 
surprised and incensed the nawab-vizier.[41] 
Hazin, though somewhat reclusive in Banaras, did give classes and hold 
discussions with other Shi`i scholars.[42] One of his students, Mulla `Uyuz, 
taught for a while in Banaras, eschewing glosses and supercommentaries in 
favor of a direct encounter with his sources.[43] A mystic and an ascetic, he 
was part of a generation of Shi`i scholars in transition from Sufi ideals of the 
learned man to more scriptural and rational-legal role models. 
Whereas some Shi`i ulama, such as Hazin, sought independence in their 
private pursuits, others eagerly entered public life. One entered the ranks of 
the ulama (a status group, not an economic class) by virtue of learning, 
though a certain amount of property generally served as a prerequisite for 
such learning. Few ulama from an artisan or laboring-class background are 
mentioned in the sources for this period. But although most ulama derived 
from middle landholding families, they could also come from the very upper 
ranks of the prebendal-feudal notables. Those recognized as ulama from the 
upper class pursued knowledge as an avocation, in addition to a political 
career. Sons of middle landholders more often made a living from a purely 
religious calling. 
Tafazzul Husayn Khan Kashmiri (d. 1800) strikingly exemplified the upper 
class Shi`i gentleman scholar in eighteenth-century India.[44] His grand- 
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father, Karamu'llah Khan, served the Mughal Empire, receiving Rs. 300,000 
from a huge land grant (jagir). Tafazzul Husayn, born while his father was 
stationed in Sialkot, moved with his family at age thirteen or fourteen to 
Lahore and then to Delhi. He studied rational sciences by the Nizami method 
in the capital. When his family settled in Lucknow, Kashmiri had an 
opportunity to study at Farangi Mahall itself, working with Mulla Hasan (later 
head of the school). He asked Mulla Hasan so many difficult questions that 
the Farangi-Mahalli finally hurled his book to the ground in exasperation and 
expelled Kashmiri from his classroom. Tafazzul Husayn then studied on his 
own, mastering difficult philosophical works by Avicenna in Arabic. He 
embraced Shi`ism, rounding out his education by attending the lectures of 
Shaykh Muhammad `Ali Hazin in Banaras, making contact with the learned 
traditions of late Safavid Isfahan. 
He used his family's powerful connections to gain an audience with Nawab 
Shuja`u'd-Dawlah, who appointed him as mentor and tutor (ataliq) of his 
second son, Sa`adat `Ali Khan. Such a position served as a means of political 
advancement for an upper-class intellectual. Kashmiri accompanied Sa`adat 
`Ali to Allahabad in 1769, where the young noble was vice-minister to Shah 
`Alam II. There he engaged in disputes on logic with the Shi`i Mawlavi 
Ghulam Husayn Dakani Ilahabadi. The two did not meet, but sent their 
advanced students with questions and answers. These included Tafazzul 
Husayn's third cousin, Salamu'llah Khan, and Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi. 
The debates by proxy demonstrate the sorts of intellectual networks that 
bound together Shi`i ulama-teachers with thinkers holding high government 
office. 
Tafazzul Husayn Khan's links with the nawabi court gave him influence with 
his larger family. Not only did his own household (including the servants) 
embrace Shi`ism, so that he almost ceased to associate with Sunnis at all, but 
his cousins on his father's side of the family accepted Shi`ism. Tafazzul 
Husayn Khan procured offices for Shi`i relatives, and some of his relatives 
married into older Shi`i ulama and notable families. The Kashmiri service 
family employed Shi`ism, Islamic learning, and notable status to penetrate 
the nawabi administrative structure and to acquire patronage from the new 
ruling class. 
Tafazzul Husayn Khan's career was checkered. He led an abortive 
assassination plot against Asafu'd-Dawlah on behalf of Sa`adat ` Ali, and lived 
many years in exile, serving later on as Awadh's envoy in Calcutta. In 1797 
the British forced him on Asafu'd-Dawlah as first minister, though the public 
perception of him as the Europeans' candidate impaired his effectiveness. 
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After the short-lived anti-British revolt of Asafu'd-Dawlah's successor Vazir 
`Ali in 1798, during which Tafazzul took a pro-British stance, the East India 
Company put Kashmiri's erstwhile pupil Sa`adat `Ali Khan into power as 
nawab. The new ruler sent Tafazzul Husayn Khan back to Calcutta as the 
Awadh envoy, but Kashmiri soon died, in 1800.[45] 
During his twenty years in Calcutta, Kashmiri learned fluent English and 
studied Latin so as to be able to read European scientific works. He translated 
books on the new European mathematics and physics, writing also on Sunni 
and Shi`i hadiths and Islamic philosophy. He taught mathematics in the 
morning to students in Calcutta, then visited English friends until noon. In 
the afternoon he taught Imami law, and after supper expounded Hanafi law. 
In the evenings he read philosophy alone. A pious notable, a man of wealth 
and taste, he had but one vice, from a strict Shi`i point of view: his love of 
music.[46] 
Hazin, the displaced poet-mujtahid, and Tafazzul Husayn Khan, the scholar-
diplomat, could hardly be considered professional Shi`i clerics. They lived at 
a time when Imami Shi`i institutions in North India barely existed, when a 
clerical career in itself made little sense for anyone interested in wealth, 
prestige, or power. Yet the time when court poets and gentlemen scholars 
could dominate Shi`i intellectual life was passing. New religious elites were 
called into being by the rise of the Shi`i court in Awadh. 
The Physicians of Faizabad 
The first phases of Shi`i state formation in Awadh witnessed the 
establishment of a Shi`i ruling group at the top of the social hierarchy, the 
development of a Shi`i wing in the military, and the subordination of the old 
Sunni clerical and mystical families through intimidation or resumption of 
revenue-free land grants. From 1766 a second process began, the gradual 
formation of a Shi`i religious class through notable-class patronage. A 
struggle commenced over the shape of the religious class, and over the 
control of religious resources. Traditional Shi`i gentlemen scholars, used to 
coexisting with Sunnis and Hindus, were ranged against a growing class of 
professional Shi`i clerics who emphasized social closure and Shi`i communal 
identity. 
Within Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's new capital, Faizabad, a cabal of physicians trained 
in Avicennian medicine and the rational sciences at first established a 
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virtual monopoly over intellectual pursuits within the new capital. Soon after 
the nawab returned from his defeat at Baksar and took up residence in 
Faizabad, five religious-minded physicians from Delhi followed him there 
and were employed by the nawab and his wife, Bahu Begam, at high salaries. 
Among themselves, they evinced much factionalism and competition, but 
they closed ranks against outside physicians or scholars. 
In the absence of any formal ecclesiastical Structures in the Shi`i community 
of North India, literati with a secular training stepped into roles played by 
ulama in Safavid Iran. They strove to maintain control over both medical and 
pastoral functions, and over the vast sums of money available to those who 
claimed to provide both spiritual and physical health.[47] Hakim Muhammad 
Mu`alij Khan. the leader of the physicians, took charge of distributing charity 
to poor Sayyids, receiving donations for that purpose from the growing 
number of Shi`i notables in Faizabad. Some critics charged him with 
embezzling substantial amounts of this charity. The number and financial 
resources of the medical doctors at court grew impressive; on his deathbed 
the nawab was attended by thirty physicians, whose combined salaries 
equaled Rs. 100,000 per year.[48] A contemporary manuscript source mentions 
ten important medical doctors at Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's court.[49] These ten Shi`i 
Sayyids and notables averaged Rs. 5,600 per year in stipends, exclusive of the 
substantial fees and gratuities they controlled. The pious physicians, some 
from Iranian or Iraqi ulama backgrounds, were something more than the 
elders of a nonconformist sect, yet far less than a professional ministry. 
Shi`i ulama of the traditional sort in Faizabad were subordinate to Mu`alij 
Khan's clique of physicians. They had no control over Islamic charitable 
institutions, nor did Faizabad's Shi`is have any public mosques or communal 
prayers, so that preachers lacked the opportunity to address large crowds. In 
both respects, Faizabad differed radically from Iran and Iraq. The major 
gatherings for Shi`is, the meetings held to commemorate the martyrdoms of 
the Imams, were dominated by eulogizers, who specialized in chanting 
techniques, rather than by the scholars of Islam, who often frowned on the 
folk practices involved in such assemblies.[50] 
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The grants by Shi`i notables served to attract increasing numbers of Imami 
ulama to Awadh's major cities. The arrival on the Awadh scene of numbers 
of trained experts in Shi`i law with a scripturalist outlook challenged the reign 
of the physicians and Sufi pirs in the religious realm. As the nawab's court 
grew more autonomous, the ruling Nishapuri family favored an assertion of 
specifically Shi`i law and ritual in order to accent its peculiar local values and 
authority. The ulama, rather than physicians or Sufis, could best articulate 
this statement. 
The growing friction between these intellectual groups resulted in a 
confrontation in Faizabad in 1779, which led to a riot. The most important 
of the Shi`i ulama in that city at the time, Mawlavi Muhammad Munir, had 
recently arrived from the Middle East. The eunuch Javahir `Ali Khan, the 
powerful manager of Bahu Begam's estates, gave the mawlavi a stipend for his 
support. Mulla `Abdu'l-Majid, an Iranian scholar who had previously served 
as the supervisor of a religious endowment in Najaf, backed Munir. 
Hakim Mu`alij Khan, perceiving these Iranian clerics as a threat to his own 
position, began to slander Mawlavi Muhammad Munir. The struggle for 
influence among the physicians and the ulama crystallized around a doctrinal 
issue. The clique of medical doctors held that the `Alid Zayd b. `Ali b. 
Husayn erred in leading Kufa in a revolt against the Umayyad government in 
A.D. 740. The Bahu Begam's eunuch courtiers, who competed with Mu`alij 
Khan for influence, bearing him great enmity, sought the opinion of Mulla 
`Abdu'l-Majid on this point. He replied that it was wrong to criticize Zayd. 
Mu`alij Khan stood firm, saying that he based his opinion on oral reports 
from the Imams.[51] 
This minor issue most likely became a rallying point more because of its 
utility in expressing the conflict between these two status groups than 
because of its substance. The view of the physicians, a more quietist one, 
suited Shi`is living in India under strong Sunni Mughal rule and in an 
overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim community. Just as Zayd should not have 
rebelled against the superior forces of the Umayyads, the physicians may have 
been implying, so Indian Shi`is should quietly accept the rule of the Mughals. 
The immigrant ulama originally came from Iran, where Shi`is formed a 
majority and anti-Sunni feeling ran high. Their support for Zayd the 
revolutionary came from a conviction that Shi`is must at all odds assert 
themselves against Sunnis. The foreign-born ulama were more communalist 
and militant than the Indian intellectuals. With the rapid decline of Mughal 
power and the ascendancy of the Shi`i nawab, such militancy became an 
increasingly viable option for members of the Awadh ruling class, such as the 
eunuchs in Faizabad. 
In addition, the eunuchs may have been especially concerned to adopt a 
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strong position in order to demonstrate their credentials as Muslims. 
Eunuchs were the children of defeated Hindu Rajputs, who were mutilated 
and brought up as Shi`is to attend upon the family of the nawab.[52] Suspicion 
of having Hindu sympathies thus attached to them in the upper-class circles 
in which they moved, and they often attempted to pass some of their wealth 
on to Hindu relatives. By adopting a militant stance on the Zayd issue they 
could at once project their orthodoxy and hit out at the physicians, their 
competitors for the favors of the begam. 
The conflict between the physicians and the ulama grew so heated that their 
partisans at length proposed a public debate. They fixed a day and announced 
the venue as the house of Bahar `Ali Khan, a eunuch in the service of Bahu 
Begam. The main parties arrived at dawn with slaves and personal troops. 
Hakim Mu`alij Khan attempted to maintain his view by asserting to his 
opponent, Mulla`Abdu'l-Majid, that reliable (mu`tabar) oral reports (hadiths) 
bore him out. The Iranian cleric challenged the elderly doctor on the 
technical meaning of the term "reliable" in the Shi`i science of oral reports. 
When Mu`alij Khan, who had studied primarily the rational sciences rather 
than oral reports, found himself unable to give a quick reply, Mulla `Abdu'l-
Majid announced the physician's defeat and abruptly left the room. Fighting 
broke out and raged for hours among the supporters of the two debaters, 
with Javahir `Ali Khan's troops and retainers emerging the victors.[53] 
The Faizabad riot of 1779 expressed the competition between Indian lay 
religious literati and immigrant Iranian professional clergy. It may further 
have symbolized the tensions brought about by the movement of some in 
Awadh toward a more scripturalist and communalist interpretation of 
Shi`ism. The physicians, most of them formerly Delhi courtiers used to 
coexistence with Sunni superiors, could not meet the demand for specialists 
in Shi`i law generated by the growth of the Awadh state. 
Early Religious Policy under Asafu'd-Dawlah 
As Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's successor, Asafu'd-Dawlah (1775-97), became 
increasingly a ruler in his own right, and the Mughal Empire no more than a 
convenient fiction for whoever held Delhi, he reversed the parsimonious 
policy toward the state subvention of religious scholars and institutions 
pursued by the first three nawabs of Awadh. Indian traditions of rulership 
required the nawab to dispense huge amounts of patronage to inferiors and 
to holy men. Some notables who opposed this new direction were replaced 
by more amenable Shi`is. Asafu'd-Dawlah not only reconfirmed long-
standing endowments and stipends to Sunni, Shi`i, and Hindu officials, 
mendicants, and 
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religious institutions, but restored some that had been usurped. The nawab's 
religious munificence denoted no streak of puritanism or fanaticism. At least 
in the early years of his reign, he drank liquor and associated with common 
Hindus. Indeed, Sunnis and Hindus profited from the policy more than 
Shi`is.[54] 
Asafu'd-Dawlah grew renowned for bestowing hundreds of thousands of 
rupees on dervishes. Sayyids, and Shi`i visitors from the Middle East.[55] The 
policy served to attract increasing numbers of Shi`i ulama to the new capital 
of Lucknow, to which he moved in order to escape the influence of the 
Faizabad establishment dominated by his father's courtiers and his mother, 
Bahu Begam. The administrators and civil servants closely related to the 
nawabate moved with him, but substantial numbers among the service elite 
remained in Faizabad in the employ of tax-farming and jagir -holding 
notables.[56] 
The Shi`i ulama in North India still enjoyed few of the advantages that 
accrued to the Sunni ulama under Mughal rule. Shi`i scholars, to be sure, did 
participate in the development of the rational sciences, writing commentaries 
on the works used in the Nizami method. But just as that syllabus paid 
relatively little attention to the study of law and oral traditions within the 
Sunni context, so Shi`i scholars were seldom well trained in the oral traditions 
of the Imams, Imami law, and the principles of jurisprudence.[57] As a small 
minority in a Sunni intellectual world, Shi`is most often studied with Sunni 
teachers. Lacking their own mosques and seminaries, they believed that the 
holding of Friday congregational prayers was illegitimate until the return of 
the hidden Twelfth Imam, who alone could rightfully lead them. This lack of 
integrating institutions and physical sites for communal study and worship 
inhibited the growth of a formal tradition of Shi`i scholarship in northern 
India. 
Still, a small ulama corps began to form, beginning with scholars who 
gathered in Faizabad after 1766, attracted by the patronage of the growing 
Shi`i notable class there. Shuja`u'd-Dawlah summoned the Akhbari 
Muhammad ‘Askari Jaunpuri to teach Shi`i sciences in Faizabad.[58] The 
nawab's wife, Bahu Begam, employed the great and popular teacher Mawlavi 
Majid Rudauli. Also of note were the legal specialist ‘Ata'u'llah Kashmiri and 
Sayyid Sari`u'd-Din b. Ashraf Mahmud.[59] As was mentioned, these ulama 
were in many ways subordinate to the court physicians. 
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The Early Career of Sayyid Dildar Ali Nasirabadi 
The opportunities for education and patronage available to Shi`i ulama from 
1766 are demonstrated by the career of Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi (1753-
1820).[60] Born and raised in the large, Sayyid-dominated village of Nasirabad 
in Rai Bareli not far from Lucknow, as a youth Sayyid Dildar `Ali learned 
Arabic and studied some basic texts in Nasirabad itself. He set out for other 
towns in order to pursue the rational sciences with individual scholars in the 
Muslim small towns. Nasirabadi's search for knowledge took him to the 
provincial capital of Allahabad, which had a relatively large Shi`i population. 
He joined the classes of the Imami philosopher Ghulam Husayn Dakani 
Ilahabadi, with whom he studied most of the basic textbooks for the rational 
sciences. As was noted above, in 1769-72 Nasirabadi explored cosmography 
(hay'at) with Tafazzul Husayn Khan, conveying questions and answers on the 
abstrusities of logic between his two mentors. Sayyid Dildar `Ali's student 
days were hard ones before he found a patron, and at one point he reportedly 
made a deal with a Hindu shopkeeper to serve as a night watchman for his 
shop if he could sleep on its doorstep.[61] 
Young Nasirabadi's peregrinations also took him north to Shahjahanpur, 
which served until 1774 as the capital of Hafiz Rahmat Khan's Ruhilah 
domain. Until that date Shahjahanpur was an important, if small, intellectual 
center with the Farangi Mahall tradition strongly represented by two former 
heads of that institution, Mulla `Abdu'l-`Ali and Mulla Hasan. Sayyid Dildar 
`Ali furthered his exploration of the rational sciences at the hands of Mulla 
`Abdu'l-`Ali, one of the foremost contemporary minds in this field. The Shi`i 
student at one point engaged in a heated debate with his distinguished tutor. 
Mulla Hasan Farangi-Mahalli, who had once angrily ejected Tafazzul Husayn 
Khan from his class, also debated Sayyid Dildar `Ali on matters of 
metaphysics.[62] 
The encounter of Sayyid Dildar `Ali with these former heads of Farangi 
Mahall in Shahjahanpur is rich in irony. Both were forced to leave Lucknow 
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by Shi`i communalists who enjoyed the backing of the nawab. Yet in their 
exile they taught and engaged in discussions with the future leader of 
Awadh's Shi`is. Admittedly, they may not hate known he was a Shi`i. But 
even in the face of the most powerful Forces for communal strife and 
separation, education in Awadh remained strangely ecumenical. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali left Shahjahanpur for Nasirabad, then journeyed to nearby 
Faizabad, where a number of Shi`i ulama were gathering under the patronage 
of Shuja`u'd-Dawlah and his notables. He fell ill, and was chided by the old 
nawab for studying too hard. When he recovered he followed the new court 
of Asafu'd-Dawlah to Lucknow, where he taught and also completed his 
studies.[63] The difficulties facing a student without a wealthy patron are 
illustrated by an incident from Nasirabadi's youth. Unable to afford a servant 
to bring food from the city market, considered an unclean place where no 
gentleman would be seen, students had to do their own shopping. One of 
Nasirabadi's colleagues, Sayyid `Abdu'l-`Ali Deoghatavi, volunteered to go 
to the bazaar, and was returning when he saw someone he knew coming 
down the road. He quickly hid himself. Then he considered that to hide a 
fault indicates a prideful desire to be honored by others. He caught up with 
his acquaintance, going out of his way to show himself and his bazaar-derived 
provisions.[64] 
Finally, Nasirabadi's diligence was rewarded. His reputation for piety and 
ability, as well as some of his early compositions, reached the notice of 
Awadh's chief minister from 1777, Hasan Riza Khan. The illiterate official, 
having these works read to him, was favorably impressed and began 
financially supporting Sayyid Dildar `Ali, giving him a stipend of Rs. 30 per 
month and including him among his companions.[65] Still, the young scholar 
was overshadowed by other, more important recipients of the chief minister's 
patronage, such as Sufi leaders. The Shi`i notables in India did not at this 
point hold the ulama in such high esteem, preferring unlettered mystics to 
learned scholars.[66] 
As the Shi`i-ruled state of Awadh began developing a more extensive local 
bureaucracy, and as its notables increasingly felt a need to promote their 
branch of Islam, the ulama became more important. The patron-client 
relationship expanded and changed in character. Younger scholars, such as 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali, pioneered a new phase in ulama-state relations in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century. Yet the need felt by the notables for a Shi`i 
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clerical class was frustrated by the lack of local scholars trained in specifically 
Shi`i sciences. In the absence of a Shi`i seminary in North India, one solution 
was to have some teachers trained in the Shi`i intellectual centers of Iran and 
Iraq. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali took his place among an increasing flow of Awadh Shi`i 
scholars to the Shi`i shrine cities of Mamluk Iraq, who went to study Shi`i 
law and help spread the religion in India upon their return.[67] An important 
predecessor, Mirza Khalil, went from Lucknow to Iraq, where he studied 
with the young Sayyid `Ali Tabataba'i, the nephew and son-in-law of Usuli 
leader Aqa Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani. Mirza Khalil, impressed with his 
teacher, endeavored to convince him to journey with him to India "in order 
to eradicate unbelief and ignorance." Sayyid `Ali, taken aback, fervently 
expressed his desire that God would never show him India or part him from 
the shrine cities. He reacted to the pious entreaty as if someone had prayed 
that evil might befall him.[68] Most high ulama in Iran and Iraq showed 
reluctance to give up all the benefits they derived from living at the Shi`i 
center in order to undertake a missionary career in an alien environment like 
North India. 
Mirza Khalil on his return had his patron, Almas `Ali Khan, offer another 
scholarship of Rs. 2,000 for study in Iraq, to Akhbari notable scholars, but 
they refused it as too small.[69] Finally Mirza Khalil went to another Akhbari, 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi, who at first begged off on the grounds that he 
had just married and lacked means to support his wife while traveling. The 
moral imperative of such a journey, however, outweighed these 
considerations, and he set out in 1779 with one young companion, Sayyid 
Panah `Ali. They proceeded arduously overland through Rajasthan to 
Hyderabad in Sindh, and thence to the coast, where they boarded a ship for 
the sea journey to Basra. 
Nasirabadi brought with him a copy of Muhammad Amin Astarabadi's Al-
fawa'id al-madaniyyah, a work hugely popular among Shi`i thinkers in North 
India. Written nearly two centuries earlier, this major statement of the 
Akhbari creed attacked such classical Usuli writers as Hasan ibn al-Mutahhar 
al-Hilli. During the long boat journey up the Euphrates Nasirabadi made 
friends with an Arab Shi`i also en route to Najaf, where he had just begun 
his studies. Their discussions came around to the principles of jurisprudence. 
Nasirabadi supported the Akhbari position, whereas his Arab friend took the 
side of the Usulis. In this discussion Sayyid Dildar `Ali first 
 
 
― 64 ― 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
― 65 ― 
encountered the now largely Usuli atmosphere of the shrine cities and found 
it disturbing.[70] 
After performing visitation to the shrine of Imam `Ali, Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
met with prominent Shi`i scholars in Najaf, committed Usulis. After several 
debates with them, Nasirabadi decided that if he insisted on arguing with his 
teachers, he would learn nothing. He then shifted north to Karbala, studying 
the oral reports from the Imams with Aqa Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani then 
seventy-five, and law with Bihbahani's younger disciples. Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
determined to throw himself into a study of Usuli works, given their rarity in 
India. He read widely on the issue of the validity of those oral reports that 
were related by only a single transmitter in each early generation (khabar al-
ahad).[71] After study of the classical writers, Sayyid Dildar `Ali began to doubt 
the validity of Astarabadi's position. In the space of a few months from his 
arrival in Iraq he adopted the Usuli school, one reason surely being the 
predominance of this ideology at the centers of Shi`i scholarship. He later 
perceived this change of views to be one of the graces he received by virtue 
of his proximity to the holy tombs of the Imams.[72] 
Nasirabadi then sought out another of Bihbahani's students, Sayyid 
Muhammad Mihdi Tabataba'i, and studied with him briefly. He pointed out 
to his teacher that in the Usuli system either a believer must be himself a 
mujtahid, or he must emulate a living mujtahid. But, he continued, the Shi`is 
of India were deprived of any opportunity for either, so that they might land 
in perdition. Tabataba'i replied that Indian Shi`is must practice caution 
(ihtiyat), following the most strict of the major positions on any matter of law. 
Nasirabadi riposted that Majlisi I once said that the most cautious position 
was not always the correct one. Sayyid Muhammad Mihdi answered that such 
instances were rare.[73] Sayyid Dildar `Ali's dissatisfaction with the practice of 
caution as a solution to the dilemma of Indian Usulis suggests that even then 
he saw the need for religious leadership which the spread of Usulism in 
Awadh would create. 
Because of his Indian background Nasirabadi had great difficulty in being 
taken seriously as a scholar, some Iranian students insisting that there simply 
were no ulama in India. They found the very thought of an Indian mujtahid 
absurd, given that only three scholars at the shrine cities were recognized 
exemplars. 
After about a year and a half, Sayyid Dildar `Ali returned to India overland 
via Kazimayn, Tehran, and Mashhad, wintering in Khurasan and 
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studying there briefly. On arriving in Lucknow he met with Hasan Riza Khan 
and had an interview with Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah. In 1781 he began 
teaching and writing in Lucknow, producing a wide-ranging attack on 
Akhbari ideas and beginning the task of training a new generation of Shi`i 
scholars in Usuli sciences. 
Conclusion 
The religion of the ruling house in preindustrial West and South Asia 
generally became an clement in state formation. The cultural traditions of 
Islam dictated that a Muslim stale have its sovereignty proclaimed in the 
Friday afternoon sermons, and in the grandeur of its cathedral mosques. In 
a patrimonial bureaucracy, religion became an important bond, the adoption 
of which allowed eunuchs and courtiers to receive appointments to high 
office. In Awadh, even Sunni elites outside the ruling circle sometimes 
adopted Shi`ism or expressed greater love of `Ali and his family within a 
Sunni framework, in order to bond themselves with the ruling house. As will 
be seen, Hindu notables and government officials also accommodated 
themselves to Awadh's newly Shi`i atmosphere. 
Awadh's external borders were demarcated by wars with the Bangash and 
Ruhilah Afghan clans and with the British. In the Bangash battles, not only 
professional soldiers but Shaykhzadah clansmen defended their region arid 
championed Nishapuri rule. This gives a clue to internal processes at work 
in Awadh, whereby local Sunni elites expressed a preference for even Shi`i 
nawabi rule over other alternatives. The nawabs derived their legitimacy from 
Mughal appointment, and their power from Shi`i and Hindu troops. 
Although they expropriated many Sunni revenue-free holdings subventing 
religious institutions, they were seen by most Sunnis as the lesser of evils 
when compared with the Afghans. 
Awadh's move toward greater autonomy from the Mughals, and the desire 
of Shi`i notables for experts in Imami law and theology to service their 
households, created an increasing need for a professional Shi`i clergy. At first 
this exigency was partially met by the court physicians, then by an influx of 
Iranian and Iraqi Shi`i ulama seeking patronage. The clash of physicians with 
foreign ulama pointed to the need for an indigenous, trained ulama corps, 
who Could help to articulate symbolically the growing autonomy of 
Nishapuri Awadh and spread Shi`i sciences. Sayyid Dildar `Ali's two-year 
sojourn in Iraq and Iran was a first step toward the formation of such a corps. 
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PART TWO 
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
POPULAR SHI`ISM IN AWADH 
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3 
 
Shi`ism and Muslim Social Groups 
 
The origins and social composition of the Shi`i population in Awadh are 
central questions for the social historian of religion, albeit questions difficult 
to answer. The flowering of Imami Shi`i popular ritual, and the spread of 
formal Imami religious institutions in the nawabi period took place, not in a 
vacuum, but against a background of folk beliefs now difficult to recover. 
The Shi`i notables that flocked to the nawabi court, many from Iran, 
Kashmir, and Delhi, are easier to trace than the partisans of `Ali in the small 
towns and in the bazaars. Nevertheless, nineteenth-century British census 
takers and administrators collected information useful for a reconstruction 
of the social origins of Awadh's Shi`is, and local and family histories 
sometimes also contain relevant data. 
This survey of Shi`i influence on the major Muslim social groups in Awadh 
will look first at the "noble" (ashraf) castes, most of them rural gentry, urban 
administrators and tax-farmers, or merchants. Since these groups often 
cannot be precisely identified by social class, they will be discussed as status 
groups, in the Weberian sense. Then the little available information on 
Shi`ism among artisans and craftsmen will be presented. Finally, there will be 
a discussion of links between Shi`ism and north Indian Sufi brotherhoods, 
religious organizations that often had mass followings. Shi`is always 
remained a small minority in Awadh, but their influence with the nawabi 
court gave them an importance out of proportion to their numbers, so that 
they profoundly influenced Awadh culture. 
Shi`is and the Census 
The north Indian Shi`i population in the eighteenth century can only be 
guessed at, and not until after the fall of the Awadh kingdom do population 
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statistics become available for the area. Tables, as of 1881, give Sunni and 
Shi`i population figures in each district of the combined British 
administrative unit of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh (an area 
nearly equivalent to the Greater Awadh ruled by Shuja`u'd-Dawlah in the 
eighteenth century). But census takers did not divide Muslims by sect when 
they recorded their occupations. We thus know the number of Muslim 
weavers in Lucknow district, but not how many of them were Shi`is. 
Without census statistics for the occupations of Shi`is and Sunnis as separate 
groups, the question of the specific niches in society filled by Shi`is cannot 
be answered. Nevertheless, it must be bound up with the social position of 
the Muslims in general. Even here the British census figures, frustratingly 
incomplete, have the disadvantage for the period under study of originating 
late in the nineteenth century. The census of 1891 first gave tables showing 
caste and occupation by religion in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, 
and Crooke's classic Tribes and Castes supplemented it for ethnographic 
information, making it, for all the problems mentioned above, a good 
analytical starting point. 
The census for the area of concern here covered two late-nineteenth-century 
administrative divisions. The first, the North-Western Provinces, constituted 
areas the British conquered north of Awadh, as well as provinces they 
annexed from Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan of Awadh in 1801. The second, 
"Oudh," was the British name for the area of Awadh that remained under 
the rule of the nawab after he ceded half of it to the British East India 
Company in 1801. The British later annexed "Oudh" itself in 1856. 
The British census takers extensively employed the category of "caste" (jat), 
even for Muslims, and preferred this category over occupational ones, 
creating conceptual problems in their collection of data. A weaver (julahah), 
displaced by the influx of cheap British textiles, who began working as a 
bearer might give his caste as weaver without mentioning his occupation. 
Census takers created an even more serious problem for historians by 
recording high-status "caste" groups such as Mughals and Sayyids only under 
those rubrics, assigning them no occupation.[1] A Shaykh who wove for a 
living but simply reported his ethnic identity would be included in the 
Shaykhs rather than in the weavers. 
This confusing procedure has left us with over two million Muslims, 37 
percent of the Muslim population in the North-Western Provinces and 
Oudh, classified only as Mughal, Pathan, Sayyid, or Shaykh, all groups being 
opaque as to actual occupation. Many high-caste Muslims may have been 
reluctant to admit to being employed, aspiring to at least the appear- 
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ance of being gentlemen of independent means. Although most Mughals 
probably owned property and land, and many Sayyids held land, large 
numbers of Pathans and Shaykhs almost certainly worked as skilled artisans, 
owning little or no land. On the other hand, the landholding elite no doubt 
contained numerous Shaykhs and Pathans. 
The "Noble" Castes 
Although the statistics concerning the "noble" (ashraf) castes therefore tell us 
little about social classes, they tell us much about status groups. Max Weber's 
conception of status groups (Stande) terminologically derives from the 
preindustrial European division of society into "orders" based on function 
and privilege. In the industrializing Germany of the early twentieth century 
Weber appropriated the word "order" (Stand) to a new use, in English 
rendered by "status group." In Weber's exposition, social classes are 
determined by their economic position and by market forces, whereas status 
groups are culturally determined bodies with a more ambiguous relationship 
to economic position.[2] Status groups depend on honor and on a style of life, 
and the group's solidarity is often reinforced by marrying only within it 
(endogamy). 
Weber gave as an example of status groups American clubs, in which persons 
of various social backgrounds might meet. He was aware that the variation 
tended not to be extreme, and that status groups were linked with social 
classes in many ways. In the long run, he noted, property is always recognized 
as a status qualification. But then, so might be the lack of property, as in the 
case of wandering holy men. Status groups tend to monopolize a set of ideal 
and material privileges. But material privileges are not solely determinative, 
and a newly wealthy family might be excluded from a wealthy status group 
because it is seen to lack the ideal qualifications for membership. Weber also 
pointed out that status groups could evolve into castes, who religiously felt 
that contact with persons outside their caste defiled them. Status groups 
become castes when they involve underlying differences that are held to be 
ethnic. 
A Weberian approach to the Muslim ashraf groups solves many conceptual 
problems, since Weber saw status groups and castes as similar phenomena 
on a continuum, beginning with purely conventional clubs and ending with 
full-blown Hindu-style castes. The Muslim noble groups certainly began as 
status groups, and through endogamy and declarations of common ancestry 
moved toward becoming castes. Caste formation in their case seldom 
achieved the completeness witnessed among the Hindu groups. 
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For instance, not all members of the Muslim noble castes would see contact 
with a common Muslim as ritually polluting. Many anthropologists of India 
have seen the Muslim "castes" as "caste-analogues," social formations that 
imitated the pure Hindu castes. Weber's approach allows us rather to see 
them as consequences of status-group development along ethnic lines. Thus, 
the Sayyids, or putative descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, would be 
"castes" in the Weberian sense in many parts of the Muslim world, and not 
only in India. This fact in itself brings into question the necessity of seeing 
Indian Sayyids as a "caste-analogue" created by the influence of a Hindu 
environment. The genuine influence of Hindu conceptions on Muslim status 
groups in transition toward becoming castes can hardly be denied, but 
influence differs from causation. 
The highest status group among Muslims, the Sayyids, included a quarter of 
a million persons in the area under study, constituting only about 4 percent 
of the total Muslim population and 10 percent of the noble castes taken as a 
group. The Sayyids asserted their descent from the Prophet Muhammad or 
from one of his close relatives. This link to the holy and revered person of 
the Messenger of God gave Sayyids special status and privileges within the 
Muslim community. Many who declared their Sayyid descent in India did so 
as a means to or statement of upward mobility, and lineage claims must be 
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treated with circumspection. But the biological reality of such sources of 
family honor is sociologically irrelevant when the public generally accepts the 
lineage as authentic. A little over 10 percent of noble Muslims living in the 
North-Western Provinces and Oudh were Sayyids, whereas in Oudh the 
percentage was twelve. This slight disproportion may represent Sayyid 
families attracted to Awadh during the rule of the nawabs, themselves 
Sayyids, and who, as Shi`is, guaranteed a special place in their dominions for 
members of the Prophet's family. 
Awadh's Sayyids divided themselves genealogically into many subgroups, the 
most numerous being those asserting descent from the Prophet through his 
daughter, Fatimah, and her husband, `Ali. For extra honor, or to stress their 
Shi`ism, some emphasized descent from `Ali and Fatimah through one of 
their descendants, most often one of the Twelve Imams revered by the 
Imami Shi`is. Over a quarter of Awadh's Sayyids asserted descent from Imam 
Riza, the eighth Imam, and almost 10 percent from Imam Husayn, the third 
Imam. Another 10 percent reported their lineage as going back to Zayd, 
another `Alid. Altogether, those asserting descent from Fatimah and her 
descendants, including the Twelve Imams, constituted 67 percent of the 
Sayyids. The rest gave their forebear as another relative of the Prophet, such 
as his uncle `Abbas, or identified themselves according to Sufi order (Chishti, 
Qadiri, Jalali Suhravardi) or place of origin (Baghdad, Bukhara, Sabzavar).[3] 
A powerful link existed between Sayyids and Shi`i Islam. Since the majority 
of Sayyids emphasized descent from an Imam revered by the Imami Shi`is, 
they often sympathized with Shi`i figures against their foes, the latter often 
portrayed as heroes by Sunnis. Though most Sayyids remained Sunnis, even 
they tended to have pro-`Alid sympathies. The Sayyids were particularly 
susceptible to the Shi`i ideas filtering into the Mughal Empire from Iran after 
1501. A sociologist who studied Shi`i marriage customs found that, in a 
sample drawn from middle- and upper-class social networks in several 
geographical locations, fully half his respondents said they were Sayyids. A 
strong Shi`i presence among Sayyids appears in other sources, many Sayyid 
families in the upper Doab, for instance, being Shi`is.[4] Such data, admittedly 
impressionistic, nevertheless give a strong and consistent impression. 
Nearly a quarter of Awadh's Sayyids late in the nineteenth century lived in 
Lucknow district, and another 12 percent dwelled in Faizabad district. Bara 
Banki, Gonda, and Hardoi also possessed large Sayyid populations, but all 
the other districts of Awadh had only three to four thousand Sayyids each. 
The privileges, patronage, and charities bestowed on Sayyids in the nawabi 
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centers of Lucknow and Faizabad acted as a magnet for them. The rural 
Sayyids congregated, not in the very small Hindu villages that accounted for 
most human habitation in North India, but in large villages or small towns 
(qasabahs), where they formed part of the landholding class.[5] 
In the qasabahs, local trade depots with small permanent bazaars, landholders 
built forts, water tanks, mosques, and irrigation facilities. Despite their rural 
setting, these islands of semiurban settlement fostered some literate culture 
among the Muslim gentry based there, allowing them to send some of their 
sons to the imperial court as civil servants and religious dignitaries, and so to 
maintain links with the cosmopolitan center. Indeed, both rentier and courtly 
service status were crucial to the qasabah elite families, and if both were not 
maintained, their fortunes could easily decline.[6] 
The small landholding families based in the provincial towns originally were 
of several types. The Mughal monarchs often granted revenue from land 
(madad-i ma`ash) to religious scholars, mystics, and Sayyid or other noble 
families. The Mughal rulers did not thereby alienate the land and could 
resume the grant at any time. A more permanent form of landed wealth was 
the zamindari, and old provincial zamindar families built up hereditary estates. 
As Muzaffar Alam has shown, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries the Delhi court treated holders of madad-i ma`ash favorably in tax 
assessment, encouraging their power as a balance to the increasingly 
insubordinate old zamindari families. Many learned and Sayyid families 
holding revenue grants used their wealth to purchase zamindaris .[7] In the 
nineteenth century some small landholding (zamindar) houses built up estates 
consisting of hundreds of villages, becoming very large landholders 
(ta`alluqdars). Despite their sometimes positive role in keeping up irrigation 
facilities and in providing security through their forts, many zamindars, 
whether Muslim or Hindu, preyed parasitically on the labor of the Hindu 
peasants who worked their estates and lived outside the fort's protecting 
walls. 
Insights into the Sayyid gentry can be gained from considering the histories 
of some prominent families. In the Akbarpur parganah of Faizabad district 
twelve Hindu and twelve Muslim landed houses predominated from 
medieval times. One of the Muslim houses, whose numerous nineteenth-
century members were Shi`is, asserted their descent from Sayyid Taj, said to 
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have emigrated from Arabia in the mid-fourteenth century. Another family 
traced itself back to Sayyid Ahmad, also from "Arabia," through the medieval 
magnates Sayyid Phul and Sayyid Piyare, the Hindi names perhaps indicating 
Hindu background masked by later usurpation of Muslim noble status. 
Also of note were the progeny of Sayyid Sulayman Nishapuri, who settled in 
Awadh in 1403 and married into the family of the aforementioned Sayyid 
Ahmad. He acquired a huge estate, and even in the nineteenth century 
believers venerated his tomb by an annual ceremony. His descendants, Shi`is, 
are numerous. They include the Pirpur and Kataria ta`alluqdar landholding 
houses, which produced great-estate builders in the nineteenth century. 
Shaykh Ahmad Qattal Luristani, said to have come from Iran, arrived in tile 
early 1400s. At one time eleven distinct branches of his family owned land in 
Akbarpur parganah, but these villages were absorbed into the ta`alluqdar 
estates of Pirpur and Samanpur. Luristani's putative descendants are Shi`is. 
In the Birhar parganah, the Sayyids of Nasirabad asserted their descent from 
Sayyid Nasiru'd-Din, said to have fled Iran during the disruptions caused by 
Timur's military campaigns. Akbar granted the family revenue-free holdings, 
although these were partially confiscated by Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan in the 
nineteenth century.[8] 
In Bara Banki, Muslim Shaykhs and Sayyids owned almost half the villages, 
though they constituted only 2.6 and 0.6 percent of the district's population, 
respectively, in the late nineteenth century. In some small towns, Sayyids 
exercised unquestioned dominance. The Shi`i Sayyids of Zaydpur had ten 
mosques and seventeen imambarahs in the late nineteenth century, but 
permitted no Sunni mosques or Hindu temples.[9] In Kintur, Bara Banki, 
Sayyids held two-thirds of the village lands, including a number of rent-free 
(mu`afi) grants.[10] The Sayyids there asserted their descent from the brothers 
Sayyids Sharafu'd-Din and Muhammad of Nishapur, said to have forsaken 
Iran for Awadh in the time of Hulagu the Il-Khanid Mongol ruler. The 
Nishapuri Sayyids of Kintur produced several outstanding Shi`i religious 
scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[11] 
Sayyid landholders exerted great social and cultural influence from tile small 
towns they helped create in Hardoi, as well. In the nineteenth century a 
thousand Sayyids owned half the land in parganah Bilgram, saying they were 
descended from Sayyid Muhammad Wasiti, who conquered it in A.D. 1217. 
(He is also held to be the progenitor of the Barhah Sayyids in Muzaffarnagar 
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north of Awadh.) In the time of Shah Jahan, Sayyid Isma`il Bilgrami adopted 
Shi`ism.[12] Even in the heavily Sunni atmosphere of Awrangzib's India, 
Bilgrami Sayyids wrote elegies for members of the Prophet's family, such as 
`Ali, thus exalting their own genealogy.[13] Some prominent Bilgram Sayyid 
families embraced Shi`ism in the late eighteenth century. Their putative 
cousins. in Barhah, of course, became Shi`is centuries earlier, and they 
wielded paramount influence at the Mughal court in the first two decades of 
the eighteenth century. The Sayyids were also important in Sandila, another 
renowned qasabah of Hardoi, where they owned 8 percent of the surrounding 
villages in the nineteenth century.[14] 
The Sayyids of Ja'is and Nasirabad in Rai Bareli district further exemplify the 
pattern of early settlement, imperial land grants, and later adoption of 
Shi`ism. They hold themselves to be in the line of Sayyid Najmu'd-Din 
Sabzavari, who they say accompanied Salar Mas`ud Ghazi on his eleventh-
century expedition into North India. (Their own genealogies belie such 
antiquity, going back, at 24.1 years per generation, only to the fourteenth 
century.) The Sayyid qasabah at Ja'is split seven generations after Sabzavari's 
arrival when Sayyid Zakariyya moved three miles away, founding a new 
settlement inside a fort at what became Nasirabad. The Sayyids of Ja'is and 
Nasirabad held land grants from the central government, dominating 
surrounding villages, but coming into sanguinary conflict with Hindu martial 
clans, often having to submit to powerful rajas. They benefited from the trade 
between Delhi and Allahabad, and, later, from the area's thriving textile trade. 
One of their number tutored Bahadur Shah (r. 1707-12). During his reign, a 
time of great Shi`i influence at court, a few Sayyids in Nasirabad embraced 
Imami Shi`ism. Later, Shi`i nawabi rule in Awadh accelerated the adoption 
of Shi`i beliefs.[15] Nasirabad produced an important Shi`i cleric, Sayyid Dildar 
`Ali (1753-1820), whose career will be described in later chapters. 
In Jarwal, Bahraich, the Sayyid line derived from Sayyid Zakariyya, who fled 
Iran during the Mongol invasion by Genghis Khan, obtaining a 15,000 bigha 
grant from the Delhi sovereign, Ghiyathu'd-Din. In 1800 the Jarwal Sayyids, 
some of them Shi`is, displaced the Ansari Shaykhs and came to hold 276 out 
of 365 villages in the parganah, although their holdings thereafter de- 
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clined rapidly to (a still formidable) 76 villages in 1877.[16] The `Alid 
genealogies of all Sayyids, and the pro-Shi`i sentiments of many, led them to 
develop origin myths that tied in with the tragedy of Karbala (where the 
Prophet's grandson Husayn b. `Ali died fighting the Umayyad government 
in A.D. 680). One Sayyid author from Ja'is wrote of the Awadh qasabahs in 
the nineteenth century that most of their headmen were Sayyids or Shaykhs 
because these groups, having supported `Ali and the Imams against other 
claimants to rulership of the Islamic Empire, fled the central Islamic lands 
for fear of their lives when the holy figures met defeat. They made their way 
through Afghanistan down to North India, settling in Ja'is, Nasirabad, 
Manekpur, Salon, Bilgram, Sultanpur, Sethan, Rudauli, Amethi, and so forth. 
Through royal edicts, they became rent-free landholders (jagirddars) and 
middle landlords (zamindars).[17] 
This myth held that Sayyids and some Shaykhs toiled as Muslim pioneers in 
an alien and hostile Hindu environment because of the same injustice that ck 
down `Ali and Husayn and denied the Prophet's immediate family 
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political power after his passing. Even in their exile, he wrote, the Sayyid and 
Shaykh partisans of `Ali found themselves pursued by fanatical Sunnis, such 
as the Pushtu-speaking Afghan immigrants to North India. The Afghans, 
antagonistic toward the Sayyids, refused to give them their daughters in 
marriage.[18] Families declaring themselves Sayyids often competed for land 
with Shaykh houses tracing their descent from Abu Bakr or ‘Umar, and 
Shi`ism had the ideological advantage for Sayyids of rendering the Shaykhs' 
ancestry a source of shame rather than pride. Shi`is held that the caliphs 
usurped rights belonging properly to the family of the Prophet. 
Sayyids also pursued trades in urban centers. In the eighteenth century the 
Sayyid artisans of Amroha were renowned for their gilded pottery decorated 
with colorful floral designs.[19] In Lucknow, Sayyids engaged in all professions 
and arts save trading.[20] Mrs. Ali, who lived among Lucknow's Shi`is for a 
decade in the early nineteenth century, wrote of the urban Sayyids: "They 
rarely embark in trade, and never can have any share in banking, or such 
professions as would draw them into dealings of usury. They are chiefly 
employed as writers, moonshies, maulvees, and moolahs, doctors of the law 
and readers of the Khoraun; they are allowed to enter the army, to accept 
offices of state."[21] She noted that a special charity existed among Shi`is for 
indigent Sayyids, pious believers giving one-fifth (khums) of certain kinds of 
income to them in charity. Mrs. Ali reported that no self-respecting Sayyid 
with sufficient means of support would accept this charity. Moreover, she 
indicated that many Sayyids refused gifts if they suspected that the donor 
gained the money through usury.[22] 
Among the Sayyids, the conflict between status and class can be clearly 
discerned. Mrs. Ali said that conscientious Sayyid families always regarded 
birth before wealth in contracting marriages. Some poor Sayyid families 
preferred that their daughters remain spinsters rather than marry into rich 
families not of Sayyid background. Since the father's need to provide a costly 
trousseau (jahiz) for his daughter posed a major obstacle to marriage for the 
poor, one form of charity consisted in a well-to-do Shi`i presenting an 
indigent Sayyid father with such a trousseau. 
Mrs. Ali described a poor Sayyid household with unmarried girls. Highly 
educated, they could read the Qur'an in Arabic and its commentaries in 
Persian. This family preferred that the girls spend their days performing 
needlework rather than wed a wealthy non-Sayyid.[23] Those in this situation 
attempted to maintain their status honor by upholding social conventions of 
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hypergamy (where the daughter marries a social equal or superior) and by 
engaging in a style of life not incompatible with their status pretensions.[24] 
Although Mrs. Ali said that "conscientious" Sayyids followed this behavior, 
less strict Sayyid families sometimes traded their high status for increased 
economic security by marrying their girls to well-to-do non-Sayyids. Also, no 
doubt some risked their honor by claiming the "share of the Sayyids" (sahm-i 
sadat) even though they were not particularly indigent. 
At the nawabi court in Lucknow, courtiers took respect for Sayyids seriously 
in social intercourse. For instance, in military parades the Sayyid regiments 
marched ahead of the others. Relevant anecdotes on this theme were 
recounted by Mir In-sha'a'llah Khan, a Sayyid whose family said they 
immigrated to North India from Najaf in Iraq, and a respected poet and boon 
companion of Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan (1799-1814).[25] Once in a 
conversation with the nawab, by a slip of the tongue he referred to a garden 
called "Imambagh" (the garden of the Imam) as "Imambap" (the father of 
the Imam). This unintended allusion to the Prophet would ordinarily have 
been a serious breach of etiquette, but Sa`adat ` Ali Khan grinned and excused 
the poet on the grounds of his own Sayyid origin. Once the powerful eunuch 
Afarin `Ali Khan had an altercation with Mir In-sha'a'llah Khan. Later at a 
salon, the poet quoted a verse in which he satirically pronounced 
imprecations upon himself. Afarin `Ali Khan pounced on the opportunity to 
second the sentiments. The poet angrily replied that a non-Sayyid who curses 
a Sayyid is himself accursed. The nawab, upset at any hint of disrespect for 
the House of the Prophet in his court, begged forgiveness for Afarin `Ali 
Khan. Upon seeing that his foe had lost face, Mir In-sha'a'llah pardoned 
him.[26] 
Sayyids enjoyed ceremonial marks of honor at court and in polite Muslim 
society, but their position was hardly unassailable. Although Sayyid-oriented 
philanthropies acted as a safety net, members of this group could become 
quite badly off. Further, they did not necessarily enjoy political privileges. 
When Sa`adat `Ali Khan agreed to cede half his dominions to the British in 
1801 to pay off debts that the governor-general maintained the previous 
nawab had incurred, he grew reluctant to make any more grants of state land 
to traditional recipients such as Sayyid families. Indeed, he resumed former 
Sayyid grants in such areas as Birhar, Faizabad, and Sandila, Hardoi.[27] 
The Sunni-Shi`i schism caused problems for Sayyids, for although both 
branches of Islam respected the descendants of the Prophet, they revered 
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only those adhering to their own branch. For instance, the chief mujtahid of 
Lucknow from 1820 to 1867, Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, ruled that if a 
Sayyid does not have real faith (i.e., if he is not a Shi`i), then his being a Sayyid 
does him no good whatsoever.[28] A Sayyid family wishing to maintain high-
status honor among both Sunni and Shi`i neighbors would face difficulties. 
Ultimately such a family might have to choose which community it desired 
honor from, and the wealth of Shi`i notables and patrons in nawabi Awadh 
helped attract Sayyids to the Imami community. 
The Mughals often possessed greater wealth and held higher office than the 
Sayyids, though they, had lower status.[29] Indians applied the term "Mughal" 
(mughul), literally meaning "Mongol," indiscriminately to all immigrants from 
central Asia, including Iran. These Iranians and ethnic Turks generally filled 
high-ranking posts with the government or served in the cavalry. Though 
they frequently received land grants in remuneration for their services, they 
were most often absentee landlords, remaining out of touch with the 
provincial, rural Muslim elite in the qasabahs.[30] Some Mughals also came to 
India as long-distance merchants. 
The Mughal Empire employed Persian both for administrative purposes and 
as the polite language at court. This meant that educated Iranians immigrating 
to wealthy India possessed special advantages in procuring positions as 
administrators, bureaucrats, and men of the pen. Since the Safavid regime in 
Iran presided over a mass conversion to Imami Shi`ism, immigrants during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries often brought with them a Shi`i 
identity. Nor were the numbers of such settlers small. The French jeweler 
and merchant Chardin gave as one reason for Iran's under-population in the 
late seventeenth century the exodus to India.[31] In fact, it seems unlikely that 
enough Iranians left for the subcontinent to affect Iran's population, but 
Chardin's observation underscores the large number of Iranians he saw in 
India. In the 1660s, most of these immigrants must have been Shi`is. During 
the early reign of the Mughal emperor Awrangzib, 1658-78, out of 486 high-
office holders 136, or 28 percent, were Iranians.[32] These mostly Shi`i 
Iranians often hid their beliefs at the Sunni Mughal court. If one added to 
the Iranians the number of Indian Shi`i officeholders (e.g., the Barhah 
Sayyids), the proportion of Shi`i nobles would reach one-third. Moreover, 
nearly half of the fifty-one highest-office holders were Ira- 
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nians. The conflict between the Shi`i Iranians and the Sunni central Asian 
Turks along religious and ethnic lines much influenced court politics.[33] 
In 1891 nearly half of all the Mughals in the North-West Provinces and Oudh 
resided in the comparatively small area of Awadh (Oudh) proper. Although 
they constituted only 3 percent of the noble castes in the whole area, they 
were almost 6 percent of the ashraf in Awadh. This without doubt reflects the 
employment opportunities offered them by the Awadh state during the 
nineteenth century, as the British abolished the old Muslim bureaucracies in 
Delhi and Bengal. 
More than 50 percent of the Mughals in Awadh resided in Lucknow and 
Faizabad districts, the two great administrative centers of the region, over 40 
percent dwelling in Lucknow alone. The only other major Mughal population 
center was Sitapur district; but Mughal immigration there was probably 
spurred by the post-annexation splendor of the Mahmudabad estate and 
most likely did not represent a feature of nawabi Awadh. Two-thirds of the 
Mughals were not classed under any ethnic subdivisions in the census, but 
large numbers were Shi`i Iranians. The remaining third fell into three groups: 
Chaghatai Turks, Turkman, and Qizilbash. Of the three, the Qizilbash 
constituted the smallest group, with only 1,237 listed. All Shi`is, they played 
an important role in establishing Shi`ism both in Iran and in the 
subcontinent, and most of them lived in Awadh proper. 
The Qizilbash, originally a federation of Turkish-speaking tribes in Anatolia, 
moved east in the fifteenth century because of increasing Ottoman control 
over their grazing lands. They lent their aid in the establishment of the Shi`i 
Safavid state in Iran.[34] Over two centuries later some served in Nadir Shah's 
army, playing a central role in the invasion of India and in the sack of Delhi 
in 1739. The second nawab of Awadh, Safdar Jang (1739-54), made it a point 
to employ Iranian Mughals for his cavalry, as well as Kashmiri Shi`is who 
imitated the Iranians in speech and dress. He hired away six or seven 
thousand Qizilbash warriors from Nadir Shah's army. Their subsequent 
career was checkered, and after the defeat of his forces at the hands of the 
British at Baksar in 1764, Nawab Shuja`u'd-Dawlah dismissed many of them 
and even razed some of the Mughals' houses.[35] Nevertheless, the Iranian 
traveler Shushtari found large numbers of Qizilbash notables in Lucknow in 
1796.[36] Many Qizilbash cavalrymen may have sunk into the laboring classes 
in Faizabad and Lucknow, losing their original identity, and the confused 
lineage of Mughals, owing to their tendency to intermarry with other groups, 
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including Hindus, may have caused their reported numbers to be low.[37] On 
the other hand, the Qizilbash would have taken local wives and raised 
substantial numbers of Shi`i children. Some Rajput converts to Islam 
attempted to create a Mughal identity for themselves, which may often have 
involved affecting Iranian, Shi`i ways. 
Although most of the Turkish Mughals adhered to Sunnism, even they 
sometimes, like others in the upper class, adopted Shi`ism in the eighteenth 
century. An example is the family of Khwaja Musa Khan, a professed 
descendant of the Sufi leader Baha'u'd-Din Naqshband. Emigrating from 
central Asia to India early in the eighteenth century, he married into the 
Mughal royal family. Under the influence of Burhanu'l-Mulk, the first nawab 
of Awadh, he became a Shi`i. His son, Madaru'd-Dawlah, refused to practice 
dissimulation in Sunni-dominated Delhi, openly mourning the Imam Husayn 
during Muharram. His daughter married Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan of 
Awadh, and his son-in-law granted him a huge rent-free holding worth Rs. 
60,000 per year.[38] This Turkish family with staunch Sunni origins employed 
its adherence to Shi`ism as a means to cement relations with rising Shi`i 
powers, such as the nawabs of Awadh. 
By far the most numerous of the ashraf groups were the Shaykhs and Pathans. 
Over half of the "noble" caste members in North-Western Provinces and 
Oudh were Shaykhs.[39] In Awadh the proportion was slightly less, about 46 
percent. Most asserted their descent from the first three caliphs or from other 
companions of the Prophet. The upper-class Shaykhs, often middle or large 
landholders in the districts, dwelt in qasabahs alongside the Sayyids. But many 
village and urban artisans and skilled laborers said they were Shaykhs, which 
accounts for their huge numbers. Shaykhs tended to be Sunnis, though some 
became partisans of `Ali and his eleven descendants. Many Sunni Shaykhs 
did commemorate the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn, though they 
frowned on the violent self-flagellation of the Imamis and could not abide 
the Shi`i practice of pronouncing imprecations on the first three caliphs. 
Pathans, descendants of Pushtu-speaking tribesmen, roamed down into 
North India from Afghanistan and the area around Peshawar throughout the 
medieval period. The eighteenth century witnessed a particularly great influx 
of Pukhtun tribesmen, who in their Indian environment became "Pathans" 
if they were accepted as noble, but remained known simply by their tribal 
names (e.g., Ruhilah) if such pretensions were rejected. The 700,000 of them 
in the province in the late nineteenth century constituted a third of the 
members of the "noble" castes. Earlier in the century many of 
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them roamed as pastoral nomads, some settling as landlords and warriors in 
the fortified qasabahs . Many became artisans and skilled laborers before the 
1891 census. Rajput converts often attempted to usurp Pathan status. 
Pathans, mostly originally Sunnis, generally retained their ancestral faith in 
North India. Some few may have been Persian-speaking Shi`i Hazaras who 
joined Pukhtuns in southward migrations, or Shi`i Afghans from the Upper 
Bangash.[40] Elphinstone, who visited the Peshawar region in 1808-9, found 
Afghans extremely hostile to Shi`i practices.[41] Many Pathans in North India 
did take up the practice of commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, 
though in the middle of the nineteenth century some abandoned the rituals 
under the influence of Naqshbandi revivalism.[42] 
The piety and spiritual feelings of those who adopted Shi`ism cannot be glibly 
explained by the social scientist on an individual level. But the spread of 
religions among large groups of people does often present patterns amenable 
to sociological analysis. From the above discussion, it seems clear that noble 
castes or status groups reacted to Shi`i ideology differently according to its 
implications for their own honor and specialized traditions, and for their 
economic position. Sayyids, as descendants of the Imams revered by the 
Shi`is, gained ideologically by embracing Shi`ism, and in Shi`i-ruled nawabi 
Awadh they could often benefit materially from such a move. They received 
special charities from the believers, as well as gaining favor with the ruling 
class. Still, the vast majority of Sayyids remained part of the Sunni 
community, within which they also had great honor. Mughals were Shi`i 
when they were from Iran, strong Sunnis when they were from, say, . In the 
atmosphere of nawabi Awadh, even Sunni Turkish notables of Mughal status 
sometimes adopted Shi`ism. Since Mughal status usually required 
specialization in the higher levels of administration or in the cavalry as 
military men and officers, Mughals associated closely with the court and came 
under special pressures to adopt Shi`ism. 
Shaykhs largely remained Sunni, perhaps partially because most dwelt in 
provincial cities and towns away from the influence of the Nishapuri court. 
Moreover, for this group to adopt Shi`ism required them ritually to curse 
their own putative ancestors, the caliphs and companions of the Prophet who 
competed with `Ali. This requirement posed no insuperable problems to the 
adoption of Shi`ism, but may have slowed the rate at which proud Siddiqi, 
Faruqi, and ‘Uthmani qasabah elites became partisans of `Ali. Pathans, with 
their strong Sunni feelings, seldom embraced Shi`ism and more often 
competed with the established Sayyid families in Awadh for land and power. 
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Artisans and Craftsmen 
Many members of the four ashraf groups just discussed came from 
landholding and military families. In the province under study, Muslims were 
proportionately represented in these rules. They very seldom, however, 
labored in the countryside, constituting only about 3 percent of the 
agricultural work force.[43] The Muslim laboring classes worked far more 
often as village or urban petty artisans and entertainers than as farming 
peasants. 
Muslims were particularly well represented in some occupations. For 
instance, of 1.8 million weavers almost half were Muslims, though in the 
general population Muslims constituted about 13 percent. Large weaver 
conversions to Islam were typical of North India.[44] Indeed, weavers, with 12 
percent of the Muslim population, formed the largest Muslim occupational 
group. Only Shaykhs (21 percent) were more numerous, but the latter is an 
ethnic rather than an occupational category. In fact, many Skaykhs actually 
worked as weavers, depending on agriculture part of the time. 
Weavers in their urban and semiurban settings strongly felt their Muslim 
identity, the British ethnographers describing them as "factious and 
bigotted."[45] Weavers often knew enough of Islamic law in the late nineteenth 
century to follow the Islamic Law (shari`ah) in matters of marriage and 
inheritance. But Muslim weavers in small villages sometimes revered local 
gods. To some extent their anti-British feelings reflected their competition 
with European textiles and the adverse impact on them of British commerce 
even from the eighteenth century.[46] 
No overall estimate of the number of Shi`is among the weavers can be given. 
In the extremely important textile center of Tanda, thirty-six miles east of 
Faizabad, Shi`is represented 3 percent of the Muslim population.[47] This 
accords with other estimates of Shi`is in the general population of Awadh, 
although no conclusions can be drawn from one city. Moreover, the small 
number of persons identifying themselves explicitly as Shi`is may be 
misleading, since they often practiced dissimulation out of fear of Sunni 
neighbors. Shi`is had great influence even where their numbers were small. 
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Tanda had forty-four mosques, thirty-four imambarahs for the 
commemoration of Imam Husayn's martyrdom, and nine Hindu temples. 
Clearly, in their devotional lives even the Sunnis included mourning for the 
wronged family of the Prophet. 
A methodological question arises when one speaks of Sunnis and Shi`is 
among the artisans and laborers. A revealing passage in the 1891 census 
suggests that rather inadequate criteria were used to distinguish the two 
groups: "For the less instructed of Muhammadans and especially amongst 
Sunnis, the difference between the two sects is little understood, and the 
enumerator had in general to ascertain the sect by a question as to how the 
hands were placed in prayer. Sunnis pray with one hand placed over the other 
in front of the body, Shias with both hands depressed by the sides."[48] 
For the many laboring-class Muslims who did not say their daily prayers, such 
criteria would have been meaningless. Even for those who did, the Shi`i 
willingness to compromise out of fear made members of that group less likely 
to insist on performing rituals in their own way. Those who reported 
themselves as Shi`i were therefore much more likely to be literate and well-
off, laboring-class Shi`is being undercounted. 
Other Muslim occupational groups with large numbers included barbers, oil-
dealers, tailors, butchers, water-bearers, washermen, and blacksmiths. These 
seven groups together with the weavers accounted for more than a quarter 
(26.5 percent) of all Muslims. Other, smaller, such occupational castes 
brought the total in the category of skilled and specialized workers to 37 
percent. Given that many Shaykhs and Pathans also worked as artisans, one 
receives the impression that most Muslims formed part of a premodern petty 
bourgeoisie. The successful traders, shopkeepers, owners of small 
workshops, and skilled artisans among these nonlanded Muslims often had 
some appreciation of the requirements of scriptural religion, as the 
ethnographic reports make clear. Low-caste and unskilled groups, and recent 
converts from Hinduism, tended to practice many Hindu usages. 
Muslims were far more likely than Hindus to live in urban settings. The 1881 
census showed that only 7 percent of Hindus lived in towns and cities, 
whereas 25 percent of Muslims did.[49] Since over 96 percent of agricultural 
laborers were Hindus, the Muslims who did not live in towns dwelt in large 
rather than small villages, where they could pursue their skilled crafts. Of 
course, the very large proportion of Hindus in the population (87 percent in 
1891) meant that they constituted a majority in most urban settlements. They 
also dominated commerce. Bayly has insightfully described the rural and 
urban relations of Hindus and Muslims as a mirror image. The qasabah- 
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based Muslim landholders employed Hindu peasant labor on their lands, 
whereas the urban Hindu merchants and traders employed Muslim 
craftsmen.[50] 
One traditional explanation for Hindu-Muslim conversion has been that low-
caste groups or those who lost their caste standing attempted to take 
themselves out of the Hindu system to remove the stigma.[51] Conversion, 
however, also clearly followed patronage networks. Indeed, one explanation 
for the high number of Muslim weavers in North India may lie in the 
production of such groups for the Muslim landed classes and for Muslim 
rulers. The links built up between the weavers and their Muslim patrons 
facilitated conversion to Islam, especially in a society where people felt 
strongly about purity and pollution in something as personal as clothing. 
Likewise, Muslim water carriers (bihishtis) served Muslim households.[52] 
The same principle of conversion along lines of patronage applied to the 
spread of Shi`ism. With a rising Imami regional court in eighteenth-century 
Awadh, the patronage of Shi`i notables became a major input into the 
economy. One finds groups servicing the elite split into Sunni and Shi`i 
factions, which often became endogamous. An example is the bards and 
storytellers (naqqals), Sunnis except in Awadh urban centers, where they 
became Shi`is. Members of the two sectarian divisions did not intermarry. 
Likewise, the dyer caste, which dyed cloth, divided into endogamous Sunni 
and Shi`i groups. In the upper Doab, servants and peasants of Shi`i Sayyid 
proprietors became Shi`is under the influence of their masters. This 
phenomenon occurred widely in Awadh as well. Many artisans had reason to 
be grateful for Shi`i rituals, such as parading replicas of the Imam Husayn's 
tomb, which generated work for them and even brought into being new 
crafts, such as that of the ara'ishvalas who constructed the cenotaphs. 
Cenotaph construction became a major craft in Awadh, and the makers of 
these ritual props took their place in the bazaars beside the butchers and 
greengrocers.[53] 
Courtesans (tava'if), another lower-class group dependent on patronage, 
became Shi`is in great numbers. About 85 percent of the courtesans counted 
by the British were Muslims, many of them Shi`is. Originally mostly low-
caste Hindus, often these women came from the ranks of widows. The men 
of the caste married, and their wives remained faithful, being purchased from 
other castes. The women born into the caste became dancing girls and often 
prostitutes. Girls began to be educated in the appropriate arts at age eight, at 
which time their parents offered sweetmeats at the local mosque, to be given 
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to the poor. Shi`ism attracted this group, since its law permitted temporary 
marriage (mut`ah), an institution that provided limited legal protection to the 
courtesan, which simple prostitution did not.[54] Shi`ism also provided a link 
of identity with the propertied classes, who patronized and exploited the 
courtesans, a bond that might have proven especially useful to the men of 
the caste, who acted as pimps. In the rural areas zamindars often assigned 
lands to Muslim dancing girls and prostitutes.[55] 
Among Sunni groups that did not embrace Shi`ism, Shi`i figures and holy 
days had an impact, though often in a transformed manner. Sunni 
shopkeepers of the Ranki caste cornmemorated Muharram, the Shi`i month 
of mourning for the Imam Husayn, by getting drunk. The Sunnis of Dalmau 
held a fair at Muharram, which 6,000 people attended annually.[56] Days that 
might for strict Shi`is be a solemn period of bereavement, in which they 
pursued no economic activity, became for Sunni villagers an occasion of 
gaiety or an opportunity for trade. This implied no hostility to Shi`ism, since 
all honored the Imam Husayn. It did represent a more typically Indian 
response to the sacred time of Muharram than the austere mourning rites 
that Imamis imported from Iran. 
Shi`ism among artisans and laborers went through various permutations, 
partially because they had little personal contact with the literate of their own 
branch of Islam, often not having close links with the high ulama identified 
with the court. The grain parchers (bharbunja) included Muslims who, when 
they married, called a Hindu pandit first, then a Muslim mawlavi. 57 Indigent 
Muslims could not afford the services of the official qazis and ulama, 
resorting instead to the unofficial "mawlavis" of the Dafali caste. Muslim 
beggars and musicians devoted to the cult of Salar Mas`ud Ghazi centered in 
Bahraich, they officiated at the weddings and funerals of the poor.[58] 
A devotion to the family of the Prophet existed among Muslim artisans and 
laborers, but this seldom involved a willingness to curse the caliphs. The 
nawabi high notables and the Shi`i clerics sought to play on pro-`Alid 
sentiments among the popular classes so as to mobilize them into a 
scripturalist Imami Shi`ism that did include ritual imprecations on the first 
three caliphs. The Shi`i notables' attempt to bring the popular classes into 
Imami Shi`ism[57] 
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succeeded most fully when these artisans and laborers worked for a Shi`i 
patron. On the one hand, Imami religious ideas spread along patronage 
networks among the poorer classes; on the other, artisans and laborers clearly 
created their own religious culture, devoting themselves to the family of the 
Prophet for their own reasons. The sense of oppression and martyrdom that 
pervades Shi`i stories of the Imams no doubt aroused the sympathies of 
people themselves oppressed by North India's prebendal feudalism. 
Sufism and Shi`ism 
In addition to the Dafalis a huge. number of Muslim holy men wandered 
North India, many of them holding the Shi`i Imams in special reverence and 
helping spread Imami ideas among laborers and artisans. The holy men 
(faqirs) of the largest of the mass orders, the Madariyyah, did not strictly 
follow the prescriptions of scriptural law. The 150,000 holy men of the 
Madariyyah in late-nineteenth-century North India constituted 2.3 percent of 
the Muslim population. The number of lay devotees must have run into the 
millions. The Madariyyah cult centered on the shrine of Shah Madar at 
Makanpur, a saint who arrived in India from Aleppo, Syria, in the fifteenth 
century. The Madari holy men imitated the Hindu holy men (sanyasis), seldom 
prayed or fasted, and used bhang (akin to hashish) freely. Some were settled 
family men; others wandered about. They revered in particular four sacred 
personages: Muhammad, Imams `Ali and Husayn, and Hasan al-Basri.[59] The 
emphasis on `Ali and Husayn, rather than on Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, 
represented a proto-Shi`i devotion to the family of the Prophet. 
Other, much smaller unorthodox (bi-shar`) orders included the Qalandar, 
Azad, Bi-Nava, and Sain groups. The literate, urban orders of the Qadiriyyah, 
Chishtiyyah, and Jalaliyyah Suhravardiyyah averaged only four or five 
thousand faqirs each. Although almost all historiography of Islam in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century North India has been locked into a 
fascination with the Delhi-based Naqshbandiyyah order, it was clearly not 
very important in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, where census 
enumerators found only 658 Naqshbandi faqirs.[60] If one takes the number 
of faqirs enumerated as an indicator of popular support, it is clear that only 
the Madariyyah was a truly mass order. As such, it was most influential, 
though it has been greatly neglected in the historical literature. Among the 
literate 
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orders, the Chishtiyyah often showed a tolerance of Shi`ism.[61] Shirvani, who 
visited India early in the nineteenth century, found that members of the Jalali 
Suhravardi order considered themselves Shi`is and cursed the Sunni caliphs. 
Many of these dervishes, he reported, neglected orthodox rituals and used 
drugs.[62] The thousands of members of the Jalali order in North India no 
doubt helped spread Shi`i ideas among the popular classes. 
Conclusion 
Imami Shi`ism existed in Awadh as a popular and not just a ruling-class 
cultural force. Admittedly, its most powerful proponents were the ethnic 
Iranians in the upper echelons of government administration and the middle 
landholding Sayyids. Among some other groups, including the semiurban 
and urban artisans and laborers, a cult of the Prophet's family existed, 
although the status of some of these persons as Shi`is remains unclear. Early 
in the eighteenth century most of these popular-class believers probably saw 
no contradiction between devotion to `Ali, his wife Fatimah, and their 
descendants, on the one hand, and honoring the first three caliphs, on the 
other. As the nawabi state and its clerical clients began promoting Shi`ism as 
an exclusivist ideology, some artisans and laborers made a choice for the 
family of the Prophet and against the caliphs. The group that was mobilized 
into exclusivist Shi`ism grew throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The majority of the Muslim population, however, continued to 
honor both the family of the Prophet and the caliphs. 
The centers of Shi`i population, as revealed by the 1881 census, show a 
barbell stretched across the North-Western Provinces and Oudh from 
Muzaffarnagar to Ghazipur.[63] Ironically, aside from those in Lucknow and 
Faizabad districts, most Shi`is lived in the upper Doab and in Banaras 
division. Nawab Shuja`u'd-Dawlah had controlled these areas, but the 
nawabs gradually ceded them to the East India Company in 1775-1801. In 
the north, the number of declared (and therefore probably only the literate) 
Shi`is approached or exceeded 10,000 in Muzaffarnagar, Bulandshahr, and 
Moradabad, with Bijnor at nearly 6,000. In the southeast the districts with 
about 10,000 included Allahabad, Jaunpur, and Azamgarh. At the center of 
the Shi`i demographic map stood Lucknow district, with 34,550 Imamis, the 
only district where they exceeded or even approached 5 percent of the 
population, being 30 percent of the Muslims there. Faizabad had over 11,000 
Shi`is, and Bara Banki over 5,000. The rest of Awadh proper had few Shi`is. 
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This pattern suggests that, although the nawabi court encouraged conversion 
in, and attracted Shi`is to, its administrative centers, in several districts 
outside their dominions in the nineteenth century Shi`ism formed a popular 
movement independent of the nawabs. The great numbers of Imamis in 
Lucknow and Faizabad also represent to some extent the amount of talent 
attracted to the nawabi centers, not only from Awadh, but from the upper 
Doab and Banaras and Allahabad divisions. Although the census revealed a 
relatively small number of Imami Shi`is in northern India, about 3 percent of 
the Muslims, the movement extended over large areas geographically and 
attracted adherents from all social classes and status groups. For the reasons 
discussed above, the census probably undercounted Shi`is. Whatever their 
numbers, the Imamis represented a vigorous and influential subculture in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century northern India. 
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4 
 
Popular Shi`ism 
 
The account of the Awadh Shi`is' social origins in the preceding chapter 
explains why scattered Shi`i lineages existed to support the Nishapuri nawabs 
and to benefit from their rule. But it does not explain how these Shi`i or 
proto-Shi`i groupings developed into a community. In the Mughal period, 
and especially under Awrangzib, Shi`is had no public rituals separate from 
Sunnis which could serve as the matrix of community formation. Religious 
identity and social networks within a genuine religious community could only 
grow up around a set of uniting public rituals. Under the patronage of the 
nawabs and their Shi`i courtiers and notables, such public rituals developed 
in Awadh.[1] 
The Shi`is of nawabi Awadh created a distinctive set of practices and rituals. 
Many new believers in the Imams entered the fold in this period, making 
their own contributions. Their rituals changed over time, shrines grew up, 
and lay believers of various classes and both sexes practiced their faith in 
their own ways, sometimes in opposition to the strictures of the growing 
corps of scripturalist ulama. Large numbers of Sunnis and Hindus were 
drawn into participation in the mourning rites for the martyred Imam 
Husayn, bringing their own influence to bear. Yet popular Shi`i practices 
most often resulted from the cultural dynamism and creativity of ordinary 
laborers, artisans, and shopkeepers, themselves partisans of `Ali, rather than 
de- 
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riving from "corruption" by Hinduism. As Turner argues, popular religion 
involves a specialization of religious services for different lay markets.[2] 
The rites of popular Shi`ism in early-nineteenth-century Awadh had two 
conflicting effects. On the one hand, widespread urban participation in 
Muharram rituals helped integrate, through a central ritual, the nawabi cities' 
diverse and growing populations. Lucknow's patron saint became the Imam 
Husayn. On the other hand, the divisive nature of some Shi`i practices, 
especially cursing the caliphs honored by Sunnis and forbidding Hindu 
celebrations during Muharram, encouraged the growth of an incipient 
communalism. 
The Nawabi Transformation of Lucknow 
Under the nawabs, Lucknow became the Realm of the Shi`ah (Dar ash-
Shi`ah). There, artisans and laborers who newly adopted the faith of the 
Twelvers inventively honored the Imams. The nawabs' administrative and 
architectural transformation of the city formed a crucial prerequisite for this 
development. Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah (1775-97) moved the Shi`i nawabi 
court from Faizabad to Lucknow in 1775. Already more than a small town 
then—indeed, a major textile-producing center—it had often served as the 
region's administrative capital.[3] Nevertheless, the 1775 move marked the 
beginning of a new era. 
When the nawabs lived primarily in Delhi they could change the provincial 
capital according to their perception of military and security needs.[4] From 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century, however, they found themselves 
increasingly boxed in by the British. Unchanging territorial boundaries after 
1801 and a stabilization of revenue collection within them brought into 
existence a fixed capital wherein the service elite congregated. For several 
decades Faizabad, with its begams, large landholders, and tax-farmers, 
continued to compete with Lucknow. But the capital soon grew so large that 
it constituted the only true metropolis in Awadh and one of the great cities 
of the subcontinent. 
The huge expenditures by the notables based in the capital supported tens of 
thousands of artisans and attracted merchants "of large property" from all 
over India.[5] The substantial textile and horse trade between Kashmir and 
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Bengal passed through Lucknow, and the town increased rapidly in extent 
and population. In 1799 Tennant put the city's population at half a million 
(probably an exaggeration) and marveled at the wide-ranging architectural 
works undertaken under Asafu'd-Dawlah. "There are," he wrote, "perhaps 
no buildings in Britain equally brilliant in external appearance as the palaces 
of Lucknow."[6] But he also remarked on the city's great poverty, filth, and 
vice, and on the large number of idle workers and artisans. 
Asafu'd-Dawlah implemented an extensive building program, tearing down 
old buildings to landscape spacious gardens in the Persian style. Indeed, the 
city grew so fast in the 1770s and 1780s that Azfari found it "unbalanced" 
(na-mawzun). The: building program was given added impetus by the drought 
years of 1784-85, when, even in Awadh, no rain fell for an entire year. The 
areas to the west were even more badly hit, causing a great influx of refugees 
into Lucknow. Laborers and peasants suffered terribly, many being sold as 
slaves, and the price of wheat in the capital went up to an astronomical nine 
or ten sers to the rupee. Sayyid `Abbas Ardistani's grandfather could 
remember the drought and told him that people were reduced to eating 
animal dung.[7] 
Asafu'd-Dawlah, Hasan Riza Khan, and Tikait Ray, in response to this crisis, 
initiated construction projects on an almost pharaonic scale as a means of 
absorbing the influx of laborers thrown off the land and of avoiding urban 
food riots. In 1785 several large works began, including a market, Tikaitganj; 
a huge gate, the Rumi Darvazah; and the Great Imambarah. Thousands of 
workers labored day and night on these projects for several years. Tradition 
has it that even men of respectable family worked incognito at night to earn 
food. The nawab-vizier spent a million rupees a year on buildings, and his 
many projects fueled a spiraling inflation rate as construction materials and 
food soared in price.[8] 
Lucknow's population may have increased in the period 1775-1800 from two 
hundred to three hundred thousand.[9] In about 1805 Shirvani estimated that 
the city had 100,000 dwellings, 30,000 shops, 2,000 taverns, and 1,000 
mosques.[10] The expansion was spurred not only by government-sponsored 
employment and markets and the famine but also by a spurt in the growth of 
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the textile trade with Calcutta. The resulting influx of uprooted Muslim and 
Hindu laborers and artisans into the city created new social networks and 
cultural traditions. Because of the pervasive influence of the Shi`i ruling class 
in the capital, they often adopted some Imami practices even where they 
retained a formal adherence to Sunnism or Hinduism. Urban immigrants 
held Shi`i-style mourning sessions for the Imam Husayn, and Muharram 
processions, organizing them on a neighborhood basis. 
The Institution of the Imambarah 
The need for a physical site where the partisans of Imam `Ali could publicly 
mourn his martyred son, Husayn, brought into being the Great Imambarah 
and smaller similar structures. Nawab Safdar Jang raised a building for this 
purpose in Delhi, though the term imambarah (Urdu for house of the Imam) 
had not then come widely into use. During Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's reign, 
Aqa Baqir Khan constructed an imambarah in Lucknow for his nephew, a 
high Mughal official, and the edifice served as a model for the Husaynabad 
Imambarah almost a century later. The north Indian imambarah of the 
eighteenth century may have been influenced by the Iranian Husayniyyah, or 
takiyyah, and by the south Indian `ashur-khanah .[11] 
The court invited architects to submit designs for the Great Imamabarah, the 
winner being the Delhi architect Kifayatu'llah. Because neither the Mughal 
emperor nor the nawab-vizier controlled Rajasthan any longer, the sort of 
marble used in the facade of the Persianate Taj Mahal proved unobtainable, 
and Kifayatu'llah was forced to have his engineers fall back on more native 
Indian techniques. They used clay bricks and stone, with ingenious mud 
molding that allowed the architect to achieve an immense, unsupported 
ceiling "more durable. . . than our most scientific Gothic vaulting."12 
Mashhadi estimated the cost of the building at half a million rupees, but the 
Iranian traveler Shushtari put the Imamabarah and mosque complex with its 
lavish decorations at a million rupees.[13] 
Isfahani also attested to the huge expenditures made by the nawabi court on 
the Imambarah and its ornamentation.[14] He said that even after the 
building's completion in 1791 (A.H. 1205) the nawab spent four or five hun- 
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dred thousand rupees on its decoration annually. Hundreds of gold and silver 
replicas of the Imam Husayn's tomb in Karbala were placed in the edifice as 
offerings to the Imam, along with innumerable glass chandeliers and 
candelabra. These offerings left no room for spectators and mourners to sit 
in the main hall. Valentia wrote that the Imambarah was stunningly 
illuminated with candles during the month of Muharram, and that in various 
parts of the building believers said prayers. He remarked that "every evening 
all unbelievers and followers of Omar, Othman, and Abu Bakr were 
anathematised, to the edification of the Hindoos, who, on this occasion, 
crowded there in great numbers."[15] 
Asafu'd-Dawlah's courtiers emulated his construction program in their own 
areas, so that in every neighborhood they put up new mansions, imambarahs, 
and mosques.[16] Hasan Riza Khan built an imambarah and a mosque, and as 
soon as his mosque was ready he transferred Friday prayers there from his 
palace. Later they were held in the large mosque Asafu'd-Dawlah constructed 
next to the Great Imambarah.[17] Most of Lucknow's Shi`i grandees, the likes 
of Afarin `Ali Khan, Tahsin `Ali Khan, Ramadan `Ali Khan, and Tajammul 
Husayn Khan, built imambarahs in this period, as did many Sunnis and 
Hindus. In the early 1800s some 2,000 large imambarahs and 6,000 smaller 
ta`ziyah-khanahs embellished Lucknow.[18] The eminent Shi`i cleric Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi constructed an imambarah in the early 1790s, which 
became a major center of religious culture and a burial site for many Shi`i 
ulama.[19] For the notable class, imambarahs performed many functions. They 
served as places for ritual mourning and worship, as literary salons, as 
personal monuments, arid as family cemeteries. Increasingly the endowment 
(waqf) of such buildings became a secure means of passing on wealth to future 
generations, since they could not then be sold and any income associated 
with them could be assigned to descendants as remuneration for 
supervision.[20] This institution also provided employment to subaltern ulama, 
who served as caretakers and read Qur'an verses for the deceased. 
Notables spent much less on such buildings than did the nawab and his 
immediate circle, however. For instance, Mirza Jangali had a monthly 
allowance of Rs. 3,000 from his brother, Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan. He 
bought a 
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piece of land in Patna toward the end of his life for Rs. 3,000 and built a 
mosque and an imambarah on it. He appointed Rs. 50 per month for a 
manager, a caretaker, and the expenses of Qur'an readings and prayers. When 
the Mirza died he was buried on the grounds of this complex. Later nawabs 
continued the pension to his descendants, including the money for the 
upkeep of the imambarah and the mosque, but the British cut it off because 
of the family's involvement in the 1857-58 rebellion.[21] In contrast to Iran, 
such endowments rarely came under the supervision of the high ulama. In 
the case just cited the deceased's own sons supervised the endowment. 
The elegiac poetry that dominated the religious culture of the imambarahs gave 
more public exposure to poets and reciters than to the staid ulama. Asafu'd-
Dawlah's court attracted numerous poets and reciters of elegies (marsiyyah-
khvans), who came to hold an important place in public life. Mirza 
Muhammad Riza, a friend of Hasan Riza Khan's and the greatest reader of 
elegies in his day, used to chant from the Qur'an at the commemorations of 
Nawab Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's passing held by his widow in Faizabad.[22] Elegy 
reciters, such as Mulla Muhammad Shushtari and Shah Husayn Vilayat, came 
to Lucknow from Iran, and found appreciation at the nawab's court. Asafu'd-
Dawlah appointed Shushtari, a poet and rawzah-khvan with some clerical 
training, to recite elegies in the Great Imambarah. An expert in music (an art 
forbidden by the legalistic ulama), he had a beautiful voice, which could melt 
peoples' hearts.[23] 
Poets, such as Mirza Rafi`u'd-Din Sawda and Mir Taqi Mir, began making 
their way to Lucknow from fading Delhi, where they often turned their 
talents to religious elegiac, or marthiyyah, poetry. Some, such as Miyan 
Sikandar, Gada, Miskin, and Afsurdah, began specializing in the marthiyyah . 
In the late eighteenth century poets replaced the four-line form of the Urdu 
elegy, favored in the Deccan, with a more reflective six lines, beginning a 
transition to the almost epic feel of the mid-nineteenth-century elegies- of 
Imam Husayn.[24] 
The poetry had both a literary and a ritual purpose. As ritual, reciters read it 
at mourning sessions as a means of making present the eternal, sacred time 
of `Ashura’, when the Prince of Martyrs redeemed Muslims with his 
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blood. The rhythmic character of poetry lent itself to this task better than 
prose, the mourners working the rhythms into their flagellations. The 
symbolic appeal of Husayn for the Shi`is of Awadh, who felt themselves to 
be in exile from Arabia or Iran, is well demonstrated by one of Mir's verses. 
Imam Husayn stands facing his bloodthirsty foes after the loss of most of his 
supporting troops, holding his infant son, `Ali Asghar. He addresses the 
Syrians, saying: 
I now swear to you an oath 
that I shall restore my honor 
I shall go elsewhere, having left this Arab 
army; I shall make India my abode.[25] 
Even Sunni scholars, such as Mawlavi Mubin Farangi-Mahalli (d.1810), made 
contributions to devotional literature mourning the Imam Husayn. Shi`i 
ulama worked the events of Karbala into their sermons, and produced studies 
of the tragedy based on Arabic oral reports from the Imams.[26] 
The development of the imambarah as an architectural form under the 
patronage of the nawabi court and courtiers provided a crucial meeting place 
for Shi`is. The Shi`i community, previously scattered and reticent, could now 
come out in public to commemorate the death of its Imams. Although the 
notable classes met in salons in any case, Shi`i tradespeople and laborers 
might otherwise have had no place to make one another's acquaintance. The 
imambarahs and smaller buildings, as well as the homes of believers, became 
centers of new Shi`i social networks and places where displaced Sunnis and 
Hindus could adopt Shi`ism. 
The Shrine to the Standard of Hazrat `Abbas 
Popular religion in northern India often centered on the tombs of holy men, 
and Shi`is no doubt yearned for a like institution within their own branch of 
Islam. In the late eighteenth century such a shrine grew up. One Mirza Faqir 
Beg returned to Lucknow with a relic from the shrine city of Karbala in 
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Mamluk Iraq during the reign of Asafu'd-Dawlah (1775-97). He said that a 
dream helped him unearth the rectal crest that had surmounted the banner 
of `Abbas, the Imam Husayn's half-brother, at the battle of Karbala. He kept 
the crest. at his home in Rustamnagar, where people began bringing offerings 
(sing. nazr) and giving them into his care. The building at first consisted of 
four bare walls, an unadorned roof, and a small courtyard.[27] The site's 
growing popularity attracted Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah's attention, and he built 
a dome for the dervish's house, rendering it a proper shrine.[28] The place 
became popular for the little people in search of healing, sons, and spiritual 
blessings, and flower and sweets merchants began doing a booming trade in 
front of the gate. Brigands and ruffians also began gathering in that part of 
the town, attracted by the new wealth the shrine brought to Rustamnagar.[29] 
A turning point came when Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan fell seriously ill, in 
about 1801, making a vow to construct a splendid new building for the 
standard should he recover. Restored to health in 1803, he took out a 
magmficent procession with his courtiers to the shrine of `Abbas, 
distributing money along the way to the thronging multitudes lining the 
streets. At the shrine he said a prayer of thanksgiving, then ordered that a 
new edifice, with an impressive gilded dome, be raised on the site. He 
established a fund to cover the shrine's expenses, and people began gathering 
there regularly on Thursday evenings. 
As members of the notable class gradually appropriated the shrine to 
themselves, it became necessary to provide more security. The nawab 
stationed patrolling police in the vicinity, with a daroghah over them, who 
cleared out the ruffians.[30] Mrs. All reported that during Muharram "by the 
condescending permission of the Sovereign, both the rich and the poor are 
with equal favour admitted," implying that during other months access for 
the poor was more restricted.[31] Ever more precious offerings were kept at 
the shrine, including a collection of fifty-two priceless jewels. A woman's 
quarter was added so that females of the notable class could pray in private.[32] 
Notable-class women took out processions to the shrine, with great pomp 
and parade, after giving birth to a male child and after his circumcision. 
Female relatives and friends, as well as domestics and eunuchs, accompanied 
them, with the men riding behind and helping guard the sanctuary while the 
women were inside. Similar processions were taken out by both men and 
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women of the upper classes on their recovery from illness or their 
preservation from possible danger. 
After Mirza Faqir Beg's death his son Fath-`Ali succeeded him as caretaker 
of the shrine, which in the 1820s yielded great amounts of cash and clothes, 
some of which the guardian of the shrine distributed to the poor in charity if 
he was "a good mart."[33] Finally, the shrine was integrated into the mourning 
rites of Muharram in Lucknow, a process discussed below. A Sufi Shi`i whom 
the ulama would have excoriated as a heretic founded the shrine of `Abbas, 
a purely folk phenomenon. It remained under the supervision of the 
founding family. Some ulama cast doubts on the authenticity of the crest of 
`Abbas's standard, which the shrine allegedly housed, and this may indicate 
their own frustration at having so popular a religious phenomenon outside 
their control.[34] This expression of skepticism had no discernible effect upon 
the great numbers frequenting the shrine. The notable class made a more 
successful attempt to assert control over the spiritual resource, and by their 
patronage they gradually made it and its environs so wealthy that the area had 
to be strictly policed. The notable class partially restricted the access of the 
common people, whose creation the shrine had been, so that their ladies 
might safely visit it. 
The shrine was only one manifestation of popular love for the family of the 
Prophet and belief in the efficacy of supplicating its members. In the event 
of sickness or loss of property Shi`is called upon the particular Imam whose 
characteristics made him suited to deal with the problem. On Fridays 
believers wrote supplications to the Twelfth Imam, who they thought to rule 
the world from a supernatural sanctuary until his millennial advent, folding 
them up and placing them in the Gomti River, certain that they would reach 
the Imam Mahdi.[35] 
Some Shi`is drew pictures of the Messenger of God and the Imams, based 
on what they knew of their virtues and appearance, and set them up as 
household shrines, to which they performed visitation (ziyarat). When 
informed of this practice. Sayyid Dildar `Ali ruled that drawing living things 
large enough to have a shadow was strictly forbidden in Islam, and that the 
"visitation" of such images had no meaning.[36] 
Another indication of popular beliefs diverging from the mujtahids' 
orthodoxy was the widespread existence of millenarian expectations among 
Awadh's Shi`is. Mrs. All reported that many north Indian Shi`is believed that 
the Twelfth Imam would return in A.H. 1260 (A.D. 1844), and that "'When 
the four quarters of the globe contain Christian inhabitants, and 
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when the Christians approach the confines of the Kaabah, then may men 
look for that Emaum who is to come.'" The Imam, they believed, would be 
accompanied by Jesus Christ, and together they would purge the world of 
wickedness so that" 'all men shall be of one mind and one faith.'"[37] 
The Shi`is of North India keenly felt that they were encompassed by 
Christian power, which had effectively penetrated their quarter of the globe. 
The insecurity and cognitive dissonance produced by the extension of East 
India Company rule were involved in the sentiments expressed to Mrs. All 
that the old world order was about to be rolled up in 1844. Such millenarian 
expectations devalued existing institutions, posing. a threat to Establishment 
figures like the mujtahids. 
Household shrines to images of the Imams, and the shrine of `Abbas's 
standard made the sacred, manifested for Shi`is in the Imams, present to the 
ordinary folk of Lucknow. Yet the sacred, like material goods, became the 
object of a struggle for control by various social groups. As the shrine to 
`Abbas's standard drew multitudes, including neighborhood toughs running 
protection rackets, its prestige caused the court and notables to invest it with 
wealth and with their own aspirations. This patronage in turn made it 
necessary for the state and the notables to assert control over the shrine 
through police and restricted access for the public, who had created the 
shrine by their hopes. In times of large-scale public ritual performances the 
notables allowed greater access to the shrine. At the same time, scripturalist 
ulama attempted to discourage such practices as keeping household shrines 
to the Imams, with their decentralizing implications for religious authority, 
and beliefs like millenarianism that undermined faith in the Establishment. 
Nevertheless, the popular classes in Awadh appropriated the Imams for their 
own devotion. 
Observance of Muharram 
The story of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and his family, and the ritual 
observances Shi`is developed to commemorate it, proved central to the 
formation of a Shi`i community in Awadh. This central story, called by 
Fischer the "Karbala paradigm," communicated profound existential truths 
about justice and injustice, life and death.[38] The distinctive manner in which 
Awadh Shi`is, as well as Sunnis and Hindus, responded to the mourning 
month of Muharram merits investigation in its own right. But their response 
is all the more important in that it had implications for communal relations. 
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Extravagance marked the observance of the month of ritual mourning, 
Muharram, during the Asafu'd-Dawlah period. In 1784 the nawab beat 
himself so violently on the tenth of that month that he bled profusely, falling 
seriously ill after accompanying representations of the Imam's tomb to the 
river, into which they were thrown at the end of the day. The nawab's officers 
followed his example in demonstrating particular munificence during the 
mourning session. Khwaja ‘Aynu'd-Din, the tax-farmer of Bareli as of 1779, 
used, "every year, after the 10th of Muharram, to scramble his household 
furniture, and refuse no one who asked him for a present."[39] 
Sa`adat `Ali, Asafu'd-Dawlah's British-imposed successor, set a rather more 
restrained tone. Because of his territorial, and hence financial, losses to the 
British, he pursued greater economy, melting down several of his 
predecessor's gold ornaments for bullion and spending far less on Muharram 
ceremonies. Although the scale of expenditure for the ceremonies never 
again matched that of Asafu'd-Dawlah's days, it remained far from 
inconsiderable. Roberts, expecting a "fast of the most mournful kind," 
remarked with surprise that it was "accompanied by so much pomp and 
splendour that strangers are at some loss to distinguish it from festivals of 
pure rejoicing."[40] Believers manifested the impulse of generosity in many 
ways. To commemorate the thirst Imam Husayn and his companions felt 
when denied water by their tormentors, Muslims in Lucknow distributed rose 
water. Some ladies gave out milk in the streets, and often people erected 
stands beside their houses where passersby could quench their thirst.[41] 
In the early 1800s, only the high notables had their own imambarahs, whereas 
the middle notables held mourning ceremonies in their large homes.[42] In the 
1820s, when Mrs. All lived in the capital, many more of the wealthy had built 
imambarahs . They erected them on the public, male (mardanah) side of the 
house, designing them as square buildings with cupola tops. Their size 
depended on the wealth of the builder, and they often served also as family 
mausoleums. Guests sat on a calico covering overlaying a cotton carpet on 
the floor of the imambarah . Its walls boasted many mirrors, intended to 
multiply the candles and reflect the brilliance of the chandeliers, and the 
notables competed in decorating their imambarahs with great splendor. 
Two ritual props graced the room, a stairway-like pulpit (minbar) and a replica 
of the tomb (zarih or ta`ziyah) of the Imam Husayn in Karbala, both facing 
Mecca. The pulpit, constructed of silver, ivory, ebony, or other fine materials, 
often matched the cenotaph. The reciter of elegies sometimes sat, 
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and sometimes stood, on the steps of a pulpit covered with gold cloth or 
broad cloth (green, if owned by a Sayyid). On each side of the cenotaph were 
ranged banners of silk or with gold or silver embroidery and fringes, hanging 
from staffs topped by crests with outspread hands whose five fingers 
represented the "five pure souls": Muhammad, Fatimah, `Ali, Hasan, and 
Husayn. At the base of the cenotaph the host arranged objects that might 
have been used by the Imam, such as a fine sword and belt, set with precious 
stones, a shield, bow and arrows, or a turban.[43] 
Believers fashioned the cenotaphs from all sorts of materials, from pure 
silver. to paper and bamboo, depending on the wealth of the owner. 
Different styles of cenotaphs developed in Lucknow, Delhi, Calcutta, and 
Hyderabad.[44] In the Great Imambarah stood fourteen tombs of pure silver, 
one for each of the Twelve Imams, the Prophet, and Fatimah.[45] The tomb 
replicas designed for an imambarah or a private residence were often made of 
ivory, ebony, sandalwood, or cedar. Mrs. Ali saw some wrought in silver 
filigree, and admired one the nawab had made in England of green glass with 
brass moldings. The inexpensive cenotaphs, made in the bazaar from 
bamboo and colored materials, ran from two to two hundred rupees in price. 
The laboring and lower middle classes set these up in their homes during 
Muharram and carried them in street processions.[46] 
The imambarahs of the notables inspired wonder in the artisans and laborers, 
who visited them in the early evening before the services began. However, 
notables did not allow the popular-class pilgrims to remain during the 
mourning sessions in the imambarahs, to which they invited only their friends 
and relatives and their servants.[47] The imambarahs made statements not only 
of piety but of wealth, power, and status. They constituted an interface 
between the wealthy and the poor who honored Husayn. But they also served 
to demarcate social lines, since the participatory mourning sessions held in 
them were very exclusive affairs. 
The upper-class form of mourning spread from Lucknow into the rural 
provinces through the influence of the prestigious nawabi court at Lucknow. 
The nawabs of Farrukhabad became Shi`is in the late eighteenth century. In 
Awadh, the great landholder Imam `Ali Khan of Bhatwamau (d. 1815) was 
the first Sunni ta`alluqdar to become a Shi`i and begin mourning practices in 
his provincial seat of power.[48] Some Shaykhzadah leaders in Lucknow had 
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converted to Shi`ism under Safdar Jang, maintaining marital links with the 
Sunni rural magnates. Muhammad Imam Khan (d. 1760s) of the large 
Mahmudabad estate in Sitapur married a Shi`i Shaykhzadah woman. One of 
their sons, Muhammad Mazhar `Ali Khan (d. 1790s), under the dual 
influence of his mother and the Lucknow court, converted to Shi`ism, 
inheriting the smaller portion of the estate in Belehra, Bara Banki. Although 
his conversion gave him an entiée into the ruling circles in Lucknow, he faced 
a great deal of hostility from his father and other relatives. 
The larger Mahmudabad portion of the estate remained under the control of 
Mazhar `Ali Khan's Sunni brother, Ikram `Ali Khan (d. ca. 1775). One of 
Ikram's sons, Musahib `Ali Khan, ruled tile Mahmudabad estate 1805-19, 
ruthlessly building up his holdings to a huge 232 villages and establishing 
good relations with the Awadh court by supporting it against rebels. 
Although he remained a Sunni, he initiated mourning rites for the Imam 
Husayn in a building inside the fort at Sitapur. He had no male issue, and in 
1836 his widow adopted a son of the Shi`i Belehra branch of the family, Raja 
Nuvvab `Ali Khan, who had lived long in Lucknow and become close to 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar's court. From his accession, Mahmudabad, one of the 
largest rural estates in Awadh, was Shi`i-ruled.[49] Even the Sunni Raja of 
Nanpara kept Shi`i ulama, many of them from Kashmir, at his provincial seat 
to read elegies for the Imam Husayn.[50] 
The accounts of European travelers make it very clear that the poor as well 
as the wealthy commemorated Muharram. Even in villages, Shi`is during that 
month marked their homes with the spread-hand symbol.[51] Although 
notable Mughals and Sayyids may have been most prominent in promoting 
Shi`i practices. many of the popolino, the little people of Awadh's urban 
centers, enthusiastically embraced the cult of the Imam Husayn during 
Muharram. Roberts wrote that "every person who has a small sum to spare 
subscribes, with others of the same means, to purchase the necessary articles 
for the purpose."[52] The public processions in the streets, where mourners 
displayed bamboo cenotaphs, banners, and parasols, were easier for the 
popular classes to participate in, as they did not require ownership of a large 
room. Persons of all classes took out processions for the Martyr, filling the 
streets, some effusing pomp and splendor, and "others content with a very 
humble display."[53] 
Since the lower-middle-class mourners could not afford to build a separate 
imambarah, they decorated the best room in their dwelling as a substitute. The 
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banners about the cenotaph in these humble homes were of coarse materials, 
tinsel or dyed muslin, with cheap metal staffs. Where mirrors proved too 
expensive, they resorted to oil-burning lamps of various shapes, brightly 
painted and decorated with cut paper.[54] 
Oil for the lamps came dear to people on the edge of subsistence, and many 
families of lower-middle-class means scrimped and saved all year so that they 
could put on an extravagant show for the Imam (and for their 
neighborhood).[55] Such zeal denoted not only piety but something of the 
same striving for status through lavish expenditure that characterized 
Awadh's magnates. In this practice as in the extravagant expenses associated 
with weddings, the artisan and laboring classes attempted to usurp status by 
emulating the lifestyle of the notables, an emulation financially ruinous for 
classes more often exploited than exploiting. Only through collectivism, 
pooling their resources to share in the paraphernalia of Muharram, could 
many laborers participate in the commemorations at all. 
The Mourning Session 
Two central rituals for Shi`is dominated Muharram: the mourning session 
(majlis), held in an imambarah or a private dwelling, and the procession. The 
procession, by far the more ancient of these rituals, originated at least by the 
time of the Shi`i Buyid dynasty in early-tenth-century Iraq. The stylized 
mourning session developed during the Safavid period in Iran, though 
gatherings to mourn the martyred Husayn had more ancient antecedents.[56] 
In Awadh in the early nineteenth century, notables held mourning sessions 
in their imambarahs twice a day during the first ten days of Muharram. The 
evening sessions, with their dazzling lighting derived from myriads of 
candles, mirrors, and chandeliers, were the best attended. The host and his 
male relatives sat on the carpeted floor near the cenotaph, the guests 
crowding in wherever they found room. The host hired a mawlavi to read that 
day's passage from a Persian prose text that described the sufferings of the 
Imam Husayn and his supporters and family in their struggle against the 
Umayyads. Among the Persian-educated notable class in Awadh, such 
readings could be extremely effective, particularly if the mawlavi wept and 
groaned with great sincerity from his minbar.[57] 
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Since this role only required some Persian education, the mawlavi could be 
one of the subaltern ulama or even relatively untrained in specialized religious 
sciences. High ulama often held their own sessions, where they tied their 
recitations of the martyr's sufferings more closely to Arabic oral reports from 
the Imams, a style known as hadis-khvani. One of his students described 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, then Lucknow's chief mujtahid, reciting oral 
reports from the Imams with translation: "I found him on the tenth of 
Muharram in the mourning session mentioning the calamities that befell the 
Martyr at Karbala, weeping violently, as was his audience. Then he descended 
from the minbar, barefoot, bareheaded, tears streaming from his ruddy 
cheeks. This was always his wont on such days. He thereafter went home and 
people gathered there."[58] 
After the Persian reading, called the "ten sessions" (dah majlis) because the 
works read from had ten chapters (one for each of the first ten days of 
Muharram), came an intermission during which servants handed around 
sweetened rose water to the gathering of mourners. Devout Shi`is in the 
1820s refrained from chewing betel leaves during Muharram, so servants 
passed about an assortment of spices on small silver trays. The highest-
ranking members of the assembly smoked water pipes during the 
intermission, though the rest of the guests, of even slightly lower rank, dared 
not join them.[59] 
After the refreshments, specialized reciters chanted elegiac poetry in Urdu. 
Even the illiterate could understand this part of the session, which must have 
formed the core of popular mourning sessions. Some of the verses had 
refrains, and the whole assembly often joined in.[60] In the early nineteenth 
century some reciters of such poetry employed a vocal technique that 
approximated singing. Readers presented verse works commemorating the 
martyrdom of the Imam Husayn in various rhetorical styles. The ulama 
favored the straightforward reading of the poetry (that al-lafz-khvani), similar 
to that practiced by poets in secular poetry readings. Another style, 
antedating in India the rise of Shi`i culture in Awadh, involved the chanting 
(suz-khvani) of elegies. In Asafu'd-Dawlah's time Haydari Khan, a great singer, 
further innovated in this field, teaching Sayyid Mir `Ali, a highly respected 
performer at the court of Sa`adat `Ali Khan. In such performances the 
musical modes (raginis) could be emphasized or played down, according to 
taste. Women, and artisans and laborers, whether Shi`i, Sunni, or Hindu, 
greatly loved the more musical styles. At the time of Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar 
(1814-27) people came from all over Awadh to Lucknow during Muharram 
in hopes of hearing the courtesan Lady Haydar sing elegiac lyrics mourning 
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the Imam.[61] Women commonly sang marthiyyahs in public, though the ulama 
condemned such mixed meetings. 
Some of the more strict, legal-minded Shi`is questioned Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
Nasirabadi about the singing of elegiac poetry. He replied that listening to 
elegiac verses for the Imam Husayn, weeping for him, and mourning him all 
have great rewards. If read with a sorrowful and pained voice, they presented 
no difficulty at all. But he disapproved of chanting marthiyyaghs with 
remodulation (Persian tarji`, Urdu katkar) as being too close to music, 
promising that anyone who avoided listening to such performances would 
be spiritually rewarded.[62] 
After the mourning verses the entire congregation rose and enumerated the 
legitimate successors after the Prophet Muhammad according to Shi`is, the 
Twelve Imams, asking blessings upon them individually. Then they repeated 
the names of the early caliphs, whom Shi`is regard as usurpers, pronouncing 
imprecations on them. These two rituals consisted of taking an oath of 
allegiance (tavalla) to the Imams and pronouncing imprecations (tabarra ') on 
the caliphal usurpers.[63] The mourning session concluded with a frenzied 
period of self-flagellation called the obsequy (ma'tam). Even Shi`i notables 
practiced it, Mrs. All reporting of upper-class ceremonies: "I have even 
witnessed blood issuing from the breast of sturdy men, who beat themselves 
simultaneously as they ejaculated the names 'Hasan'! 'Hosein'! for ten 
minutes, and occasionally during a longer period, in that part of the service 
called Mortem."[64] 
Again, the ulama disapproved of flagellation. Mrs. All wrote that "Maul-vees, 
Moollahs, and devoutly religious persons" never joined in beating their 
breasts, although they were present in the audience while others thus 
violently expressed their grief. The ulama carried on their own mourning 
practices for longer than most believers in the 1820s, for a full forty days. 
They apparently did not participate in the mourning processions.[65] Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, asked about self-flagellation in the 1820s or 1830s, 
replied that wailing and healing one's chest over the calamities that befell the 
family of the Prophet was only permissible if one lost control of one's self.[66] 
Women also commemorated Muharram, though only a few princesses and 
wealthy courtesans had their own imambarahs . Almost all the hostesses made 
their best room in the ladies' quarters into a temporary imambarah, allowing 
only females in. Mrs. All thought the grief of women during the first ten days 
of Muharram greater than that of men, such that pious women 
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would neglect their private sorrow during that period. In Hyderabad, Shi`i 
women beat their breasts in self-flagellation, just as did men.[67] In Lucknow, 
women gave up betel leaves, the wearing of jewelry, and bright (especially 
red) clothes, instead loosening their hair and garbing themselves in dark 
colors. Some even mortified themselves by wearing their mourning clothes 
in torrid, sultry Lucknow for ten solid days. Mrs. Ali's serving-maid went the 
entire time without drinking water during the day. Every evening the ladies 
gathered about the cenotaph they had set up. with female friends, slaves, and 
servants surrounding the hostess.[68] 
As elsewhere in the Shi`i world, educated women presided at these distaff 
sessions.[69] In Awadh they derived for the most part from indigent Sayyid 
families that lacked the dowry to attract a high-status Sayyid groom but 
refused to accept one from a less prestigious caste, in accordance with the 
hypergamy (marrying up bu?? not down) widespread among Indian Muslims. 
They often served as Qur'an teachers for the daughters of notable families. 
Hostesses hired them for the first ten days of Muharram, presenting them in 
remuneration not only with a fee but with fine gifts as well. They read both 
the Ten Sessions in Persian and the elegiac poetry in Urdu.[70] 
The mourning sessions held in homes during Muharram and during other 
months of the Shi`i sacred calendar provided crucial opportunities for the 
development of social networks among Shi`is, whether male or female, 
notable or commoner. Mourners went from session to session, spreading 
news and giving Shi`is of one neighborhood or village a sense of unity with 
their coreligionists elsewhere. Lucknow became a place where Shi`is from all 
over Awadh could meet at Muharram and thus overcome their sense of being 
isolated minority communities through congregation in the Realm of the 
Shi`ah. The sessions reflected in their social composition the class and status 
of the host, with tradespeople excluded from notable gatherings. But within 
social classes and neighborhoods, the sessions did much to foster a sense of 
community identity. 
Processions 
The mourning sessions held in homes or imambarahs, although public, largely 
reflected kin and friendship ties in their composition. The truly civic rites, 
the 
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processions, brought together in the streets persons from all over each major 
city, as well as many visitors from nearby villages. With the development of 
processions, Shi`ism came into its own as a religion in Awadh. No longer the 
furtive creed of isolated Sayyid communities in the service towns, it 
blossomed as the court's favored rite, central to the ritual life of cities like 
Lucknow and Faizabad. 
Particular activities marked each of the ten days of Muharram. At the end of 
the preceding month, Dhu'l-Hijjah, middle- and working-class men brought 
that year's bamboo cenotaphs home from the bazaar with great ceremony. 
Notable families with permanent cenotaphs prepared a room or an imambarah 
to receive guests for the mourning sessions. The first day of Muharram 
witnessed, not activity, but an eerie quiet as shops closed and families began 
mourning at home. 
On the second day, the public marveled at the imambarahs of magnates and 
visited the cenotaphs of friends. The devout saw such visitation as a ritual 
obligation substituting for the expensive pilgrimage to Karbala itself.[71] From 
this day multitudes crowded the streets and alleys, most on foot, but with 
some notables on horseback or in palanquins, making social rounds, visiting 
cenotaphs, and participating in the twice-daily mourning sessions. On the 
third day of Muharram women sent sweet dishes to friends and relatives, as 
well as to poor families, in remembrance of the Imam's passing, just as they 
would have on the third day after a loved one's death. They repeated this on 
the seventh and fortieth days after the first of Muharram.[72] 
On the fifth of Muharram believers took out processions throughout 
Lucknow to Rustamnagar, where they had their standards blessed at the 
shrine of `Abbas. Mrs. Ali witnessed a notable's entourage undertaking the 
trip. At the head of the procession walked a guard of soldiers around four 
elephants, which carried men and silk-and-gold banners. In the train of the 
elephants came a band playing Indian instruments, as well as trumpets. Next 
in order came a mourner holding a black pole from which two swords hung 
on a reversed bow. Behind him walked the owner of the banners, 
accompanied by reciters of verse elegies and a large number of friends. The 
verses chosen for the procession particularly concerned the sufferings of 
`Abbas. Thereafter came a horse, representing Husayn's steed, Duldul a fine 
white Arabian. His legs were stained with red, and arrows appeared to be 
stuck in various parts of his body. A turban rode on the tragically empty 
saddle. Friends of the family, servants, and private foot-soldiers brought up 
the rear.[73] 
Thousands of other, less affluent mourners also headed for the shrine with 
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their banners. They entered it by a flight of steps-from the courtyard. A 
shrine attendant took the banner of each person through the right entrance 
and touched it against the crest of `Abbas's own staff. Each mourner moved 
on after his banner touched quickly to the sacred crest. Mrs. All estimated 
that shrine attendants consecrated forty or fifty thousand banners in a single 
day.[74] Whatever the number, the ritual demonstrates a rather high level of 
organization and corporate cooperation for a premodern South Asian city, 
given that neighborhoods of all religions and classes apparently took part.[75] 
The next big day, the seventh of Muharram, commemorated the battlefield 
wedding of Qasim, the Imam Husayn's doomed nephew, to the Imam's 
daughter. In Awadh, mourners remembered the wedding through the staging 
of premarital processions and formalities. Notables took out processions to 
the imambarah of a social superior, reproducing the pattern of hypergamy as 
practiced by Indian Muslims. At the imambarah the mourners reposited a 
model of Qasim's tomb. After the completion of prenuptial ceremonies for 
Qasim and his bride, notables distributed money to the poor, just as they 
would have at a real wedding. Middle- and laboring-class people also 
commemorated the ill-starred wedding, but did so at home rather than with 
costly processions.[76] Elsewhere in India mourners introduced variations on 
this ritual. In Hyderabad to the south, a man sometimes impersonated Qasim 
and was prepared for burial at the imambarah . On the seventh of Muharram 
in that city mourners painted a representation of the Imam's horse made of 
wood and decorated it with jewels.[77] 
The climax of the mourning period came on the tenth day, the anniversary 
of the Imam Husayn's own martyrdom. Participants rose in the early hours 
of the morning and began preparing for the procession, women sometimes 
lighting candles at the cenotaph before dawn and making requests. At dawn 
the mourners set out for a symbolic burial ground on the outskirts of the city, 
called a Karbala. In Safavid Iran, the laboring classes participated in street 
processions; the wealthy favored the mourning sessions inside.[78] In Awadh, 
however, many notables joined the street processions with great fervor. The 
wealthy put together a military funeral parade, with elephants, bands, a bearer 
of the sword staff, banners, and a caparisoned and bloodstained Duldul with 
a royal umbrella above his head. Friends and family of the owner, elegy 
chanters, incense bearers, and the owner of the cenotaph display himself 
walked behind, often barefoot and with heads exposed 
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to the sun. Next came the cenotaph of Husayn surrounded by banners and 
covered by a canopy supported by silver poles, in the style of a Muslim 
funeral, then the cenotaph of Qasim and the wedding paraphernalia. Several 
elephants brought up the rear, from which servants threw money to the poor, 
who crowded behind the processions of the grandees. These not only sought 
money and blessed bread from the train of the notable's parade, but 
conducted their own humble processions in its wake, with their coarsely 
made cenotaphs held high. They thereby also sought security, since the 
wealthy had a guard of matchlock-men in case of trouble from brigands or 
Shi`i-Sunni violence.[79] 
From time to time the procession halted, sometimes as often as every five 
minutes. Then the notables listened to the elegies being chanted, or mourners 
flagellated themselves to the accompaniment of drums. Although the 
laboring-class mourners could not compete with the splendid pageants of the 
notables, they could nevertheless gain divine rewards and social status among 
their peers through extreme breast-beating. In north Indian cities at this time, 
tens of thousands of people assembled in the streets. The processions often 
arrived after nightfall at their Karbalas, four or five miles distant, where 
mourners ritually interred the cenotaphs and performed the whole ceremony 
of a funeral. Tempers ran high on this day of collective grief, and Sunni-Shi`i 
riots sometimes broke out among Awadh's habitually armed men. 
On their return home the rich distributed food, money, and clothes to the 
poor. The horse Duldul and his expensive attire was donated to a poor Sayyid 
family.[80] In the 1820s the mourning ceremonies were effectively over on the 
tenth of Muharram. On the third day after, men began shaving their beards 
again, women threw off their mourning vestments, bathed, and put on 
jewelry. The populace began chewing betel leaves once more. Only a few 
very devout persons continued to mourn for forty days.[81] 
Shi`i ulama took a critical attitude toward some of the Muharram practices, 
incidentally reinforcing their own status as purists. In 1808 the Iranian 
immigrant scholar Aqa Ahmad Bihbahani endeavored to convince notables 
in Faizabad to give up the practice of beating drums to the accompaniment 
of their breast-beating.[82] A believer in Lucknow asked chief Shi`i cleric 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi whether it was proper to employ drums and 
symbolic horses and camels on the tenth of Muharram. He replied that drums 
were a heretical innovation, but that using camels to evoke the cara- 
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van of the doomed Imam's family for the purpose of rendering hearts tender 
presented no difficulties.[83] In later years camels draped in black were 
brought during the month of Muharram to the Nasirabadis' imambarah 
itself.[84] Some later Shi`i ulama condoned other folk practices. Mawlavi 
Abu'l-Hasan Kashmiri wrote in defense of even the use of drums in 
mourning the Imam.[85] 
Ende has discussed how some Arab ulama in the modern period have 
defended flagellation, suggesting that they felt it to be in their interest, 
pecuniary or otherwise, to encourage mass participation in Muharram rites.[86] 
Since the Awadh ulama in the early nineteenth century received their 
patronage from the semifeudal notables rather than from the bazaar, they 
could afford in general to take a much more elitist approach. Even then, they 
often had to come to terms with the folk practices of the notables; Sayyid 
Muhammad's ruling allowed flagellation if the mourner forgot himself, 
providing a convenient out to those who wished to practice it. The ulama's 
exclusion of music, including drums, from Muharram practices derived from 
their greater scrip-turalism, but it had the effect of further differentiating 
them as a status group from their notable patrons. 
In Iran very late in the eighteenth century a new practice associated with 
mourning the Imam grew up, the passion play (ta`ziyah). From 
representational acts in the tenth-of-Muharram processions, wherein 
mourners poitrayed Husayn and his enemies, a tradition emerged of folk 
theater centered in a fixed playhouse. In Awadh, no such indigenous 
development occurred during the period under discussion. Shi`i notables 
there did sponsor Hindu-style plays about Krishna, and perhaps these 
performances preempted the development of alternative theatrical traditions. 
Accounts by travelers in Bengal and Bihar reveal a higher level of playacting 
and representing during Muharram than existed in Awadh.[87] Ulama in 
Awadh gave rulings against the use of tableaux or religious paintings as 
backdrops during mourning sessions.[88] 
The processions of Muharram filled the streets of Awadh's cities with 
flagellating mourners. The frenzied multitudes that so impressed Western 
travelers with their zeal hid, in their numbers and the seeming chaos of the 
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crowded streets, an underlying organization. Procession marchers grouped 
themselves by neighborhood, by patron, by status group. The degree of 
organization that must have been necessary to consecrate thousands of 
standards at the shrine to the standard of `Abbas bespeaks a vast increase in 
Lucknow's cohesion and a sophistication in Shi`i and non-Shi`i Muharram 
networks. 
Non-Shi`i Participation in Muharram 
The culture of Awadh, a preindustrial society, demonstrated syncretic 
tendencies. Cultural mediators, such as Sufi pirs, drawing their clientele from 
both Muslim and Hindu, transmitted symbols from one group to another. 
Muharram rites in Awadh began to serve the same mediating function for 
some groups. Boundaries between religious communities existed, and riots 
occurred between Hindu and Muslim or Sunni and Shi`i. But to a greater 
extent in the early nineteenth than in the early twentieth century, cultural 
mediators linked popular-class groups.[89] 
Sunni Muslims in Awadh in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also held 
mourning sessions, but frowned on the breast-beating and ritual cursing of 
the Shi`is. Sunnis likewise participated in Muharram processions, but in 
various ways differentiated themselves from Shi`is. For instance, although 
the latter held up five fingers to symbolize the Prophet's immediate family, 
the Sunnis would hold up three fingers, for the first three caliphs.[90] For 
Awadh's Sunnis, `Ali and his sons were the rightful successors of the caliphs, 
not their victims. Although Sunni-Shi`i violence frequently broke out on this 
occasion, it derived from a different conception of the caliphs, rather than 
from any sympathy for the Umayyad enemies of Husayn. After the 1820s 
some Sunnis began to speak well of the Umayyads, probably as a reaction 
against the Shi`i atmosphere of Awadh. Only in the first decade of the 
twentieth century did the two communites became so estranged that even 
Sunnis who mourned Husayn began taking their model cenotaphs to 
different burial fields than the Shi`is for interment.[91] 
The vast Hindu majority often also took part in the mourning for Imam 
Husayn, incorporating his cult into their ritual calendar as yet one more 
divinity in the pantheon. The Iranian traveler Shushtari saw Hindus com- 
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memorating Muharram all over North India in the late eighteenth century. 
He wrote that in Delhi wealthy Hindus with not the least trace of Islam about 
them went to great trouble to construct imambarahs . They fasted during 
Muharram, recited elegies for the Imam in Hindi, Urdu, and Persian, pelted 
each other with stones in mortification, and fed the poor. They constructed 
replicas of the Imam's cenotaph, bowed to them, and supplicated them for 
favors. After the tenth of Muharram they threw the cenotaphs in the river or 
buried them. Shushtari found some of the Hindu approaches to fasting and 
self-mortification during Muharram quite strange, maintaining that Indian 
Muslims copied them.[92] 
The Kayastha scribal caste in particular adopted Muslim customs, owing to 
their long association with Muslim rulers as secretaries and revenue-
department civil servants. Many Kayastha notables built their own imambarahs 
.[93] But Hindu popular-class participation in Muharram processions and 
attendance at public mourning sessions, such as those at the Great 
Imambarah, cut across caste lines. Roberts wrote, "Hindoos . . . are 
frequently seen to vie with the disciples of Ali in their demonstrations of grief 
for the slaughter of his two martyred sons: and in the splendour of the-
pageant displayed at the anniversary of their fate. A very large proportion of 
Hindoos go into mourning during the ten days of Mohurrum, clothing 
themselves in green garments, and assuming the guise of fakeers."[94] 
Fanny Parkes's Hindu cook spent forty rupees on a bamboo cenotoph for 
the Imam, performed all the Muharram rites, and then resumed his Hinduism 
when he had interred his cenotaph with funeral offerings of rice, corn, 
flowers, and cups of water.[95] In the Hindu-ruled provinces of central and 
southern India, as well, Hindus celebrated Muharram with processions and 
illuminations. Strict, scripturalist Brahmins often opposed this practice, but 
even some of them mourned Husayn. In Sunni-ruled Hyderabad riots would 
sometimes break out between Hindus and Muslims during Muharram, and 
the Hindus participating in the mourning rites would actually take the Muslim 
side against their coreligionists.[96] 
Hindus therefore not only widely participated in the Muharram rites but 
helped influence their shape in India by introducing practices that even high-
caste Muslims adopted. Garcin de Tassy pointed out that Muharram, like 
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the festival for the Goddess of Death, Durga, lasts ten days. On the tenth 
day of Durga puja Hindus cast a figurine of the goddess into the river, 
paralleling the Shi`i custom of often casting the Imam's cenotaph into the 
river on the tenth day of Muharram. The Muslims made the same offering to 
the Imam that Hindus proffered their sacred figures.[97] Since high-caste 
Shi`is and Hindus considered each other ritually impure and unbelievers, 
popular-class syncretism of this sort sometimes posed problems for strict 
Shi`is. Someone asked the chief mujtahids in the early 1830s whether an 
unbeliever could properly give an offering in cash or kind to the Imams and 
distribute cooked food to poor believers during Muharram. The mujtahid 
replied that the most cautious course was for them to bring such food only 
if the host of the mourning session asked them to do so (ahvat ast kih bar 
tibq-i guftah-'i malik arand).[98] 
Widespread, though not universal, Sunni and Hindu participation made 
Muharram rites trans-communal. Sunnis in Awadh genuinely loved and 
supported Husayn, and the tears they shed for the Prophet's grandson helped 
soften hardline Shi`i attitudes toward them. Hindus commemorated 
Muharram as well, adopting Husayn as a god of death, his bloodstained horse 
and his severed head lifted aloft on Umayyad staves presenting no less 
terrible an aspect than Kali Durga with her necklace of skulls. Syncretism and 
cultural intermediaries, such as readers of elegiac poetry, helped create a Shi`i 
tinged traditional culture in a society where, among the popular classes, 
religious communal identity was still weak or at least not exclusivist in tone. 
Conclusion 
Muharram rituals constituted a complex of practices carried out on a mass 
scale. These rituals were highly ambiguous, both in regard to vertical 
stratification among religious communities and in regard to horizontal 
stratification within the Shi`i grouping. Some of these practices, bearing an 
ecumenical aspect, were joined in by many Sunnis and Hindus. Others helped 
spread Shi`i ideals among the masses and promoted social networks among 
believers, not only within city quarters, but between city dwellers and visitors 
from the qasabahs in the hinterland. More than anything else, the practice of 
cursing the caliphs helped erect communal barriers between Shi`is and 
others, and the violence it provoked helped reinforce internal Shi`i solidarity. 
Yet that solidarity did not completely obscure the social distinctions 
separating notables and commoners. 
The Muharram commemorations, including the "pilgrimages" to the 
cenotaphs and the focus on death, demonstrate the coexistence of structure 
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and anti-structure. On the one hand, social distinctions temporarily broke 
down into liminality and a generalized feeling of leveled community 
(communits), which the late Victor Turner found typical of such rites.[99] The 
notables of both sexes demeaned themselves in bereavement for the Imam, 
men walking barefoot and bareheaded under Lucknow's harsh sun, and 
highborn ladies wearing the same sweaty clothes for ten days in a climate that 
called for frequent baths. 
The mourning processions and the notables' distribution of largesse created 
a sense of solidarity among social classes. But in important ways mourners 
intensified structure, emphasizing distinctions of class and status in the 
exclusivity of the mourning sessions at imambarahs and in the primacy of 
notable pageants during the Muharram processions. Indeed, the processions 
constituted a microcosm of Awadh's prebendal hierarchical social structure. 
Muharram was a prime opportunity for the display of wealth and various 
sorts of expenditure that contributed to the expression of high status. 
Moreover, at the same time that the ceremonies drew together the 
participants from various classes and religious communities, they often 
sparked communal violence because some Sunnis and Hindus objected so 
strongly to them. 
The mourners of Husayn in the bazaar or in the large villages worked their 
own genius on Muharram rites, such that they often created ritual forms later 
usurped by the notables, including veneration at the shrine of `Abbas. 
Although the notables excluded the popular classes from the services at their 
private imambarahs, and forced them to march behind their elephants in the 
procession, the popular classes in many ways led the way in venerating the 
Martyrs, expressing their grief in everyday ways that helped make the Imam 
and his family real to them. For they were, after all, the experts in what it 
meant to be oppressed. 
The Shi`i notable class, whose distribution of gifts and cash during 
processions helped ensure the participation of the poor, promoted the 
extensive mourning rites for Husayn. Fenced in by the East India Company, 
the notables had little opportunity to invest in territorial expansion, 
expressing their culture and prestige through religious architecture and 
patronage instead. In addition, informal laboring-class associations shared 
expenses and promoted the rites. In some places Sufi faqirs organized the 
ceremonies, during which they received offerings.[100] 
People used the story rhetorically and allegorically as well as ritually. 
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Some notable-class Shi`is depicted the encroaching British as the evil Yazid 
in the 1857-58 rebellion. Among laboring-class devotees of the Imam the tax 
collectors and police of the Shi`i government itself may have been seen at 
times as the real Yazid. Moreover, where Muslim villagers were a small 
minority surrounded by unbelievers, the Umayyad armies attacking Husayn 
came to be portrayed as Hindus.[101] 
The artisans, laborers, and peasants depended on the largesse of the Shi`i 
rulers, and this link of dependency encouraged the little people to share with 
the rulers in their religious practices. In this way a general Shi`i community 
came into being, still loosely organized, but enjoying new and wide-ranging 
social networks built around the sacred calendar of Imami mourning sessions 
and processions. In the early nineteenth century this calendar was also shared 
by many Sunnis and some Hindus. Yet some Awadh government policies 
helped make Muharram rites, at times, divisive of religious communities. 
When the early stages of political mobilization began late in the nineteenth 
century, Muharram processions and violence began serving a new purpose 
in creating communal identities, which grew into political ones in the 
twentieth century.[102] 
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5 
 
The Beginnings of Formal Shi`i Institutions 
in Awadh 
 
Imami Shi`ism in eighteenth-century Awadh originally possessed features 
that Western sociologists would define as "sectarian." But the distinction 
between sect and "church" deriving from Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, 
fruitful in the sociological study of religious groupings in Protestant 
countries, clearly must be employed cautiously in a labyrinthine religious 
milieu like Mughal India.[1] Moreover. one must carefully note that in this 
context the term "sect" bears no pejorative connotation. Although many 
definitions of sect and church have been proposed, most suffer from lack of 
precision and our inability to plot their primary attribute on a continuum, as 
a scientific definition would demand. Benton Johnson offered a widely 
accepted solution to this difficulty by restating the sect-church distinction "in 
terms of a single-variable property, namely the extent to which a religious 
body accepts the culture of the social environment in which it exists."[2] I will 
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amend this definition slightly to include antagonism or indifference to the 
state. Sects, then, are religious groups in some tension with the prevailing 
culture and the state. In what I will term formal religious establishments, 
called "churches" in Western sociology, this tension lessens, though it seldom 
disappears altogether. 
Accepting this single variable as the central one, we may look at other 
attributes of sects delineated by researchers like B. R. Wilson as frequent 
although not universal correlates.[3] Many attributes of sectarianism appear in 
Awadh Shi`ism, and the primary variable certainly does, since its ethos 
opposed the prevailing values of Sunni-dominated Mughal society. Shi`is 
conceived of themselves as the "saved sect" (firqah-'i najiyah), the elect of 
believers who supported the wronged family of the Prophet. Rather than a 
formal hierarchy of trained jurisprudents, north Indian Imamis possessed 
merely private experts in the oral reports of the Imams—experts 
differentiated from the lay community only in their slightly higher level of 
education. The Akhbari ulama resembled Pentecostalist ministers, who 
rejected priesthood and whose training emphasized scriptural knowledge, 
eschewing rationalist theology.[4] 
Akhbari north Indians, denouncing the strong division between the lay and 
the clerical that marked Usulism, had an egalitarian religious structure within 
the congregation. The crucial distinctions divided, not laymen and clerics, but 
notables and commoners. As was noted above, believers segregated their 
mourning sessions along class lines. Since few north Indian Imami clerics 
attained a high degree of jurisprudential learning, the typical Usuli 
jurisprudent immigrated from Iran, and ethnic tensions may also have been 
involved in the Akhbari attacks on mujtahids. 
Awadh's Akhbaris forbade the formal worship of Friday congregational 
prayers on the grounds that the perfect leader who alone could lead them 
had departed into supernatural Occultation. The central ritual of sectarian 
Shi`ism was the mourning session (majlis) held for the martyred Imams, 
particularly Imam Husayn, in which personal piety could be expressed by 
open demonstrations of grief. In laboring-class processions believers 
spontaneously showed their faith through violently beating their breasts. 
Upper-class ceremonies tended to be more restrained, although they still 
involved weeping 
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and a touching of the heart. Both the rejection of Friday prayers and the 
emphasis on mourning sessions underlined the feeling of tension with the 
outside world that most north Indian Imamis felt. 
Shi`is saw India as the land of unbelief (kafiristan), chafing under the rule of 
the Sunni Mughals. Some Muslim caste leaders forbade Sunni-Shi`i marriage, 
another sign of sectarian tension. Shi`is from the propertied classes often 
departed from a sectarian attitude enough to achieve high rank in the Mughal 
government, although even here they remained conscious of a distinction 
between their private inclinations and their duties to the Sunni Mughal 
sovereign, which strongly emerged during Awrangzib's conquest of the Shi`i-
ruled Deccan.[5] The widely scattered Imamis in North India existed on the 
periphery of the Shi`i centers in Iraq and Iran. Their loose religious 
organization and sectarian outlook approximated that of tenth-century Shi`is 
in the wake of the Imam's Occultation. But just as the rise of the Safavid state 
in Iran helped transform Shi`ism into a formal religious establishment, so the 
nawabs in Awadh had a similar impact in North India. 
Although a Johnson-Wilson description of the sect as an ideal type 
corresponds to what we know of Imami Shi`ism under the Mughals, the 
cultural complexity of India makes it necessary to define our terms more 
precisely. First, the "prevailing" culture in India, with which a sect would be 
expected to conflict, was dual. In a sense, two notable class orthodoxies 
coexisted, Mughal-supported Sunnism and the Hinduism of the twice-born 
castes. Even though Hinduism suffered some disabilities under Muslim rule 
and so sometimes also exhibited sectarian tensions with it, Hindus were the 
great majority of the population, and enough Brahmins and Hindu martial 
groups were integrated into the Mughal system of prebends and benefices to 
constitute them as junior partners in the Mughal enterprise. C. A. Bayly has 
suggested that the Jains and some Hindu ascetic orders constituted sects in 
eighteenth-century Awadh, and that they avoided entanglement with the 
government and possessed some degree of corporate organization.[6] The 
definition of sect I am using would agree with the tendency to antagonism 
toward or indifference to the state, although it would not absolutely require 
any particular form of organization, which I have not taken as a primary 
variable. In Mughal India, then, Shi`is could be considered sectarian in the 
same way as Jains could, since they opposed and subsisted outside the 
orthodoxy of the Sunni Muslim establishment, with its ulama, qazis, muftis, 
and seminaries, much as the Jains subsisted outside Brahminical Hinduism. 
Another issue in the definition of sects and religious establishments has been 
raised implicitly by a group of sociologists considering the dominant 
 
  
― 126 ― 
ideology, thesis. Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner showed that although Marx 
and subsequent sociologists considered the church to have ideologically 
dominated medieval Europe, in fact the authority of the ecclesiastical 
institutions sat rather lightly on the majority of the peasant population.[7] 
European peasants continued to practice an autochthonous religion far 
removed from the theology and ritual of the literate priests who presided 
over the churches of the aristocracy, though only intermittently did peasant 
groups come so strongly into conflict with the church as to develop an 
alternative religious collectivity in the form of a sect. The formal religious 
establishment provided an ideology and an ecclesiastical structure primarily 
useful in uniting the ruling class and in socializing members of that class to 
values appropriate to their social position. It only lightly encompassed the 
peasant majority, and the underprivileged strata (the great majority in 
preindustrial societies) threw up most of the sectarian challenges to the 
religious establishment. 
The rise of a Shi`i ruling class in Awadh, composed of members of the 
Nishapuri ruling family, high administrators, and tax-farmers, and powerful 
eunuchs raised as Shi`is at court, created the need for a formal Shi`i 
establishment that could minister to the often literate notables. One of the 
functions of this religious establishment would be to justify Shi`i rule. No 
Shi`i formal religious establishment had existed in North India under the 
Sunni Mughals, so that an entire range of institutions needed to be newly 
created by Shi`i elites. 
The foundation of a formal Shi`i establishment required specialized clerics. 
The Shi`i ulama sought through professional closure practices to assert 
control over the monetary resources that notables poured into religious 
institutions, no easy task in the traditional, ecumenical setting of India.[8] 
Among Shi`i clerics, Usulis attempted to exclude all Shi`i holy and learned 
men who did not possess a diploma (ijazah) that allowed them to derive legal 
judgments and preside over ritual activity. To monopolize religious authority 
and the patronage of the Shi`i state would require the exclusion of popular 
Sufi leaders and institutions, who mediated between Muslim and Hindu 
disciples. It also implied the displacement of Sunni ulama already occupying 
official religious offices. 
The growth of sectarian folk practices among Shi`is in Awadh, discussed in 
the preceding chapter, paralleled the growth of a formal, literate religious 
establishment among the notables. The two processes dovetailed only a 
century and more later, as literacy increased, the printing press spread formal 
religious ideas and practices, and urbanization brought the need for a clearer 
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communal (as opposed to village kinship or caste) identity. The process of 
Shi`i Islamization (parallel to "Sanskritization" among modernizing Hindus) 
occurred first of all among the Awadh notables and clerics involved in 
constructing their dominant ideology. 
The Establishment of Friday Prayers 
The institution of Friday congregational prayers, the first major religious 
innovation undertaken by the notables and clerics of Awadh in creating a 
formal religious establishment, seems in retrospect a natural step. But this 
move aroused bitter controversy at the time, since it broke with all north 
Indian Shi`i tradition. North Indian Akhbarism saw the holding of such 
prayers as a usurpation of the absent Twelfth Imam's authority, and Shi`is 
associated mosque ritual with the arrogance of the Sunni majority. Moreover, 
the Awadh nawab's authorization of such prayers constituted a slap in the 
face to the Sunni Mughal emperor and a further declaration of regional 
independence, not to be undertaken lightly. Only a powerful congruence of 
secular and religious motives could have brought about this change. 
The growth in numbers and authority of Usuli ulama helps account for the 
change. As the promise of patronage attracted Shi`i clerics from Kashmir and 
from Iraq and Iran to Awadh, the number of scholars belonging to the Usuli 
school, dominant in those areas, increased. Greater political stability in the 
Middle East and North India in the last quarter of the century and more 
secure trade routes increased Awadh's contacts with the Shi`i centers of West 
Asia. The Imami newly rich could afford pilgrimages to the shrine cities of 
Karbala and Najaf, and could in addition afford to subvent such travel for 
scholars such as Mirza Muhammad Khalil and Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi. 
On his return to Lucknow, Nasirabadi rejoined Chief Minister Hasan Riza 
Khan's inner circle, his penetration into the corridors of power and influence 
a tribute to his brilliance and ambition. But he was still the junior-most 
religious thinker patronized by the chief minister. The Sufi pirs Shah 
Khayru'llah and Shah `Ali Akbar Mawdudi wielded more influence. Even the 
Shi`i notables of Awadh maintained the Mughal noble tradition of showing 
respect for Sufi leaders. The chief minister's first cousin Aqa Mirza was a 
devoted Sufi.[9] Hasan Riza Khan saw no contradiction between Sufism and 
Shi`ism, and whereas the growing clerical class in Faizabad had primarily to 
contend with the power of the physicians, in Lucknow their rivals for 
patronage and influence were Sufi leaders. 
In the early 1780s, after Nasirabadi had returned from his sojourn in Iraq and 
Iran, a new controversy began to polarize the Imami community. The 
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foreign Usuli ulama wished to see Shi`i Friday congregational prayers 
established in North India, whereas Indian Imamis of the Akhbari school 
resisted this initiative. One early source attributes the dominance of 
Akhbarism in North India to the school's pro-laity (camm-pasand) tendencies. 
The same source states that Akhbaris in Awadh avoided the few mujtahids 
there completely, some even ritually cursing them. They criticized the Usulis 
for believing in independent legal reasoning (ijlihad), allowing considered 
opinion (zann) as a basis for legal rulings, employing analogy just as did the 
Hanafi Sunnis, and recognizing scholarly consensus as a source of law.[10] 
Akhbaris perceived the Usulis to have compromised with Shi`i principles, 
adopting the Sunni tenets of their Mughal oppressors. Moreover, Akhbaris 
may have projected their hostility to the Establishment Sunni clergy onto the 
professional Usuli ulama. Although the issue of Friday prayers was not one 
strictly between Usuli and Akhbari, since members of both schools took 
varying stances on it, north Indian Akhbaris on the whole tended to feel that 
they were impermissible in the absence of the Imam.[11] 
Many Indian Akhbaris opposed Friday congregational prayers on doctrinal 
grounds; others feared chat such separate rituals would provoke a Sunni 
backlash. In the previous decade, Muhammad ‘Askari Jaunpuri (d. 1777), a 
local Akhbari scholar appointed to the post of court mufti, advised against 
such prayers.[12] Awadh's Shi`is did not believe that congregational prayers 
were held even in the majority Shi`i areas of Iraq and Iran, and they were not 
customary anywhere in North India.[13] 
Mulla Muhammad `Ali "Padshah" Kashmiri, arriving in Awadh in the carly 
1770s, lacked this caution and timidity. He settled and taught in Faizabad and 
in about 1785 wrote a treatise on the virtue of congregational Friday prayers 
for Shi`is. The author dedicated the book, five chapters long, to Nawab 
Asafu'd-Dawlah, calling upon him to establish Friday prayers. In the fourth 
chapter he mentioned three individuals qualified to lead the prayers. Two of 
these, Mirza Muhammad Khalil and Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi, were local 
scholars who had adopted Usulism in Iraq. Kashmiri argued that instituting 
this measure would aid the nawab in his quest to spread the Islamic revelation 
(i.e., in its Imami form) more widely in his dominions. When Chief Minister 
Hasan Riza Khan went to Faizabad on a visit, Mulla Muhammad `Ali 
Padshah presented him with a copy of the treatise. Hasan Riza Khan made 
the proposal public on his return to Lucknow. But when he sounded out 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali about the idea, he rejected it. Nasirabadi 
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feared that such a public display would arouse the hostility of the majority 
Sunnis, and he asked the chief minister to dismiss the proposal. To avoid 
further pressure, he retired with his family and attendants to Nasirabad.[14] 
With Nasirabadi gone, Hasan Riza Khan spent more time with other 
companions, especially with Shah `Ali Akbar Mawdudi.[15] A leader of the 
Chishti order orginally from Delhi, he settled in Faizabad in the 1770s. Under 
the influence of Awadh's court culture, and perhaps in order to gain easier 
access to court patronage, he accepted Imami Shi`ism. He did so, however, 
without giving up his Sufi ideas and rituals and while retaining his followers 
among the largely Sunni Chishtis. 
One Friday afternoon Hasan Riza Khan was shocked to discover that the 
Sufi leader said congregational prayers with his followers, but Shah `Ali 
Akbar was quick to enumerate the virtues of the ritual in Shi`ism. The pir's 
strong support for Friday prayers, coming on the heels of Mulla Padshah's 
similar proposal, determined Hasan Riza Khan to institute them. Ironically, 
foreign-born Usulis and local former Sunnis pushed the Awadh court into 
beginning this ritual, a move doctrinally opposed by local Akhbaris. Even an 
Usuli like Sayyid Dildar `Ali felt uncomfortable with the idea, which 
demonstrates how strongly Indian Shi`is felt the need to maintain a low 
profile and to avoid conflict with the much stronger Sunni community. Other 
Shi`is also attempted to dissuade the chief minister from this plan, warning 
that it might provoke the Sunni Afghan chief `Abdu'r-Rahman Qandahari to 
revolt.[16] 
When Sayyid Dildar `Ali returned to Lucknow, Hasan Riza Khan once again 
pressed him to lead the Friday prayers. The young cleric consulted with some 
trusted advisers and came to the conclusion that it would be ungrateful not 
to help with such worthy work. (Moreover, such a slap in the face to his 
patrons might have signaled the decline of his so far promising career as a 
court religious scholar.) Sayyid Dildar `Ali, however, clearly retained some 
ambivalence about the prayers. When he first led them, in May 1786 (13 
Rajab 1200), some believers from the notable class gathered at the palace, 
where they prayed the noon and afternoon prayers in congregation. But they 
followed the same ritual form as if they were praying congregationally on any 
other day of the week, rather than the special Friday form.[17] This may have 
been an attempt at compromise, though it lasted only a short 
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time. The controversies behind this incident can no longer be traced. 
Two weeks later the same group prayed the Friday congregational prayers 
(jum`ah) according to the prescribed forms. Some sources indicate that before 
he agreed to preside over this ceremony, Nasirabadi wrote a treatise on the 
congregational Friday prayer, showing it to be an "obligation of preference" 
(vujub-itakhyiri) rather than an individual, absolute duty (vujub-icayni). He firmly 
disputed the most conservative (and earliest) post-Occultation view that 
Friday congregational prayers are forbidden in the absence of the Imam.[18] 
In taking the "obligation of preference" position he cautiously required the 
prayers. Sayyid Dildar `Ali said that since some scholars forbade them and 
others considered them obligatory, caution dictated that believers pray both 
the Friday prayer in congregation and the individual noon prayer (zuhr). 
The beginning of Friday prayers in Lucknow, a victory for the rationalist 
Usuli ulama, came about because of a coalition of forces. Sufi leaders, 
intermediaries between Sunni and Shi`i disciples, may have hoped to unite 
their followers in a single congregation by having formal ceremonies to which 
the Sunnis were accustomed. High Awadh secular officials probably wanted 
the prayers as symbols of regional autonomy. Foreign Usuli ulama promoted 
them because they believed them religiously necessary, and as part of their 
clericalist ideology. Local Usuli ulama, more cautious, finally acquiesced in 
holding the prayers, more because of outside pressure than inner conviction. 
Sufi leaders appear not to have recognized the possibility that leadership of 
the prayers might be taken over by the Usulis, displacing them and bringing 
a new religious elite to the fore. 
Ideological Justification for Friday Prayers and Clerical Authority 
The holding of Shi`i Friday prayers provoked opposition from several 
quarters. Sunnis disliked it, though the feared violent reaction from them 
never materialized. Even with the Shi`i community, many felt misgivings and 
refused to participate. Shi`i artisans and laborers apparently rejected the 
prayers as an upper-class whimsy. The largely Akhbari notables opposed 
them as a heretical innovation. Sayyid Dildar `Ali's response to the criticisms 
emerged in his Friday afternoon sermons, some of which he collected into a 
manuscript volume. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali wished to justify the need for a professional clergy of the 
Usuli sort. On that afternoon in May 1786 he told his audience in the chief 
minister's palace that a man either is a religious scholar or is not. If not, 
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he must emulate an expert on Islamic law in subsidiary matters. Emulation, 
necessary in practical matters of complicated law, is forbidden in matters of 
essential creed (masa'il-i usuliyyah). Even in areas of belief, however, Shi`is 
have the duty of reaching the orthodox conclusions through their own effort. 
Nasirabadi saw his sermons as one way of sharing his knowledge as a scholar 
with his lay audience.[19] Since his eighteen months in Iraq hardly made him 
a mujtahid, his attitude was somewhat presumptuous. But in a north Indian 
context, with few Usulis, someone with even a short experience of studying 
with mujtahids in Iraq could project an aura of authority. 
The prayer leader argued that if Shi`is did not produce ulama, then they 
would have to depend on Sunni scholars to teach them, and might be misled 
by the latter, who would not instruct them in the oral reports from the 
Imams. Although he drew on an oral report from Imam Ja`far as-Sadiq for 
this point, Nasirabadi was describing the actual situation in India; he himself 
had studied extensively with Sunnis. Without ulama, he insisted, people 
would soon not know to which religion they belonged, and ulama were 
necessary to guard the moral order.[20] In a pluralistic society like India, he 
believed, only a cadre of professional clerics could maintain a strong sense of 
communal identity. 
That summer in the fasting month of Ramadan, the prayer leader warned his 
aristocratic audience against deliberately neglecting Friday prayers, fasting, or 
religious charity (zakat). He said that whoever refused to say Friday prayers 
in congregation would receive no benefit from his individual daily prayers; 
he complained that he needed to voice such warnings because most Shi`is 
did not observe the religious laws, owing to their worldly concerns. He urged 
that religious donations be given to an experienced, upright (`Adil) mujtahid, 
and that he be allowed to distribute them to the poor.[21] He attacked the 
Awadh custom of putting religious charities in the hands of court physicians, 
claiming jurisdiction over this institution for the professional clergy. The 
handful of Usuli ulama not only would have a platform for the propagation 
of their views in the official congregational prayers, but also would gain 
control over vast sums of money. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali's first sermon contained a second theme: the need for 
works and not only faith. It did not suffice, he insisted, to swear allegiance to 
the Imams and to mourn their martyrdom, but one must also obey, be pious, 
say one's daily prayers, and help the poor. He condemned those who argued 
against the prayers because they would tempt some believers to perform this 
good work in order to be seen of men, pointing out that the believers are 
commanded, not only to inner purity (safa-yi batin) but also to outer purity 
(safa-yi 
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zahir), suggesting that Friday prayers were an outward sign of internal piety.[22] 
The first sermon dealt also with religion and state relations. The young Usuli 
cleric argued that Shi`is had not held Friday prayers in India in the medieval 
period, because of the dominance of tyrannical Sunni emperors, just as they 
had avoided them in pre-Safavid Iran. The Safavids, he said, established the 
institution, and he urged the nawab of Awadh to emulate them in continuing 
to sanction the prayers. He denied that in agreeing to lead them he had sold 
himself (Shi`is unhappy with the government obviously had accused him of 
doing so).[23] 
Nasirabadi felt some tension between his values as a religious scholar and 
those of even a Shi`i aristocracy. Sensitive to the charges some hurled at him 
of moral turpitude in becoming involved with the state and helping move 
Shi`ism toward a formal religious establishment, he noted that Sunni and 
Shi`i ulama differed over the referent of the qur'anic verse "Obey God and 
obey the Prophet and those in authority among you" (4:59). Sunnis, he said, 
made it refer to rulers and nobles, whereas Shi`is restricted it to the Imams. 
Shi`is held that God would not order us to obey someone who might 
command something not in accord with the religious law. The Sunnis, he 
continued, branded Shi`ism worldly and said that Shi`is had no other aim 
than to draw close to the notables. 
He responded that the opposite was true, and that Sunnis interpreted Qur'an 
4:59 in this way precisely in order to please the powers that be. He also 
pointed out that Shi`i ulama forbade the wearing of silk, using gold or silver 
vessels, listening to music, gazing at unrelated women, and homosexuality. 
Therefore, Shi`i norms conflicted most strongly with the lifestyle of the 
Muslim ruling classes. He ended by staking out his own moral independence, 
saying, "It should not be thought that I have in the course of this talk, when 
giving thanks to the nawab, embellished my words for the sake of being seen 
of men or pleasing him, hut only because the holy law demanded it. Giving 
thanks where due is incumbent."[24] Nasirabadi needed to make this 
disclaimer because he had so highly praised the bibulous, arbitrary Nawab 
Asafu'd-Dawlah as the establisher of the holy Law, the promulgator of the 
religion of the Imams, and the center of the sky of justice, and had prayed 
God to render his rule eternal.[25] 
In his Ramadan sermon for 1786, the prayer leader painted the holding of 
prayers as the most cautious course, attempting to steal the high ground from 
critics who felt that they should not be performed in the Occultation on 
grounds of caution. Such critics objected that uprightness (‘adalat) in the 
prayer leader was a prerequisite, but without the direct appointee of an 
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Imam it would be an attribute difficult to establish. (That is, the appointee of 
an ordinary mortal might secretly have some vices.) Nasirabadi replied that 
the same difficulty attended the appointment of Shi`i qazis and muftis, who 
must also be upright, yet no one raised similar objections in this regard.[26] 
Even after the passage of a year, the Friday congregational prayers remained 
controversial. In August 1787 Sayyid Dildar `Ali discussed openly the nature 
of the opposition. He reported that some of the deniers, wealthy men, 
privately maintained that the Friday prayers actually were not the nawab's 
idea and that he remained ambivalent about them.[27] Quite possibly, he did 
have mixed feelings. Hasan Riza Khan most strongly sponsored the 
ceremonies. Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah, still the titular first minister of the 
Mughal Empire, may have felt apprehension about the political repercussions 
of sanctioning the ritual of a branch of Islam different from that of his 
nominal sovereign. He remained reluctant to cut his last symbolic ties with 
the empire, even though he refused to respond positively to calls of the 
emperor that he come to Delhi or provide troops to the center.[28] 
Of course, the political value of ties to the emperor plummeted even further 
in the late 1780s, which may help explain why the nawab-vizier approved the 
holding of Shi`i Friday prayers at all. In the period 1786-87, when they 
commenced in Lucknow and Faizabad, the Mughal emperor, Shah `Alam II, 
had been reduced to a figurehead over whom the Hindu Marathas and the 
Sunni Muslim Ruhilah Afghans fought because of his remaining authority as 
a symbol.[29] On the other hand, the visiting Mughal prince, Javan-Bakht 
Mirza, was allowed to attend the Lucknow prayers, and his presence probably 
indicates that Delhi did not perceive them as rebellious.[30] The nawabs of 
Awadh became firmly committed to holding Shi`i ceremonies and 
supporting the Usuli ulama. As they resorted less and less to the Mughals for 
the legitimation of their rule, they cast about for other sources of legitimacy. 
The creation of a supportive Shi`i clerisy was, in Awadh as in Qajar Iran, one 
means to this goal.[31] 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali attacked the upper-class opponents of Friday prayer for 
their pride reminiscent of the pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance (hamiyyat-i 
jahiliyyah). They did not want to bow behind a prayer leader, because it 
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would detract from their social status. These notables, among the wealthiest 
and most powerful men in North India, may well have balked at allowing the 
son of a small landholding qasabah family to lead them in prayer. Nasirabadi 
depicted his opponents as licentious aristocrats who spent their time listening 
to music, wearing silk, drinking from gold vessels, hanging paintings on their 
walls, and patronizing unveiled singing girls. 
He denounced their pretensions to religious learning as arrogant, ridiculing 
them for saying that since Shi`is at the shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf in 
Iraq did not openly hold Friday congregational prayers, believers should not 
hold them in Lucknow either. Since his opponents, as Akhbaris, objected to 
emulating anyone but the Imams, he pointed out the inconsistency of their 
imitating the practice in the shrine cities. Moreover, he denied that believers 
never held Friday congregational prayers in the holy centers of Iraq. 
He said the ritual had not previously been performed in North India because 
the Sunni emperors forced Shi`i notables to practice dissimulation. The 
situation, he continued, had now changed and Islam forbade the aping of 
one's ancestors. He argued that some scholars, such as Aqa Muhammad 
Baqir Bihbahani in Karbala, considered the Friday group prayers to be 
preferentially incumbent (vujub-itakhyiri), holding them privately. Nasirabadi 
said that he wished to make Bihbahani's stance clear, even though he 
recognized that most of his opponents, as Akhbaris, either emulated the dead 
or emulated no one. He emphasized that he himself, as a mujtahid, had come 
to his own conclusions and was not emulating Bihbahani. He neglected to 
mention that other scholars he studied with in Iraq, such as Aqa Sayyid `Ali 
Tabataba'i, took a more cautious position on this matter. Neither group in 
Lucknow referred to the practice in Iran, which indicates that they only 
considered that of the shrine cities in any sense normative.[32] 
Artisan and laborer Shi`is also tended to react with hostility to the Friday 
prayers. Since the court began them in a notable's mansion, the prayers 
obviously were not meant to encompass the popular classes at this point. 
Later the nawab had a cathedral mosque (jami` masjid) constructed in 
Lucknow so that the public could attend. Sayyid Dildar `Ali betrayed 
impatience at opposition from this quarter, dismissing the common people 
as animals and beasts that needed a shepherd who could use his staff to force 
them to the attainment of happiness.[33] A week later, Nasirabadi stressed that 
all Shi`is were not saved, and that some were worse than Sunnis. He said that 
some 
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put Ali on the same level as Muhammad, while others made him God. Such 
Shi`is, for all their love of the Imams, were unbelievers. He thundered that 
most of the ignorant Shi`is in his own time deserved to enter hellfire on these 
grounds. Sayyid Dildar `Ali rejected as effeminate the view of some that one 
should not speak badly of anyone who believes in the Imams[34] 
From his newfound pulpit Sayyid Dildar `Ali promoted the Usuli school of 
Shi`ism as orthodoxy. He claimed extensive prerogatives for ulama of that 
school and attempted to displace other competitors for the patronage of the 
Shi`i high notables, such as Sufis and Akhbari scholars. He strove against 
Akhbarism as the ideology of wealthy Shi`i gentlemen scholars, and against 
the extremist theological views of the little people. The rituals, law, and 
religious donations of the Shi`i community, he argued, should be controlled 
by the Usuli ulama. 
The Spread of Friday Congregational Prayers 
The practice of holding Shi`i Friday prayers and building Shi`i mosques 
spread to other cities, and then to smaller towns and villages. Through this 
institution, Shi`i medium landholders in the lineage centers enhanced their 
local prestige and authority. Further, service positions as prayer leaders 
opened up for them in the cosmopolitan cities where rich and powerful Shi`i 
patrons lived. Like the imambarahs, the new mosques united Shi`i 
communities, though fewer attended the formal services, which probably 
catered more to the landed, literate strata. 
The same year that Friday prayers began in Lucknow they commenced in 
Awadh's other major urban, center, Faizabad. As in the case of the riot seven 
years earlier, Javahir `Ali Khan (d. 1799) took the lead in supporting the 
program of the Usuli ulama. Sayyid `Abdu'l-`Ali Deoghatavi (1749-1827), 
from a village near Ghazipur, was appointed to lead the prayers in Faizabad. 
He came there in 1770 to study, pursuing his education with Mulla 
Muhammad `Ali "Padshah" Kashmiri and becoming a mujtahid. He received 
a land grant (mu`afi) worth Rs. 1,000 per month from Asafu'd-Dawlah to 
support him in the office of prayer leader.[35] 
Not many Shi`is attended the prayers at first, being unused to them. 
Especially in the rainy season and in winter, attendance dropped off sharply. 
Javahir `Ali Khan, who zealously supported the institution, hired twenty men 
as servants to bring companies of people to the mosque, not only for Friday 
prayers but for the five daily prayers as well.[36] As in Lucknow, the posi- 
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tion of Friday prayer leader in Faizabad became hereditary. It was next held 
by Sayyid Muhammad Deoghatavi (d. 1849), Sayyid `Abdu'l-`Ali's son, who 
studied with Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi, becoming a mujtahid.[37] His son, 
Sayyid `Ali (d. 1897), failed to reach the rank of ijtihad, even though he 
became Friday prayer leader. By that time personal charisma and specialized 
training for the post, originally an important consideration, had grown 
irrelevant in favor of traditional family claims and the charisma of office.[38] 
As was noted, the prayers began to be held in the lineage centers as well. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali constructed a Friday prayers mosque in his home town of 
Nasirabad in 1812. In 1807 Sayyid `Abdu'l-`Ali built an impressive mosque 
in Deoghata. After 1803 the British took over many areas of northern India 
formerly under Sunni Mughal rule, providing a safe atmosphere for Shi`is to 
build mosques and hold Friday prayers. 
Mawlavi Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ibadat, having studied with Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
in Lucknow, began leading Friday congregational prayers in Amroha at an 
old imambarah . In 1808 Hajji Ashraf ` Ali of Patna settled in Amroha and built 
a Friday prayers mosque.[39] The position of Friday prayer leader passed to 
the incumbent's son, who likewise trained with Lucknow's mujtahids.[40] Later 
in the century Mawlavi Sayyid `Ali Husayn, a zamindar and mu`afidar who had 
studied in Lucknow with Sayyid Dildar `Ali's son Sayyid Husayn, also served 
as prayer leader in Amroha.[41] Prominent families and middle landholders in 
the towns of the area began to enhance their local prestige and authority by 
having some members study in Lucknow and return to perform such 
religious leadership functions as leading prayers in the public mosques that 
these same families had built. 
In Awadh the ruling elite appointed mostly Indians to religious posts, despite 
the large number of qualified Iranian immigrants. The Indian ulama, better 
acquainted with local protocol, excluded their Iranian competitors. After 
failing to procure patronage in Awadh, Aqa Ahmad Bihbahani, the grandson 
of Aqa Muhammad Baqir, became prayer leader of British-ruled Patna in 
1809, supported by local Shi`i notables. He said the sermon in the name of 
the "king of Islam" (padshah-iIslam), probably referring to the Qajar monarch. 
In British-ruled territory Bihbahani felt no compulsion to recognize the weak 
Mughals in Delhi.[42] 
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Shi`i Religious Education 
The handful of Usuli ulama trained more scholars in their school on an 
informal basis. Sayyid Dildar `Ali in addition to bringing up his own five sons 
as ulama, taught a number of other religious students, though not all became 
clergymen. Of thirty-one long- and short-term pupils listed in Nasirabadi's 
biography, eight were clearly gentlemen scholars of the notable class. One 
sees a contrast between Mirza Kazim `Ali, a high notable who taught law and 
the prmciples of jurisprudence as an avocation, and Mirza Javad `Ali (1760-
1842), a poverty-stricken student who never composed much because he had 
difficulty in finding patronage. Another four "students" were Nasirabadi's 
colleagues, who traded knowledge with him. 
Of the remaining nineteen, mostly young men of a religious turn of mind, 
some came of middle landholding families in the qasabahs . These, like Sayyid 
Muhammad Quli Kinturi (later principal Sadr Amin at the British court in 
Mccrut) and Sayyid Muhammad Deoghatavi (later Faizabad's chief prayer 
leader), went on to careers in the religious or judicial fields. Some of his 
students, from families specializing in medicine, went on to become 
physicians themselves. Many of the younger scholars became committed 
Usulis, writing polemics against Akhbarism, Sufism, and Sunnism. Some of 
the younger notables trained by Nasirabadi also produced such works. Not 
everyone who studied with Nasirabadi came to support him; most of his 
students derived from an Akhbari background and some remained Akhbaris. 
Moreover, two young men very close to him, his cousin Sayyid Yad `Ali 
Nasirabadi and his old traveling companion Sayyid Panah `Ali, turned against 
him after studying with him, and remained his bitter critics.[43] Very firm 
bonds of loyalty and shared ideology emerged from the social networks 
centered on informal teaching and study, but sometimes those same 
networks accommodated strong enmities. 
Many other scholars, including Iranian and Kashmiri immigrants, taught in 
Awadh. In addition to class sessions, notables held salons centered on 
religious discussion. The prayer leader in Faizabad, Sayyid `Abdu'l-`Ali 
Deoghatavi, trained numbers of Usuli clerics. Through these informal 
tutoring systems Usuli ideas spread among Shi`i literati and notables, not only 
in Awadh but beyond it to Banaras and Allahabad divisions, the upper Doab, 
and Bihar. In the next generation Nasirabadi's sons and major students 
taught hundreds of scholars, and in the 1840s the Awadh rulers finally 
founded a Shi`i seminary (madrasah). 
The networks of learning extended even beyond India to Iraq and Iran, as in 
the case of Sayyid Dildar ` Ali. Ironically, the Indian connection proved highly 
lucrative for the Usuli cleries in the shrine cities. In the late 1780s Chief 
Minister Hasan Riza Khan remitted Rs. 500,000 to Najaf through the 
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Iranian firm of Hajji Karbala'i Muhammad Tihrani for the construction of a 
canal in the middle Euphrates, which would bring water to perpetually dry 
Najaf. The project, aimed at sparing inhabitants and pilgrims inconvenience, 
was completed in 1793. Later Asafu'd-Dawlah sent another Rs. 200,000 to 
the mujtahids in Iraq.[44] The nawab's channeling of such large sums to the 
chief Usuli ulama in the shrine cities, on the advice of Sayyid Dildar `Ali, 
strengthened them and further contributed to Usuli dominance. Tafazul 
Husayn Khan Kashmiri, as chief minister in 1795-98, remitted a great deal of 
money to Aqa Sayyid ` Ali Tabataba'i for the poor and the ulama in Karbala.[45] 
The Judiciary and Ulama-State Tensions 
Shuja`u'd-Dawlah probably appointed a chief qazi, as well as qazis in the 
provinces, since the Mughal system assumed these. Civil administrators 
performed many judicial functions. In rural areas large landholders often 
tried civil and criminal cases according to customary law (‘urf).[46] Elliot gave 
evidence that religious-law qazis, appointed to each parganah, continued to 
exist in Awadh right up to the 1856 British annexation. These Sunni 
provincial qazis often held the post on a hereditary basis, having been given 
service grants by the Mughal government for undertaking judicial duties. 
They decided disputes, appeased enmities, performed marriage ceremonies, 
decided inheritance cases, wrote decrees, led ritual prayers, and instructed the 
people in religious law. Typical of the evidence available for the continued 
appointment of qazis in the parganahs is the petition to the nawab from Hafiz 
Muhammad Basir, who wished to be made judge in Sandila on the death of 
his father, the former holder of the post. In Kakori as well, the post of qazi 
was held in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century on a 
hereditary basis.[47] 
In the eighteenth century the rudimentary judiciary of the central government 
lacked any great authority. Shuja`u'd-Dawlah appointed as mufti the Farangi-
Mahalli Ghulam Hazrat who held a similar post early in Asafu'd-Dawlah's 
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Dawlah's reign.[48] Isfahani painted a black picture of the judiciary under 
Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah as altogether ineffective. He said that in 1783, as a 
result of pressure exerted by the British resident, Bristow, the deputy chief 
minister, Haydar Beg, appointed Mawlavi Mubin Farangi-Mahalli as civil 
judge. After a while the government replaced him with a Shi`i Iranian, 
Muhammad Nasir Khan (a cousin of the assassinated chief minister, 
Mukhtaru'd-Dawlah), a notable rather than a religious scholar. In 1792 the 
Sunni Mufti Ghulam Hazrat became Lucknow's chief qazi, but the payroll 
for his court employees was, owing to treasury department problems, always 
in arrears.[49] 
Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan (r. 1798-1814) likewise depended largely on the 
Sunni ulama of the Farangi Mahall for his court judges.[50] These Sunni judges 
sometimes came into conflict with the nawab; Sa`adat `Ali removed Mawlavi 
Zuhuru'llah (d. 1840) from office after a dispute. Such disputes with the court 
could be ruinous both to careers and to finances, but Zuhuru'llah sought and 
received the patronage of a Shi`i tax-farmer, becoming mufti once again after 
Sa`adat `Ali's death. 
The judiciary remained weak, and the British, worried about the impact of 
insecurity on property, constantly urged Nawab Sa`adat `Ali to establish 
courts of justice and police throughout his dominions. He astutely turned 
this demand around and used it as a bargaining chip, saying that such a court 
system could be established only when the rebels in the countryside were 
extirpated, an indirect way of asking for more British troops to help his tax 
collectors.[51] 
The Sunni background of the government qazis made many Shi`is 
uncomfortable about resorting to them. A believer asked Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
Nasirabadi if, where two Shi`is had an unsettled legal dispute, they were 
permitted to take it to an upright Imami religious scholar. He replied that it 
was not only permissible, it was the preferred course.[52] The Shi`i ulama 
enhanced their moral authority and circumvented the Farangi-Mahall judges 
through giving informal rulings on disputes between Shi`is. 
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Only in the 1840s did the government institute a Shi`i judiciary in Awadh. 
The major reason for the long delay in this development was that the Shi`i 
ulama simply did not trust the nawabs to let them make rulings according to 
Islamic law and their own consciences. Partially, they may not have wished 
to put themselves in a position where they would have been sure to come 
into conflict occasionally with their benefactors, for long remaining content 
to let Farangi-Mahallis like Mufti Zuhuru'llah undertake this often dangerous 
and morally compromising work. 
An incident in the continuing rivalry between the Indian and Iranian Shi`i 
ulama demonstrates the difficulties they faced in this regard. Aqa Ahmad 
Bihbahani came to India late in the eighteenth century and stayed in 
Hyderabad, Murshidabad, and Patna. He then came to Awadh in search of 
patronage, settling at first in Faizabad. In fact, he ought to have gotten the 
ulama in Lucknow to have the nawab extend an invitation to him, but 
perhaps because of his Iranian pride he did not abide by-that etiquette. He 
then committed the even more serious breach of coming to Lucknow 
without the nawab's permission.[53] 
At the end of Ramadan in 1222 (1807), some believers came to Bihbahani in 
Lucknow and stated that they had seen the moon, a sign that the month of 
fasting was over. Aqa Ahmad gave a ruling that the next day was the first of 
Shawwal and the Holy Day (‘Idal-Fitr) marking the breaking of the fast. He 
sent the ruling to Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan, who, he said, at first accepted it. 
Later the nawab changed his mind and issued orders that the Holy Day would 
be celebrated a day later. Some friends advised Bihbhani to go along with the 
nawab's judgment, but he replied that in such matters the mujtahid must be 
obeyed, not obedient. He asserted that given the Shi`i faith of the nawab, 
practicing dissimulation with him could have no meaning, and the Imams 
forbade the sort of worldly greed that would impel a cleric to obey him on 
this issue. 
The next day Sa`adat `Ali Khan went to the mosque for the Holy Day 
prayers, which Sayyid Dildar `Ali led. Aqa Ahmad insisted that the Law 
forbade holding the prayers a day late, but the Lucknow ulama justified it on 
grounds of pious dissimulation (taqiyyah) Bihbahani sent a letter to the ulama, 
protesting that such actions gave an excuse to the Sunnis to criticize them. 
In reply, they quoted oral reports from the Imams living under the Sunni 
Abbasids about pious dissimulation, which he felt inappropriate. He 
complained that many in Lucknow thought that simply receiving a diploma 
(ijazah) permitting one to transmit the oral reports of the Imams made a 
scholar a mujtahid, cattily remarking that in all of North India he never found 
any true ulama.[54] These barbs, directed at Sayyid Dildar `Ali, aimed 
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at disputing his status as a mujtahid. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali angrily riposted that he had on many occasions opposed 
the nawabs, but insisted on the legitimacy of practicing pious dissimulation 
with them. He gave as an example the time that Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah fell 
ill and British friends suggested that he have some liquor for its medicinal 
effects. The nawab had given up drinking some time before, repenting before 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali. He asked Nasirabadi about this medical advice through a 
notable. The prayer leader replied without hesitation that many oral reports 
said that forbidden things have no curative effect. He could not permit the 
drinking of wine for medicinal purposes, on grounds of Islamic law. 
Nasirabadi explained that he had not practiced pious dissimulation in that 
case because the nawah asked him a direct question. In the incident of the 
late Holy Day prayers, Sa`adat `Ali Khan never bothered to inquire as to his 
opinion, but simply issued orders postponing the ceremonies. Had he asked, 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali would have informed him that he was wrong to do so. But 
for the prayer leader to have volunteered such information would have been, 
he insisted, so serious an infraction against court protocol that it might well 
have put his life in danger. Temporary visitors such as Bihbahani might have 
been able to defy the nawab, he allowed, but local religious officials were in 
a much more precarious position.[55] 
This sort of awkward situation made Shi`i ulama unwilling to accept positions 
as government-appointed judges. At one point the government of Sa`adat 
`Ali Khan attempted to appoint Sayyid Dildar `Ali to a judgeship. Nasirabadi 
explained that his acceptance would have been conditional on the nawab's 
assurance that the Islamic Law would be implemented. Since this would have 
meant that Sayyid Dildar `Ali would be judging the nawab, he declined to 
accept.[56] 
Conclusion 
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed two religious 
processes at work among notable-class Shi`is in Awadh. As the Shi`i-ruled 
state became more autonomous from the Mughals in Delhi, notable Shi`is 
felt less tension with their own government, moving away from a sectarian 
sort of religion to a more formal establishment. As a corollary of this 
lessening tension with the state, Shi`is brought into being formal Shi`i 
religious institutions, some of them for the first time in North India. These 
institutions, in turn, required specialized staff, setting in motion the second 
religious process, the creation of a professional clergy. 
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The major cause for the transition to a formal religious establishment was 
clearly the rise of a Shi`i regional ruling group in post-Mughai Awadh. Just 
as it produced a new, local patrimonial bureaucracy, it encouraged a more 
rational and bureaucratic approach in its own branch of Islam. Moreover, the 
cathedral mosque and Sunni Friday prayers had been powerful symbols of 
empire in Mughal Delhi. Some said that Asafu'd-Dawlah intended the Shi`i 
cathedral mosque he built in the 1790s to rival the one in Delhi.[57] The ruling 
elite, desirous of celebrating its increasing autonomy in Awadh with a new 
capital, new bazaars, and extensive architectural works, appreciated the 
symbolic political value of Shi`i Friday prayers. Thus, the move to a more 
formal religious establishment paralleled a further stage of state making in 
Awadh, in which the regional court openly threw off even the emperor's 
favored form of religion. 
A more autonomous Shi`i state reduced the tension with the Shi`i 
community by providing security to it for its religious practices. A little over 
a century after Awrangzib forbade all Shi`i rituals in India, Awadh's Shi`is 
freely and openly practiced their faith. One of the classic prerequisites 
recognized by Shi`i ulama for the holding of Friday prayers was that it be safe 
to do so.[58] In authorizing the prayers, the nawab and the chief minister made 
a declaration of security for Shi`is in their realm. Nasirabadi had to accept 
the sincerity of that declaration before he could agree to lead the prayers, and 
even then he adopted a rhetoric of independence, urging Shi`is to obey the 
Imams before any secular authority. Behind this idiom of independence, 
however, lay the inescapable fact that Shi`i clerics like Nasirabadi were being 
co-opted by the state as adjuncts to its moral authority. In return, the highly 
trained Usuli ulama, who demanded absolute obedience from laymen on 
religious matters, were given financial support by the state, beginning their 
transformation into a professional clergy. This emergence of a body of paid 
religious experts is one correlate of a formal religious establishment, as 
opposed to a sect. 
Obstacles to the achievement of a religious establishment among Shi`is 
remained. The Akhbari gentlemen scholars of the notable class at first 
refused to bow behind the petty landholding ulama. The ulama themselves 
still distrusted the state, refusing formal judicial duties. Moreover, since the 
Friday prayers began among a small circle of the chief minister's intimates in 
Lucknow, artisans and laborers of the bazaar were excluded. Like the office 
of mulla-bashi in late Safavid Iran, the office of prayer leader in Awadh 
resembled in its initial stages the chaplaincy of the ruling household.[59] But 
just as the nawab's arbitrary, patrimonial power had to extend throughout 
Awadh, 
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so too did the official school of Shi`ism he adopted make universal claims to 
authority.[60] Only some Awadh notables at first recognized these claims, as 
Usuli Shi`ism became their dominant ideology, and most Shi`i artisans and 
laborers retained a more sectarian form of Shi`ism. 
Much of this chapter deals with professional closure by the Usuli ulama.[61] 
The beginning processes of clerical professionalization described here ended 
in widespread exclusionary practices, which will be dealt with in the next 
chapter. In this first stage in their appropriation of social and economic 
opportunities, the Usuli ulama specified a set of religious offices—prayer 
leader, jurisconsult, endowment and religious charities supervisor, and 
teacher—which they sought to fill. These often highly remunerative offices, 
required by the conventions of Muslim states and institutions, attracted pre-
bends, benefices, and stipends for their support. The Usulis, having defined 
the services offered, strongly made the argument that untrained laypersons 
lacked the professional expertise to provide them. In this first stage of 
professionalization, the Shi`i jurisprudents attempted to exclude literate 
gentleman scholars from what they saw as properly clerical posts. They 
excluded from their demands for a monopoly on such offices only the 
Muslim court judgeships. (Here the tendency to professional closure and the 
demands of their status group's style of life, of fidelity to scriptural principles, 
came into conflict.) To some extent. this attempt at clerical closure 
represented the demand by sons of small and middle Shi`i landholders that 
service opportunities with the Shi`i state be expanded for them and wealth 
shared beyond the narrow circle of notables and administrators. 
The professional closure attempted by the handful of Usuli clerics was 
incomplete in the late eighteenth century. Unwilling to assume the risks and 
accept the moral compromises involved in the formal judiciary, they left that 
traditionally ulama-dominated institution to the Sunni Farangi-Mahallis. The 
Usulis' reluctance indicates both their incomplete transition from sectarian 
to establishmentarian views and their conviction that the ulama had not yet 
successfully socialized the Shi`i ruling class to scriptural values. Competitors 
for state patronage abounded, in the form of Sufi Shi`i leaders, conservative 
Akhbari ulama, and even Sunni and Hindu learned and holy men, so that the 
Usuli ulama had anything but a monopoly on religious patronage. Yet with 
the foundation of Friday congregational prayers, and with Nasirabadi's 
teachings on the authority of mujtahids over laymen and over religious 
donations, the foundations were laid for the emergence in Awadh of a full-
blown hierocracy, a clerical hierarchy that asserted sole authority over the 
formal religious establishment. 
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6 
 
The New Jurisprudents and the Struggle for 
Religious Leadership 
 
Weber isolated two kinds of ruling organization, the political and the 
hierocratic, or religious. Both, he thought, seek to attain power and to 
exercise domination (the probability that a command with a given specific 
content will be obeyed by a given group of persons).[1] The Weberian 
categories shed light on religious developments in Awadh. The Shi`i-
dominated Awadh state depended on the grant of prebends and tax-farming 
rights for its civil and military administration. The new religious 
establishment was likewise supported by service land grants, providing an 
income to scholars, who thus became differentiated as professional clergy 
from the laity. This gradual emergence of a Shi`i religious establishment in 
Awadh alongside the Shi`i state brought to the fore questions of authority 
and the sort of domination this "hierocracy" would wield. In the late 
eighteenth century official Shi`i clergymen, mostly small and middle 
landholders from the qasabahs, began performing the functions of prayer 
leader, informal jurisconsult (mufti), and supervisor of religious charities. The 
institutions these individuals helped create contained the seeds of an 
increasingly complex religious establishment with its own bureaucracy and 
control over wealth. 
Usuli ideology, adopted by this new group, had been used in Iran and 
southern India to justify a clerical monopoly over religious authority, often 
coupled with aggression toward competitors.[2] Usulism was developed by 
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clerics seeking greater accommodation to the ruling establishment, growing 
most powerful in Safavid Iran. In accepting that the central institutions of 
the Islamic state can exist in the absence of the Imam, the Usulis adjusted 
themselves to the power realities of Shi`i ruled governments, endeavoring to 
found a monopolistic religious establishment that encompassed the entire 
Shi`i community.[3] The search for monopoly brought the Usulis into conflict 
with other Shi`i religious leaders, most notably Sufis and Akhbaris, whom 
they sought to exclude from authority. 
How should the struggle between these religious groups be interpreted? A 
Marxian analysis might lead us to search for conflicts between economic 
classes as the base of these ideological struggles. On the other hand, a 
Weberian approach might see the dispute as one between status groups. 
Certainly, Weberian categories seem at first sight very useful in interpreting 
the struggle for religious leadership in Awadh. But only a full examination of 
the conflicts can help decide the applicability of these explanatory models to 
the material. 
Weber distinguished three types of legitimate domination—the charismatic, 
the traditional, and the rational—recognizing that none of these might occur 
in its pure form and would more often be found mixed together.[4] The types 
of Awadh religious leadership fall generally under the Weberian headings. 
Sufi leaders based their right to legitimate domination mainly on charismatic 
grounds, citing mystical knowledge and the ability to perform miracles. 
Akhbari ulama stressed the traditional grounds for their authority, in the 
Imami oral reports. Usuli ulama grounded their claims in their mastery of a 
premodern sort of rational-legal technique, asserting that the expertise of the 
mujtahid in deriving legal judgments from the revealed text through 
reasoning lent him his authority. (Both Sufis and Usulis also made some 
claims to authority on traditional grounds.) The clash among the mystics, the 
experts in oral reports, and the rationalist jurisprudents appears to have 
derived at least partially from the differing types of legitimation to which they 
appealed in the exercise of their religious domination. The question remains 
whether conflict between social classes entered into this dispute. 
The Battle with Sufism 
Within the Shi`i community the new Usuli school faced no more formidable 
contenders for control over religious institutions and notable patronage than 
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Sufi leaders. The notables in Awadh did not originally hold the ulama and 
mujtahids in high esteem, rather honoring Sufi pirs. Sufis believed in the 
metaphysical doctrine of existential monism (wahdat al-wujud), which in its 
extreme forms approximated pantheism. Sufi leaders, or pirs, claimed to 
enjoy divine graces (karamat), to perform miracles, and to be privy to 
inspiration (kashf) from God. Indian Muslims practiced Sufism widely, 
including those in Lucknow, where people attended meditation and chanting 
sessions, seeking to teach mystical states (vajd va hal). The legalist ulama 
objected that music and revelry often accompanied these gatherings, 
lamenting that many high notables attended them and believed Sufism to be 
a path to spiritual well-being. Several of the powerful court physicians in 
Faizabad left sons who continued a tradition of Sufism and Akhbarism.[5] 
Even formally, Sunni pirs often benefited from the largesse of Awadh's 
Imami rulers. Asafu'd-Dawlah granted twelve rent-free villages, yielding Rs. 
30,000, to the pirs of Salon in perpetuity. The pirs spent most of the proceeds 
in supporting itinerant faqirs and Hindu Vairagis, without distinction of 
religion, who made short stops in Salon. At any one time a hundred such 
visitors congregated in this largely Muslim town of four thousand. Other 
Sunni Sufi endowments existed at Bhardasa near Faizabad, endowed by 
Asafu'd-Dawlah with lands yielding Rs. 15,000 per year, and at Manikpur in 
Partabghar, with Rs. 4,000 per year.[6] 
Some pirs had Shi`i sympathies. Mir Taqi Mir related how his father, a Shi`i, 
discussed the Umayyads (enemies of `Ali) with a Sufi leader who replied that 
he had, thank God, never mentioned their names.[7] The Usuli clergy said 
Sufis adopted Shi`ism only pro forma, and that Sufis followed their pirs only 
because they expected worldly benefits. Aside from Sufi brotherhoods 
(tariqah Sufism), many notables in Awadh cultivated the mystical philosophy 
of such Shi`i thinkers as Mulla Sadra Shirazi, whom the Usuli jurists 
dismissed as a heretic.[8] 
Although Sufi adoption of Shi`ism in Awadh may often have aimed at 
gaining court patronage, some Shi`i Sufis developed their own subculture and 
literary traditions. They were influenced by the Shi`i Ni`matu'llahi order, 
which had spread to Hyderabad and based itself there after Usuli persecution 
in Safavid Iran. Indian missionaries of this order promoted a re- 
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vival in Iran in the late eighteenth century, meeting violent repression from 
Usuli clergy, who saw the pirs as rivals to their own authority and access to 
court patronage.[9] 
Sufis in Awadh told a story that the early Shi`i figure ash-Sharif ar-Radi was 
praying behind his brother, the great scholar Murtada `Alamu'l-Huda, when 
he suddenly left the mosque. When rebuked, he replied that he had seen the 
prayer leader covered with blood and could not continue, because of ritual 
pollution. When asked about this, `Alamu'l-Huda confessed that he had been 
considering an issue in the ritual law of menstruation, admitting that ar-Radi 
was right to have acted as he did. In this story, `Alamu'l-Huda stands for 
those concerned with outer appearances, while ar-Radi represents mystics 
devoted to inner reality (abl-i batin). The tale demeaned the official ulama as 
overly concerned with ritual law, and exalted the Sufis, for whom prayer had 
no significance unless the heart was also engaged. True to form, the Usuli 
ulama complained of the story's legal inaccuracy, since such a thought would 
not invalidate the prayers. The appearance of classical Shi`i authors in the 
story indicates that the Sufis were working in an Imami tradition.[10] 
Sufis and the Friday Prayers 
The establishment of Friday prayers in 1786 helped provoke a crisis. As long 
as Shi`is simply held informal mourning sessions for the Imams, the 
community could remain diffuse and diverse. The holding of formal prayers 
in congregation at Hasan Riza Khan's palace required that criteria for 
community membership be set up. Moreover, Hasan Riza Khan and-other 
notables created tensions by bestowing patronage both on Sufis and on their 
Usuli rivals. The appointment of an Usuli prayer leader proved divisive, since 
to pray behind him implied acceptance of his spiritual leadership. The Sufis 
held meditation sessions, with dancing and singing, on Fridays in the same 
hall where Shi`is said Friday prayers in congregation. The Sufis did not join 
the prayers, some suggesting that praying in public was prideful. They said 
that anyone with inner purity did not need such rituals, which only bestowed 
outer purity.[11] 
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In the 1780s at the Awadh court the struggle between jurists and mystics 
grew fierce. Once the Sufi Shah Khayru'llah told his patron Hasan Riza Khan 
that he did not go to Karbala, for fear of Aqa Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani, 
whom he accused of extorting money from Indian pilgrims to the shrine of 
Imam Husayn. Nasirabadi, having studied in the shrine cities, protested that 
such fears were wholly unfounded.[12] 
In 1786, about four months after the congregational prayers began, Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali launched a stinging attack on the Sufis in his afternoon sermon. 
He condemned those who claimed to meet every day with God, or even to 
be God Himself, and who said they knew the condition of the seven heavens. 
Nasirabadi sneered that if one asked them a question about Islamic law, they 
would be unable to answer. He accused them of innovating heretical rituals 
and laws. Since Sunnis in India often attacked Shi`is as innovators, 
Nasirabadi made this charge cautiously. He defined a heretical innovation 
(bidcah) as a practice contrary to the path of the Prophet. For instance, he 
said, there is an oral report from Muhammad that whoever weeps for Husayn 
will enter heaven. Therefore, the mourning sessions held by Shi`is for the 
Imam are not heretical innovations, though they grew up after the time of 
the Prophet. (Sunni critics, of course, did see such mourning sessions. as 
heretical.) 
Nasirabadi also criticized Sufis for the practice of spiritual retreat and 
seclusion, saying that meeting with the believers and associating with one 
another is much praised in the oral reports from the Imams.[13] In later 
sermons, as well, he returned to these themes, criticizing Sufi ascetic ideas 
and what he saw as pantheism. He rejected the analogy that God flows in his 
creation as water in milk, or that God is as the ocean and beings are as the 
waves. Such a view, he said, would reduce us to saying that dogs and pigs are 
God Himself.[14] 
The Chishti leader Shah `Ali Akbar Mawdudi (d. 1795), Nasirabadi's keenest 
competitor for the support of Hasan Riza Khan, led the Friday morning 
meditation sessions, but he and his following refused to attend the 
congregational prayers. They prayed Friday prayers elsewhere, with Mawdudi 
as the prayer leader. Shah `Ali Akbar, stung by Nasirabadi's anathemas 
against the Sufis from his newly won pulpit, sent Hasan Riza Khan a letter 
saying "Praise be to God! Is it right that someone should now mount the 
minbar and pronounce curses on the person who founded the congregational 
prayers?"[15] When Hasan Riza Khan brought the matter up with Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali, he replied that he did not wish Mawdudi to be among those 
whom 
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he cursed. If he categorized himself as a pir, Nasirabadi bore no blame. But 
Mawdudi considered himself a law-abiding mystic, insisting that the 
prerequisite for mystical initiation was to follow the holy Law. He felt that 
the principles of esoteric knowledge, like those of jurisprudence, were based 
on the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus, and analog.[16] He therefore strongly 
objected to being branded a heretic. 
The chief minister perceived no contradiction between the legalism of the 
Usulis and the mystical approach of his favorite Sufis, still hoping to find a 
way for the two to coexist. He broached the idea that Sayyid Dildar `Ali meet 
Shah `Ali Akbar personally and iron out their differences. Nasirabadi 
dismissed the man as a fraud, saying that Mawdudi refused to participate in 
the Shi`i prayers only because of his many Sunni followers. Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
said he feared that he might confuse the Shi`i congregation if he now, after 
having mounted the pulpit and cursed Sufis every Friday, expressed a wish 
to meet a pir.[17] 
In the early 1790s a final break came. One evening Hasan Riza Khan brought 
Shah `Ali Akbar to the Great Imambarah just before sunset. The new Friday 
prayers mosque stood next to the Imambarah, and the believers were 
preparing to say the sunset (maghrib) prayers. At sunset Nasirabadi normally 
ordered candles to be lit at that Great Imambarah, out of respect to the 
cenotaphs stored there. That evening, however, he waited, in hopes that the 
Sufis would leave. Hasan Riza Khan defused this tense situation, arranging a 
pro forma (zahiri) meeting between Usuli and Sufi. 
The chief minister wanted Shah `Ali Akbar to pray behind the mujtahid. The 
negotiations broke down, however, and Mawdudi led his Sufis in the sunset 
prayer at the Imambarah. Hasan Riza Khan went over to the Friday prayers 
mosque to say the prayers behind Nasirabadi with the Usulis. Sayyid Dildar 
`Ali ardently requested of the chief minister that he be excused from meeting 
the Sufi. Shah `Ali Akbar at that point fell ill and had to leave. Nasirabadi 
was happy at this development, which allowed him to avoid meeting the 
man.[18] 
The incident proved decisive for the development of the Shi`i community in 
Awadh. The Sufi Shi`is, excluded from the official congregation, lost 
opportunities to exercise influence with, and receive patronage from, high 
notables. Shi`i Sufism might have acted as an ecumenical force, since pits 
often had Sunni or even Hindu followers. The Shi`ism of the Usuli ulama 
emphasized strident communalism, such militancy ultimately provoking a 
Sunni backlash. 
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Usuli-Sufi Polemics 
The analysis of texts generated by the Usuli-Sufi conflict helps us understand 
the mentalities involved and is useful for several reasons. The intellectual 
disputes between Usulis and Sufi Shi`is in Awadh well illustrate religious 
developments. But attitudes toward ritual, as was just demonstrated, could in 
themselves have an impact on the shape of the community, and so on society. 
The question arises whether these texts can be read so as to shed some light 
on the social conflicts that also underlay the enmity between mujtahids and 
pirs. 
Nasirabadi followed his efforts to exclude Sufis from his congregation with 
an ideological assault on them. He dedicated it to Hasan Riza Khan, whom 
he called the founder of Friday prayers, but wrote it in Arabic, directing it 
primarily at the ulama. The book attacked both the metaphysical Sufism of 
classical upper-class thinkers and the Sufism of the orders, with their rituals. 
He quoted Imami oral reports, and presented what he said was an original 
refutation of existential monism (wahdat al-wujud).[19] He refuted the medieval 
Shi`i thinker and admirer of the Andalusian mystic Ibn ‘Arabi, Sayyid Haydar 
Amuli, whose work defended the conception of existential monism in a Shi`i 
context.[20] This focus suggests Amuli's influence among India's Sufi Shi`is. 
Beyond the metaphysical controversy Nasirabadi concentrated on showing 
the illegitimacy for Twelver Shi`is of Sufi beliefs and practices. He began with 
the doctrine of inspiration (kashf) which literally means "uncovering." He 
explained that it consisted of seeing spiritual lights and hearing voices. Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali objected that instances of mystical inspiration cannot be verified, 
and that the persons who related tales about it or said they experienced it 
cannot be trusted, since they also told miracle stories about the enemies of 
`Ali, or fell into other doctrinal errors. He said it cannot be told whether such 
inspiration comes from God or from Satan, since most Sufis engaged in 
ascetic practices, such as rigorous fasting, that impaired their judgment.[21] 
This section reveals the close connection the prayer leader saw between 
Sufism and Sunnism, much of his attack on Sufism being originally 
elaborated against the Sunni Naqshbandis of Delhi.[22] 
Nasirabadi criticized the Sufi practice of inducing a trance state to achieve 
mystical ecstasy (wajd), excoriating the mystics for falling on the ground and 
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asking God for healing, then singing, beating drums, and dancing. He 
charged that Sunni kings, such as the Umayyad Mucawiyah, promoted these 
pro-Islamic practices to distract Shi`is from their political opposition to him. 
He quoted Sufi works to prove that Sufis from every social class engaged in 
ecstatic exercises accompanied by music, an art form Shi`i jurisprudents 
unanimously condemned.[23] The mystics, he said, invented ritual practices 
such as vegetarianism, the giving up of fine clothes, and retreats into 
seclusion for meditation, which he stigmatized as monkery (rahbaniyyah), 
recalling the oral report from the Prophet that there is no monkery in Islam. 
He also objected to Sufi criticisms of the wealthy, quoting from oral reports 
attributed to the Imams on the permissibility of seeking to become rich as a 
means of avoiding the sorts of sins to which poverty might drive one.[24] 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali not only defended the wealthy but accused Sufis of 
uncontrolled passions, implying that they actually addressed their mystical 
love poetry, ostensibly for God, to real women or slave-boys. He cited Imami 
oral reports condemning Sufis. Nasirabadi further disparaged the loud or 
silent group repetition (dhikr) of the creed "There is no God but god," 
marshaling oral reports that forbade the raising of the voice during worship. 
Usulis forbade the oath of allegiance and obedience (baycat) that adepts gave 
to the Sufi master, and the cloak (khirqah) of initiation they received from 
him in turn.[25] In conclusion, Sayyid Dildar `Ali branded Sufis innovators (ahl 
al-bidcah), saying the Prophet Muhammad forbade association with heretics. 
He advocated the shunning of Shi`i Sufis, urging that whenever an Usuli saw 
them in the street he should publicly curse them as apostates. Indeed, he saw 
all sects save the Imamis as unbelievers on grounds of incorrect dogma. At 
the end of the book he included the formula of repentance after apostasy in 
an effort to convince Sufi Shi`is to come over to Usulism.[26] 
Sufis replied vigorously to Nasirabadi, writing in Persian. An anonymous 
manuscript survives by a Sufi in rebuttal of Lucknow's prayer leader. The 
treatise contended that the spread of Sufism among Shi`is was of old 
standing. Great Imami thinkers had in their biographical dictionaries 
accepted the division of Shi`is into legalists (zahiri) and mystics (batini). 
Indeed, the tract's author wrote, all Sufis have a Shi`i tinge because of their 
respect for the mystical knowledge of `Ali, only the Naqshbandis being truly 
Sunnis. The mystical knowledge referred to in the Imami oral reports, he 
argued, is the Sufi path (tariqat), and many eminent Shi`i ulama forbade the 
laity to criticize Sufi leaders. He maintained that mystics (curafa ') are more 
noble than the ulama because God gives them perfection and their way has 
transcended a 
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dependence on books and the intellectual doubts it engenders.[27] 
The nameless Sufi emphasized that many great Imamis were Sufis, including 
important Safavid-era thinkers. He attacked the practice of publicly insulting 
Sufis as pure fanaticism, and defended Bayazid Bistami, whose pantheistic-
sounding savings included "Praise to me, how great is my glory!" He 
explained that Bistami did not assert his own divinity, but rather claimed to 
have become as nothing, so that only God was left. Moreover, he added, 
some oral reports front the Imams supported the doctrine of existential 
monism.[28] 
The treatise contended that Usulis erred in trying to distinguish between 
those Safavid thinkers who actually adhered to Sufism and those who only 
thought well of it, the figures in question having all been practicing Sufis. The 
Usulis wished to claim the great thinkers of the Imami heritage as their own, 
perhaps partially because they believed in consensus as a source of law. But 
Sufi Shi`is rightly presented themselves as the true heirs of a major Safavid 
tradition. The Sufi's rebuttal ended by defending the listening to music and 
the bestowal of cloaks of initiation. He insisted that Shi`i law permitted music 
that inspired a desire for the hereafter. He said that music was originally 
forbidden among Shi`is because of the need for pious dissimulation (taqiyyah) 
in times when Shi`i songs put believers in danger.[29] In Shi`i-ruled Awadh, 
he implied, Shi`is could sing freely. 
Another revealing encounter between the official prayer leader and a mystic 
occurred in the next decade. In 1803 an Iranian Sufi named Mawlavi Sami` 
came into conflict with Lucknow's Usulis. Sayyid Dildar `Ali, fifty years old, 
had been the capital's prayer leader for seventeen years and had grown firmly 
attached to the Awadh establishment. Mawlavi Sami` attacked him on 
precisely this point, sending him a list of questions. From the first, he 
endeavored to put the prayer leader on the defensive. Mawlavi Sami` wrote 
that the truly pious among the learned avoided rulers, thus remaining 
obscure, while scholars seeking wealth and high position gravitated to the 
court, becoming prominent. What, then, should laymen do? The Sufi 
suggested that the mujtahids' position in society derived from compromises 
they made with the impious rulers, and implied that laymen should emulate 
less opportunistic jurisprudents. 
Nasirabadi attempted to neutralize the issue of social class. He said that if an 
upright mujtahid and qualified exemplar (marja`) avoided rulers, he should be 
consulted. On the other hand, if a jurisprudent sought riches licitly, a layman 
could not refuse to follow him simply because of Ins wealth. After all, he 
said, many prophets and great Shi`i thinkers were wealthy, and the 
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high class standing of Muhammad Baqir Majlisi and his association with the 
Safavid court was occasioned by proper motives and resulted in obvious 
benefits for the faith.[30] 
Mawlavi Sami` next quoted scripture condemning tyranny and forbidding 
Muslims to aid despots. He said that both jurisprudents and mystics knew 
very well that none among the ruling classes in India observed the limits set 
by the holy Law. Was it right, he pointedly inquired, to call such rulers tyrants, 
or not? Nasirabadi agreed that the literal sense of Imami oral reports 
indicated such a step. But he said the Qur'an denied that it ordained any 
discomfort for the believers in their religion. Perhaps the Imam meant to 
forbid anyone to approve in his heart of tyranny, or the word "tyranny" 
meant only wrongdoing to the House of the Prophet.[31] Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
casuistically justified cooperation with the despotic government of Sa`adat 
`Ali Khan, which because of its Shi`ism at least supported the family of the 
Prophet. 
The Sufi asked the prayer leader whether it was right to associate with the 
notables and to accept grants from them, of cash, goods, or land and villages. 
Nasirabadi said that one might accept gifts from tyrants as long as one had 
no sure knowledge that they were usurped property.[32] Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
himself took grants of cash and villages, where Hindu peasants labored to 
support his Shi`i religious office. Mawlavi Sami` then chastised Usulis for 
cursing Sufis and said that many Safavid thinkers had spoken well of Sufism. 
Nasirabadi rejected this precedent, since in dogma emulation was forbidden. 
He allowed that pious continence (zuhd) like that of `Ali's companion Abu 
Dharr could never be deprecated But Sufis, he said, bore enmity for the 
Imams, and Safavid thinker Majlisi II's condemnation of them was well 
known. Nasirabadi dismissed Safavid thinkers who admired Sufism as 
heretical followers of Ibn ‘Arabi. 
Mawlavi Sami` rephrased his question, complaining that in those days cursing 
Sufis had become as common among Shi`is as cursing the Sunni caliphs. He 
recalled north Indian Shi`is, such as Shaykh `Ali Hazin and Husayn Khan 
‘Azimabadi, who thought well of Sufism, and pointed to the writings of Shah 
Nicmatu'llah Vali Kirmani (d. 1437), founder of the Ni'matu'llahi order, as 
examples of Sufi Shi`ism. Nasirabadi reiterated his objections to Sufi rituals 
as innovations, attacking Sunni Sufis as opponents of Shi`ism.[33] 
The Usuli attack on Sufism focused on beliefs and rituals that the 
jurisprudents branded unscriptural innovations influenced by Sunnism. The 
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Sufis made the case that they represented an important spiritual tradition 
within Shi`ism, including many Safavid exponents, and so were not simply 
innovating heretics originating in Sunni-dominated northern India. The 
mujtahids and the pits argued, not just about purely religious issues in dogma 
and ritual, but about social issues as well. The Usulis extolled the virtues of 
associating with the ruling classes for the sake of the Shi`i faith, while some 
Sufi Shi`is accused them of moral turpitude in so compromising themselves. 
In defending the goodness of wealth to Mawlavi Sami`, Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
upheld the values of the qasabah-based service elite of which he formed a 
part, as well as those of his patrons, the high notables. 
The Social Context 
The struggle of Usulis to displace Sufi leaders from positions of influence 
took place in society as well as in doctrinal tracts. To look at the conflict on 
a more concrete level requires a focus on the social-control mechanisms 
invoked by the Usulis, and on the social interests that underlay the dispute. 
Mujtahids in Awadh had no Sufi pirs put to death, as happened in Iran. But 
Usulis verbally abused Sufis in public and shunned them. Nasirabadi declared 
Shi`i believers in existential monism ritually unclean (najis), so that no one 
should eat with them.[34] 
Usulis should curse even Sayyids and true believers in the Shi`i creed who 
held heretical Sufi doctrines and gave allegiance to a Sufi pir, holding that 
through mystical exercises one could draw near God. Still, Nasirabadi did not 
put Sufis completely outside the pale. One might accept food from one, and 
should help out even a Sufi relative in need. An Usuli should not curse a Shi`i 
simply for wearing the patched robes of a Sufi, but should ascertain his beliefs 
first, though wearing such clothing indicated moral corruption at the very 
least. 
Nasirabadi's control over charitable contributions allowed him to attract 
students with stipends and to train a new generation of anti-Sufi scholars. 
Sayyid Aczam `Ali Bankori. for instance, wrote against Sufis and in favor of 
marriage, and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Musavi the preacher (va`iz) attacked 
Sufis and Sunnis in his sermons.[35] The campaign against the Sufis created an 
atmosphere of witch-hunting among Awadh's Shi`is. A man could be 
publicly disgraced and cursed on mere suspicion of Sufi tendencies. While 
these practices benefited the ulama in helping to cut off patronage to their 
Sufi competitors, they made life unpleasant even for respectable persons of 
slightly unorthodox views. 
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Sayyid Najaf `Ali Kashmiri, arriving in Faizabad in the late 1700s, inclined to 
the upper-class mysticism of the Isfahan school but had no links to a Sufi 
order.[36] A self-effacing man, once when someone mistook him for an 
attendant at a public bath, he obligingly helped the fellow bathe. His 
commentaries on mystical works by Safavid thinkers, coupled with his ascetic 
bent, led his enemies to accuse him of being a Sufi. To save his reputation he 
publicly had to abuse the Sufis as heretical innovators guilty of 
antinomianism and esoteric interpretation of the scriptures. More lay behind 
such controversies than a high-minded concern with correct doctrine. Aqa 
Ahmad Bihbahani observed that when any of the ambitious ulama in 
Faizabad saw that a scholar had gained renown and might become a source 
for emulation for the laity, they smeared him as a Sufi or an Akhbari.[37] 
In 1816 Nasirabadi's biographer said that Sufi meetings had declined among 
Awadh's Shi`is to such an extent that both the high and the low opposed 
Sufism. Though an exaggeration, the statement probably reflects social 
trends. In Jaunpur an important family of religious dignitaries traditionally 
maintained in their neighborhood a Sufi center (khanqah) that had been built 
by Mufti Sayyid Mubarak Jaunpuri (d. 1687). In the late 1790s the building 
fell to ruin. The family had by that time become Shi`is, and they made an 
architectural statement of their new faith by building an imambarah on the 
site. In the Sufi center of Salon, one Sadiq `Ali Shah raised an imambarah in 
1796.[38] 
Nasirabadi's sons carried on the campaign against Sufism in the 1820s and 
1830s, and it clearly remained an issue within the Shi`i community. The 
mujtahids ruled that while the Imams and great Shi`is may have performed 
miracles, all such acts attributed to Sufis were lies.[39] They forbade marriage 
between a Shi`i women and a Sufi Shi`i, even one of sound doctrine, as long 
as he attended chanting sessions. (Although Sayyid Dildar `Ali had earlier felt 
reluctant to anathematize someone solely on grounds of practice, his sons 
took a harder line.) Conversions to Shi`ism from Sunnism also raised 
questions. Some Sunnis claiming descent from the medieval mystic `Abdu'l-
Qadir Gilani became Shi`is in the 1820s, but refused to curse their ancestor. 
They said cursing him would advertise their Shi`ism and prevent them from 
dissimulating with Sunnis. The mujtahid coolly replied that if someone 
deserved to be cursed, being related to him was no excuse for not doing so. 
The Usulis' hatred of Sufism extended even to matters of literary usage, and 
they 
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forbade the use of the Sufi term `ishq, overwhelming love, in describing one's 
relationship with God, on the grounds that it was unscriptural and implied a 
reprehensible excess and anthropomorphism. 
The issues of asceticism and Sufism to some extent involved matters of social 
class. Akhund Mulla Muhammad Riza Kashmiri, a celebrated ascetic and 
Akhbari contemporary of the wealthy prayer leader Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
Nasirabadi, owned a small mill.[40] He himself sometimes ground the wheat 
that people brought him, and sometimes he had his male or female servant 
do the job. He lived on the proceeds, supported his dependents, and gave 
away excess profit to the poor. 
The story goes that once a high notable from the court of Asafu'd-Dawlah 
attempted to visit him on an elephant. The pious mulla waved him away from 
his gate, protesting that, as a poor man, he could only be met by other poor 
men. Mulla Muhammad Riza's asceticism and God-fearing ways lent him a 
great deal off popularity. The Akhbaris Taju'd-Din Husayn Khan and Subhan 
`Ali Khan, tax-farmers hired and then dismissed by Nawab Sa`adat `Ali 
Khan, pleaded with Mulla Muhammad Riza to pray for them, and at length 
he acceded to their importuning. Attributing their later reinstatement to his 
intercession with God, they offered him a ten-thousand-rupee reward, but 
he refused it. 
Whereas small landed proprietors, such as the Nasirabadis, or tax-farmers 
such as Subhan `Ali Khan, depended on the goodwill of the government for 
their continuing prosperity, a small-time miller like Kashmiri could afford to 
be more independent. He had sympathy for the peasants who brought him 
their grain to be ground, and he certainly preferred the company and welfare 
of the poor to that of the rich. His asceticism made a virtue of the relative 
poverty of his social class, and he refused to become involved in the unstable 
life of intrigues that acceptance of ruling-class patronage would have entailed. 
Though he was not a member of a Sufi order, his lifestyle came closer to the 
ideal preached by Sufis like Mawlavi Sami` than did that of most Usuli ulama. 
His steadfast Akhbarism marked his independence from the mujtahids, 
exemplifylng the kind of sectarian Shi`ism that artisans practiced even after 
the Usulis created a formal religious establishment and wielded great power 
at court. 
Awadh's notables also continued to give patronage to Sufis. In the early 
1830s Roberts reported that a few years earlier a mendicant mystic called 
Shahji had come into high favor with the ruler of Awadh, and was given 
permission to levy small contributions for his support from shopkeepers 
throughout the capital. Although he collected only five cowries a day from 
each one, a very small sum, the total from all the bazaars amounted to a 
considerable revenue.[41] 
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The Usuli campaign for social closure by excluding Sufi practices from the 
Shi`i community derived partially from a desire to monopolize religious 
authority and resources. By making an argument that the Usuli style of life 
was more scriptural, and by painting the Sufi Shi`is as heretics and crypto-
Sunnis, the Usulis succeeded in weakening Sufi legitimacy within the Awadh 
ruling class: Their weapons included social ostracism, public humiliation, and 
the denial of marriage and inheritance rights. This campaign had the latent 
usefulness of providing a way of smearing newly immigrant competitors for 
patronage or authority. 
The Usuli-Akhbari Contest 
The Akhbari school of jurisprudence offered another ideological alternative 
to Usulism within the Shi`i community, though the influence of the originally 
stronger Akhbaris declined in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The 
Akhbaris, basing their approach to law on a strict construction of the Imami 
oral reports and disallowing rationalist interpretations, challenged Usulism in 
its fundamentals. As with the Usuli-Sufi struggle, the ideological debate 
reflected social conflicts. Yet no one social group or class among Shi`is could 
be wholly identified with Akhbarism or Usulism; rather, groups in conflict 
often adopted one ideology or the other as a weapon, sometimes depending 
on which system of thought a rival had already chosen. Beyond these factors, 
it might be asked whether there was an "elective affinity," in Weberian terms, 
between a religious ideology and the interests of a social group. 
Akhbari ulama began by being the great majority among Awadh's Shi`i 
clerics. The Akhbari Mulla Muhammad ‘Askari had been brought to Faizabad 
by Shuja`u'd-Dawlah, and his students remained influential. Chief Minister 
Hasan Riza Khan patronized Akhbari ulama, one of whom, Sayyid Murtaza, 
in 1788 wrote a book for him on "prayer of the heart." This scholar argued, 
as an Akhbari, that the Qur'an could not be understood without reference to 
the oral reports from the Imams.[42] While many immigrant ulama from 
Kashmir who fled Sunni Afghan and then Sikh rule adhered to the Usuli 
school, some supported Akhbarism. Mulla Muhammad Muqim Kashmiri 
arrived in Lucknow in 1786 as a refugee, attaining a reputation as an Akhbari 
and a miracle-worker. In outlying cities like Banaras, Akhbaris such as 
Sharafu'd-Din Banarasi wrote, though he directed his polemics more at 
Sunnis than Usulis.[43] 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali had to accept Akhbari students at first, in hopes of 
persuading them to adopt Usulism. Some of his students, however, remained 
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committed Akhbaris, employing the knowledge of Usuli principles of 
jurisprudence gained with him to refute their teacher. Thus, Mawlana Sayyid 
Murtaza Lakhnavi studied with Sayyid Dildar `Ali and then wrote against the 
use of legal analogy (qiyas), an Usuli principle. He later emigrated to 
Hyderabad, Deccan, perhaps because of the declining popularity of Akhbari 
scholars in nineteenth-century Awadh.[44] 
On returning from the Iraqi shrine cities in 1781, Nasirabadi set out to refute 
the Akhbari school, to which he had himself adhered only two years earlier. 
The resulting work. entitled Asasal-usul (Foundation for the Principles of 
Jurisprudence), stated the Usuli position and briefly refuted Astarabadi's 
seventeenth-century Akhbari manifesto, Al-fawa'idal-madaniyyah . The treatise, 
rapidly copied out and spread about, produced fierce controversy.[45] 
Nasirabadi's prestige as Lucknow's prayer leader after 1786 enabled him to 
teach the work as a textbook to many students, having one of them translate 
it from Arabic to the easier Persian. He discussed the main issues in 
jurisprudential method between the two major schools, giving both rational 
and traditional proofs for the stances he took. Here we will treat points 
dealing with the role of the ulama in interpreting the Law. 
Nasirabadi wrote that the most noble of sciences after the study of God's 
unity (tawhid) are the principles of jurisprudence, and to forsake them is a 
sin.[46] Beyond the Qur'an and the Imami oral reports, Usulis accepted two 
other sources of law, consensus and ijtihad . The authority of the ulama to 
interpret the law lay in these two principles. Opposers of consensus as a 
proof in law insisted that all the jurists whose opinions made up the 
consensus would have to be known to be truthful, something impossible to 
ascertain. Nasirabadi, however, argued that consensus is often an 
indispensable way of knowing the judgment of the Imam indirectly.[47] 
Akhbaris rejected this principle as arrogant, insisting that if a hundred jurists 
disagreed with the Imam, his word would still be true, whereas if a hundred 
jurists agreed with him, their views would be superfluous. 
Usulis gave the fourth source of law as reason (caql).[48] Nasirabadi argued that 
the goodness and badness of voluntary actions can be perceived rationally, a 
stance that he said Mu`tazilis, Imamis, and Hindus agreed on, but that Sunni 
Ashcaris rejected. Usulis counted syllogism (qiyas) an important rational 
device for determining the law, but accepted only two kinds as valid. In the 
first, the scriptural text, by the nature of the prohibition or com- 
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mand, implied the common term between two cases. Thus, if the Qur'an 
ordered believers not to abuse someone verbally, they could not go beyond 
that and beat him up. In the second, legitimate sort of analogy, the scripture 
actually mentions the common term (`illah). Where date wine is forbidden 
explicitly because it causes people to lose their senses, grape wine could be 
prohibited oh the same grounds. But Usuli mujtahids were forbidden to 
speculate as to the reason for a law and to create an analogy on the basis of 
their own judgments.[49] 
Nasirabadi defined ijtihad as the expenditure of effort in seeking a considered 
opinion concerning the provisions of the holy Law so as to remove any 
possibility of guilt deriving from a failure to be thorough. Drawing on 
‘Allamah al-Hilli, he said that ijtihad is a legal ruling in a case that lies beyond 
things that can be conclusively proven, such as the need to pray five times a 
day, and where no certain proof (dalil qat`i) exists. Sayyid Dildar `Ali affirmed 
that before the mujtahid exerted himself, God already had a ruling on any 
issue, which he merely sought to find. Nasirabadi said that God has always 
indicated the correct judgment, but that since He does not impose duties on 
his servants beyond their ability to perform them, the mujtahid is excused if 
he errs. The Akhbari school insisted that anyone giving a fatwa that went 
beyond citing scripture was responsible before God should he err.[50] 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali described the two sorts of mujtahid, absolute and partial. 
An absolute mujtahid can derive every theoretical subsidiary legal ruling from 
the holy text, whereas a partial one can derive some rulings but not all. Some 
denied the right to practice ijtihad to the partial mujtahid. Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
held that the partial mujtahid could practice ijtihad where he was competent, 
since he would otherwise have to emulate another jurisprudent, which was 
forbidden to mujtahids. One might note that since India in the early 1780s 
had hardly any absolute mujtahids, the Usuli school could spread only by 
allowing partial mujtahids to derive judgments. He quoted oral reports from 
the Imams, taking them as a traditional charter for the prerogatives of the 
mujtahids. He explained that the mujtahid had to practice according to his 
conclusions, and should he find two possible rulings equally persuasive, he 
had a duty to choose between them.[51] Nasirabadi saw the interpretation of 
the law as dynamic and as inhering in the person of the jurist, not in his 
rulings. If a mujtahid gave a ruling without mentioning his reasoning, then 
forgot how he derived it, he had to exert himself on it all over again. 
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If his conclusions the second time differed From the first, the second ruling 
had to be followed. 
Lay believers were to emulate a jurist on subsidiary religious matters. Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali defined emulation (taqlid) as practicing according to the word of 
someone else without proof. Reference to the sayings of the Prophet and the 
Imams, he said, was not emulation, because they performed miracles to prove 
their authority and because Qur'an verses uphold the need to Follow their 
sayings. Quoting ‘Allamah al-Hilli, he affirmed that laymen could lawfully 
emulate mujtahids in subsidiary matters of the law. Even educated persons 
must do so if they are not trained in jurisprudence. Nasirabadi gave several 
reasons for this emulation. First, not everyone in the community was 
commanded to learn Islamic law and the principles of jurisprudence. If every 
member of the community spent years training to become a mujtahid, the 
social order would disintegrate. Nor could a layman take up studies only 
when an occasion called for him to know something.[52] Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
argued for the existence of a specialized class of clerical professionals to 
whom all laymen, even the literate notables, owed absolute obedience. Only 
in matters of dogma could believers investigate for themselves, so long as 
they arrived at the correct answers. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali then discussed the characteristics of the Shi`i jurisconsuit 
(mufti), perhaps in hopes of promoting the office. He said that a mufti must 
have two characteristics, the ability to perform independent legal reasoning 
(ijtihad) and piety (wara’). He should be chosen by the general acclamation of 
the believers. He said that people could know who was learned enough to fill 
the post without being themselves experts in the law, just as they were 
capable of recognizing a great merchant without knowing anything about 
commerce. 
Nasirabadi wrote that once a layman began emulating a mujtahid in a matter, 
he should not go to another one for a ruling on the same issue. On other 
questions, however, he was free to seek rulings from another jurist· A layman 
should not emulate a dead mujtahid, as Imamis sought to attain an ever 
stronger considered opinion, which only a living mujtahid could do. In 
conclusion, Nasirabadi quoted oral reports from the Imams in an effort to 
show that ijtihad did not originate with ‘Allamah al-Hilli (d. 1326), as Akhbaris 
charged, but went back to companions of the Imams.[53] (In fact, ijtihad in the 
technical sense was not accepted by Imami jurisprudents before the 
thirteenth century A.D., and the Akhbaris have the stronger case on this 
point historically.)[54] 
Nasirabadi's Usuli stance met opposition from many Shi`i notables in 
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Awadh, and from the Akhbari ulama. The strong support given to him and 
other prayer leaders by the chief officials of the government, however, 
protected them from their foes and gave them a platform to spread their own 
ideas. Since Akhbaris in North India opposed the very holding of Friday 
congregational prayers, which the nawabi government supported, they could 
not compete with Usulis for such official posts. State-sponsored Friday 
prayers acted as an engine to drive the Usuli advance. 
Nasirabadi's most colorful enemy from the ranks of the Akhbari ulama, 
Mirza Muhammad Nishapuri Akbarabadi (1764-1817) of Agra, became 
involved in politics everywhere he went, in North India, Iraq, and Iran. One 
of the more brilliant minds India produced in the late eighteenth century, and 
one of the last great Akhbari scholars, he wrote in numerous fields. His 
father, Mirza ` Abdu'n-Nabi of Khurasan, conducted long-distance trade with 
North India, having had, according to his detractors, a rather limited capital 
in Iran of only five or six thousand rupees. Doing well in Agra, he married 
the daughter of Ma`sum `Ali Khan, a revenue official under the Mughal first 
minister, Najaf `Ali Khan. Mirza. `Abdu'n-Nabi did some trading in 
Allahabad, where his son Muhammad spent part of his youth.[55] 
At about the age of twenty, in 1784 or so, Mirza Muhammad Akbarabadi, an 
Akhbari, went to the Iraqi shrine cities, where he studied with the leading 
Usulis, finding the same atmosphere there as had Nasirabadi only a few years 
earlier. He did not reveal that he was an Akhbari while in Iraq. A few years 
later he returned to Awadh, where his fame reached the ears of Asafu'd-
Dawlah and Hasan Riza Khan. Meeting with the nawab, he slowly began 
cursing all dialectical theologians (mutakallimun) and mujtahids as the hosts 
of Satan, creating a suspicion of the Usuli ulama in the minds of Asafu'd-
Dawlah and his chief minister. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali already had tense relations with Hasan Riza Khan over his 
attacks on the chief minister's Sufi favorites, and was not in a strong position 
to reply to Akbarabadi. His biographer claimed that Nasirabadi refrained 
from responding to the Akhbari's polemics because he was a guest and a 
traveler. He did, however, send some of Akbarabadi's treatises back to the 
shrine cities to inform Sayyid `Ali Tabataba'i of his Akhbari views.[56] It is 
difficult to believe that Nasirabadi did not move behind the scenes to 
undermine Akbarabadi's position at court, considering the threat he posed. 
His biographer simply wrote that Mirza Muhammad's extreme positions 
repelled most of the believers. At length the Akhbari left the Awadh court, 
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where he had failed to dislodge Usulis like Sayyid Dildar `Ali, and returned 
to Karbala. 
Known in Iraq as an Akhbari, he came into strong conflict with the 
dominating Usuli elite and emerged as a formidable debater. He constantly 
moved his opponent into different fields until he found one on which he was 
more knowledgeable. Only Sayyid `Ali Tabataba'i could best him in open 
debate. He was at length forced, apparently on threat of violence, to flee the 
shrine cities with his family, for Iran, where he spent time in Fars, Khurasan, 
and Gilan provinces. In 1792 he wrote a biographical dictionary in Luristan, 
stressing Akhbaris. In largely Usuli Iran, Mirza Muhammad provoked the ire 
of powerful local mujtahids, which obliged him to move about constantly.[57] 
In the late 1790s Akbarabadi settled in Tehran, gradually acquiring a 
reputation for learning and Indian-style divination. From 1797 Fath-`Ali 
Shah Qajar ruled, and Akbarabadi increasingly ingratiated himself with the 
court, just as he had earlier sought to influence Asafu'd-Dawlah in Awadh. 
His correct prediction of the imminent demise of the Russian military leader 
Tsitsianov at Baku greatly enhanced his prestige. But his increasing influence 
over the shah aroused the jealousy of many notables at court, and the 
apprehension of powerful Usuli ulama Shaykh Ja`far an-Najafi in this period 
wrote a refutation of Mirza Muhammad's Akhbari ideas, in which he declared 
him an unbeliever and pronounced his blood and property lawful to whoever 
wished to take them. With notables and Usuli ulama working against him, 
Fath-`Ali Shah came to perceive him as a danger to the state and expelled 
him.[58] 
He lived subsequently in Baghdad and Kazimayn, where a mob killed him in 
February 1817. Shirvani, who knew Akbarabadi personally, said that fanatical 
Usuli ulama instigated the riot against him.[59] Mirza Muhammad perhaps 
thought of returning to Awadh shortly before his death. In early 1814 he 
dedicated to Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan his refutation of Nasirabadi's work 
on the principles of jurisprudence, probably in hopes that he would find 
favor with the ruler and be called to Lucknow. 
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Akbarabadi originally wrote his attack on Sayyid Dildar `Ali's work in 1792 
in Iran, when he was smarting from his successive failures in Lucknow and 
Karbala. He objected that Nasirabadi said the principles of jurisprudence 
were the greatest science after that of the unity of God, asserting that Qur'an 
commentary and jurisprudence (fiqh) itself surely took precedence.[60] As an 
Akhbari basing himself as closely as possible on the oral reports from the 
Prophet and the Imams and the Qur'an, Akbarabadi felt scripture 
commentary to be infinitely more important than other sciences. Usulis 
magnified the importance of the principles of jurisprudence, the ideological 
basis of the authority of the mujtahids. 
Akbarabadi denounced such Usuli principles as appeal to consensus, 
analogical reasoning, and the ranking of oral reports as sound or weak. 
Akhbaris, as conservatives, uncritically thought sound all oral reports 
attributed to the Imams in the four standard collections. He also rejected 
dependence on considered opinion (zann) in deriving legal judgments, 
maintaining that certain knowledge (`ilm) could be gained from the text of 
the Imami oral reports. Surprisingly, he took Nasirabadi to task for his 
criticisms of India. Sayyid Dildar `Ali complained about the ignorance and 
unbelief in that country, whereas Akbarabadi insisted that among the Hindus 
were brilliant scholars and ascetics working in a great non-Islamic intellectual 
tradition, and that Indian Sunnis and Isma'ilis counted among them men of 
great erudition. Even the tiny Imami community had extremely learned men. 
Akbarabadi's intense pride in his Indian heritage provides a clue to why he 
clung so fiercely to Akhbarism, whereas Nasirabadi deferred to Iraq and 
Iran.[61] 
In Awadh, as in Iran, Usulism gradually won out as the ideology favored by 
the high ulama and the state. Many of Nasirabadi's students attempted to 
rebut Akbarabadi. But into the nineteenth century some ulama favored 
Akhbarism, and important notable families, such as the Kanbuh Barelavis, 
including administrators Subhan `Ali Khan and Taju'd-Din Husayn Khan, 
continued to adhere to Akhbarism. Such notables employed Akhbarism as a 
means of stressing their intellectual independence from the Usuli ulama, 
whom they saw as sons of petty landholders greedy for power over laymen.[62] 
These Akbharis held high office in the Awadh state and received political 
support even from notables who attended Friday prayers. In 1823 Chief 
Minister Agha Mir Muctamadu'd-Dawlah granted patronage to Husayn `Ali 
Khan Barelavi to write a theological work in support of Shi`ism, wherein he 
attacked Usulism and blamed the Caliph ‘Umar for introducing the ille- 
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gal practice of ijithad .[63] He may have gotten patronage from so eminent a 
source because his cousin Subhan `Ali Khan was deputy chief minister. 
In 1818 Husayn `Ali Khan had issued a wide-ranging criticism of Usulism, in 
which he admitted that Usuli ideas had become widely accepted. He 
disparaged the division of the Imami community into expert mujtahids and 
a laity reduced to emulating them blindly, complaining of the rationalist 
thrust of Usulism, which led scholars to waste their lives studying dialectical 
theology, logic, and metaphysics and to import this misleading approach into 
their legal reasoning. He ridiculed Usuli doctrines, saying that since a 
mujtahid had to be the most perfect and knowledgeable of his 
contemporaries, there should logically be only one mujtahid in each age. In 
any case, be remarked drily, such a breadth of knowledge among Usulis was 
rare indeed in 1818. He rejected Usuli claims that the ulama represented the 
hidden Twelfth Imam, accusing mujtahids of love of high position and a 
desire to rule over others, even though only the Imams were worthy of 
obedience and emulation. Some Usulis, he said, went so far as to declare that 
even fasting and prayers were invalid except with the permission of the 
mujtahid of the age. He condemned the practice of putting religious 
donations (zakat, khums, sadaqal) under the control of the mujtahids, citing it 
as another evidence of their greed. Elsewhere, he said that Usulis were 
seeking leadership through attacking Akhbaris and classing them with Sunnis 
and Sufis.[64] 
In 1825 Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, Awadh's chief mujtahid, wrote a 
spirited defense of Usulism against Akhbarism, painting the controversy as 
one over whether the believer should emulate living or dead authorities. 
Usulis, he wrote, cmulate the living, while Akhbaris follow the dead Their 
insistence on deriving legal judgments only from the oral reports left 
Akhbaris with extremely narrow choices in their rulings Not even the greatest 
of the ulama could arrive at a decisive judgment on every matter on the basis 
of a clear scriptural text (nass). 
Sayyid Muhammad pointed out that if trained scholars found such a feat 
difficult, women and children could not perform it at all. How, he asked, 
could women and children themselves consult books of oral reports from 
the Imams such as al-Kulayni's Al-Kafi? Obviously, he concluded, they would 
have to consult an Akhbari scholar—and what else was this but emulation 
(taqlid)? Since both Usulis and Akhbaris held that the laity had to consult 
religious experts, the dispute between them was purely verbal (lafzi). 
Nasirabadi further argued that if Akhbaris truly gave rulings according to sure 
knowledge and decisive evidence (qat`i), they would not differ with one 
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another in their legal judgments. But in fact they often did so. lie said he knew 
an Akhbari who claimed that his judgments were based on positive proof 
(dalil qat`i), and who heaped abuse on mujtahids when they demurred. Since 
all judgments given by Shi`i scholars of both schools were ultimately based 
on the (Qur'an and oral reports from the Prophet and the Imams, he said, it 
was not important if some (the Akhbaris) called that basis sure knowledge 
(`ilm) while others (the Usulis) called it considered opinion (zann).[65] 
Sayyid Muhammad's opponents rejected his condescending dismissal of the 
Akhbari position as not all that different from the Usuli one. Husayn `Ali 
Khan Barelavi was asked why, since adherents of the two schools often gave 
the same judgments, there should be any conflict. In reply he denied the 
premise that the two schools gave the same rulings. He maintained that the 
judgments often greatly differed. After all, many of the same rules existed in 
Shi`ism as in Sunnism. He thought the method of deriving judgments the 
crucial issue.[66] 
Another Akhbari thinker from the notable class, Mirza Muhammad Zaki 
Khan, pointed out that if a layman arrived at certainty about an Islamic legal 
judgment through an oral report from one of the Imams, Akhbaris allowed 
him to practice according to it even though he had not attained the level of 
a mujtahid. Usulis, he scoffed, disallowed this, making it incumbent on him 
to forsake his own certainty and to emulate the mere considered opinion of 
a mujtahid.[67] 
Akhbaris and Usulis not only conceived the law differently, they even 
differed on the idea of property. Shi`is of both groups held that since 
Muslims conquered India, its land belonged to the Imam. Usulis thought that 
believers could nevertheless legally possess the land by buying it. Usulis 
charged that Indian Akhbaris disallowed human ownership of conquered 
land, saying it belonged only to God. Sayyid Muhammad sarcastically 
remarked that if Akhbaris proscribed land ownership, then anyone could 
legitimately usurp the property of the Akhbaris, warning that this doctrine 
would subject everyone's household to destruction. Most Akhbaris may have 
denied that their belief had the communistic implications Sayyid Muhammad 
suggested, though some artisans may have actually rejected the legitimacy of 
private property in land.[68] 
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While the last years of independent Awadh saw an even closer relationship 
between the stale and the religious hierarchy, tensions remained between the 
mujtahids anti believers from a laboring-class background. Little evidence 
about popular-class Shi`i sectarian movements survives, but an important 
manuscript letter draws back the curtain briefly. In 1841 a Shi`i cleric named 
Muhammad an-Najafi wrote to Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi from the old 
Bengal center of Murshidabad.[69] He complained that he originally came to 
India to travel, entering the lands of the infidels unwittingly, and being forced 
to spend most of his time with the ignorant. 
After thus ungratefully describing the patrons he found in Murshidabad, an-
Najafi reported two challenges to the authority of the Usuli ulama in the city. 
Mir Asad ` Ali, the leader of the morticians and gravediggers, himself a washer 
of bodies, claimed leadership and ordained laws for the people, "forbidding 
the permissible and allowing the forbidden." An-Najafi said that most of the 
common people followed his commands, having gone astray. Some friends 
finally suggested that he appeal to the chief mujtahid in Lucknow to condemn 
the man, who had clashed with an-Najafi. He therefore sent a description of 
the body-washer's heresies to the merchant Aqa Isma`il Zand so that he 
might take it to the Awadh capital. 
The other challenge came from an Azerbaijani Turk named Mulla Baqir, who 
had arrived in Murshidabad a few years earlier. Mulla Baqir adhered to the 
Akhbari school, vehemently denouncing whoever believed in ijtihad and 
emulation and endeavoring to attract the weak and common people to his 
religion. An-Najafi dismissed the Akhbari as a man devoid of erudition, a 
mulla fit to teach primary school. The Usuli from Iraq answered the Turk's 
polemics in Arabic, but said that the Akhbari seemed to know little of that 
tongue. An-Najafi therefore appealed to Sayyid Muhammad to respond to 
these two movements, for, he wrote, "the judgment of your Excellency is 
obeyed everywhere. It is incumbent upon you to strengthen religion, as you 
are the chief of Islam and the Muslims." 
These last examples suggest a pattern of popular-class sectarianism that 
demonstrated opposition to the middle- and upper-class mujtahids and their 
patrons. The case of Mulla Baqir shows again that Akhbarism as an ideology 
could be put to various uses, having an appeal both to high notables who 
refused to accept the leadership of the middle landholding mujtahids and to 
laborers and artisans who resented the establishment of the nawab and his 
Usuli intimates. Such resentment can be seen in Awadh in an anecdote from 
the biography of Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi. Once he fell ill on a Friday, and 
in the evening some laboring-class Shi`is of rough appearance arrived and 
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asked him to say funeral prayers for their dead friend. He replied that he was 
ill. They muttered that if their friend had been one of the notables, he would 
have complied. Sayyid Husayn, stung, agreed to perform the prayers. The 
story inadvertently reveals that Shi`i commoners often saw the mujtahids as 
lackeys of the rich.[70] 
The Usuli scholars, an ambitious and upwardly mobile group, advocated 
rationalism and a dynamic approach to law and social norms which allowed 
for new and independent judgments.[71] They rejected the emulation of past 
authorities, insisting that even their notable-class patrons defer to them in 
matters of legal interpretation. Admittedly, these were the tenets of a 
centuries-old school of jurisprudence. But they also constituted a flexible 
ideology with great appeal to a rising status group that wished to influence 
the shape of society and saw increasing opportunities for doing so. The 
Usulis justified the need of believers to obey the professional jurisprudents 
by arguing that the structure of society would be destroyed if authorities 
allowed children, the bazaar classes, and common people to take legal 
judgments directly from the scriptural sources.[72] Akhbari gentlemen scholars 
resisted longest the claim by Usuli ulama from the small and middle 
landholding classes to a monopoly on specialized knowledge of Shi`i law. 
Conclusion: Social Class, Hierarchy, and Authority 
The dispute between status groups (mystics, traditional authorities, rationalist 
jurisprudents) set the intellectual terms of the struggle for control of Awadh's 
growing religious establishment. But the social dimension of the conflict is 
obvious from the frequency with which opponents argued over the 
goodness, badness, and nature of wealth and property. The dispute among 
Sufis, Akhbaris, and Usulis took place at three social levels. First, some 
religious figures competed among themselves for spiritual leadership of 
Awadh's towns and middle landholding families. Second, some struggled to 
monopolize the patronage of the high notables and to control their religious 
culture as well. The fusion of the religious idioms promoted by learned men 
from the intermediate strata with those of the high notables created a 
dominant ideology (dominant among the Shi`i propertied classes). Third, 
religious officials from the landed classes battled with charismatic 
personalities or traditional authorities from the bazaar classes. The Usuli 
establishment strove to dominate 
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Shi`is at all levels of society; but in preindustrial societies like Awadh the 
majority of tradespeople maintained their own religious ideologies. 
Some conflicts between Sufis and Usulis involved competition among 
learned men of similar social and economic backgrounds. For men from the 
small landed classes in the Islamic lineage centers, either Usulism or Sufism 
could provide bases for religious domination and avenues of influence with 
the large landholding and ruling classes. They chose their path according to 
family background, local tradition, and personal inclination or ambition. 
Where learned men of similar social background competed for notable-class 
patronage, their disputes seldom centered on whether wealth was good or 
bad. They took its goodness for granted. 
Examples abound of status-group rivalry lacking any dimension of class 
conflict. The Shi`i ulama of Nasirabad and the pirs of Salon competed with 
one another for the benefices and other patronage that the high notables 
could bestow. The decline of Mughal Delhi and the rise of Shi`i-ruled 
Lucknow posed a challenge to Sunni Sufis of middle landholding background 
used to Mughal patronage. Chishtis like Shah `Ali Akbar Mawdudi, himself 
from Delhi, parlayed their pro-`Alid sentiments into an asset in attracting the 
patronage of rising Shi`i notables. The jurisprudents staffing the emergent 
religious establishment showed intense hostility to the charismatic Sufis.[73] 
The Imami ulama bested the Sufis by their strong commitment to 
communalist Shi`ism and their specialized knowledge of Ja`fari law. They 
could not, however, altogether stop Awadh notables from patronizing the 
mystics. 
The issues of whether wealth was good or not and of the propriety of 
cooperating with the government more often arose when the competing 
status groups also derived from different economic classes. Here, a Marxian 
model, or at least a Weberian model of social closure informed by the 
Marxian idea of conflict between economic classes, has greater explanatory 
power. Mystics who stood outside the benefice (madad-i ma`ash) system of 
the prebendal state could criticize the government as tyrannical and 
denounce the official ulama for compromising themselves by cooperating 
with it. It is possible that critical outsiders like Mawlavi Sami` had ties to 
Iranian long-distance traders or other social classes with minimal dependency 
on the agrarian bureaucracy in Lucknow. The artisan and laboring classes 
practiced yet another kind of mysticism. Even where they were Shi`i, they 
often wished to remain aloof from the state and to maintain their 
independence from the official ulama. Both Akhbarism and Sufism offered 
alternative sources of legitimation for their leaders. The tensions between 
Mulla Muhammad Riza Kashmiri and the Usulis derived, not from 
competition for patronage from the rich, but from the Usuli establishment's 
desire to dominate the entire body of the faithful. The indepen- 
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dence of popular-class sectarian movements, such as those in Murshidabad, 
stood in the way of such hierocratic domination. One basis for elective 
affinity between Sufism and Akhbarism and popular-class leaders lay in the 
ease with which these ideologies allowed religious leaders from the bazaar, 
who had no leisure to pursue complicated rationalist studies, to make 
charismatic or traditional claims to authority. Moreover, as Usulism became 
the dominant ideology, groups seeking to maintain their independence of the 
ulama or of the state often clung even more tightly to alternative ideologies.[74] 
The cultural dominance of the Usuli ulama among Shi`i notables led to less 
status at court for traditional Muslim spiritual leaders like Sufis and Akhbaris. 
The ousting of the pirs proved important, since they often had Shi`i, Sunni, 
and Hindu disciples. Their more tolerant, often syncretic Islam had 
developed in traditional Mughal society, itself a compromise, or 
collaboration, between Muslims and Hindus. Some Awadh notables 
continued an open approach to intercommunal relations, but Usuli 
exclusiveness began markedly to affect government policy from the 1820s. 
Three reasons can be adduced for Usulism's victory. The first is the 
attractions for a new generation of Shi`i ulama of this ideology, which 
legitimated lay-clerical differentiation and gave the mujtahids the sole 
prerogative of interpreting the Law, demanding the obedience of laymen to 
their rulings. Given the increased opportunities for clerical patronage and 
posts in the growing Shi`i state, Usulism made more sense to young north 
Indian ulama than it had to their fathers. The second reason is the largely 
successful use of exclusionary closure by Usuli ulama to assert claims to 
religious posts and resources and to deprive rivals of that patronage. Their 
strategies included a form of credentialism, in which they recognized only 
diplomas from Usulis as a proper qualification to fill clerical posts. They also 
resorted to more violent means of exclusion, such as verbal abuse and public 
humiliation of rivals, branding them heretics and non-Muslims. This 
professional closure succeeded better among propertied Shi`is than among 
the popular classes, who often retained their own, untrained, religious 
leadership.[75] 
The third reason is the preference for Usuli ideology by the emergent Awadh 
state. As a government bureaucracy grew up, with the prayer leaders and 
muftis as its religious wing, state officials favored more rational-legal bases 
for authority. Usulism was much more suited, at that place and time, to 
integration into the Awadh state than either Akhbarism or Shi`i Sufism. It 
sanctioned formal religious ceremonies, such as Friday congregational 
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prayer, which became important to the state as an expression of regional 
identity and semiautonomy, whereas Akhbaris opposed the institution, and 
Sufis refused to bow behind the official prayer leader. Moreover, the tension 
between the Shi`i state and the clergy was less in Usulism than in Indian-style 
conservative Akhbarism, which disallowed many state functions during the 
Occultation. The state's increasing support for Usulis was crucial to their 
power, since "a class, race, sex, or ethnic group only accomplishes 
domination to the extent that its exclusionary prerogatives are backed up by 
the persuasive instruments of the state."[76] 
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Religion, State, and the Second Usuli 
Generation 
 
In the first phase of the formation of a clerical elite, the Usuli ulama forged 
a successful alliance with the increasingly autonomous Shi`i notable class in 
Awadh, founding their influence on the Friday congregational prayers. These 
prayers at once symbolized the regional semiautonomy of the Awadh court 
from Mughal Delhi and the leading religious role of the Usuli prayer leaders. 
The Usuli ulama subsequently made successful claims for control over 
religious resources, such as private Shi`i religious donations, thus increasing 
their wealth. They also strove to exclude competitors for religious authority, 
such as Sufi and Akhbari Shi`i leaders. 
The second phase of clerical elite formation, to which we now turn, coincided 
with the rise of the second generation of Usuli ulama to positions of 
influence. They sought to consolidate their position at the Awadh court and 
to regularize the sort of patronage offered them by the high notables. 
Challenged by the emergence of a completely independent Shi`i monarchy, 
they had to decide whether to participate in ifs legitimation. As the authority 
of the Shi`i ulama began to be accepted by commoners, they sought to 
present their authority as supernatural, as well as rational-juridical. Their 
clerical competitors for patronage and religious authority in this period 
included immigrant Iranian ulama and the new Shi`i school of Shaykhism, 
promulgated from the Iraqi shrine citics. But a more serious threat came from 
the development of caesaropapism: the second Awadh king claimed religious 
as well as secular authority, coming into heated conflict with the Usuli elite. 
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The Coronation of Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar 
Awadh entered a further stage in the continuing process of state making 
almost two decades into the nineteenth century. The elevation of Nawab 
Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar in 1819 from first minister of the Mughal Empire to 
autonomous .monarch in his own right posed questions about the role of the 
Shi`i ulama in the independent Awadh state. This brief account of the 
incident, which has already been subjected to a free searching analysis by 
Michael H. Fisher, seeks to bring out its specifically religious implications.[1] 
Awadh in 1819, militarily weak and surrounded on three sides by the British, 
nevertheless experienced stability and prosperity. Its rainfall-based 
cultivation of grains and foodstuffs rendered it the "garden of India." 
Governor-General Hastings wished to weaken the vestigial structures of the 
old Mughal Empire, as a means of dividing and ruling India, but his 
encouragement of princely states, such as the Nizamate of Hyderabad, to 
declare themselves independent monarchies met with rebuff everywhere 
except in Awadh. Perhaps because of the Nishapuri family's Shi`ism, 
Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar followed up hints by Lord Hastings that the British 
would look favorably on an independent Awadh. 
Just a few months after his assumption of the rank of the Mughal Empire's 
first minister, in the summer of 1814, he began showing a willingness to break 
away. The resident wrote to Calcutta later that year that in view of recent 
statements of the governor-general, the nawab-vizier wondered about the 
propriety of his sending gifts marking submission to the king of Delhi on 
Muslim holy days. He said he had suspended transmission of ceremonial 
offerings to the king until further notice. Lord Hastings wrote back that the 
vizier might transmit offerings to Delhi if he wished, but that he was certainly 
under no obligation to do so. He directed that the resident in Lucknow 
refrain from sending gifts to the Mughal monarch (whom the British had 
reduced, in any case, to a powerless figurehead subsisting under British 
rule).[2] 
Five years later Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar declared himself an independent Shi`i 
king in a coronation ceremony that, as Fisher has shown, drew on many 
cultural traditions for its symbolism, including Shi`i, Mughal, Hindu, and 
British elements. The ninth of October 1819, the day of the coronation, 
coincided with the Shi`i festival commemorating the Prophet's alleged verbal 
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appointment of `Ali as his successor at Ghadir Khumm. In the morning 
Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar, his heir apparent, Nasiru'd-Din Haydar, and Chief 
Minister Agha Mir Mutamadu'd-Dawlah, seated on elephants with rich 
canopies of gold embroidery, led a huge procession of notables from all over 
Awadh, similarly mounted, to the Shrine of `Abbas, where they offered 
prayers of thanksgiving in private. The humble shrine to a crest founded by 
a faqir ended by being incorporated into the coronation festivities of a Shi`i 
monarch.[3] 
The party proceeded to a nearby ceremonial building, the barahdari, where 
the coronation occurred. Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar, the chief minister, the 
British resident, and Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi (1785-1867), all played 
important parts in the ceremony. Sayyid Muhammad's old and weak father, 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali, would pass away only a few months later. Sayyid 
Muhammad, age thirty-four, actually filled the offices of the capital's prayer 
leader and chief Shi`i religious authority. Just before the ceremony the Awadh 
ruler retired to a private room for prayers with his close companions, 
emerging with Muctamadu'd-Dawlah, Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, and an 
officer of the household bearing the sword of state. 
After Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar ascended the throne, the chief minister passed 
the crown to the younger Nasirabadi, who placed it on the ruler's head. The 
new king embraced the British resident, guns were sounded, and Nasirabadi 
read out the monarch's throne names. The select audience was showered 
with jewels and money, and inferiors made offerings in hopes that the 
monarch would return them even more generously.[4] The role of the chief 
mujtahid in the coronation harked back to the Safavid state in Iran. Originally 
the chief of the Sufis girded the monarch with the sword of state. Both Shah 
Safi (Sulayman) (1667-94) and Shah Sultan Husayn (1694-1722), however, 
had the Shaykhu'l-Islam perform this act instead. The Shaykhu'l-Islam girded 
Sulayman with sword and dagger and placed a crown on his head. In 1694 
the renowned Shaykhu'l-Islam Muhammad Baqir Majlisi girded up the last 
effective Safavid monarch. Just as Awadh kings saw themselves as heirs to 
Safavid glory and traditions, Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi revived Majlisi's 
role.[5] 
Fisher has shown that the East India Company officials took issue with the 
mujtahid's prominent part in the coronation, which the court ceremonially 
reenacted every year, feeling that they, rather than the Shi`i ulama, provided 
legitimation to the rule of the Nishapuri dynasty. In 1822 the acting resident 
reported that the king put on his own crown (also the practice in 
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Qajar Iran). The next year Mordaunt Ricketts, the new resident, placed the 
crown and the robe of state on Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar at the commemorative 
coronation, and the resident played this role thereafter. The chief mujtahid 
was not altogether displaced from the ceremony, however. It became the 
custom for the monarch to perform a ritual prayer of thanks with Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi before receiving the crown from the hands of the 
resident.[6] The transformation of the nawabs of Awadh into monarchs 
involved more form than substance. As Sharar drily remarked, when the 
Awadh rulers had real power they lacked the status of monarchs, but when 
they were enfeebled they suddenly became royalty. The other ruling houses 
in India, particularly the Delhi Mughals, reacted angrily at the new 
pretensions of the Nishapuris, whose own officials and subjects in the 
countryside continued to refer to them as nawab-vizier.[7] 
The change, of symbolic and cultural import for the ruling Shi`i elite, posed 
problems of reinterpretation for the Imami ulama in their relations to the 
state. Along with other paraphernalia of independent rule, such as striking 
coins, the Awadh monarchs began having the Friday congregational prayers 
read in their own names.[8] Classical Shi`i thinkers, such as Ibn al-Mutahhar 
al-Hilli, forbade the reading of the Friday sermon (khutbah) in the name of 
the secular ruler as a heretical innovation of the Sunnis. During over two 
centuries of Safavid rule in Iran, however, the Shi`i ulama always read the 
Friday sermon in the name of Shi`i kings, whom they referred to as the 
Shadow of God.[9] Awadh's prayer leaders stepped into the role of even more 
strongly legitimating Nishapuri rule, at least in their outward actions. The 
establishment of Shi`i Friday prayers in 1786 had symbolized the growing 
autonomy of Awadh, and in 1819 the insertion of the name of the Nishapuri 
ruler in its closing sermon formally announced the independence of the 
country. 
The original symbols of nawabi legitimacy deriving from Mughal 
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appointment had emphasized both the power and the authority of the 
Mughal emperor. Both had long since waned, and these elements of rule 
became symbolically divided in the new ceremony. The British resident, who 
insisted on placing the crown on the monarch's head, represented the only 
real power in North India, and the prayers with the mujtahid bestowed the 
only sort of authority a Shi`i ruling class could ultimately recognize, the 
cachet of the Hidden Imam. 
Immanence and Leadership 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, upon his father's death in 1820 the leader of 
Awadh's Shi`is, strove to resolve the tension between the original, sectarian 
symbols in Imami Shi`ism and the new trappings of Shi`ism as an 
establishment. He also wished, in the Indian context, to reify supernaturally 
his position of leadership. To this end he related a widely accepted dream he 
said his father had seen when Sayyid Muhammad was only a small child.[10] 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali saw that a multitude of Shi`is had gathered on a high hill 
with great joy. Amazed, he asked what was happening. One replied that the 
Twelfth Imam had appeared on the hill. The Imam then embraced Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali, taking him further up the hill. After inquiring as to which of the 
collections of the Imam's oral reports were most reliable, the mujtahid 
implored him to take care of and train up the child in his arms, Sayyid 
Muhammad. The Imam agreed, calling his maidservant and ordering her to 
suckle Sayyid Muhammad, thus entering him into his household. Sayyid 
Muhammad later boasted that from that day he was one of the people of the 
Imam's household (ahl baytih). 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali, given leave to depart, had second thoughts about giving 
up his eldest son. The Imam reassured him that he would be able to see 
Sayyid Mahammad in that vast land. In recounting the dream years later 
Sayyid Muhammad pointed out that an adopted son is nevertheless 
considered a son, and a foster father is yet a father. He asserted that since the 
Imam agreed to raise him and teach him, the learning he received from his 
father actually derived from the Imam himself. His father was already, as a 
mujtahid, a general representative of the Imam Mahdi. But he was the Imam's 
special representative in teaching his son. 
Sunni figures, of course, often employed dreams to legitimate their religious 
authority and increase the charisma with which their followers invested them. 
Bahru'l-‘Ulum of Farangi Mahall and Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi (discussed 
in chapter 9) both founded new Sufi orders on the basis of dreams of mystical 
initiation from the Prophet or his caliphs. Nevertheless, the claims 
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Sayyid Muhammad put forth to being the adopted son of the Twelfth Imam, 
to having been reared and taught by the Mahdi, and to membership in the 
holy household, startle by their enormity. Had such assertions been made in 
a work of doctrine or law they would have seemed obviously heretical, but 
their appearance in the context of a dream made them less immediately 
objectionable. 
The Shi`i expectation of the coming of the Imam and a dissatisfaction with 
human institutions in the absence of this eschatological figure constituted the 
sectarian pole within the religion's spiritual symbology. Such beliefs implied 
a tension between the religious group and the structures and values of the 
larger, secular society. For Akhbaris this tension tended to remain strong. But 
for Usulis the alleged designation of the mujtahids as general deputies of the 
Imam helped remove some of the tension. The mujtahids could, by proxy, 
bestow a certain legitimation upon the central institutions of Muslim society, 
as their role in the coronation of Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar demonstrated. 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi's own extravagant claims to a special 
relationship with the hidden Imam aimed at rendering religious authority 
immanent and present, no longer in Occultation. 
Patronage and the Ulama 
The growing authority and social position of the Usuli clergy derived from 
the patronage and support the Shi`i ruling class offered them. The ulama 
built, not only new instituions, but a new economic base for their activities. 
Patronage as employed here does not indicate a political system, but is used 
to describe economic support given by Awadh's court and great notables to 
Muslim learned and holy men. In the eighteenth century this patronage 
differed little from that of the Mughal period in legal description, being 
offered within the system of prebendal feudalism. Later, however, the 
economic form of patronage offered the ulama changed, as capitalism began 
to make an impact on Awadh. The significant shift in the form of notable 
support for the religious classes over the period treated here made it 
necessary to use a general word, like "patronage," rather than a specific one, 
like "feudalism." 
Sociologist Michael Gilsenan acutely raised the general question of the 
relationship of the ulama to local notables in considering the issue of patrons 
and clients. His informants in modern northern Lebanon told him that the 
lord's power was based on force, oppression, and domination, whereas the 
ulama derived their authority from scriptural learning and (often) descent 
from the Prophet. They regaled him with stories of how saintly ulama 
opposed arrogant notables and mediated for the common people with the 
bey and with God. Gilsenan at first accepted the stories, but then became 
suspi- 
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cious, as we shall see below.[11] A similar image of the ulama's righteous 
independence of the notables also emerges in the accounts of some historians 
of the Shi`i ulama, who have often taken such stories (told by descendants 
of the ulama) at face value.[12] But just as Gilsenan continued to question, so 
must we. 
The key to interactions between the notables and the ulama lies in their 
economic relationship. In Awadh, as was noted, the form of economic 
patronage changed over time. Asafu'd-Dawlah, ruling a strong state with the 
prospect of expansion, freely bestowed tax-free grants of land on notables 
and court favorites. The prayer leaders in both Lucknow and Faizabad 
received land grants. After the British annexed half of Awadh in 1801, 
however, Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan grew unwilling to alienate state land, and 
the service elite increasingly depended on stipends and salaries. Ghaziyu'd-
Din Haydar sometimes broke his father's rule by granting crown lands to 
large landholders (ta`alluqdars) and notables, but he also began turning some 
of his courtiers into rentiers subsisting on the interest from Awadh loans to 
the East India Company.[13] 
These changes in the way the patrimonial bureaucratic state rewarded its 
dependents and staff, brought about by the impact of Western capitalism, 
immediately affected the ulama, who formed a part of the same patronage 
system. Most Shi`i ulama, not themselves independently wealthy, subsisted 
after 1801 on stipends and occasional gifts granted by the notables, as well 
as on voluntary religious taxes. Ironically, these ulama often accepted money 
from the government, earned. through charging interest on loans to the 
British. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi, as the prayer leader in the capital, received 
both a service grant of nine tax-free (mu`afi) villages and a yearly salary of Rs. 
5,000 from the treasury. In a will that he wrote just before his death, Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali appointed his eldest son, Sayyid Muhammad, his successor, the 
land grant and the yearly stipend devolving upon him.[14] The details of these 
grants survive in British documents drawn up after annexation. The revenue-
free villages were undoubtedly the older benefice, most having probably been 
granted by Asafu'd-Dawlah. Sayyid Muhammad later reported 
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the villages and the annual yields to him (see table 3).[15]  It should be noted 
that Sayyid Muhammad submitted these estimates of his income to the 
British government at a time when they were considering levying taxes on it, 
and the British insisted that he consistently underestimated the yields, putting 
the total closer to Rs. 5,000 per year. 
 
Another set of records shows that upon his accession to the governorship of 
Awadh, Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar ordered that Rs. 5,000 be paid annually as a 
stipend to Mawlavi Dildar `Ali and his heirs, without requiring a renewed 
grant or documentation (sanad).[16] He may have been confirming a stipend 
bestowed earlier. Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi's income exceeded that 
extracted from the Hindu peasants in his villages and the stipend provided 
by the Awadh government. Notables gave him grants of money and gifts, 
especially when they sought his informal legal rulings or commissioned him 
to write something. 
Mrs. Ali gave an example of how the Nasirabadis amassed a fortune in this 
manner.[17] She noted that in the 1820s the widow of the Shi`i nawab of 
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Farrukhabad, Vilayati Begam, made a will in which she left Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi a handsome sum of money for his own use. At first 
surprised that such a bequest should have come to him from outside Awadh, 
he instituted strict inquiries to make sure that the begam did not simply mean 
for him to distribute the sum to the poor on her behalf. Satisfied on that 
score, he made sure that she had fulfilled all her religious obligations in life, 
such as paying the poor tax, and finally accepted the wealth she had left him. 
Still, no matter how wealthy he became in this way, he had only nine revenue-
free villages and a stipend, and by the standards of Awadh's Shi`i magnates 
he remained merely a small landholder. Unlike some wealthy ulama from 
Iranian or local zamindar background, the Nasirabadis did not intermarry with 
the notable class, preferring to wed their rustic cousins in Nasirabad rather 
than make alliances with the worldly upper classes of Lucknow.[18] 
The structures of patronage in the 1820s and 1830s became more fluid. 
Rather than making hereditary grants of villages, the Shi`i court and notables 
most often simply appointed stipends and occasional gifts for the ulama they 
supported. The patrimonial, family-centered nature of many grants is 
illustrated by the case of Sayyid Hasan Riza Zangipuri (1779-1862), from a 
small town in Ghazipur, who studied in Faizabad. On becoming a mujtahid, 
he traveled for five years in Iran, receiving a robe of honor and cash gift from 
the Qajar ruler Fath-`Ali Shah. Back in Lucknow, his wife established 
connections with one of Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar's wives, Mubarak Mahall, 
who gave her a substatial stipend and appointed Rs. 160 per month for her 
learned husband as well.[19] 
Not all ulama felt comfortable in accepting gifts from the rich. Sayyid `Ali of 
Bhikpur, Bihar, insisted on living on his salary, refusing the gifts (nazranah) 
of notables. Needless to say, most ulama lived rather less ascetic lives and 
eagerly accepted gifts from magnates. Sayyid `Ali, originally a Sufi, embraced 
Usuli Shi`ism and studied in Lucknow with Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi, 
receiving Rs. 5 per month as a student stipend.[20] In the absence of notable 
gifts, Sayyid `Ali's income remained small. He found work at Rs. 10 per 
month as a tutor to the children of a notable, then received a raise to Rs. 30 
per month. Mihdi Qummi Kashmiri, arriving in Lucknow in the late 1820s 
or the 1830s, refused to accept patronage from notables in the form of land 
grants, which he apparently felt would limit his independence. But he did 
take gifts of cash (nazranah).[21] 
Nor did all ulama stand in great need of stipends from the high notables. 
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Many prominent clerics in Lucknow came from a rural landholding 
background. Sayyid Ahmad `Ali Muhammadabadi (d. 1878), from a zamindar 
family based near Jaunpur, trained in the religious sciences with the Usuli 
prayer leaders of Faizabad and Lucknow. He received gifts and stipends from 
the Awadh monarch for his religious writings. Muhammadabadi enjoyed his 
role in Lucknow as a learned man so much, and proved so successful at it, 
that, reluctant to return home to direct property affairs, he signed over his 
zamindari estate to his son and sent the young man out to oversee it.[22] 
Training as one of the Usuli ulama could also provide an entree to the court 
and a means of social mobility. Mawlavi Imdad `Ali Keranavi (d. 1873) came 
to Lucknow in the early 1830s and parlayed his skills as a reciter of prose 
mourning works for the Imam Husayn into a fortune. From a medical family 
in a service qasabah in Muzaffarnagar, he studied in Lucknow at the seminary 
set up by Hakim Mihdi `Ali Khan during his brief tenure as chief minister, 
1830-32, receiving a stipend for his support and earning a diploma of Friday 
prayers leadership from Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi.[23] He gradually made 
contacts at the court, reciting mourning passages at the salons of the king 
and his wives. Nasiru'd-Din Haydar so enjoyed his performances that he 
bestowed upon him a five-piece robe of honor and Rs. 500, fixing him as a 
permanent reciter for royal mourning sessions. The king gave to him in 
marriage a girl brought up in his own household, paying all the marriage 
expenses from the state treasury, and bestowed upon him a black mansion. 
Keranavi moved into administration, becoming the supervisor of the royal 
kitchen at Rs. 700 per month, with his wife receiving Rs. 200. The informal 
educational institutions of the Shi`i ulama in Lucknow became an important 
element in elite formation, whereby Shi`is from service families in the lineage 
centers could make important contacts in the capital and climb Awadh's 
social ladder. 
The story of a Kashmiri immigrant family demonstrates the extent to which 
persons from notable families might identify themselves as ulama through a 
style of life, regardless of their social class. Mirza Sadiq `Ali Kashmiri (d. 
1873), called to Lucknow in the late 1820s by his uncle, found on arrival that 
the older man had joined in the uproarious life of Lucknow's notables. 
Shocked to find his uncle hosting wild parties with singing girls, he moved 
elsewhere out of piety. Later he took service with the prayer leader for the 
great notable Hakim Mihdi `Ali Khan. Some ulama, on the other hand, 
surrendered to the values of their patrons. Abu'l-Qasim Sasani, settling in 
Patna, gave rulings that allowed drinking and gambling. The notables, de- 
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lighted, made him their cynosure. Sayyid Najaf `Ali Naunahravi (1793-1845), 
a student of Sayyid Dildar `Ali, enforced Usuli orthodoxy by refuting 
Sasani.[24] 
Sociologist Michael Gilsenan was astonished by something one of his 
informants told him about notables and ulama. The lord and a celebrated 
cleric, dead some twenty years, "got on famously." What, the startled social 
scientist inquired, about all those stories of saintly ulama struggling against 
the lord's tyranny? Gilsenan, upon reflection, saw that the stories were more 
ideology than reality. "For the Sheikhs [ulama] are, in fact, the dependents of 
the Beys, their dependence masked by miracles and the supposed triumph of 
authority over power."[25] 
In the same way, for all their talk of being the general representatives of the 
Twelfth Imam, and for all the stories crowding the biographical dictionaries 
of humble mujtahids besting despotic rulers, the Twelver ulama in Awadh 
depended for their social position largely upon the patronage of the notables. 
Those who had their own small holdings could be more independent of the 
court, but their very position as exploiters of the peasantry made it likely that 
their interests would coincide with those of the big landholding notables. The 
ulama established their own style of life as an honored status group within 
the ruling class, and many would not yield on principle even for monetary 
gain (though some, like Sasani, clearly did). But in Awadh, perhaps even more 
than in Iran, the ulama formed a subordinate part of the ruling class. In Iran, 
a few very wealthy merchant-ulama established a relative independence of 
the government, though too many broad generalizations have been made on 
the basis of this small group. In Awadh, however, no such merchant-ulama 
are recorded, and the small-landed or salaried background of most clerics 
made them dependent on the Shi`i notables. 
Challenges to Indian Usuli Dominance 
Three new rivals to the authority of the Indian Usulis arose in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. These challenges threatened not only their control 
of religious institutions, but also their income from court and notable 
patronage. The first threat, ethnic in nature, was competition from Iranian 
immigrant ulama, who often carried more prestige by virtue of having come 
from the centers of Shi`i scholarship and power. Another challenge derived 
from the gnostic Shaykhi school of Shi`ism, which achieved prominence in 
the Iraqi shrine city of Karbala, spreading from there to India. The third 
menace came from claims to religious authority by the second Awadh king, 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar. This caesaropapism threatened to introduce 
idiosyncratic rituals into Awadh Shi`ism and to undermine the religious 
leadership of the Usuli ulama. 
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The Iranian immigrant ulama, largely of the Usuli school, remained prime 
competitors for patronage from the notables. They and the Indians fought, 
despite their adherence to the same school of jurisprudence. Unlike the Usuli 
conflict with Akhbaris and Sufis, the dispute originated neither in alternative 
forms of religious legitimation nor in tensions between social classes. Rather, 
it derived from a different sort of social closure, based on ethnicity. The 
rivalry between Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi and Aqa Ahmad Bihbahani 
earlier in the century left a residue of bitterness between the Indians and the 
Iranians. Sayyid Dildar `Ali's anonymous official biography often criticized 
Iranian ulama who came to Lucknow as greedy 'individuals who prostituted 
themselves for money. 
The Iranian `Abdu'l.-‘Azim Husayni Isfahani wrote a typical rebuttal of these 
charges, dedicating it to Nawab Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar.[26] Isfahani took 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali to task for saying he lived in hard times for the truth. He 
pointed out that the Awadh rulers provided ample patronage to Shi`i 
religious figures. Nowadays, he remarked, everyone is a Mawlavi Dildar, and 
religious students who used to sit on the dirt now receive Rs. 500 or Rs. 
1,000. He objected that Nasirabadi seemed to warn people that because being 
a Shi`i mawlavi had become so lucrative, many wolves in sheep's clothing were 
arriving from abroad. Isfahani said that in fact Nasirabadi sought to forbid 
people from giving hospitality to foreign ulama and pilgrims who came to 
Lucknow. Indeed, he said, matters had reached the point where no one 
would help even an indigent visitor. He asked who Nasirabadi was, to 
impugn, as having set up in business, Iranian expatriate ulama who were from 
learned families and who gave rulings respected by the believers. He accused 
the prayer leader of calumniating the people of Lucknow, Aqa Ahmad 
Bihbahani, and other Iranian ulama arriving in Awadh. 
Isfahani took issue with Nasirabadi's statement that people had lost their 
ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, branding it ungrateful to 
those dwelling in the capital, who generally held Sayyid Dildar ` Ali in the high 
esteem. The nawab certainly could distinguish between truth and falsehood, 
as could many others. He questioned Sayyid Dildar `Ali's credentials as a 
mujtahid, saying he had studied only briefly with the mujtahids in the shrine 
cities of Iraq, and that he never received a diploma of ijtihad . He added 
bitterly that since that time Nasirabadi had revealed himself to be a mere 
layman in his mentality and that none of his sons or students had turned out 
to be distinguished. 
Such attacks were in turn rebutted by Nasirabadi's students, the Indian ulama 
carrying the day. The biographical dictionaries mention very few Iranian 
ulama who settled in Lucknow and attained high religious rank after 
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1814. Many came as visitors and left after receiving gifts from the nawabs. 
More Iranians came successfully as physicians, poets, and architects at court, 
and some of their sons or grandsons went into the religious field. 
One exception, Mulla Mihdi Astarabadi (d. 1843), a student of Sayyid `Ali 
Tabataba'i's in Karbala who lived for some time in Kirmanshah, arrived in 
Lucknow in 1824. He received patronage for his many compositions from 
members of the ruling circle, such as Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar's wife, Badshah 
Begam; from Hakim Mihdi `Ali Khan, chief minister in the 1830s; and from 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar (r. 1827-37). But even Astarabadi, out of Iranian pride, 
refused to join in the social circle of the local Indian ulama, living in Lucknow 
as something of a recluse. Astarabadi died in 1843, leaving an estate worth 
Rs. 10,000, which the Lucknow mujtahids remitted to Najaf for distribution 
to his heirs.[27] 
The Indian Shi`i ulama saw the Iranians arriving in Lucknow and Faizabad 
as carpetbaggers, unscrupulous mullas attempting to cash in on their Iranian 
prestige at a provincial court and among a gullible Shi`i population. But the 
Iranians felt that the Indian Usulis unfairly (and inhospitably) attempted to 
exclude them from patronage opportunities. Surprisingly, the Indian ulama 
succeeded, by and large, in reserving the best posts in Awadh for Indians, 
despite the greater prestige of the Iranians. They succeeded in doing so 
largely because of their detailed knowledge of local court protocol, which 
most Iranian ulama not only refused to learn but also disapproved of as 
demeaning to the station of Islamic scholars. To Awadh's notables, the 
Iranian ulama often looked, or were made to look, rude and haughty. A 
limited number of Indian-born Usuli families thus continued to monopolize 
religious office. That so acrimonious a struggle could take place among Usulis 
on the arbitrary grounds of ethnicity points to motives of exclusionary 
closure and competition for religious patronage, and strengthens the 
contention in chapter 6 that even disputes with an obvious doctrinal basis 
had a dimension of social rivalry. 
Shaykhism 
A minority of post-Occultation Imami religious leaders primarily based their 
claims to authority on charisma, and such charismatic leaders promoted 
either Sufi mysticism organized around brotherhoods (turuq) or gnostic 
esotericism (batiniyyah) often organized in secret cells of believers. Usulis 
opposed both charisma-based sorts of religious leadership by emphasizing 
technical, rational approaches to understanding scriptural law. Religious 
leaders of the Sevener, or Isma`ili, branch of Shi`ism more commonly prac- 
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ticed esoteric interpretation of scriptural texts and made claims to secret 
knowledge acquired supernaturally, than did Twelvers. But a major 
charismatic challenge to Usulism based in esoteric approaches to Twelver 
Shi`ism emerged in the late eighteenth century in the form of Shaykhism. 
The Shaykhi movement made an impact on Awadh in the 1830s and 1840s, 
demonstrating a reservoir of dissatisfaction with Usuli dominance. 
Shaykhism was founded by Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i (1753-1826), a scholar 
and visionary who in the 1790s trained with Usulis in the shrine cities of Iraq, 
thereafter establishing himself as a prominent theologian in Fath-`Ali Shah's 
Iran. Al-Ahsa'i stirred controversy by saying he had visions of the Imams and 
that his knowledge was based on inspiration (kashf), but his dreams were no 
more unorthodox than those of the Nasirabadis in Lucknow. Toward the 
end of his life his speculative, philosophical bent aroused the opposition of 
legalist ulama, some of whom issued rulings saying that he had departed from 
Islam in believing that only a spiritual, and not the physical, body would arise 
on resurrection day. 
Al-Ahsa'i's chief disciple, Sayyid Kazim Rashti (d. 1844), succeeded him in 
Karbala upon his death, developing his teacher's doctrines into a new school 
of Imami Shi`ism that differed somewhat from Usulism. In 1828 he met 
twice with a group of Usulis who attempted to clarify Shaykhi doctrine and 
to force Rashti to renounce some teachings. Shi`is in Karbala gradually 
became polarized between the minority Shaykhis and the majority Usulis, led 
by Sayyid Ibrahim Qazvini. In the 1830s rivals made several attempts on 
Sayyid Kazim's life, but the school and its leader doggedly survived.[28] 
Since many Shi`i scholars and notables traveled between Awadh and Iraq, 
Sayyid Kazim, as the Karbala-based leader of Shaykhism, had an influence 
on North India. A prominent scholar from Lucknow, Sayyid `Ali Nasirabadi 
(1786-1843), the second son of Sayyid Dildar ` Ali, studied with Sayyid Kazim 
Rashti.[29] Better known as a preacher and a reciter of the Qur'an than as a 
mujtahid, he wrote apologetics for Shi`ism against Sunnis. In 1829 he 
traveled to Karbala, where the ulama, especially Sayyid Kazim Rashti, treated 
him with respect despite his Indian background. He studied for a year with 
the Shaykhi leader and received a complimentary diploma from him 
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during a period when the schism between Usulism and Shaykhism had 
intensified. Sayyid `Ali could scarcely have been unaware of Rashti's 
doctrines, and Sayyid Kazim for his part may have been attempting to spread 
his teachings to India. The year after his arrival in Iraq Sayyid `Ali set out 
once more for Awadh, where he devoted himself to an Urdu Shi`i 
commentary on the Qur'an, printed in 1840. He then returned to Karbala for 
his few remaining years. 
The most vigorous advocate of Shaykhism in Awadh, Mirza Hasan 
‘Azimabadi (d. 1844), came of a Delhi family settled in Patna.[30] He arrived 
as a young man in Lucknow where he pursued his study of Shi`i sciences 
with Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi, writing in the 1820s a treatise arguing that 
holding Friday congregational prayers constituted an absolute, individual 
duty rather than an optional obligation. As the prayers became 
institutionalized in Awadh the hesitancy about them, visible in their first-
generation promoters such as Sayyid Dildar `Ali, lessened. 
Mirza Hasan went on pilgrimage to Mecca and then on visitation to the 
shrine cities of Iraq. He elected to reside in Karbala, where he gradually 
became a close follower of Sayyid Kazim Rashti. In 1836 ‘Azimabadi 
returned to Lucknow, where he worked as a preacher (va`iz), promulgating 
the doctrines of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i and Sayyid Kazim Rashti. He 
translated one of al-Ahsa'i's doctrinal works from Arabic into Persian and 
wrote an original composition on Shaykhi theology. Hostile Usuli sources say 
that Mirza Hasan spoke of having visions (manamat) in his sleep, said he 
received inspiration (kashf) from the Imams, and promoted himself as a 
miracle worker. At first Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi attempted to ignore Mirza 
Hasan's behavior, but when he succeeded in gathering some followers among 
the common people the Usuli mujtahid felt compelled to refute his former 
pupil. Mulla Mihdi Astarabadi, who may have encountered Shaykhism in 
Kirmanshah, joined in with an attack on Rashti's student.[31] 
Shaykhi theology postulated that God's attributes were of two kinds, active 
and essential, and that each of the attributes was represented in both 
categories. God had two kinds of knowledge, essential (or identical to his 
essence) and active (whereby he knew contingent things).[32] Traditional Shi`i 
theology accepted the division of divine attributes into active and essential, 
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but insisted that each attribute was one or the other. God's knowledge was 
an essential attribute, his speech an active one[33] Usulis charged that al-Ahsa'i 
fell into heresy by saying that God had two sorts of knowledge. 
Another difference of opinion centered on nominalism. Classical Shi`i 
thinkers like Ibn Babuyah defined the essential attributes, such as God's 
knowledge, as identical to the divine essence. The word "knowledge" when 
applied to God had no referent other than the essence, acting as a denial of 
ignorance in him. Shi`is borrowed this stance from the early Mu`tazili school. 
Later thinkers, such as Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1699), felt 
uncomfortable with so thoroughgoing a nominalism, denying that the 
negation of attributes in God was the highest stage in understanding his 
absolute unity.[34] Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i took a view closer to that of Ibn 
Babuyah and the Mu`tazilis. In his attack on Shaykhism, Sayyid Husayn 
Nasirabadi focused on these two seminal doctrines of Shaykhi theology, 
aiming to reaffirm the positive essential attributes and to refute the 
postulation of both essential and active divine knowledge.[35] 
‘Azimabadi remained committed to the Shaykhi school, working to build it 
up even in the face of fierce opposition from his old mentor. In 1844 he once 
again set out for the shrine cities of Iraq but got only as far as Allahabad, 
where he fell ill and died. Since Sayyid Kazim died on I January 1844, it seems 
likely that Mirza Hasan had received word that the old leadership of the 
movement in Karbala was gone and a struggle for succession had begun. He 
probably wished to return to Iraq so as to establish direct contact with 
whatever new leadership might emerge. 
Mirza Hasan's death at an early age deprived north Indian Shaykhism of its 
most active proponent, the increasingly wealthy and powerful Usuli hierarchy 
in Awadh succeeding in its quest to uproot the new rival. Even so, in 1852 
the appearance of the Shaykhi school still pained Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi 
Later Usuli refutations of Shaykhism originated in the Deccan, where 
Shaykhi influence remained much stronger.[36] In the early 1870s the Shi`i 
notable Mawlavi Ghulam Nabiyu'llah Ahmad Khan Madrasi (d. 1906) came 
to Lucknow, where Sayyid Bandah Husayn, son and successor of Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, condemned him as an unbeliever because of his 
Shaykhi leanings. Madrasi's grandfather had been a notable in the court 
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of the anti-British south Indian Muslim ruler Tipu Sultan, and Nauganavi 
noted that Shi`is in the Deccan were much under "Shaykhi, Babi and Nusayri 
influence."[37] Although in Iran millenarian expectations of the coming of the 
Imam Mahdi in 1844/1260 contributed to the rise of the Babi movement 
from the matrix of Shaykhism, no evidence survives of any Babi activity in 
Awadh. 
In the 1830s the Usuli ulama of Awadh, despite their lukewarm relations with 
the court, still had enough authority to stamp out what they perceived to be 
a heresy. The control mechanisms at their disposal are by now familiar: public 
denunciation and humiliation, and shunning. The second generation of Usuli 
ulama mobilized their followers for exclusionary closure even more 
effectively than had the first generation in the eighteenth century. Most 
important, one hears of no great notable who lent his patronage to Shaykhis, 
so that the Usulis appear to have effectively starved the new school of funds 
in Awadh. The Usuli approach to religion and law won out over the esoteric, 
charismatic approach of the Shaykhis, perhaps because Awadh bureaucrats 
and tax-farmers, many of them intellectually formed by the rationalist Nizami 
method of the Farangi Mahall, could better appreciate the rational-legal 
techniques of the mujtahids. 
The Ulama and the State, 1827-1857 
Weber's two ruling organizations, the political and the hierocratic, for the 
most part exercised legitimate domination over different spheres of society. 
But the potential for conflict between them always existed. Weber suggested 
a tripartite typology for state-religion relations. In the first type, hierocracy, 
the religious leaders legitimate the ruler. In the second, theocracy, the ruler is 
also the high priest. In the third, caesaropapism, a secular ruler also controls 
the religious hierarchy, having a legitimacy not dependent on the religious 
officials.[38] 
Which of these types best describes Awadh is clear. From the establishment 
of Friday prayers under Asafa'ud-Dawlah in 1786 through the coronation of 
Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar in 1819 the Shi`is of Awadh gradually developed a 
loose hierocracy, wherein the mujtahids legitimated the Nishapuri ruler. The 
Nishapuris had little religious charisma of their own, and the Usuli ulama, 
not themselves holders of political power, developed enough charisma 
among Shi`is to bestow legitimacy on the Awadh ruler. As was noted in 
chapter 5, this legitimation held good within the Shi`i ruling class, though 
obviously it had little relevance in the countryside, to the Hindu masses, or 
to 
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Sunni rajas and townsmen. Usuli hierocratic legitimation had meaning only 
in the context of the small, dominant Shi`i community. 
In the 1830s the Awadh king Nasiru'd-Din Haydar experimented with 
another cultural typology, promoting a system closer to caesaropapism. 
Weber well recognized the difficulty for a ruler of successfully claiming 
religious authority, and the danger of the attempt. In Awadh the move 
toward caesaropapism faced double jeopardy. First, it aroused the hostility of 
the well-placed Usuli ulama and of many sober members of the Shi`i ruling 
class, who had been socialized to Usuli values. Second, for other reasons, 
some features of the ruler's claim to religious authority also alarmed the 
British, the real guarantors of political power. The coincidence of some Usuli 
hierocratic and British utilitarian norms constituted a particularly powerful 
obstacle in the path of Nasiru'd-Din Haydar's religious policy. 
The reign of Nasiru'd-Din Haydar marked a period of very turbulent 
relations between the monarch and the high ulama. Both his beliefs and his 
style of life made Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar's son disliked and distrusted both 
by the Usuli ulama and by the British residents. He was raised by a 
stepmother, Badshah Begam, a powerful wife of Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar, who 
held a huge land grant (jagir). A lady with a fertile religious imagination, she 
invented numerous Shi`i ritual piactices centering on devotion to the Twelve 
Imams.[39] 
She held elaborate ceremonies for the births of the Imams, such as would be 
held by Indian Muslim women for a real birth in the household. She also had 
pretty Sayyid girls brought from their families and maintained them in her 
palace as wives of the eleven Imams descended from `Ali and Fatimah. The 
girls were not allowed to marry mortals after having been consecrated to an 
Imam, though it is said one escaped this restriction by saying that she had 
seen the Imam in a dream and that he had divorced her. She had mausoleums 
constructed for each of the Twelve Imams, to which she made offerings and 
observed mourning ceremonies, not only for Husayn, but for all the Imams. 
She asserted that she sometimes received inspiration and could foretell the 
future. 
When her stepson Nasiru'd-Din Haydar came to the throne, he continued 
these innovative practices and even expanded on them. He dressed in 
women's clothing on the birthdays of the Imams and pretended to give birth 
to dolls representing them, following all the rituals of bathing that a Muslim 
woman who had given birth would perform. These practices, eccentric and 
idiosyncratic, representing solely a preoccupation of the ruler and his 
intimates, had little effect on the Shi`i populace. The masses may have 
welcomed them, however, since the king spent huge sums to feed the poor 
during the frequent religious holy days.[40] 
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Precisely because of the expense of the new rituals, they became a political 
issue with the British resident. John Low wrote to Calcutta in 1836 that the 
king spent an enormous sum of sixty-six lakhs of rupees a year, close to six 
million pounds sterling, exhausting his treasury in spite of the resident's 
remonstrances: 
. . even subsequently to the exhaustion of the old Treasury, he, amongst other acts 
of extravagance squandered in one day, the sum of a lac of Rupees—50,000 upon 
two head dresses, of which he has already more than an abundance, and 50,000 
in making up dresses for the celebration of the birth of some imaginary 
prophet;—that he has established some absurd ceremonies . . . (the forms of 
which most mahomedans think idolatrous) which originated entirely with 
himself, and which entails a tremendously heavy annual expenditure, as they are 
held on each of the supposed anniversaries of all the twelve Saints—and each 
procession including the dresses and dinners and gifts to numerous person—
costs on an average not less than a lac of Rupees. . . . The above is a general 
outline of the mode in which the King of Oude passes his life—with the 
exception of certain periods devoted to the celebration of Mohurrum—and 
some new and absurd ceremonies called "achootas," during which times he 
abstains from drinking, and devotes himself to superstitious ceremonies—a few 
days in every month are set apart for those ceremonies, which invariably end 
with a grand procession in which His Majesty takes a part dressed in female 
clothes—sitting in a richly embroidered covered Palankiin with a doll in his lap—
which he supposed to represent some newly born Prophet or Imaum;—The 
sums of money thrown away monthly on this new freak of the King's are 
enormous.[41] 
These proceedings dismayed the Shi`i ulama as much as they did the resident. 
Once Nasiru'd-Din Haydar Shah gathered a group of notables and Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi to commemorate the death of an Imam. The king 
wanted Sayyid Muhammad to read the prayer for the dead so as to reenact 
the funeral ceremony. When they got to the palace, some notables pleaded 
with Sayyid Muhammad to humor the ruler. Nasirabadi responded that he 
could not take part in such a ritual. When the king came out in his black 
mourning clothes and called for the funeral prayer, Sayyid Muhammad stiffly 
informed him that only an Imam could read the prayer for a deceased Imam. 
The incident passed, leaving a residue of bitterness.[42] 
Both the British resident and the chief mujtahid also agreed in criticizing the 
monarch for his use of force to usurp the wives of other men, many of them 
from poor families. The resident learned that the king "had in the most open 
and despotic manner forcibly separated a husband of respectable station in 
life from his wife—turned the unhappy man out of the City, and insisted 
upon marrying the woman (then pregnant) without even waiting for a 
divorce."[43] Nasiru'd-Din Haydar asked Sayyid Muhammad to perform his 
marriage with the lady, but the mujtahid refused because her divorce from 
her first husband was not proven to have taken place according to Islamic 
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law.[44] Later the king gave the man a Rs. 500,000 bribe to renounce his wife, 
and married her legally, arranged an abortion for her, then a short while later 
abrogated this temporary marriage. 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar felt that he did not need the ulama to legitimate his rule, 
though he would have been willing to incorporate them into his rituals had 
they proved more compliant. In a significant step toward caesaropapism he 
claimed for himself the position the Usuli ulama claimed, of being the 
representative (na'ib) of the hidden Twelfth Imam. One of his courtiers, a 
Hindu convert to Shi`ism, enunciated this doctrine: "Know that since there 
is no escape for any era from having a Master of the Age (Sahib-i zaman), and 
in relation to the threshold of the Master of the Age, the Caliph of the All-
Merciful, the Interceder on the Day of Judgment, the Twelfth Imam, the king 
upon his throne is worthy of being the representative of that Holy One."[45] 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar made this claim only in his third regnal year. In 1830 
he began issuing coins inscribed: "The Shadow of God, the representative of 
the Mahdi, Nasiru'd-Din Haydar the King, struck coins in silver and gold by 
the Grace of God."[46] Rather than being a dynastic claim on the part of the 
Awadh rulers, this seems rather to have been one more aberration of 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar's decade in power. The contemporaneous Qajar rulers 
in Iran made no similar claim to being the representative of the Imam.[47] 
The monarch sought out other holy men to replace the rigid Usulis. The 
1830s saw a revival of court-sponsored Sufism, coinciding with a similar 
phenomenon in Iran. Low wrote, "His majesty has of late frequently invited 
a number of Fakeers to the Palace of an Evening; when he put on clothes 
somewhat similar to theirs, and after listening to their legends and pretended 
prophecies for some hours, he has loaded them with presents."[48] Some of 
the faqirs may have had links with rural bandits. When the king asked them 
what he should do to get a son, they replied that he should release twenty to 
thirty prisoners from his jail. He did so, to the dismay of the British, who had 
labored long and hard to apprehend the peasant rebels.[49] 
Conclusion 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar's bid to subjugate the Usuli hierarchy in Awadh to his 
complete control as royal representative of the Twelfth Imam failed. This 
caesaropapist ideology was rejected by most of the king's relatives in the 
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royal family, so that his successors declined to follow through with it. The 
Usuli ulama themselves steadfastly denied these royal pretensions, and since 
many ulama served as tutors to the children of notables, they often succeeded 
in transmitting Usuli clericalist sympathies to the secular ruling class. The 
Usuli clerics had developed too strong a network of learned men trained in 
Shi`i doctrines, and had attracted too widely the allegiance of Shi`i notables, 
to be easily displaced or subjugated by Nasiru'd-Din Haydar.[50] 
In the long run the ulama successfully monopolized religious functions in 
Shi`i society through their claim of unique professional expertise and their 
use of mechanisms of social control to exclude ethnic competitors like 
Iranians and charismatic ones like Shaykhis. They continued to develop their 
function of legitimating the Awadh state for the Shi`i community, 
participating in the coronation ceremonies and delivering their Friday 
sermons in the Awadh king's name. Although on many issues the ulama 
disputed the actions of the ruler in the 1830s, they continued to say the Friday 
prayers in his name, and on some policies they supported the monarch 
against the British. From 1786 to 1827 the Usuli clerics made successful 
claims on patronage from Awadh's court and high notables, as well as on the 
religious donations of Shi`i tradespeople. The lesser extent of court 
patronage available in the 1830s had little effect on the patronage system, 
which remained intact outside the court itself. New political leaders would 
emerge in the 1840s, who would follow pro-clerical policies, catapulting the 
ulama into a position of vast wealth and influence in Awadh affairs. 
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8 
 
Clericalist Monarchy and Shi`i Institution 
Building 
 
The 1840s saw the high point of ulama influence and wealth in Awadh as 
new governments abandoned the anticlerical policies of the 1830s. This Shi`i 
influence grew strongest in Lucknow and Faizabad and in the Shi`i-
dominated small towns, such as Sitapur, Nasirabad, and Kintur. The 
authority of the Awadh mujtahids often extended also to other Shi`i 
communities in British-ruled northern and eastern India, who sought legal 
rulings and spiritual guidance from them. Yet most of rural Awadh remained 
relatively untouched by developments at the Shi`i court in Lucknow. Most 
peasant laborers in the small villages dwelt in a rustic religious world centered 
on Hindu figures like Ram and Krishna; Sunni Islam and Sufism influenced 
the culture of the towns. Rural Awadh suffered through difficult times in the 
late 1830s and early 1840s, with grain shortages. The contrast between the 
indigence of the exploited peasants and the magnificence of the court's 
expenditures on Shi`i institutions may have helped provoke Hindu 
resentments, which would explode in the 1850s in a dispute over ownership 
of a religious edifice. 
Still, Shi`i policies and agendas did greatly affect the Awadh government in 
the 1840s, making a significant impact, especially on urban society. Religious 
welfare policies made it easier for the Shi`i poor to receive government help, 
encouraging adoption of Shi`ism among the indigent and increasing the 
authority of the mujtahids among commoners, since the ulama distributed 
the alms. For the first time an Awadh government took steps toward 
implementing aspects of Shi`i law as policy, in the realms of narcotics, the 
poor-tax, and the judiciary. The government established a powerful 
instrument for the self-replication and systematic training of the ulama corps 
in the form of 
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a Shi`i seminary. Twenty years after Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar became an 
independent Shi`i monarch, Awadh rulers began to take seriously their 
autonomy from the Mughals and Sunni Mughal traditions. The import of 
these policy changes for relations among Awadh's diverse religious 
communities will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, the question is what 
significance vastly greater government patronage had for the structure of 
Shi`i institutions in Awadh. 
Remission of Monies to Iraq through the Ulama 
Muhammad `Ali Shah (1837-42), placed on the throne by British military 
action after Nasiru'd-Din Haydar's sudden death, took a keen interest in 
public works of a religious nature. He began the building of a new edifice for 
mourning the Imams, and a new cathedral mosque, restating his dynasty's 
devotion to Shi`ism and multiplying posts available to ulama. The treasury of 
Awadh also provided substantial funds to the mujtahids in Najaf and 
Karbala. In a letter dated 1839 (1255) the north Indian clerics informed the 
ulama in Iraq that the new Awadh monarch, having a great love for the holy 
shrines and all who dwelt in their vicinity, had heard that the Asafiyyah canal 
was dry and wished to have it repaired. He ordered that Rs. 150,000 be sent 
to each of the two cities through the British resident by means of the political 
agent in Turkish Arabia. The letter instructed the ulama to let Lucknow know 
that the money arrived and to ensure that it was spent for the purpose 
stipulated.[1] British records show that in June 1839 the Awadh government 
remitted Rs. 30,000 to Iraq for the repairs to the canal, and the following 
summer sent another Rs. 250,000 to complete the work. In November 1841 
the king of Awadh sent Rs. 26,000 to Karbala for religious purposes, the total 
coming to just over Rs. 300,000 split two ways.[2] Since the Awadh monarch 
gave the ulama charge of the transmission of these monies and of overseeing 
the progress of the Iraq projects, he greatly enhanced their influence in 
Awadh and the Shi`i world. 
Growing Ulama Political Authority 
Of all Awadh's rulers, Amjad `Ali Shah (1842-47), who came to the throne 
on his father's death, took legalist, Usuli Shi`ism most seriously. His pious 
admiration for the mujtahids led him to bestow on them increasing responsi- 
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bilities of a governmental nature, integrating them as never before into the 
Awadh state. In contrast to the common image of the Shi`i mujtahids as 
hostile to secular government, the Awadh ulama accepted offers of 
government posts and government monies with alacrity. Indeed, few if any 
major Shi`i ulama remained outside the structure of government patronage 
and religious institution building in the 1840s. They appear to have seen the 
very willingness of a secular government to act in a proclerical manner as 
evidence of its justness and the rightness of cooperating with it. 
The young monarch tempered his own pattern of life, that of an Indo-
Muslim king, with Shi`i piety. He maintained a harem of four hundred 
concubines and four wives, but avoided the scandals and adultery that echoed 
in his predecessors' palaces. So scrupulous about the use of state funds that 
he did not say his daily prayers in clothes bought by the government treasury, 
he took instead a stipend from his mother with which to purchase his own 
vestments.[3] The tall, corpulent ruler with "a nose of extraordinary size" 
claimed on his coins to be the Shadow of God on earth.[4] Even he, however, 
did not altogether eschew the life of an Awadh notable, indulging in such 
forbidden pastimes as listening to songs and music, and spending a great deal 
of his time in the harem. He entirely lacked the horror the clergy felt at 
representational art, ordering all the buildings in Lucknow painted white or 
in colors and covered with scenes of Indian life.[5] 
Amjad `Ali Shah demonstrated a legendary deference to the Usuli mujtahids, 
illustrating the way in which the clergy had been able to influence members 
of the ruling class. He suggested a seal for Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, 
whom he called the "sultan of the ulama," which referred to him as the 
"object of the faith of Amjad `Ali Shah." Sayyid Muhammad, feeling that the 
king had gone too far, demurred and asked that the phrase be altered to 
"object of the bounties." The monarch used to visit the chief mujtahid's 
mansion with humility. 
At the powerful cleric's instance, the king ordered that the many taverns and 
hashish shops in Lucknow be closed down and that the narcotics crops be 
destroyed. He ordained that houses of male prostitution, which had 
proliferated in the capital, be put out of business. The male prostitutes, most 
of them transvestites, were arrested and banished from the city, except those 
who gave up their saris and agreed to have their locks shorn. Some notable 
patrons of the notorious Pomegranate Seed brothel wrote Sayyid 
Muhammad asking that he drop by, in a brash attempt to save the 
establishment. He 
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stiffly responded that if they read the formula for repentance, gave up taking 
the place of women, and grew beards, he would be glad to accept the 
invitation.[6] 
Amjad `Ali Shah appointed Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi as the head of the 
excise department, an announcement that the government would no longer 
seek to profit from the sale of forbidden liquors and would attempt instead 
to abolish the substances subject to the tax. The all-out assault on the rip-
roaring style of life of Lucknow's boisterous denizens met strong resistance 
and ultimately failed. The wits of the city found endless material for their 
satirical doggerel, taking revenge for the Usuli establishment's attempt to 
interfere in their amusements. One wag wrote: 
Whoever drinks no wine, believers, he will burn in hell; 
The excise to the Heavenly bartender's lover fell.[7] 
The attack on hashish or bhang stores and taverns also had an economic 
motive, since Sayyid Muhammad resented Hindu dominance of Awadh's 
commerce. He wished to initiate a state-sponsored Muslim boycott of Hindu 
shops. Some Muslims founded stores with much effort, but the king's plans 
in this regard fell short of realization.[8] 
The Government Payment of Alms 
Awadh Shi`is had for long privately paid Islamic poor-taxes. Even in 
Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's Faizabad the Akhbari physician Hakim Mu`alij Khan 
distributed donations by his rich patrons for the poor (paying himself 
handsomely to do so). In the 1890s Mrs. Ali noted that wealthy Muslims 
often gave one-fortieth of their annual income to the poor as zakat and one 
tenth to indigent Sayyids as khums . She reported that Sayyids could not 
accept other kinds of charitable donations (sadaqah), as for instance when 
someone. distributed gifts on escaping from a deadly illness.[9] 
In the 1830s the mujtahids in Awadh began making a major effort to increase 
official donations of a charitable nature. Since according to Usuli doctrine 
the mujtahids should be placed in charge of this money as the general 
representatives of the hidden Imam, any large increase in donations would 
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also augment their own power and financial resources. Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi wrote a work on the subject for Muhammad `Ali Khan Nasiru'd-
Dawlah, soon to be Muhammad `Ali Shah. It is even possible that when he 
wrote the book Sayyid Muhammad already knew that the British intended to 
depose Nasiru'd-Din Haydar and replace him with Muhammad `Ali. This 
secret decision leaked from the residency in Lucknow, becoming common 
knowledge among political operators like Subhan ` Ali Khan.[10] (Nasiru'd-Din 
Haydar's sudden death in 1837 removed the necessity for such a move.) 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi instructed the prince in the intricacies of the 
Islamic law of philanthropy. The recipients of the poor-tax (zakat), he said, 
included the poor, the indigent, those appointed to distribute the alms, 
converts to Shi`ism, slaves, debtors, and public welfare projects (from holy 
war to building mosques and bridges). In the time of the Occultation, he 
stressed, the poor-tax must be given to the upright mujtahid. He noted that 
under the Safavids the mujtahids administered the tax. All recipients, Sayyid 
Muhammad wrote, had to be Shi`is, and the contributions of Sayyids had to 
go to other Sayyids.[11] 
The other major philanthropy, called the "fifth" (al-khums), originally formed 
the early Muslim state's portion of war booty. It benefited both the Prophet 
and his immediate family as well as various categories of the indigent. In 
Sunni Hanafi law, prevalent in India, it could be given, but would benefit 
only the poor and not the Sayyids, who said they were heirs of the Prophet. 
In the absence of the Imam early Akhbaris tended to see the obligation of 
Shi`is to render this tax as having lapsed. Later Usulis believed that it should 
be divided in two basic parts, one for the mujtahids (the share of the Imam 
[sahm-i Imam ]), and the other for needy Sayyids.[12] Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi said that consensus had settled on the donation of the fifth as a 
duty. Believers owed this charitable tax on plunder; on precious metals after 
costs; on found hidden treasure; on profits from commerce, agriculture, and 
artisanry; on precious stones from the sea; on lawful money any time it was 
mixed with ill-gotten wealth of unknown origin; and on land sold by a Shi`i 
to a Jew, Christian, or Zoroastrian. The whole amount had to be delivered to 
the upright jurisprudent, who divided it into six parts in accordance with a 
literal reading of Qur'an 8:41. The mujtahid himself accepted three portions 
on behalf of God, the Prophet, and the Imam. He distributed the other three 
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portions to the poor, orphans, and wayfarers among the Sayyids, excluding 
other Shi`is.[13] 
The Lucknow mujtahids upheld this exclusivity to the point that they forbade 
the use of the sum allotted to the Imam for the funding of Muharram 
mourning sessions, since non-Sayyids participated in them. The rules for the 
fifth also encouraged centralization, since few recognized mujtahids dwelt in 
qasabahs and the charity, when donated, would have to be sent to Lucknow. 
Moreover, the terms of donation favored the educated Sayyids in the cities, 
who were more likely to receive the philanthropy. Poor, ignorant Shi`i 
Sayyids who did not know the rules for daily prayer were ineligible.[14] 
Whatever poor-tax Muhammad `Ali Shah paid was a personal affair, though 
the largesse of a king could be considerable. But Amjad `Ali Shah went 
considerably beyond any recorded past practice in making charitable funds 
available to the mujtahids. He took the unprecedented step of having the 
government of Awadh pay the Shi`i poor-tax (zakat) on its annual revenues. 
At 2.5 percent, the charitable contribution annually came to more than Rs. 
300,000 per year, totaling Rs. 1.7 million over the five years Amjad `Ali Shah 
ruled. The fifth was not, apparently, paid on this scale, although large sums 
were realized from this religious tax as well. The king gave both the poor-tax 
and the fifth into the care of Sayyids Muhammad and Husayn Nasirabadi.[15] 
The first year the mujtahids distributed the funds they were literally mobbed. 
The poor, and sudden converts from Sunnism and Hinduism to Shi`ism, 
besieged the houses of Sayyids Muhammad and Husayn. A later writer 
sniffed that "many of the undeserving" received funds.[16] Thereafter the 
mujtahids established a register with the names of those they considered 
genuinely deserving Shi`is, to each of whom they appointed a monthly 
stipend. Then they set up a department to handle the paper work, with Sayyid 
Husayn's son Sayyid ` Ali Naqi Zubdatu'l-`Ulama’(d. 1893) at its head. During 
this period hundreds of Sunnis and thousands of Hindus embraced Imami 
Shi`ism, many of them in order to gain access to alms. Officials gave Hindu 
converts to Shi`ism special preference in acquiring government jobs and, if 
they were tax-farmers, forgave them revenue shortfalls. Mosques and 
imambarahs proliferated.[17] 
In the 1840s many Shi`i clerics grew genuinely wealthy through their control 
of Islamic charities. Sayyid `Ali Naqi, who administered the money, paid 
himself so well that he could build four spacious, lavishly furnished man- 
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sions, with courtyards anti pools around which he set chairs that could not 
be matched for elegance in London itself. Each mansion had a name and was 
kept up by a horde of servants and provided with a stable for elephants. In 
the afternoon friends and seekers of knowledge would gather for salons 
around the pool, sitting on the European-style chairs. He also built a 
magnificent imambarah renowned for its mourning sessions. He was so 
respected that once when he went to Rampur to pray congregational prayers 
with the Shi`is, the Sunni nawab joined in behind him.[18] 
In each neighborhood Sayyid `Ali Naqi appointed persons he trusted to 
distribute the charity. The ulama sometimes employed this privilege as a way 
of bestowing favors. Mawlavi Sayyid Kamalu'd-Din Mohani, a zamindar who 
preferred to live in Lucknow, fell into financial difficulties because of his 
large family. To help him out, Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi put him in charge 
of distributing charily. In 1845 he left to become the supervisor of a pious 
endowment in Calcutta, founded by a relative.[19] 
In a pluralistic society like Awadh where the Shi`is formed a small minority, 
the provision of such huge sums to this group struck many as invidious. Even 
Shi`is like the historian Kamalu'd-Din Haydar criticized the system, 
observing that the mujtahids were obliged to put large sums of money in the 
hands of high state officials—ostensibly for redistribution to the needy—as 
bribes to ensure the continuing payment of the Rs. 300,000 per year.[20] The 
government payment of the poor-tax emerged as an important issue under 
Vajid `Ali Shah (1847-56) during the residency of Colonel Sleeman. Sleeman 
faulted the system on several counts, pointing out that no Sunni could 
partake of the charity. Moreover, he said, since Sayyids could receive poor-
tax monies only if they fell in the category of the indebted, the Awadh 
mujtahids 
get over the difficulty by borrowing large sums before the money is given 
out, and appropriate the greater part of the money to the liquidation of these 
debts, though they all hold large sums in our Government securities. To his 
friends at court he [the chief mujtahid] sends a large share, with a request that 
they will do him the favour to undertake the distribution among the poor of 
the neighborhood To prevent popular clamour, a small portion of the money 
given out is actually distributed among the poor of the Sheea sect at 
Lucknow, but that portion always remains small.[21] 
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Sleeman noted that government stipends were in arrears to the amount of 
five million rupees, and that the government was bound to pay the poor-tax 
only when free of debt. But, he said, the chief mujtahid, the chief minister, 
and the court favorites had too great a stake in it to allow it to be 
discontinued. Vajid `Ali Shah acquiesced in its payment, though the treasury 
was depleted, and the amount paid into the poor-tax had actually increased. 
At some point Vajid `Ali Shah, either bowing to British pressure or for his 
own reasons, stopped giving the poor-tax and even defaced coins lest he be 
obliged to give it. This interruption in their income, which became even more 
serious when the British annexed Awadh in 1856, caught the mujtahids and 
their families off guard, leaving them heavily indebted and forcing them to 
sell off their British stocks. This and other royal actions soured relations 
between the court and the mosque. Sayyid Muhammad `Abbas Shushtari 
mentioned as one of the sorrows in Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi's life the 
"opposition of the notables [umara ']," admitting that Amjad `Ali Shah 
showed him much respect but lamenting that he had hastened to the next 
world. Vajid `Ali Shah demonstrated not nearly so much veneration of the 
ulama.[22] 
The substantial poor-tax funds quite aside, Amjad `Ali Shah showered the 
clergy with perquisites. He gave Sayyids Muhammad and Husayn Nasirabadi 
each an extra Rs. 200 per month as the capital's official prayer-leaders and 
provided extra allowances to other members of the Nasirabadi clan as well. 
In addition, the king established a special fund for Sayyids totaling, at one 
point, Rs. 2,000 each month. The senior members of the Nasirabadi family 
received Rs. 100 per month each, with altogether Rs. 380 per month out of 
these monies going to the Nasirabadis. They shared the rest of the allowance 
(probably deriving from khums) with other Sayyids of their choosing, the total 
number of recipients reaching forty-seven at one point. Vajid `Ali Shah, 
immediately upon coming to power, cut the Sayyid fund in half. Still, in 1849 
his treasury sent Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi Rs. 2,180 per month in 
various perquisites to be shared out.[23] 
The poor-tax and the fifth contributions over which the high ulama exercised 
control for nearly a decade increased their wealth and power immeasurably. 
They had, from their point of view, a legal right to half of the khums 
donations, and the power to decide to whom the other half would go. They 
employed various devices to gain access, as well, to the poor-tax (zakat) 
revenues. Even mere control over the latter, amounting to hundreds of 
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thousands of rupees per year, would have rendered them important sources 
of patronage. This money tied them closely to the ruling establishment, 
drawing them into tight association with the secular state. Most important, 
by accepting regularized payments of huge amounts of money from 
government revenues, their position within the ruling class changed from 
that of small land- and benefice-holders and stipendiaries. They became 
direct recipients of state-expropriated peasant surpluses. In many ways the 
prominent ulama joined the class of high notables. Like the Awadh notables, 
they also became rentiers by investing in East India Company stock. 
The Funding of a Shi`i Seminary 
The Usuli Shi`i ulama already had informal means of passing their status on 
to their children, of teaching them the technical expertise demanded by many 
ulama posts, and of controlling entry into the ulama corps. Their teaching 
sessions in homes produced enough Usuli clerics to meet the notable-class 
demand for their services in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. But 
with the accession of great wealth and numbers of government posts for Shi`i 
clerics in the 1840s, the ulama could only take advantage of the opportunities 
to influence society and move upward socially by expanding and more 
rationally ordering their educational activities. In short, they needed formal 
seminaries. 
After Amjad `Ali Shah and his chief minister, Aminu'd-Dawlah, had been in 
office for nearly a year, the leading mujtahids Sayyids Muhammad and 
Husayn Nasirabadi decided that they finally had a government with which 
they could work closely. They suggested that the new government formally 
subvent an official, expanded Shi`i seminary (madrasah). The ruling circles 
responded with enthusiasm and generosity. In May 1843 a proposed schedule 
was drawn up wherein the king appointed Rs. 31,200 per year for the school, 
with fourteen primary teachers, seven intermediate teachers, and five 
advanced instructors, with three principals.[24] For Shi`i scholars with land 
around their qasabahs the salaries were more of a perquisite than an income, 
although for Sayyids that had fallen on hard times even Rs. 240 per year could 
help to make ends meet. 
Amjad `Ali Shah neglected to endow the seminary or to appoint lands 
permanently to generate its income, paying for it instead from the royal 
treasury every year by personal fiat. The king often visited the premises, at 
the tomb 
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of Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan, and distributed sumptuous meals. He also 
funded a smaller seminary at Faizabad, at least for a time. Many of the 
families that staffed and attended the royal seminary had already taught Shi`i 
sciences on an informal basis for some time. Amjad `Ali Shah simply gave 
permanent form and monetary support to such teaching, allowing numerous 
salons to coalesce into one institution.[25] 
The top administrative post at the Lucknow school fell to Sayyid Muhammad 
Taqi Nasirabadi (1818-72), the son of Sayyid Husayn. His emergence into 
prominence at the age of twenty-five marks the rise in the 1840s of the third 
generation of Usuli ulama. His heading tip of the school also typified the 
Nasirabadi family's determination to keep key clerical posts in the family; like 
the young executive taking over his father's business, Sayyid Muhammad 
Taqi's qualifications for the post lay in his family name rather than in his 
scholarly attainments or experience (many of the teachers he hired and fired 
were much senior to him on both counts). He did not even receive from his 
father and uncle his diplomas qualifying him to relate the oral reports of the 
Imams until 1845 (1262), two years after he became principal. He also held 
an honorary diploma from Shaykh Muhammad Hasan an-Najafi in Iraq, into 
whose hands the Awadh ulama had placed hundreds of thousands of rupees. 
In addition to his duties as principal and senior teacher at the royal seminary, 
he helped his father lead prayers at the Tahsin `Ali mosque, sometimes also 
leading them in his father's presence at the royal mosque. He wrote 
prolifically, often in Arabic, and must have felt a pressing need to provide 
textbooks for the new generation of two hundred students coming up 
through his institution.[26] 
At the school he wielded absolute administrative powers: "It appears from 
Wajboolarz [wajibal-card ], dated the same year in which the institution was 
founded, that full and plenary powers were conferred on the principal, to 
appoint, remove or alter salaries at his pleasure."[27] In addition to his salary 
of Rs. 1,800 per year and his share of income from the family villages, he 
received from 1848 a complimentary stipend of Rs. 100 per month, in 
addition to Rs. 540 per year from the rent of shops around the Tahsin `Ali 
mosque.[28] 
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But such formal emoluments were no doubt dwarfed by the gifts of notable-
class patrons and students. 
The assistant principal when the school first came into existence was Sayyid 
Ahmad `Ali Muhammadabadi (d. 1878), a middle landholder (zamindar) and 
leader of a small town in British-ruled Azamgarh just south of Awadh. 
Trained by the Usuli prayer leaders of Faizabad and Lucknow, and by a 
Farangi-Mahalli, he secured notable-class patronage when he became the 
tutor for the sons of the sometime chief minister, Imdad Husayn Khan 
Aminu'd-Dawlah. Muhammadabadi's wealth and erudition and his 
penetration of ruling-class networks in Lucknow allowed him to marry his 
son to the daughter of another man who served as chief minister, Ahmad 
`Ali Khan Munawwaru'd-Dawlah.[29] The third seminary administrator in 
1843, Muhammad b. `Ali Fayzabadi, a close student of Chief Mujtahid Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, also served as a preacher (va`iz), strongly 
recommending Friday congregational prayers and working sermons from the 
New Testament and the Imam `Ali into his talks.[30] 
Of the five advanced teachers at Rs. 840 per year only a few can be identified 
from the biographical dictionaries. One, Sayyid Muhammad Siyadat 
Amrohavi (d. 1849), a Friday prayer leader from a zamindar background, had 
studied with Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi.[31] Another prominent advanced 
teacher, Sayyid Muhammad `Abbas Shushtari (1809-88), served as Sayyid 
Husayn Nasirabadi's secretary in his Arabic correspondence with Iraq. From 
an Iranian clerical family that settled in Awadh as court physicians and 
intermarried with the Awadh notable class, Sayyid Muhammad `Abbas 
forsook medicine for a religious career. At age seventeen he began studying 
Shi`i sciences with Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi, who encouraged him to 
become a prayer leader and sermonizer. He tutored the children of the great 
merchant Mirza Muhammad `Ali Dihlavi to earn a living and received his 
diploma allowing him to relate Shi`i reports in 1841. For a time without 
means, he tried his hand at medicine again. He later remarked that although 
he came of a family renowned for its wealth, he himself at one point fell on 
hard times.[32] 
Finally, in the spring of 1842 Shushtari obtained a post under Muhammad 
`Ali Shah. When in May of the same year the king died and a new 
administration came in, he lost that position and had trouble maintaining his 
service-elite style of life. A year later when the Shi`i seminary for which 
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Sayyid Muhammad `Abbas himself helped lobby was funded, Sayyid Husayn 
exercised his influence to have Shushtari made a senior instructor at the age 
of thirty-four, at Rs. 840 per year in salary. The financial difficulties he 
experienced underline the strong motivation the ulama had to expand job 
opportunities in the economically depressed 1840s. 
The seminary underwent changes over time. In 1846 the government moved 
it to the larger facilities at Asafu'd-Dawlah's Great Imambarah in the old part 
of town. The faculty expanded from twenty-nine to thirty-eight, though the 
number of students stayed around two hundred. The turnover was large: only 
eleven faculty members appointed in 1843 remained on the rolls in 1856. 
Often their own sons replaced instructors who died, and in any case their 
stipends became inherited family property. Even where teachers died leaving 
no one in the family capable of succeeding them at the seminary, their heirs 
continued to receive the stipends. They were, like many service grants in this 
period in Awadh, a curious mixture of salary and pious endowment, a liquid 
waqf, an alienated portion of the Government treasury. 
Although no list survives of the students who passed through the school, and 
the extant lists of teachers often give only a first name, the information 
available indicates that the seminary functioned for upper- and middle-class 
Shi`is. Further, it actually became involved in 1843-56 in elite formation in 
Awadh. Many of the teachers who can be identified were small or middle 
landholders from the Muslim lineage centers, and others derived from high 
service families clustered around the court in Lucknow. An example of how 
the seminary could be used for upward mobility is Mirza Muhammad `Ali 
"Qa'imu'd-Din" (d. 1872), who worked himself up from instructor to master 
and finally became a jurisconsult at Vajid `Ali's court and an intimate of the 
king.[33] 
Contemporary observers remarked on the patrimonial nature of the school's 
administration, and younger members of the old elite ulama families received 
a disproportionate number of appointments to the staff on their completion 
of studies at the seminary. In 1848 Sayyid Husayn appointed his son Sayyid 
`Ali Naqi Nasirabadi, then twenty-seven, deputy principal at Rs. 600 per year. 
Sayyid Bandah Husayn Nasirabadi (d. 1875), son of Chief Mujtahid Sayyid 
Muhammad, became a master teacher in 1852 at Rs. 480 per annum. The late 
Mufti Sayyid Muhammad Quli Kinturi's youngest son, Sayyid Hamid 
Husayn, was hired as a teacher when only twenty-two. In 1855 his cousin, 
Sayyid Ghulam Husayn Kinturi, became the daroghah at Rs. 300 per year, 
taking charge of the stipends, which came to over Rs. 30,000 per year at that 
time.[34] 
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Despite the dominance of elite Usuli families established in Lucknow and 
Faizabad, some teachers were drawn from the qasabahs, and some came from 
beyond Awadh, from nearby places like Bijnor or Farrukha-bad, or even 
from the Punjab. The school also attracted as students literate Shi`is from 
Muslim service towns throughout northern India. The Shi`is trained at the 
seminar), took strict Usuli ideas hack to their provincial towns. Sayyid 
Muharram `Ali Nauganavi (d. 1889) of Moradabad left his house as a young 
mall without telling anyone and went to Lucknow to study at the seminary. 
The first Shi`i scholar from Nauganoh to be trained in Lucknow, he taught 
the others who followed. He established direct contact with the Usuli 
tradition in Iraq by visiting the shrine cities, settling thereafter in Meerut 
district and Saharanpur. The Lucknow seminary helped link together widely 
scattered Shi`i communities into a network of personal acquaintance and 
shared expertise, as well as promoting in the qasabahs the stronger division 
between the trained cleric and Shi`i layman which already existed in Usuli 
Lucknow and Faizabad.[35] 
Just as Farangi Mahall, with its special teaching method and rationalist 
emphases, had helped train bureaucrats as well as ulama, so the Shi`i seminary 
performed both functions. Typical textbooks included an early-Safavid-
period Usuli work in the principles of jurisprudence; a standard work on 
metaphysics in Arabic; Mulla Sadra's commentary on an early philosophical 
and scientific encyclopaedia; a work by Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi in law; and 
a late-eighteenth-century Usuli commentary on law from Karbala. The 
syllabus mixed works often used with the Nizami method with the central 
textbooks favored by or produced by the Usuli revival in Iraq and in 
Lucknow.[36] 
Sons of notables often took classes at the seminary for a while before moving 
on to administrative positions. Mirza Muhammad Riza "Barq," a student at 
the seminary, later received an appointment as the court paymaster (bakhshi). 
The high notable Mirza Riza Khan `Ali-Jah Bahadur pursued religious 
knowledge at the seminary in Lucknow, then studied in Karbala. He and his 
brother attained both worldly and religious leadership back in Awadh.[37] 
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The seminary established in the 1840s allowed the more systematic 
socialization of Awadh's Shi`i ulama to Usuli values and the training of a 
greater number of ulama to fill the posts rapidly being created by the 
proclerical government. Young ulama came into the system as sons or clients 
of the older, established mujtahids who controlled stipends and subsequent 
clerical appointments. The older ulama could thus offer aspiring young 
clerics incentives to conform to Usuli orthodoxy. Their intellectual formation 
included years of studying Arabic, the rational sciences, and Usuli principles 
of jurisprudence and theology. Some Shi`i notables also had their sons study 
at the seminary, both for the rational tools they would learn there and for the 
sober religious education they would receive. Notable and ulama families 
looked on a few years at the seminary as a way of building character, and 
even young students from an affluent background were often forced to live 
on the small stipends provided by the school. Bonds other than learning and 
patronage linked the middle-landholding or service-class teachers at the 
seminary with the high notables. Marriages tied the Muhammadabad- and 
Shushtari families, both represented on the faculty, to two of the wealthiest 
notable houses, from which chief ministers had been drawn. 
The Establishment of Shi`i Courts in Awadh 
The Usuli ulama, for all their privileged position and new wealth, lacked 
official control over Awadh law. To move into such judicial posts required a 
degree of integration into the institutions of the secular government which 
the Indian Usulis had thus far avoided. It would also give the mujtahids a 
much more powerful tool for shaping Awadh society in accordance with 
their interpretations of Islamic law in its Imami form. The coincidence of 
ambitious Usuli ulama at the head of the religious establishment and 
cooperative Awadh monarchs guaranteed both the willingness of the 
government to appoint Shi`i judges and the willingness of the jurisprudents 
to plunge into the mire of positive law. 
Mughal traditions proved tenacious in Awadh, partially because the Nawabs, 
for all their Iranian and Safavid symbols, had themselves been integrated into 
the Mughal heritage. Even when the Nishapuri rulers declared themselves 
kings, Awadh administration proceeded along Mughal lines. Many Mughal 
land and service grants continued in force, and what was most remarkable, 
the judicial system remained in the hands of Hanafi Sunnis. As was shown 
above, even in the first decade of the nineteenth century Sa`adat `Ali Khan 
proposed that a Shi`i judiciary be established. The Usuli ulama, who did not 
trust him and did not wish to compromise their integrity any further, 
rebuffed him. 
The Farangi-Mahall family filled most judicial posts. Lucknow and Faizabad 
had urban criminal and civil courts (divani ‘adalat), and major govern- 
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ment offices employed jurisconsults. Hereditary village qazis had jurisdiction 
over their parganah. Large landholders and government-appointed revenue 
collectors and governors (fawjdars) also dispensed justice according to 
customary law; In Faizabad Hafizu'llah Farangi-Mahalli headed the civil and 
criminal courts, with his relative Ni`matu'llah serving as a mufti. In Lucknow 
Muhammad Yusuf Farangi-Mahalli (d. 1870) succeeded his father as mufti 
on the civil and criminal court at Rs. 200 per month, holding the post until 
Vajid `Ali Shah's deposition. Sunnis from outside Lucknow filled some 
judicial posts. Mufti Sa`du'llah Moradabadi (1804-77) studied in Rampur and 
Delhi, arriving in Lucknow in 1827 for further schooling at Farangi Mahall. 
He taught at the royal seminary, then became mufti for the office of the chief 
municipal authority (kotwal) in Lucknow.[38] 
With the accession of wealth, power, and prestige to the Shi`i high ulama in 
the 1840s, they now made a bid to control the Islamic-law judicial system, a 
traditional outlet for the talents of Muslim learned men. Mufti Sayyid 
Muhammad Quli Kinturi, who retired to Lucknow from a post in the British 
court at Meerut in 1841, strongly advocated this step. While in Meerut he 
wrote a work urging the king to institute a Shi`i legal system. He published it 
in 1843, dedicating it to Amjad `Ali Shah, to whom he referred as "the 
exemplar of [the phrase] 'the just king'" (misdaq as-sultan al-`Adil). He said he 
wrote the work to refute Sunni taunts that Shi`is were incapable of being 
qazis and muftis, and to encourage the Awadh government to take up the 
torch of the Buyid, Safavid, and Qutb-Shahi states in promoting Shi`ism and 
honoring the Shi`i ulama. He insisted that it was forbidden for non-Shi`is to 
be court judges, admonishing the king to appoint only Imami jurisprudents 
to such posts. He explained tile difference between a qazi (who makes 
specific judgments in disputes between parties) and a mufti (who gives 
general pronouncements in elucidation of the law), arguing that only qualified 
mujtahids should be appointed to either post.[39] 
Kinturi therefore endeavored to exclude laymen and Akhbaris from judicial 
posts, as well as Sunnis. He had, however, to answer the charges of those 
Indian Shi`is who insisted that only the ulama in Iran and the Arab lands held 
the status of mujtahid, there being no mujtahids in India. On the 
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contrary, he asserted, rulings in accordance with Imami Shi`ism could be 
implemented in Awadh insofar as the ulama there had met all the classical 
requirements of independent judicial reasoning (ijtihad).[40] 
Lay Shi`is had for long made the leading mujtahids arbitrators in their 
disputes.[41] In establishing a Shi`i court system Amjad `Ali Shah formalized, 
again, an informal arrangement. He appointed Sayyids Muhammad and 
Husayn Nasirabadi jointly to head a supreme appeals court that would 
oversee all Islamic-law courts. Sayyid Muhammad made his eldest surviving 
son, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Munsifu'd-Dawlah (d. 1859), chief justice 
(daroghah) of the Lucknow civil and criminal court (divani ‘adalat), retaining 
the Farangi-Mahall jurisconsults in a subordinate position (a compromise 
falling short of Kinturi's all-Shi`i ideal). Sayyid Muhammad Baqir received Rs 
500 per month in formal salary, but a British investigation concluded that 
"the incumbent receives much more than 500 from many sources."[42] 
The government created an entirely new system of Islamic-law courts in the 
provinces, called the fawjdari ‘adalat . It appointed Twelver Shi`i jurisconsults, 
one for each district in Awadh, to be attached to the office of the district's 
governor and revenue collector. Sayyid Muhammad Baqir likewise headed up 
this new branch of the judiciary. His younger brother Sayyid Murtaza (d. 
1859) presided over a subordinate Sadr as-sudur court that handled cases at 
the local level. The chief mufti, or jurisconsult (sadr ifta '), over all the 
provincial courts was Sayyid Hadi Nasirabadi (1813-58), a nephew of Sayyid 
Muhammad, the chief mujtahid.[43] As might be expected, Sayyid Muhammad 
bestowed the less desirable but still powerful jurisconsular posts in the 
provinces, not on members of the Nasirabadi family, but on their younger 
disciples, often themselves from outside Lucknow. They included two clerics 
from a British-ruled province just north of Awadh, as well as muftis from 
small towns in Awadh proper.[44] A member of the Nasirabadi clan still based 
in that village became jurisconsult for his area. 
The creation of the Shi`i judicial system, like the seminary, provided 
employment for the emerging third generation of Usuli ulama, who found 
job opportunities in traditional fields like prayer leading to be limited. The 
king considered Sayyid Muhammad `Abbas Shushtari for a post as the prayer 
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leader at the new cathedral mosque built in the 1840s, but protocol required 
him to retain Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi. As compensation, he made 
Shushtari, then teaching at the seminary, jurisconsult of the chief minister's 
office. He received a substantial increase in income, but said he was 
reluctant to accept the post because of the interference of government 
officials, the enmity of those he ruled against, the dishonesty of the 
attorneys, and the greed of court officials. Once when a plaintiff offered 
him a bribe, Shushtari re- 
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portedly broke into tears at this affront to the holy Law.[45] Those tears 
expressed the contradiction between the original sectarian ideology of Imami 
Shi`ism on the one hand, hostile to the secular world in the absence of the 
divinely-guided Imam, and on the other the Usuli ideology of collaboration 
with any state that was willing, and involvement in positive law and practical 
administration. 
The Usuli clerics advanced in the 1840s on the last major front in their battle 
for monopoly over important religious posts, that of the Islamic-law 
judiciary. They vigorously practiced exclusionary closure, hoping to displace 
the Sunni magistrates completely by arguing that only an Usuli mujtahid 
could legitimately give legal rulings as magistrate or jurisconsult. They also 
argued against Iranian competitors that Indian Usulis were perfectly 
competent to derive legal rulings. A Shi`i judicial system also allowed the 
Usuli ulama to impose many of their conceptions of proper behavior, 
property, and family relations, and relative rights of various social groups and 
religious communities on sections of Awadh society. The appointment of the 
provincial jurisconsults even tenuously extended the writ of Usuli law into 
the interior of Awadh, a new and significant development. Of course, the 
Shi`i judges had relatively little influence on Awadh society as a whole, since 
most persons handled their legal matters informally or, in the countryside, 
went before ta`alluqdar landholders. Still, sometimes Shi`i judges could play 
pivotal roles, as will be shown in chapter 10. 
Relationship with the Shi`i Centers of Iraq 
The rise of a full-fledged Shi`i religious establishment in Awadh raises the 
question of the Indian Usulis' relationship with the great jurisprudents of 
Najaf and Karbala. Although mujtahids were forbidden to practice emulation 
(taqlid) of other jurisprudents. the Usuli emphasis on the greater authority of 
the most learned (al-aclam) jurisprudent led to the emergence of a small 
number of pace-setters whose judicial opinions commanded wide respect 
and around whom a new consensus often formed. In the 1840s a convention 
existed that of all the great centers, Najaf was preeminent, so that the head 
of the religious establishment in that city was considered the leader (ra'is) of 
all the Shi`is. In a biographical notice of Shaykh Muhammad Hasan an-
Najafi, one of his students wrote in 1846 (1262), "Upon him devolved the 
leadership of the Imamis, both Arabs and non-Arabs, in this, our own 
time."[46] 
The relationship of the high ulama in north India to the mujtahids in the 
shrine cities remained a complex one. They all addressed each other as the 
"best of the mujtahids," the "exemplar of the people," the "heir of the 
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prophets," rendering the superlatives no more than pleasantries. A story from 
Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi's biography illuminates the relationship. Shushtari 
wrote that Sayyid Husayn allowed the deputation of judicial authority (al-
istinabah fi'l-qada), considered a very minority opinion that seemed to 
contradict Shi`i consensus. After Muhammad Hasan an-Najafi took the same 
stance in his Jawahiral-kalam, others in Awadh changed their views, agreeing 
that such deputation was permissible. Sayyid Husayn, on the other hand, not 
once changed his mind on a major position.[47] The story demonstrates that 
an-Najafi's authority as a mujtahid and source for emulation (marja` at-taqlid) 
carried weight with many north Indian ulama in the 1840s, but that the 
Nasirabadis maintained their independence. Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, 
after all, maintained that he was esoterically taught his knowledge by the 
Twelfth Imam himself. 
After an-Najafi's death, Murtaza Ansari, who controlled 200,000 tumans per 
year in charitable donations, emerged in Najaf as the most widely recognized 
jurisprudential source for emulation in the Shi`i world.[48] Later in the 
nineteenth century Muhammad Mihdi Kashmiri of Lucknow wrote of 
Ansari, "His cause attained renown throughout all horizons, and he was 
mentioned in the pulpits in a manner unparalleled before him. He was an 
exemplar to the Shi`is in their entirety, in their religion and in their worldly 
affairs."[49] Again, although such sentiments in favor of Ansari clearly existed 
in Awadh, it is unlikely that any of the leading members of the Nasirabadi 
family acknowledged anyone else as more learned than themselves. 
For their part the jurisprudents in the shrine cities did not simply dismiss the 
Indian mujtahids as rustic bumpkins, at least to their faces. Shaykh 
Muhammad Hasan an-Najafi continually asked the Lucknow mujtahids to 
send copies of their compositions to Najaf, where they were read and 
circulated, early Awadh use of the printing press making Shi`i authors there 
accessible to readers in the Middle East. When he read Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi's book in defense of temporary marriage, he called it the "crown 
of Shi`ism and referred to the author's father, Sayyid Dildar `Ali, as "the seal 
of the mujtahids." Elsewhere he noted that Sayyid Dildar `Ali's long work on 
the principles of religion entitled "Mirrors for Minds" had arrived, upon 
which he lavished effusive praise, attributing the brilliance of the fami- 
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ly's compositions to their descent from the Imams.[50] 
The anecdote from the life of Sayyid Husayn about judicial deputation 
indicates that many Shi`i ulama in India accepted even controversial rulings 
as authoritative when issued by the leading mujtahid in the Iraqi shrine cities. 
The top mujtahids in Awadh, however, never changed their views on 
another's authority. The lower ranks of mujtahids everywhere may have 
shown more deference to an-Najafi (and then to Ansari) as the most learned 
exemplar than did the chief mujtahid in each major city. 
State-Ulama Tensions 
Paradoxically, the accepting of posts as government judges and jurisconsults 
brought the Indian ulama into direct involvement with the day-to-day 
administration of the Awadh government and yet simultaneously increased 
possibilities for conflict with secular officials. The ulama, as the judiciary 
branch of the state, naturally at times struggled with the executive over policy 
and the impact of legal decisions. Such conflicts had nothing of the sectarian 
about them, but rather expressed differences between secular imperatives 
and hierocratic ones in judicial policy. The Usuli ulama maintained a distinct 
set of values and style of life that set them apart even within the ruling class. 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi refused the titles bestowed upon other 
notables, such as khan and bahadur .[51] The third generation of Usuli ulama 
modified this attitude, insofar as they accepted noble court names, such as 
Munsifu'd-Dawlah (the Just of the State). Still, differences of religious culture 
separated even the high ulama from other notables. 
Letters written by the ulama in the wake of the 1843 Ottoman sack of the 
holy shrine city of Karbala in Iraq shed light on their conception of the 
secular notables, whom they called umara ', rulers, as opposed to ‘ulama ', the 
learned. Rather than blaming the Sunnis for the disaster in the Middle East, 
which cost perhaps 5,000 Shi`i lives, Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi lamented that 
one seldom found notables (umara ') with hearing ears, excoriating both Sunni 
and Shi`i high notables as corrupt. One Iranian cleric who barely survived 
the Ottoman attack, which aimed at subduing the rebellious city, blamed 
both the Ottoman sultan for ordering the assault and the Iranian shah for 
failing to defend the holy city, and wrote to Lucknow a radical letter from 
Iraq in which he said, "Would that there were no king ruling over us, and 
none over Iran!"[52] Even such a rhetorical expression of premodern re- 
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publican sentiments by the Shi`i ulama in Awadh is unrecorded, however, 
and for all their differences with the Nishapuris, the Usulis in Lucknow knew 
that without them Shi`ism in India had little future. Indeed, the Usuli clerics 
often referred to the Awadh monarch as a just king, implicitly accepting the 
legitimacy of his state. 
A sample of anecdotes told by later ulama in their biographical dictionaries 
will illustrate the clerics' own interpretation of ulama conflict with the state. 
Although Muhammad `Ali Shah maintained generally good relations with the 
ulama, his means of acquiring land for a new Shi`i mourning complex 
brought him into conflict with the chief mujtahid. When the king called for 
Holy Day prayers to be held there to commemorate the breaking of the 
Ramadan fast, Sayyid Muhammad informed the monarch that some of the 
land on which the building was constructed belonged to Na`im Khan. He 
refused to lead the prayers at the new site until the monarch paid the original 
owner a just price for his land according to Islamic law. After an 
investigation, and with the consent of Na`im Khan, Sayyid Muhammad 
suggested a fair price. Muhammad `Ali Shah paid it, and the ceremony 
proceeded as planned.[53] 
Amjad `Ali Shah bought some mosque furnishings from a merchant for Rs. 
1,300,000. Although the ruler gave the whole sum, some courtiers in charge 
kept back Rs. 100,000. Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi intervened to ensure 
that the merchant received the whole amount.[54] In the same period, when 
prince Vajid `Ali took a fancy to another man's slave-girl, usurping her from 
him, Sayyid Muhammad made an investigation and concluded that according 
to Islamic law Vajid ` Ali Mirza would have to surrender the girl to her rightful 
owner. The king ordered the judgment carried out. When Vajid ` Ali ascended 
the throne he sent a message through a notable to suggest that the chief 
mujtahid review the slave-girl case. Sayyid Muhammad resolutely refused to 
bow to the monarch's pressure. Later Mirza Muhammad `Ali Qa'imu'd-Din 
rejected the request of some of the king's wives to have their adopted 
children inherit, in contradiction of Shi`i law. Vajid `Ali at first got other 
mujtahids to reverse his decision. But the truth eventually came out, forcing 
Vajid `Ali to apologize.[55] 
The message of these anecdotes is that their attention to the imperatives of 
the law often divided the Muslim learned men from their notable patrons 
and friends. Yet a close observer can see that the Muslim learned men's 
fastidiousness constituted an alternative style of life within the Shi`i upper 
and middle strata, rather than demarcating a separate class. In matters of 
property, in attitudes toward non-Shi`is, in acceptance of the Awadh 
government 
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as the best that could be hoped for in the Occultation, the Shi`i clergy were 
at one with the high notables. 
Still, the division of status groups, as between the notables and the learned, 
which also tended to involve a class distinction between great tax-farmers or 
landholders and a less wealthy intermediate stratum, often produced friction 
and nuances in policy. Vajid `Ali Shah, though he resorted to the mujtahids 
in major legal issues, increasingly grew estranged from them. As was noted, 
he stopped government payment of the poor-tax, causing a substantial 
diminution in the wealth passing through their hands. He halved the Sayyid 
fund. He once again allowed the sale of opium, wine, and bhang, putting 
Ghulam Riza Khan, a notable, in charge of the excise department. In the 
1854-55 and 1855-56 school years he virtually stopped payments for the Shi`i 
seminary, threatening the salaries of thirty influential clerics and the stipends 
of hundreds of students. As the British report noted, it was unclear whether 
the king withheld payments for financial reasons or whether he intended to 
abolish the college.[56] 
Although the pendulum swung back in the 1850s away from increasing ulama 
influence at the Awadh court, the Usuli clerics held on to many of their posts, 
perquisites, and means of influencing Awadh society. The alliance of secular 
state and hierocracy produced in the 1840s a formal religious establishment 
tightly intertwined with the ruling elite, which came to form the judicial 
branch of the patrimonial-bureaucratic state. The clerics, owning only a 
handful of villages each or depending on stipends from notable patrons or 
government posts, maintained a distinct style of life appropriate to their 
status group, marking them off from the fabulously wealthy high Shi`i 
notables and the royal family. Yet the pious stories of stiff-necked mujtahids 
besting unscrupulous tyrants only masked the degree to which the ulama 
increasingly collaborated closely with the state in the 1840s, appropriating the 
sort of wealth that made some of them notables in their own right. The young 
Vajid `Ali Shah's attempts to undermine some of the mujtahids' power only 
underscores the extent to which they had come to form part of the ruling 
establishment, since most Awadh rulers upon coming to power moved 
against the mainstays of their predecessors' administrations. 
Conclusion 
The 1840s witnessed the peak of mujtahid power, marked by the creation of 
a whole range of new institutions and the accession of great wealth and 
political authority. In a patrimonial bureaucracy such as Awadh, however, 
this high-powered public role depended heavily on the goodwill of the central 
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officers of state, and so revealed itself to be volatile rather than stable. The 
1850s saw a rapid decline in the public influence of the Shi`i clergy, though 
some of their achievements of the previous decade continued a curtailed 
existence. 
The Awadh high ulama recognized the government as having a common law 
(‘urf) legitimacy, even though it was imperfect and so ultimately unjust (ja'ir), 
but they often had policy differences with the secular branch of the state. For 
some years, even these lessened. Because the Indian ulama lacked the mass 
base of those in Iran, they depended more on the Shi`i notables, seldom 
playing a real oppositional role. Moreover, even in Iran the clergy never 
received charitable monies directly from state treasuries. No outright 
statement by the jurisprudents in Lucknow of the complementarity of the 
secular and religious branches of government, like that produced by Qajar 
mujtahids Sayyid Ja`far Kashfi and Mulla `Ali Kani, has yet been 
discovered.[57] But in practice just such a complementarity emerged in 
northern India. 
Under Amjad `Ali Shah, Imami Shi`ism in Awadh came into its own as a 
formal religious establishment, with a salaried professional clergy, claims to 
universal dominion, systematic education in dogma and rites, and a 
compulsory organization. From the old charisma of Shi`i mystics and 
Sayyids, the Usuli ulama had evolved into a hierocracy where charisma was 
attributed to the office of the mujtahid or the Friday prayer leader, rather 
than being personal. The clergy of this formal religious establishment enjoyed 
special privileges bestowed by the government, and in the royal seminary had 
founded a regular hierocratic educational institution that also allowed them 
systematically to socialize secular officials to their values.[58] The key element 
in the transformation was the government provision of wealth for religious 
specialists, at first in the form of benefices or land grants, then stipends often 
deriving from interest on loans to the British or dividends of British 
Government securities. Access to material resources was essential for the 
growth of a formal religious establishment: 
The process of routinization of charisma is in very important respects 
identical with adaptation to the conditions of the economy, since this is the 
principal continually operating force in everyday life. Economic conditions 
in this connection play a leading role and do not constitute merely a 
dependent variable. To a very large extent the transition to hereditary 
charisma or the charisma of office serves as a means of legitimizing existing 
or recently acquired powers of control over economic goods.[59] 
The transformation of a sectarian collectivity into a formal religious 
establishment has been one of the main theoretical concerns of this book. 
The 
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modalities of this transformation among Awadh's Shi`is and some of the 
economic reasons for it have been discussed in detail. Another consistent 
question has been the effect of social stratification on religious organization. 
Social class, one variable in the analysis, cannot itself account for the 
difference between sect and formal establishment. The Shi`i notables serving 
under Awrangzib constituted part of a sectarian group despite their wealth. 
Only where a religious collectivity's form of religiosity is tolerated or 
promoted by the state, and where that collectivity itself feels comfortable 
with the state, can a formal religious establishment emerge. 
But given this precondition, sociocconomic class comes in as a secondary 
variable correlating with membership in a religious establishment. In the 
modern West, the "middle class and the middle aged are over-represented in 
established churches and denominations."[60] In Awadh, the intermediate 
propertied strata and the wealthy notables allied themselves within the 
structure of an Usuli dominant ideology. This formal religious establishment 
began to reach out to urban artisans, laborers, and the poor in the 1840s, as 
well, through its welfare-distribution activities and its power to determine 
who was orthodox enough to receive Shi`i religious charities. Still, sectarian 
movements such as those at Murshidabad, discussed in chapter 6, probably 
continued among the poorer Shi`is. 
The secular government and the religious establishment worked together, 
though the real power lay unquestionably with the monarchy. Nor did the 
government attempt to usurp religious authority in the creation of a 
caesaropapism once Nasiru'd-Din Haydar's policies in this regard met failure. 
The Usuli establishment paid for the privileges that the state bestowed upon 
it, by helping legitimate the Awadh government and upholding its authority. 
The religious institution building and Shi`i proclerical policies of the Awadh 
government in the 1840s demonstrated the extent to which the Usuli ulama 
had convinced the Shi`i notable class of the urgency of their own agenda. 
The Imami clerics in Lucknow, with their control over religious education 
and religious monies, and their publications in Persian and Urdu, had 
effectively indoctrinated both the Shi`i clerical families from the rural lineage 
centers and the administrative and tax-farming families in the cosmopolitan 
centers, creating an Usuli dominant ideology that bound together the Shi`i 
propertied classes. The scripturalization of the Shi`i urban poor also 
increased in this period, as ulama distribution of welfare money to the 
indigent gave them greater social control over the propertyless. They 
encouraged extensive adoption of Shi`ism by Hindus and Sunnis, especially 
among government employees and the urban poor. From the impressionistic 
accounts we have of this period, they succeeded best among urban Hindus, 
thousands of 
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whom forsook Ram and Krishna for Hasan and Husayn. Shi`i 
scripturalization and the implementation of aspects of Shi`i law in Awadh 
helped to establish a communal identity more clearly among Shi`is in relation 
to other religious communities, as will be discussed in chapter 9. 
Rulers such as Amjad `Ali Shah pursued communalist pro-Shi`i policies, 
despite the minority status of the state religion, as a means of symbolically 
demarcating the line between the ruling class and its subjects. The king's 
religion enjoyed special privileges because it was the king's religion. The 
Imami clergy were especially dependent upon the government because the 
proportion of Awadh's inhabitants subject to their own sanctions of 
excommunication and public cursing remained small. A minority sectarian 
movement among North India's Muslims had emerged with claims to being 
a state religion and a universal church solely because of its association with 
the Shi`i high notables that controlled the government. But the narrowness 
of that power base, and the fragility of that state in the face of growing 
European economic and political power, left Imami Shi`ism open to being 
swiftly reduced once more to the status of a small sect. 
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Shi`i, Sunni, Hindu:  
Communal Relations in Awadh 
 
 
Introduction 
Religious communalism and separatism have dogged the history of modern 
South Asia. Various schools of thought have sought to explain this 
phenomenon differently, but three elements appear generally important. The 
first—the increasing organization of religious communities for political 
action and competition for resources—began toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, helped by growing literacy and mass communications. 
Second, local community leaders mobilized their religious communities as a 
means of gaining power. The third is the role of the British, sometimes 
simplistically depicted as manipulating communal divisions so as to rule more 
easily. A more sophisticated approach sees post-1858 British attempts at an 
"even-handed" policy toward religious communities as exacerbating tensions 
by questioning the dominance of the Muslims and initiating shifts in the 
communities' relative power. 
This book looks at the period before the politicization of religious 
communities under the British. Yet some preindustrial processes occurred in 
Shi`i Awadh which laid the groundwork for greater religious communalism. 
The Usuli rationalization of government judicial policy emphasized religious 
affiliation as grounds for discrimination, and the Awadh government often 
pursued policies inimical to the interests of Hindus and Sunnis. Incipient 
Shi`i communalism benefited the Usuli ulama, who promoted it. The British 
residents in Awadh often intervened in Awadh's communal conflicts, 
sometimes out of less than altruistic motives, and it is important to discover 
their effect on communal relations.[1] 
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The large Hindu and Sunni communities in Awadh posed problems for the 
Shi`i ulama and, to a lesser extent, for the Shi`i state. Both secular and 
religious ruling institutions have an interest in speading their favored 
religion.[2] Yet despite that interest, Awadh's nawabs and mujtahids failed in 
promulgating Shi`ism as a mass religion. Moreover, the coexistence of vastly 
different mythologies in one culture, the surreal juxtaposition of Krishna's 
plain of battle, Kurukshetra, with Husayn's Karbala, demanded either a loose 
syncretism or a powerful delineation of community boundaries in order to 
avoid cognitive dissonance. The syncretic solution, often adopted in 
medieval India, clashed with the rationalizing tendencies of the growing Usuli 
hierocracy. 
Imamis and Hindus 
Shi`i clerics exhibited intolerance of Hinduism, although the Awadh 
government co-opted rural Hindu elites and employed Hindus in the 
bureaucracy. Indeed, Shuja`u'd-Dawlah's powerful eighteenth-century state 
owed as much to Hindu ascetic warriors as to the Shi`i Qizilbash cavalry, as 
Barnett has shown. Awadh's rulers never resolved the contradiction between 
ulama hostility to Hindus and relative state tolerance of them. As the Shi`i 
ulama began to influence state policy in the 1840s, however, their attitudes 
toward Hindus became important. Hindus constituted 87 percent of Awadh's 
population (which probably stood around ten million in the 1850s), and the 
mujtahids strove to keep Shi`i practices pure and scriptural in this infidel 
environment. They also wished to bring Hindus into the Shi`i fold, to offer 
them conversion or death. 
The Shi`i concern with Hinduism began at home, since Imami clerics had to 
define the limits of their community so as to exclude Hindus and their 
practices. In 1803 MawlavÏ Sami` posed this sort of problem for Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi, pointing out that most Muslims in India disregarded 
the laws of Islam. Some Shi`i laymen mourned the Imam Husayn in the 
Indian manner. He noted that many Hindus, including courtesans, spent 
great amounts of money and energy to observe the rites of Muharram. He 
wanted to know whether such groups were ritually pure, allowing association 
with 
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them. Nasirabadi replied that a born Muslim who could not be proved to 
reject any essential doctrines had to be judged a Muslim. But until one knew 
for sure that someone born an unbeliever had accepted all necessary beliefs, 
he had to be judged an infidel even though he mourned Imam Husayn.[3] 
Mawlavi Sami` criticized the behavior of Shi`i women, saying that most 
women and even some men, including some from the noble castes, 
associated with Hindus and followed their ways, believing in astrology and 
idol worship. Muslim women worshiped the goddess Kali Durga in secret 
when their children fell ill. Nasirabadi replied that a Muslim woman could 
only be considered an apostate after investigation had demonstrated her 
heresy conclusively. He further ruled that a Muslim with right views did not 
depart from Islam in merely adopting some Sufi or Hindu behavior, short of 
idol worship. On the other hand, a Hindu of illegitimate birth who converted 
to Shi`ism would be saved and considered legitimate because of his love for 
the Imams. Nasirabadi drew the lines so as to make it hard to exclude a Shi`i 
from the community, but possible though difficult to include a Hindu of 
even doubtful origins. His criteria for membership fell closer to the 
universality of a formal religious establishment than to the exclusivity of a 
sect.[4] 
The court eunuchs served as another interface between Hinduism and 
Shi`ism. The nawabs and their begams enslaved these boys, most often sons 
of Hindu Rajput warriors captured in battles with the central government, 
castrating them and bringing them up in their own households. Owing to the 
patrimonial nature of the Awadh state, the notables often entrusted their 
eunuchs with official duties, such as managing their owners' estates or even 
tax-farming entire provinces, transforming them into a mamluk (slave-ruler) 
substratum of the government. The slave eunuch officials accumulated vast 
properties that legally belonged to their masters, although they often could 
influence the disposition of their property, maintaining close ties to their 
Hindu relatives. When, for instance, a British subject pressed claims against 
the great tax-farmer Almas `Ali Khan, whom Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan 
owned, the ruler refused to intervene, on the grounds that if he put too much 
pressure on him the eunuch might transfer his property to Bahu Begam (the 
nawab's mother) in Faizabad, resulting in a serious loss to the nawab.[5] 
The Hindu origin of some important Shi`i notables led to anomalous 
inheritance situations. Babu Bacchu Singh, Hindu grand-nephew of Darab 
`Ali Khan, owned the mosque and imambarah of Javahir `Ali Khan in Faiza- 
 
 
  
― 226 ― 
bad, where Shi`is held holy day prayers.[6] The case of Tahsin `Ali's estate 
further attests the continuing ties between the eunuchs and their Hindu 
relatives: The supervisor of Asafu'd-Dawlab's old harem in Faizabad, he held 
a land grant (jagir) in addition to large amounts of movable property. In 1813 
he fell seriously ill and informed the British resident that he wished to dispose 
of his property in a will and without the interference of the nawab. The 
resident recognized that the nawab had the right to resume his land grant, 
but at first supported Tahsin `Ali's attempt to pass on his movable property 
to Hindu nephews. He only later realized that according to Islamic law non-
Muslims could not inherit from a Muslim. The nawab repossessed his slave's 
estate, though, under British pressure, he did give the Hindu nephews a 
stipend.[7] 
A second issue was the attitude of Shi`i clerics, government officials, and 
laypersons toward Hindus. The clerical attitude can be easily summarized. 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi harbored an almost violent animosity toward 
Hindus, arguing that the Awadh government should take stern measures 
against them. He divided unbelievers into three kinds, those (harbi) against 
whom Muslims must make war, those (dhimmi) who have accepted Muslim 
rule and pay a poll-tax, and those (musta'min) whom their Muslim rulers have 
temporarily granted security of life.[8] He insisted that Imami Shi`ism 
accepted only Jews and Christians as protected minorities (dhimmis), and even 
they could only achieve this status if they observed the ordinances governing 
it. He differed with Sunni schools that considered Hindus a protected 
minority. 
He wrote that Muslims could only grant infidels personal security (aman) in a 
country they ruled for one year, lamenting that the government had long 
treated as grantees of personal security the Hindus of northern India, who 
openly followed their idolatrous religion, drinking wine, and sometimes even 
mating with Sayyid women. He complained that the irreligious Sunni Mughal 
rulers of India neither made war against the Hindus nor forced them to 
accept Islam. Legally, nonetheless, the lives and property of Hindus could be 
licitly taken by Muslims. Nasirabadi shared this rather bloodthirsty attitude 
with other Muslim clerics, of course. The Sunni Naqshbandi thinker Shah 
Valiyu'llah (1703-62) wanted the Mughals to ban Hinduism.[9] 
The dependence of Muslim rule upon an alliance with Hindu landholders 
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rendered any such persecution of the majority community wholly 
impracticable. Short of that, the jurisprudents of the growing Usuli school 
attempted to throw up communalist barriers between Shi`is and Hindus. 
Sayyid Muhammad Quli Kinturi, who worked in the British court at Meerut, 
wrote a treatise aimed at convincing Shi`is to treat Hindus as ritually 
impure.[10] Imami ritual law differed from the Sunni in stressing the pollution 
of many objects and persons, including non-Muslims. Kinturi explained that 
Shi`is, many of them immigrants ignorant of their law, had fallen under the 
influence of more lax Sunni attitudes. Given that the most abased of Hindu 
guests would refuse to touch food or utensils in a Muslim home until they 
were ritually purified, he lamented, it ill beseemed Muslims with their 
millennium of wealth and rule to neglect to reciprocate this humiliating 
treatment. 
In the 1830s one of Sayyid Dildar `Ali's sons ruled that a believer should 
avoid praying while wearing a ring fashioned by a Hindu, for washing it with 
water could only expunge its outward impurity. Such ideas percolated 
through the community, the Hindu origins of many Muslims leading them to 
practice ritual pollution in any case. Parkes's Muslim servant who married a 
Hindu widow around 1830 insisted that she convert to Islam because 
otherwise eating with her would defile him.[11] 
The ulama did allow Shi`is to give food to Hindus. A Shi`i, citing the qur'anic 
sentiment that a full believer should help a hungry neighbor, inquired of 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali whether only Muslim neighbors were meant. Lucknow's 
chief mujtahid replied that apparently the verse meant only Muslims, 
although he ruled it permissible to share food with an infidel on the verge of 
starving to death. One of his sons allowed Shi`is to offer Hindu guests 
something to drink when they came for a visit during Muharram. Moreover, 
contact beneficial to Shi`i ulama was permitted. Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi 
(1796-1856), Sayyid Dildar `Ali youngest son and a major mujtahid, allowed 
Shi`is to take money for teaching infidel children Arabic and Persian.[12] 
Sunni schools did not share the Imami conception of the ritual impurity of 
non-Muslims, developed originally in eighth-century Iraq. Ironically, the 
promulgation of a stronger sense of purity among Awadh's Shi`is by the Usuli 
ulama helped integrate them more fully into one of the central ideologies of 
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the Indian social system.[13] For Hindus, ritual purity and the elaborate rules 
for social relations it implied helped underpin the caste system. Awadh's 
Shi`is became a sort of caste. Like Brahmins, they would give food to, 
although not accept food from, outgroups. Ritual purity was only one area in 
which the Imamis exhibited growing tendencies toward exclusivism and 
communalism under the impact of nawabi rule and the growth of a Shi`i 
hierocracy. 
On the other hand, Shi`is and the Shi`i government, although they often 
exploited Hindus, seldom violently persecuted them. Violence most often 
broke out between the two communities during the Shi`i mourning month 
of Muharram, as in Jaunpur in 1776 or Lucknow in 1807.[14] Some Awadh 
governments showed less tolerance of Hindus than others, those of Nasiru'd-
Din Haydar (1827-37) and Amjad `Ali Shah (1842-47) being the most anti-
Hindu. In 1829 the king forced a Brahmin boy to go through with 
circumcision even after his family changed their minds about having him 
convert to Shi`ism. He told the outraged resident that he had a divine right 
to dispose of his subjects as he wished. Ricketts angrily retorted that the 
British Government recognized no such right. When, three months later, 
Hindus provoked violence by defiling a mosque in Rikabganj, the king 
vindictively sent troops into the area, who plundered, ripped nose-rings off 
the faces of Hindu women, and destroyed all forty-seven Hindu temples in 
that quarter, putting to flight its entire population of three thousand. When 
rioting threatened to spread to other quarters, the British resident intervened 
with the king, who reluctantly sent criers through the city warning that he 
would punish anyone found molesting a Hindu or insulting his temples.[15] 
Most Awadh governments considered order more important than keeping 
Hindus in their places. When, in November 1840, some Hindus defiled a 
zamindar's mosque with pig's blood, his sons rounded up a crowd of angry 
Muslims to exact revenge. On 3; December, at the order of the heir apparent, 
Amjad `Ali Mirza, the chief of police took the ringleaders to Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, who ruled that the blasphemer should be 
apprehended and punished after conviction, but forbade vigilante action. The 
mob refused to listen to the mujtahid or the police chief. On 4 December 
two hundred Muslims killed cows, profaned temples, and damaged shops in 
Yahyaganj and ‘Ayshbagh. British administrator Colonel Sleeman saw such 
perils of com- 
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munal violence as an argument for the Indian need of British government, 
but he exaggerated their frequency and severity.[16] 
The last three Awadh rulers initiated programs that enhanced the prestige 
and the power of the Usuli ulama in north Indian society. Proclerical Shi`is 
remembered the twenty years before British annexation as a golden age. 
Sunni and Hindu writers, on the other hand, deplored the "sectarian narrow-
mindedness and crooked religious policy" of such clericalist rulers as Amjad 
`Ali Shah (1842-47).[17] As was seen in chapter 8, Amjad `Ali Shah enacted 
anti-Hindu policies, founding Shi`i shops to drive Hindu merchants out of 
business, and rewarding Hindu officials who adopted Imami Shi`ism. The 
provision of government welfare monies to only the Shi`i poor encouraged 
thousands of Hindus to convert to Shi`ism in the 1840s, according to clerical 
sources. Awadh's fiercely Usuli governments showed little understanding of 
their Hindu subjects, allowing communal resentments to fester, a policy that 
culminated in a major battle over a religious edifice in Faizabad, discussed 
later. 
Although the Shi`i ulama may have preached government violence against 
Hindus, they disapproved of mob action. The growth of a formal Shi`i 
establishment and its intermeshing with state institutions like the judiciary · 
made it possible at times for the mujtahids to enact highly discriminatory 
policies toward Hindus, whom they viewed as idolaters. The ulama practiced 
exclusionary closure by urging Shi`is to treat Hindus as ritually impure 
(reciprocating Hindu treatment of Muslims), making Shi`is almost a caste. 
They used jobs and welfare money to convert Hindu civil servants and urban 
poor. Since the Usulis had campaigned so hard against Sufism, few Shi`i pits 
existed to mediate among Hindu and Shi`i disciples, and the ulama strove 
mightily to stop Shi`is from patronizing Hindu holy men. The Usuli 
destruction of mediating groups between Muslims and Hindus aided the 
growth of communalism, of religion-based group identities hostile to one 
another. 
Shi`i-Sunni Relations in Awadh 
The attitude of both the state and the mujtahids to Sunnis differed starkly 
from their views of Hindus. The Awadh government depended on Sunni 
troops ever more heavily in the nineteenth century, and Sunnis dominated 
the middle and lower echelons of many government departments. The Usuli 
ulama advocated a Shi`i-Sunni alliance against Hindus and recognized the 
ritual purity of those Sunnis who loved the family of the Prophet (the major- 
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ity in Awadh). Still, some Sunni leaders resented Shi`i dominance, refusing 
the profferred alliance. Tensions between social classes, and the differential 
impact of Nishapuri rule. in various parts of Awadh, as well as that of the 
British in neighboring areas, also helped encourage resentments among some 
Sunni groups. The triumphalist Usuli insistence on cursing the first caliphs 
angered many Sunnis and engendered recurring communal riots. 
North Indian Muslims showed widespread interest in Imami Shi`ism during 
the eighteenth century. The spread of Shi`ism coincided with a relative 
decline in the fortunes of the Sunni central Asian and Indian propertied 
classes centered in Delhi and tied to the fragmenting Mughal Empire. 
Although some Shi`is suffered as well, they could often more freely practice 
their religion under the Europeans than under the Sunni Mughals. Shi`i 
Sayyids, Iranians, and Indian notables on the ascendant in Awadh, allied 
themselves with the British. In fading Delhi, Sufi leader Shah `Abdu'l-‘Aziz, 
who had Shi`i in-laws, complained that in most households one or two 
members had adopted Imam Shi`ism.[18] Sayyid Dildar `Ali's Shi`i Sufi 
nemesis, Mawlavi Sami`, said that during his time in India he had noticed 
great Sunni families gradually adopting Shi`i ways, first in their prayers, then 
in marriage ceremonies, burials, and the division of inheritance (some finding 
Shi`i law in the last regard more convenient). Mawlavi Sami` suggested that 
Indian Shi`i clerics, often influenced by their Sunni background, could not 
be trusted.[19] Still, Shi`is obviously remained a small minority. 
Since the Naqshbandi Sufi order maintained close ties with the Turkish and 
Afghan notables on the wane, its leaders fulminated most loudly against 
changing social configurations in the eighteenth century, including the rise of 
the Shi`is. The partisans of ` Ali in Awadh responded vigorously to the attacks 
issuing from Delhi.[20] The substance of the polemics, centering on the 
interpretation of early Islamic history and ritual through a biased and 
uncritical, traditional scholarly apparatus, holds less significance than the 
social tensions underlying the debate. In these works the Sunni high culture 
of faltering Delhi squared off against the Shi`i ambience of vigorous 
Lucknow, and the Naqshbandi, central Asian tradition of strict Sunni Sufism 
grappled with the flourishing Usuli school of Iranian and Iraqi provenance. 
Sunni notables of Delhi watched the decline of the Mughal Empire, as first 
the Hindu Marathas and then the British East India Company reduced the 
Mughal 
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emperor to a figurehead. Crisis-stricken Sunny ulama asked with anguish if 
the Deity had visited these calamities upon them as punishment for lapses in 
the way Sunnis practiced Islam. 
Within Awadh itself, disputes over the relative virtues (or vices) of Sunni 
Caliphs Abu Bakr or ‘Umar may have reflected the competition for wealth 
and power between Sunni Shaykh landholders, claiming descent from the 
first three caliphs, and Shi`i Sayyids who vaunted their ancestry in the line of 
Imam `Ali. The writing of Shi`i polemics and apologetics became a major 
industry in Awadh, many scholars receiving patronage from rulers and 
notables for defending the faith. Both Usulis and Akhbaris united in this 
enterprise. The Akhbari notable Subhan `Ali Khan, a deputy chief minister, 
wrote against Sunnism, sharing his works with the Usuli mujtahids and 
warning against Sunni attempts to play on Shi`i divisions. Subhan `Ali Khan 
and his cousin Husayn `Ali held that since Abu Bakr and ‘Umar had not 
directly fought against Imam `Ali, they had not fallen into unbelief (kufr), 
although the mujtahid Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi said that even those who 
did not outwardly battle Imam `Ali could in an esoteric sense be unbelievers. 
The more ecumenical Akhbari stance offended Awadh's own Sunnis less, 
whereas Sayyid Husayn's position typified Usuli communalism. Sayyid Dildar 
`Ali and his student Kinturi both defended the practice of publicly cursing 
the first caliphs.[21] 
Although Sunnis predominated among Awadh Muslims, the anti-Shi`i 
Naqshbandi order had little strength there, and many Sunnis living under the 
nawabs proclaimed their belief in Imam `Ali's superiority (tafdil) over the 
other claimants to the caliphate while not disputing the legitimacy of the three 
leaders who preceded `Ali in the office. Farangi-Mahallis such as `Abdu'l-
Acla, son of Bahru'l-‘Ulum, excoriated `Ali's enemy, Mucawiyah. Mawlavi 
Mubin Farangi-Mahalli (d. 1810), who served Asafu'd-Dawlah briefly as 
judge of the criminal court in the capital, wrote an elegy (Shahadatnamah) for 
the Imam Husayn, and also supported `Ali's superiority.[22] 
Shi`is often extended more tolerance to Sunnis than to Hindus. The 
Nasirabadis lived near the Sunni seminary, the Farangi Mahall, where most 
Shi`i scholars studied to master the rational sciences. Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
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argued that in Awadh Sunnis should be legally treated as Muslims and as 
equals of the Shi`is, even though non-Shi`is would burn in hell in the next 
world. Although he stigmatized Mughal emperors as despotic pharaohs, he 
called for an acceptance of all Muslims in Awadh as equals under the law. He 
proposed an analogy for this situation, citing the early Muslim community in 
Medina, where the Prophet made no distinction between sincere believers 
and the hypocrites in their legal treatment. Later in his book on land property 
laws he made a distinction between Sunnis (mukhalifun) who recognized other 
caliphs besides `Ali but did not oppose the rights of the Prophet's family, and 
Sunni enemies (nawasib) of the Imams. He extended legal status as Muslims 
during the Occultation to the first category, but held that both kinds of Sunni 
erred spiritually.[23] 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali held as ritually pure those Sunnis who bore no enmity 
toward the Prophet's family, although he urged Shi`is where possible to 
patronize Shi`i artisans. The clerics forbade Shi`i men to marry Sunni women 
who expressed enmity toward the Imams, and they had reservations about 
intermarriage with even ritually pure Sunnis. The Lucknow mujtahids held 
that although a Shi`i man could marry a Jewish, Christian, or Sunni' bride, no 
Shi`i woman could marry outside her faith. Only if a mujtahid allowed such 
a marriage could it have any legal status. Sayyid Dildar `Ali ruled, however, 
that a Sunni bride who later adopted Shi`ism did not have to divorce her 
husband. The Usulis were not as adamant as fierce Sunnis like Shah `Abdu'l-
‘Aziz, who, ruled that since by Hanafi law Shi`is were apostates, a Hanafi 
man should never marry a Shi`i woman. He held that such alliances would 
introduce bad religious ideas into the family. Despite strict communalist 
attitudes among the ulama, Sunni-Shi`i marriages remained common.[24] 
Many Sunnis served in the Awadh bureaucracy, and sometimes scored real 
victories there. In 1815 Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar dismissed his chief minister, 
Agha Mir Muctamadu'd-Dawlah, giving charge of public affairs to the 
proclerical Mirza Hajji, the eunuch Afarin `Ali Khan and the latter's agent 
Mir Khudabakhsh.[25] Ardistani wrote that Mir Khudabakhsh went to 
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excess in cursing the Sunni caliphs, ordering their names carved into rocks at 
the foot of urinals. He promoted Shi`is in the military, and forced many 
Sunnis to adopt Shi`ism. In the meantime Agha Mir used his contacts near 
the nawab, Sunni secretaries upset at Mir Khudabakhsh's hard line on cursing 
the caliphs, who constantly maligned Mir Khudabakhsh and praised Agha 
Mir. Sunnis within the Awadh bureaucracy who had access to the nawab 
formed an alliance with the out-of-power former chief minister to ease out a 
group inimical to Sunni interests.[26] 
Perhaps one of the means employed by Sunni civil servants to combat Mir 
Khudabakhsh and his masters was to publicize their embezzlement of state 
funds. A little less than two years after he had been fired, Agha Mir came 
back to court as chief minister. The nawab dismissed the clique formerly in 
power, holding them responsible for considerable defalcations in revenue.[27] 
This incident proves, not the especial corruption of the troika in power in 
1815-17, but that it alienated an important and powerful group within the 
Awadh bureaucracy, the Sunnis. 
The traditional Akhbari willingness to compromise with Sunnis gave way 
before Usuli militancy. An important contradiction underlay Usuli policy 
toward Sunnis, in that the mujtahids condemned Sunni doctrines but aimed 
for harmonious relations with Sunnis. In one breath they consigned Sunnis 
to hell and denied them permission to marry their daughters, and yet 
proposed a practical alliance of Shi`i and Sunni elites. The political 
requirements of running a Mughal-derived successor state made acceptance 
of Sunnis within the polity a necessity. Yet Shi`i insistence on cursing the 
Sunni caliphs and disparaging Sunni beliefs guaranteed that the alliance 
would be riven with conflict. 
Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi and Growing Sunni Militancy 
The practice of exclusionary closure by the Usuli elite in Awadh put in Shi`i 
hands a great amount of the country's wealth and power. Along with the 
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prebendal-feudal class structure wherein tax-farmers and rajas expropriated 
the surplus produced by Hindu peasants and Sunni artisans, a religious 
stratification emerged that favored Shi`is over other religious communities. 
The Shi`i rich were the wealthiest in the land, while the Shi`i poor gained 
access to government-supplied alms denied to Sunnis and Hindus. A few 
Sunnis reacted with counterclaims to power and wealth, in effect practicing 
a kind of social closure that Parkin has termed "usurpation," which aims at 
"biting into the resources and benefits accruing to dominant groups in 
society."[28] 
The Naqshbandi revivalist movement headed by Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareli 
from 1817 to 1831 illustrates the greater impact during those years of Delhi-
style Sunni communalism on Awadh, and offers a prime example of 
usurpationary closure. Although the movement had more impact on 
Peshawar than on Awadh, some comments about it are in order here. Sayyid 
Ahmad, born in 1786, came of a family in the Awadh town of Rai Bareli with 
a history of seeking outside military careers and of serving locally as Sufi 
pits.[29] The family's Sufi disciples often included Afghans from other nearby 
towns. In the eighteenth century, Afghan soldiers and settlers came into 
Awadh, bringing with them anti-Shi`i sentiments from their homeland. In 
early-nineteenth-century Peshawar the persecuted Shi`is dared not admit 
their faith, and the fierce Sunni majority forbade them to take out processions 
with cenotaphs to honor the Imam Husayn.[30] Afghan military gentry 
colonizing Awadh integrated themselves into the local culture and formed 
alliances with settled old Muslim families by joining local Sufi orders. 
From the eighteenth century the central Asian Naqshbandi order began to 
establish itself among some Sayyids in the Rai Bareli district, at the same time 
as other Sayyids adopted Shi`ism.[31] Naqshbandi Sufism was at the nexus of 
relations between declining Sunni elites in the qasabahs and newly arrived 
Afghans, and the exclusivist Sunnism the latter brought with them from 
central Asia may have influenced their Naqshbandi pirs in Awadh. In North 
India, where Shi`i anti Hindu usages much affected local Muslims, the 
breezes blowing from beyond the Khyber looked like a kind of reformism. 
Although Rai Bareli lay in the fertile, wealthy Baiswara area, the Sunni Muslim 
service gentry based in certain of the district's small towns demon- 
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strably suffered financial decline in the opening decades of the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, many service qasabahs in North India suffered the same 
fate.[32] In the 1830s Butter found Rai Bareli to be a decayed town of only 
8,000 inhabitants, with only 500 to 600 Muslims. He said the population of 
this formerly booming textile center had declined sharply from 50,000 since 
the turn of the century. He saw some new Hindu temples, indicating some 
wealth in that community, but no new mosques. Part of the town's rapid 
decline derived from the excessive demands made by big tax-farmers 
(chakladars) appointed from Lucknow, whose expropriations forced Mahajan 
capitalists to leave the place. Large landholders in the area also made the 
waterways accessible to Rai Bareli unusable for commerce because of the 
high imposts they charged boats for passing through their territories.[33] 
Politically, as well, the area's Sunni small landholders had suffered. 
Opportunities for military and bureaucratic service outside the area declined 
quickly as the East India Company gobbled up North India. In Baiswara the 
Hindu raja of Tiloi paid unusually low taxes to Lucknow and maintained a 
good deal of local autonomy as the central government grew weaker. Shi`i 
Sayyids in qasabahs such as Nasirabad, from whose ranks Sayyid Dildar `Ali 
had emerged, profited most. Three-fourths of Nasirabad's Sayyids adopted 
Shi`ism in the eighteenth century, being rewarded by special land grants from 
Nawab Asafu'd-Dawlah.[34] 
Sayyid Ahmad, his family in Rai Bareli rendered indigent by the town's 
decline, left it with some other adolescent companions to seek menial jobs in 
Lucknow as bearers or hat-seamsters, finally finding work with a notable. 
Perhaps finding such work demeaning, Sayyid Ahmad left for Delhi, where 
he employed his family's network of Sufi contacts to become a student of 
Shah `Abdu'i-‘Aziz's, the Naqshbandi leader. In 1812 he enlisted in the 
mercenary army of Nawab Amir Khan, who fought the British on behalf of 
the Marathas in central India until 1817, when Sayyid Ahmad found himself 
once again without gainful employment.[35] 
During the period 1817-21 Sayyid Ahmad traveled about North India as a 
Sufi pir, organizing on a grass-roots level. Like others in the Mujaddidi 
Naqshbandi line founded by Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi in the seventeenth 
century, Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi attacked the doctrine of existential 
monism (wahdat al-wujud) and the practice of listening to music, and also 
attempted to 
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expunge from his Sunni followers what he saw as Shi`i and Hindu accretions. 
He called it an error to prefer `Ali to the other caliphs, or to honor Imam 
Husayn more than the earlier companions of the Prophet. Finally, he 
attacked the practice of making replicas of the Imam Husayn's standard and 
tomb, which he placed in the same category as constructing idols. As for 
Hindu usages, he promoted the remarriage of widows and forbade ancestor 
worship. His movement came to have a social content, since he considered 
all traditional illicit cesses and imposts on petty traders, peasants, and artisans 
as anti-Islamic.[36] 
Although he succeeded in attracting as his disciples some younger members 
of the Shah Valiyu.llah family in Delhi, Sayyid Ahmad never emerged as a 
mass leader in Awadh, despite his personal popularity among some Sunni 
groups. The Sunni zamindars around Salon repulsed his missionaries, 
reaffirming their commitment to Muharram processions with cenotaphs for 
the Imam Husayn. The Sufi pit of Salon likewise rejected his overtures, and 
Butter found Awadh's Muslims less attracted to him than those of 
Rohilkhand to the north or Bengal in the southeast.[37] 
Sayyid Ahmad's activities in the upper Doab were traced by one of Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali's students, Musharraf `Ali Khan.[38] He said Sayyid Ahmad had 
the cenotaphs of his Sufi followers in Saharanpur burned. The Shi`is in the 
area vigorously protested, and the British therefore expelled him. He went 
then to Meerut, but the British judge there had already heard about him and 
also ordered him out. (It may be that Sayyid Muhammad Quli Kinturi, a Shi`i 
court official in Meerut, helped to have him expelled.) He next went to the 
princely state of Rampur, but the Sunni ulama there objected to his teachings, 
and the nawab, then a Sunni, asked him to leave. He had a similarly brief stay 
in Bareilly. He then returned to his hometown in Awadh, having failed to 
find a secure base in British India or to attract the patronage of a Muslim 
ruler. 
In October (Muharram) of 1819 violence very nearly broke out in the district 
of Rai Bareli between Naqshbandi revivalists and Shi`is. The dominant Shi`i 
Sayyids of Nasirabad informed their Sunni cousins, who held only one of the 
town's four neighborhoods, that they intended to pronounce imprecations 
openly on the caliphs in the Sunni quarter. The Sunnis sent to Sayyid Ahmad 
in Rai Bareli for help, and he replied, promising he would arrive on the 
evening of the eighth of Muharram when the cursing would take place. He 
gathered a band of Sunnis from Rai Bareli and Afghans from Jahanabad, 
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who had been Sufi disciples of his family for generations, and set off for 
Nasirabad with two hundred men. 
The perplexed Shi`is sent to Lucknow for help from Chief Mujtahid Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali. Meanwhile, a district reporter got news of the disturbance even 
more quickly to the Awadh ruler, Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar, who turned it over 
to his chief minister, Muctamadu'd-Dawlah. The chief minister, aware that 
Nasirabad lay in the jagir of his political rival Badshah Be-gam, wished to 
prolong the disturbance so that he could convince the British resident to let 
him take over the territory and put it in order. He therefore dispatched 
Awadh troops to the scene of the trouble led by Sunni commanders with 
sympathies toward Sayyid Ahmad, and ordered Sayyid Dildar `Ali not to 
interfere. The nawab's troops arrived in Nasirabad and forced the Shi`is to 
pledge not to curse the caliphs openly, which Sayyid Ahmad's forces 
interpreted as a victory.[39] 
Thereafter, as a peace offering, the chief minister invited Sayyid Ahmad to 
Lucknow, where he associated with notables and gave sermons for several 
weeks. Usuli students of Sayyid Dildar `Ali's and Sunni Farangi-Mahallis' 
opposed him. A popular figure, he nevertheless had little success in spreading 
his teachings among the masses. Pathans in the Awadh army applauded his 
militancy, forcing the Shi`i government to deal with him gently. His advisers 
kept him from attacking Shi`ism while in Lucknow, fearing violence. He did, 
however, praise the Sunni caliphs.[40] After further organizing in Bengal, 
Sayyid Ahmad and seven hundred followers set out on pilgrimage to Mecca 
in 1821, to stress their orthodoxy. There he may have encountered the strict 
reformist ideas of the Arabian followers of Ibn `Abdu'l-Wahhab, but he had 
already drawn the main lines of his reformist Sufi doctrine (which owed 
more, I have argued, to the confluence of Peshawar and Rai Bareli than to 
Najd). 
They returned to Awadh, but in 1826 set out on a holy war against the Sikhs. 
Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar reported this development to the British resident, 
who wrote to Calcutta: 
His majesty the King of Oude has been in some alarm from an individual by 
the name of Syyed Ahmed, a Sectary of the Soonnee Persuasion, having 
seduced a great many soldiers & etc. from his Service;—and his Majesty 
informing me that he is a very dangerously factious person, and is about to 
leave Oude with many followers, and may with them join the enemies of the 
Government.[41] 
The Awadh ruler said he did not arrest Sayyid Ahmad, out of fear that his 
 
  
 
― 238 ― 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
― 239 ― 
soldiers might either disobey or convert to his cause. He therefore allowed 
him to leave Awadh quietly, but informed the British government. Sayyid 
Ahmad's subsequent career in Peshawar, Punjab, and Kashmir falls beyond 
our purview. After five years of fighting the Sikhs and attempting to organize 
the suspicious Pukhtuns to their north, he and four hundred fighters were 
massacred in May 1831 in Kashmir by an army led by Ranjit Singh's son and 
aided by Hindu zamindars fearful of Sayyid Ahmad's recruitment of 3,000 
Muslim peasants to his revolt in the area.[42] 
Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi's Naqshbandi "Muhammadiyyah" movement 
represented a religious and social protest against the decline of Sunni political 
power, the downward mobility of the Sunni intermediate strata, the 
deterioration of Sunni towns, and the subjugation of Sunni peasants by the 
British and by Hindu and Sikh rajas. Although an urban man, he threw his 
lot in with Muslim tribesmen and peasants threatened with Sikh domination, 
becoming a social bandit and adopting messianic rhetoric.[43] He made the 
Punjab a staging area for a future move against the British and Shi`i Awadh. 
Afghan landholders, settled near Delhi, who chafed under British rule and 
resented Sikh advances, supported him financially. 
Although the movement's protests against un-Islamic taxes on tradespeople 
and its anti-imperialist fervor or lent it a progressive aura, Sayyid Ahmad's 
statelet in the Peshawar region simply continued in a novel fashion 
patrimonial and prebendal-feudal forms of government.[44] His Naqshbandi 
state would have oppressed the vast Hindu majority in North India. Despite 
the genuine discontents to which it appealed, Rai-Barelavi's revivalism had 
too narrow a base to succeed, and he attracted only a small number of 
fighters. This lower-middle-class Sunni attempt at usurpationary closure 
against Shi`i Awadh failed. The limited effect of the movement on North 
India has been overblown by later writers, who have paid little attention to 
its social, economic, and cultural context. Still, Naqshbandi communalism 
emanating both from Delhi and from Rai-Barelavi's scattered initiates 
constituted a challenge to Awadh Shi`is. 
Sunni-Shi`i Issues in Awadh, 1827-1847 
Outbreaks of violence between Shi`is and Sunnis in nineteenth-century 
Awadh depended partially on policy decisions by ruling and religious elites. 
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The mujtahids became even more insistent on public cursing of the caliphs, 
one cause of violence, after the 1819 creation of an independent Shi`i state. 
Since many Sunnis revered the Prophet's family and marched at Muharram, 
only cursing the caliphs established a Shi`i identity decisively. Requiring such 
imprecations became a means of social closure. A second cause of disputes, 
government policy, played an even more central role. Where the government 
actively persecuted Sunnis with military force, violent incidents increased. 
Where the government planned Muharram procession routes so as to avoid 
conflict and used troops to prevent it, the violence decreased. 
The third factor, increasing Sunni militance on some issues, involved a 
stronger Sunni reply to perceived Shi`i insults. Finally, the British resident 
influenced episodes of communal violence, and British motives will be 
explored below. Greater Shi`i and Sunni militancy contributed in the 1820s 
to escalating violence among Awadh's religious communities. Mrs. Ali wrote 
that at Muharram every large city in India witnessed serious quarrels, often 
ending in bloodshed. While many Sunnis joined in Muharram ceremonies, 
some increasingly denounced the rites, the likely meaning of Mrs. Ali's cryptic 
remark that "the Soonees are violently opposed to the celebration" of 
Muharram.[45] This sentiment might have resulted from Naqshbandi 
propaganda, but may also have simply reflected a natural Sunni reaction to 
Shi`i dominance. 
The frequent urban disturbances of the late 1820s coincided with an 
economic downturn in North India, and Awadh's rulers took a hard Shi`i 
line, having little interest in mollifying Sunnis and Hindus. Even Farangi-
Mahall scholars, who generally maintained proper relations with the 
government, experienced strains, and one Mawlana Haydar in 1824 had to 
leave Awadh after a dispute with the king about religion.[46] In the 1820s Chief 
Minister Agha Mir allowed ritual cursing by Shi`is in the bazaars during 
Muharram. Shi`is often accosted Hindus, and people feared to come and go 
in the markets. When men came to blows, the Shi`i chief of police arrested 
Hindus and Sunnis rather than Shi`is.[47] In 1827 Nasiru'd-Din Haydar, an 
even more extremist Shi`i, acceded to the throne. 
In 1828 Muharram fell in torrid July. The monarch issued a warning 
"ordering those who could not passively hear the execrations against the 
Califs, always vented at this season, either to quit the City, or strictly confine 
themselves to their own homes."[48] On the tenth of Muharram a fight broke 
out at the Karbala of Makarimnagar, where both Sunnis and Shi`is went to 
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bury their cenotaphs. A group of Mewatis, low-caste converts to Sunni Islam 
from a Hindu Meo background, had a grudge with Shi`is whom they met at 
the Karbala. A Mewati killed a Shi`i with a pistol shot, and Shi`is in turn cut 
him down. Mewatis, many of them soldiers and so well armed, gathered at 
the Karbala in great numbers, as did the Shi`is. The ensuing battle left six 
killed and nine wounded.[49] 
Nasiru'd-Din Haydar, furious, ordered government troops to the quarter of 
the Mewatis, who, meanwhile, had fled for British territory. The king 
commanded Daroghah Muzaffar `Ali Khan to bring up artillery and plunder 
and destroy their dwellings. Mir Fazl `Ali, his chief minister, vainly opposed 
this course of action as invidious, but Nasiru'd-Din Haydar listened to 
Muzaffar `Ali Khan's extremist views. The army indulged in an orgy of 
looting, razing four hundred structures while white clouds of smoke billowed 
above the city. The resident feared that Sunnis might rise against the minority 
government and that the displaced Mewatis would turn to banditry in British 
territory. He intervened with the king, who defended his actions, saying the 
Mewatis had committed aggression. Gradually the violence ceased. The 
resident observed that thinking Shi`is condemned the king's policy, and that 
"all other sects have a feeling of fear for what may in future be their own 
fate."[50] 
Muharram that year lasted for a full forty days by royal decree, as a result of 
a vow Nasiru'd-Din Haydar said he once took when ill. The resident 
pressured the king not to carry through this measure, a hardship to Sunnis 
and Hindus who had to postpone marriages and suffered business losses. He 
proved intransigent, and Ricketts determined to dissuade the king from 
enforcing the longer mourning period the next year. The governor-general 
agreed that the resident was right to intervene in the Mewati affair, expressing 
concern about the bloodshed in both Lucknow and Faizabad.[51] In July 1829 
Muharram passed without major incident, but Nasiru'd-Din Haydar once 
again extended the official mourning period to forty days. Muzaffar `Ali 
Khan convinced the king that he had to defy the resident in order to prove 
himself an independent sovereign. But pressure from the British (worried 
that religious violence might involve their troops) and from level-headed 
members of his own government caused Nasiru'd-Din Haydar to moderate 
his hard line on Muharram cursing. 
Although the king often quarreled with Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, on 
this issue they agreed. He asked Sayyid Muhammad whether it was 
permissible to curse the first three caliphs openly during Muharram, in view 
of 
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the public disturbances it caused. Nasirabadi replied that Shi`is could not 
practice pious dissimulation in a Shi`i-ruled state (darash-Shi`ah). The Shi`i 
ruler should address any public disturbances by suppressing them rather than 
by forsaking the ritual prescribed by the faith. He added that in early Islamic 
times their enemies cursed the Imams and no one went out of his way to 
stop them.[52] Sayyid Muhammad's recognition of Awadh as a Realm of the 
Shi`ah contrasts starkly with his father's view of it as a province of the Sunni 
Mughal Empire. 
Colonel Sleeman, later British resident in Awadh, said that Sayyid 
Muhammad held cursing the caliphs to be as necessary a ritual obligation for 
Shi`is as sounding the call to prayer or slaughtering the cows of Hindus. He 
wrote that although Shi`is in British-ruled territory said their curses privately 
and in whispers for fear of the civil government, in Awadh they uttered them 
aloud at the encouragement of the Shi`i rulers. Still, Nasirabadi disapproved 
of meetings held by notable Shi`is who read obscenities and racy satirical 
verses about the Sunni Caliph ‘Umar, drawing a distinction between ritual 
curses and obscenities.[53] 
Some local Sunnis began to reciprocate the hard line of the Shi`i secular and 
religious leaders in the 1830s. In 1833 Mirza Ahmad Faruqi, a Sunni scholar 
from Delhi settled in Lucknow, retold the Karbala tragedy in his sermon after 
Friday prayers. The sermon, written down and passed about, reached 
Naqshbandi leader Rashidu'd-Din Dihlavi in Delhi, who wrote Faruqi a letter 
asserting that the martyrdom of Husayn was not established for Sunnis. On 
hearing of this, Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi asked the Sunni scholars in 
Lucknow for a ruling on the issue, to which Mufti Zuhuru'llah Farangi-
Mahalli, daroghah of the religious court, replied with a ruling that Husayn's 
martyrdom was in doubt.[54] 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi penned a long response, noting that in Awadh 
close contact with Shi`is had caused Sunnis to pay more than their former 
respect to the family of the Prophet. He criticized Sunnis who ruled it 
impermissble to call Husayn a martyr, who held the Umayyad Yazid to be a 
rightful caliph, and who said that relating the events of Karbala in sermons 
showed disrespect to some of the companions of the Prophet. In this period, 
some Sunnis also began praising the very figures the Shi`is cursed. Mawlavi 
Turab `Ali Lakhnavi (1798-1864), who taught rational sciences to a 
generation of Sunni and Shi`i scholars, wrote a treatise on the virtues of the 
third 
 
 
  
― 243 ― 
Sunni caliph, ‘Uthman.[55] On the other hand, some Sunni figures defended 
mourning the Imam Husayn. `Abdu'l-Vajid of Farangi Mahall wrote a book 
in which he justified Muharram practices for Sunnis. Gharib Shah 
Shahjahanpuri, a Sufi leader and zamindar with Shi`i leanings, encouraged his 
disciples to construct tombs for the Imam even when other Pathans 
abandoned the practice.[56] 
The increasing communal barriers between Sunnis and Shi`is can be seen in 
a dispute that broke out when a Sunni government secretary joined 
congregational prayers at a Shi`i mosque. A Shi`i cleric objected, and the 
Sunni delivered a note to his house, full of abuse. The cleric asked Sayyid 
Muhammad `Abbas Shushtari to reply. Shushtari wrote that Sunni did not 
accept the absolute caliphate of `Ali, which the Shi`i call to prayer proclaims, 
and that a Sunni could only pray hypocritically at a Shi`i mosque. Moreover, 
he said, a Shi`i mosque might be defiled if a non-Shi`i entered it.[57] 
Amjad `Ali Shah (r. 1842-47), a blatant communalist, cut off the stipends of 
many Sunnis and Hindus, employing Shi`is as the heads of every government 
office. Because he thought Sunnis and Hindus ritually impure, he forbade 
them to write the names of God, the Prophet, his daughter Fatimah, or the 
Twelve Imams on official letters, and hired Shi`i secretaries to write the holy 
names. The heir apparent, Vajid `Ali, at one point forced several reluctant 
Sunni secretaries (munshis) to embrace Shi`ism.[58] 
The Awadh government, in the wake of its 1819 declaration of 
independence, vaunted its Shi`ism and placed Sunnis under disabilities (such 
as having to listen to Shi`i curses on their beloved caliphs). This policy. 
promoted by the Usuli ulama. provoked several violent incidents in the 1820s 
and 1830s, alarming the British residents. The British intervened to ensure 
order, largely out of pragmatic motives. They feared that the minority Shi`i 
government might be pulled down and replaced by a more radical Sunni or 
Hindu state less complaisant toward the British. They also saw the possibility 
that persecuted Sunnis like the Mewatis would flee to British territories and 
form bandit gangs. 
After 1837 the Awadh government, threatened with annexation by the 
British, sought to prevent Sunni-Shi`i violence. In the 1840s Shi`is expressed 
their triumphalism through the bestowal of more wealth, jobs, and patronage 
on Shi`is than on Sunnis, and the exclusion of Sunnis from lucrative positions 
(including the office of chief minister). Security measures in the cities pre- 
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vented such invidious policies from resulting in riots, but they evoked Sunni 
resentment. visible in the major communal conflict of the 1850s, over a 
Hindu temple near Faizabad. Awadh's stridently pro-Shi`i policies also 
provided the British, ever looking for evidence of Indian rulers' unsuitedness 
to rule, with an image of the oriental despot arbitrarily oppressing his people. 
The Faizabad Temple Dispute and the Shi`i Ulama 
Any exploration of communal relations in Awadh must consider the conflict 
over a Hindu temple, which some Sunni Muslims claimed as the former site 
of a mosque, and which nearly exploded into civil war in 1855. The Shi`i 
government and the mujtahids had to take a stance on the dispute, so that all 
three of Awadh's major religious communities became involved. Moreover, 
the British intervened forcefully, providing insights into their role in Awadh's 
communal relations in the 1850s. Did they by their intervention unwittingly 
exacerbate communal tensions? Or did they prevent a major Sunni-Hindu 
conflagration? 
The 1855 dispute began when a Sunni zealot named Shah Ghulam Husayn 
started a campaign against the Hindu temple establishment in Faizabad 
dedicated to the Ramayana's monkey-god, Hanuman. The Muslim crusaders 
claimed that the site had originally supported a mosque subsequently 
supplanted by the Hanumangarhi. Shah Ghulam Husayn's followers clashed 
in July 1855 with thousands of Hindus, ending in a massacre of the zealots 
in a mosque at Ayodhya, a suburb of Faizabad. The news of, this military 
defeat inflicted on Muslims by Hindu holy men and their supporters (among 
them large landholders and their peasants from the Hindu countryside) 
inflamed Sunni and Shi`i passions throughout North India. Sayyid `Ali 
Deoghatavi, Faizabad's Imami prayer leader, visited the mosque during the 
investigations ordered by the government. The issue split the Shi`i 
population between those very religiously committed and the secular 
officials; Faizabad Shi`i administrators like Mirza Acla `Ali took measures 
against Sunni mobs to keep the peace.[59] 
Vajid `Ali Shah enjoyed Hindu festivals and plays about Krishna, but as an 
Usuli he believed in Shi`i rule and superiority. Furious about the killing of 
Muslims by Hindus at the mosque, he nevertheless wanted Sunni ringleaders 
apprehended as troublemakers. His officials in Faizabad sought to defuse the 
situation. The governor of Sultanpur and Faizabad, Agha `Ali Khan, 
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attempted to pacify the Muslims under his jurisdiction, while the Hindu Raja 
Man Singh controlled Hindus.[60] 
The governor's conciliatory approach provoked resentment in Lucknow 
among Muslim militants, including Chief Mujtahid Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi. On 24 August 1855 he conducted Holy Day prayers at the Great 
Imambarah in the presence of the heir apparent, the chief minister, and 
multitudes of notables close to the court. At the end of the service he 
denounced the governor, Agha `Ali Khan, and all those he said had taken 
bribes to side with the Hindus. The officers of state greeted this outburst 
with embarrassed silence. A Sunni delegation then sought a ruling. from him, 
asking if he accounted the slain Sunnis martyrs, and whether individual 
Muslims should avenge their deaths. Sayyid Muhammad cautiously replied 
that the Muslim state had a duty to put an end to the wickedness of the 
infidels.[61] He steadfastly refused to encourage mob action, insisting that the 
Shi`i state had a duty to intervene on the Muslim side. The implication, that 
if the king refused to act, nothing could be done, angered Sunni vigilantes 
eager to set out independently. 
On 30 August, Outram, the resident, met with Chief Minister `Ali Naqi 
Khan. The Awadh government endeavored to avoid taking a decision bound 
to offend Muslims or Hindus or the British by putting the whole matter in 
the chief mujtahid's lap. It proposed that the commission of inquiry headed 
by Agha `Ali Khan be disbanded and replaced by Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi. The chief minister also insisted that the evidence for the 
existence of a mosque at the Hanumangarhi was good. The resident took 
strong exception to both points, blaming Shah Ghulam Husayn and his 
followers for provoking the violence. He allowed that the chief mujtahid 
could take part in the investigations, but demanded that the final decision be 
made by the king. He further objected to Nasirabadi's rulings urging 
retaliation against the Hindus. `Ali Naqi Khan explained that given the way 
the questioners framed their inquiries, no other answer could have been 
given.[62] 
On the same day, the government investigative commission announced its 
conclusion that no mosque existed at the Hanumangarhi, at least in the past 
twenty-five to thirty years, and most probably never had. Western 
descriptions of the temple thirty years earlier bear out the first part of this 
conclusion.[63] In Lucknow pandemonium broke loose, with Muslim vigilante 
groups forming. A certain militant, Mawlavi Amir `Ali Amethavi, among the 
Sunni ulama calling for holy war, had earlier been brought to the capital 
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from Amethi to meet with Vajid `Ali Shah. The king, aware of the appeal for 
his Sunni military men of the mawlavi's brand of communalist militancy, 
wished to pacify him, offering him a robe of honor and pledging to send Rs. 
15,000 to Mecca on his behalf. He may also have promised him that a mosque 
would be built at the side of the temple. In a flash of lower-middle-class pride, 
the mawlavi told, the king that he was not a revenue collector, to accept a robe 
of honor.[64] 
When news of the commission's findings broke, Mawlavi Amir `Ali left for 
his qasabah base again with two hundred men, in protest. Court emissaries 
failed to convince him to return to the capital, but he did agree to wait one 
month to see if the mosque was restored at the Hanumangarhi. Outram, 
meanwhile, worried that Vajid `Ali Shah's Muslim troops, approving of the 
mawlavi's cause, might well refuse to fight him. Vajid `Ali's own proposal for 
compromise involved building a small mosque onto the side of the temple 
to the monkey-god, with its own door entering from the side, thus preserving 
the building's sanctity for Hindus while meeting Muslim demands. But the 
Hindu Vairagis, or holy men, at the temple rejected the proposal out of hand. 
In the meantime the king began pressuring prominent ulama to support the 
government in the face of the challenge posed to it by the holy-war 
movement.[65] 
The Sunni warriors thought that the king considered Hindus a protected 
minority (dhimmi) in Shi`i law and that he held holy war (jihad) forbidden 
during the Occultation. Vajid `Ali may have held the first belief, but the Usuli 
ulama did not. Sayyid Dildar `Ali denied protected-minority status to Hindus, 
as idolaters. Rather, the Mughal, Hanafi tradition sometimes extended 
protection to Hindus. The Imamis did hold that in the absence of the sinless 
Imam no one could lead an offensive war. From Buyid times, however, Shi`is 
recognized the possibility of defensive holy war, and Usulis in Iraq and Iran 
emphasized defensive jihad in the nineteenth century in response to the 
Russian threat to lran. Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi permitted holy war in 
the time of the Occultation whenever the lands of Islam were attacked. No 
such grave situation existed in Faizabad, however, so that Shi`is did not 
phrase their calls for retaliation against the Hindus in the idiom of holy war.[66] 
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The Awadh government elicited a more specific ruling from Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, asking: 
Q. What is your guidance concerning those who go to Faizabad to fight the 
Hindus? For they desire to take revenge on them for their uncivilized behavior 
with the mosque and the Qur'an. According to the Law is it permissible for them 
to go there and fight, and will this be rewarded? Or is it forbidden? 
A. Without the participation and aid of the customary-law ruler or the Islamic-
law ruler, such actions are in no wise permissible. God knows best.[67] 
The customary-law (‘urf) ruler was, clearly, the king, whereas the ruler in 
Islamic law was the Imam (which in itself provides a clue as to how the Imami 
clerics really perceived their Shi`i government). 
But in a later ruling Sayyid Muhammad went beyond this terse answer, 
replying: "Under these circumstances the order for waging the Jehad does 
not apply; but the sovereign has the right to build the Musjid [mosque]—and 
the Hindu Ryots ought not to disobey."[68] Nasirabadi sympathized with the 
grievances of the jihad movement, but he wished to obviate such vigilante 
tactics by putting pressure on the ruler to intervene against the Hindus 
himself. 
The resident had objected to Sayyid Muhammad's call for the king to make 
Hindus pay blood money for Muslims killed at the Ayodhya mosque. But he 
attempted to make use of his later rulings by pressuring `Ali Naqi Khan, in 
view of the chief mujtahid's prohibition on a holy war, to declare the mawlavi 
and his followers traitors deserving death. The chief minister warned that 
premature military action would cause needless bloodshed. On the other 
hand, Outram took strong exception to Sayyid Muhammad's call for the 
government to build the mosque. Vajid `Ali Shah denied any intention of 
forcibly building a mosque at the temple site, but called ridiculous Hindu 
claims to whatever ground their monkey-god had trod.[69] 
With the arrival of October the resident handed the king a warning that he 
would be held personally responsible if he attempted to build a mosque next 
to the temple or if he allowed Muslims to attack Hindus. Dalhousie and 
Outram were warning him that his kingdom would be annexed unless he 
crushed the holy-war movement. Vajid `Ali Shah received the 
communication with emotion, pledging to do his duty. Outram speculated 
that the king had been relying on the British to quell any Hindu uprising. The 
chief minister had certainly asked for British help in fighting Amir `Ali, but 
was rebuffed. Although the volunteers in the mawlavi's militia tended to be 
lower 
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middle class and laborers, he received financial assistance from influential 
families, so that the movement began to pose a threat to Awadh's stability.[70] 
September, coinciding with the mourning month of Muharram, had brought 
fresh communal violence. To demonstrate their dissatisfaction, Muslims in 
Lucknow left fifteen replicas of Imam Husayn's tomb unburied. Sunnis and 
Shi`is quarreled over greater Sunni willingness to employ Muharram symbols 
for protest. In Zaydpur the powerful Shi`i Sayyids insisted on burying their 
cenotaphs, clashing with followers of Amethavi, who did not want them 
interred until the mosque was built at Ayodhya. In Sihala, the campaigners' 
base, the mawlavi's men attacked Hindus, breaking into temples to destroy 
their idols. Alarmed, Vajid `Ali belatedly agreed to order Hindu troops in 
Faizabad to guard the Hanumangarhi.[71] 
Mawlavi Amir `Ali moved gradually through small towns on the way to 
Faizabad. Vajid `Ali Shah threatened his governors and revenue officials with 
severe sanctions should they support the mawlavi, with some success. He 
knew that his Shi`i troops at Daryabad could be depended upon to fight the 
campaigners if it came to that.[72] Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi's 
commitment to law and order waivered when he saw that the king intended 
to bow to British pressure in neither punishing the Hindus involved in the 
massacre at the Ayodhya mosque (which the resident saw as self-defense) 
nor building a mosque at the temple site. Outram reported that Amir `Ali 
was said to be "urged on by the High Priest, who is reported to have replied 
insolently to the Minister's remonstrances."[73] 
A turning point came on about 20 October, when a group of Sunni ulama 
supportive of the government went to Daryabad to debate Mawlavi Amir 
`Ali. They included several employees of the Awadh government, such as 
Mufti Muhammad Yusuf Farangi-Mahalli and Mufti Sacdu.llah Moradabadi. 
Independent members of the Farangi-Mahall family adamantly backed the 
holy war, creating a split in the ranks of the Sunni ulama. The pro-
government clerics successfully debated the mawlavi, undermining his 
support both among lay followers and in the king's army. 
The lower-middle-class nature of the holy-war movement contributed to the 
unfolding tragedy. Many of the mawlavi's followers had given up their shops 
or service to follow him and now threatened to murder him if he did not 
proceed to Faizabad soon. When negotiations finally broke down on 
November 7, the holy warriors met the government's Shi`i regulars, 
reinforced reluctantly by the private armies of Shi`i ta`alluqdars such as the 
Mahmudabads, and were mown down.[74] 
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The Hanumangarhi dispute involved several levels of social closure. Social 
class and religious identity played a part, since the holy-war movement was 
spearheaded by lower-middle-class Sunni clerics and their followers, who had 
sold their shops or given up their service to join it and so had a total 
commitment to its sectarian goals. The resentments of these Sunnis against 
the wealthy Hindu rajas and merchants who supported the Hanu-mangarhi 
was fueled by Sunni loss of power in Shi`i Awadh and by growing Hindu 
political influence.[75] Amethavi's sectarian movement, in addition, attracted 
the support of Sunni ulama and notables not closely connected with the 
Awadh court, echoing the appeal thirty years earlier of Sayyid Ahmad Rai-
Barelavi to some of the same, out of power, groups. 
The conflict caused a split within the ruling Shi`i establishment. The Usuli 
ulama and their followers supported Amethavi's demands even while 
deploring his vigilante tactics. The central officers of the state in Lucknow 
and Faizabad, on the other hand, sought compromise. Barred from that 
course by British support for the Hindus, they acquiesced in the resident's 
demand that they destroy Amethavi's movement. The British showed 
"evenhandedness" in affirming Hindu rights, partially out of a hard-nosed 
political calculation of the consequences of a major Hindu-Muslim clash in 
Awadh. Convinced that the majority Hindus might well win or provoke a 
major conflict that would draw in British forces, they forced the Muslim 
government to give up its privileges. Hindus sensed British support for their 
position, which may have made them more assertive and intransigent.[76] 
Conclusion 
Communal relations in Awadh under eighteenth-century nawabs differed 
greatly from those under the "shahs" of the mid-nineteenth century. Asafu'd-
Dawlah gave privileges to Hindu holy men as well as Muslim ones, to Hindu 
pilgrims to Allahabad as well as Shi`i pilgrims to Karbala. Communal 
relations, hardly idyllic, nevertheless depended on Mughal traditions of 
personal status, which affirmed Muslim superiority but recognized the right 
of Hindus to exist. Mediators among religious communities, in the form of 
Sufi pirs and Hindu holy men, abounded and even won influence at court. 
The Usuli ulama sought to rationalize communal relations on a different 
basis. They claimed a special, exclusive relationship with Shi`i laymen 
(including notables), who were bound to emulate them in matters of law and 
ritual, and countenanced no competition from Sufis or Hindu holy men. 
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They legally excluded Hindus from a legitimate status under the Awadh state, 
although they had few means until the 1840s to interfere in the actual 
workings of communal law. Their demand for the social exclusion of Hindus 
as ritually impure idolaters received scant response from the Shi`i-ruled state, 
which depended on Hindu elites to help it rule. In the process of socially 
excluding Hindus, ironically, Shi`is adopted an idiom that made them more 
like a caste. 
The contradictory policy advocated by Shi`i ulama toward Sunnis involved 
the exclusion of hard-line Sunnis like the Naqshbandis, leniency toward 
Sunnis who participated in Muharram rituals, and a political alliance with 
Sunnis against Hindus. Ironically, the challenges to Shi`i dominance in 
Awadh came, not from Hindus, but from Sunni sectarian movements, such 
as those of Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi and Amir `Ali Amethavi. Usuli 
insistence on cursing the caliphs, more strident after the inception of the Shi`i 
kingdom, alienated many Sunnis and helped provoke a backlash. Violently 
anti-Sunni policies of the Awadh government in the 1820s and 1830s gave 
way under both external British and internal pressures to more juridical forms 
of exclusion in the 1840s and 1850s. Both Usuli communalist policies at the 
center and increasing decentralization in the countryside, implying greater 
power for Hindu rajas and merchants, help explain Sunni frustrations in the 
1850s. 
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10 
 
The Mujtahids and the West: From 
Accommodation to Annexation and Revolt 
 
The growth of a Shi`i state and of a Shi`i religious establishment in Awadh 
occurred at a time of European colonial expansion, giving events there a 
unique twist. The Safavids and the medieval Indian Shi`i states dealt with 
mercantilist Europeans, but their main foes were Sunni land-based powers. 
From late in the eighteenth century, Nishapuri Awadh, like Qajar Iran, 
moved primarily in a diplomatic, military, and economic world dominated by 
the British.[1] Both Iran and Awadh allied themselves with the British in the 
face of external threats (the Russians for Iran, the Marathas and Afghans for 
Awadh), and both saw their British ally become itself a threat to their 
independence. Awadh, uncomfortably close to Calcutta, felt British influence 
and pressure more acutely than did Iran. The British residents in Lucknow 
became far more than ambassadors, gaining influence over Awadh notables, 
over government monies, and over the Awadh military's hired British 
troops.[2] 
The British encirclement of Awadh raises the question of how the Shi`i 
religious establishment responded to the European presence from the late 
eighteenth century through annexation and the revolt ("Mutiny") of 1857-59. 
Some important Shi`i ulama in Iran took a strong anti-Russian line in the 
1820s, although the full story of their complex relations with the Western 
powers in the first half of the nineteenth century has yet to be told.[3] How 
did 
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Awadh's Shi`i ulama view British power, British economic imports, and the 
impact of mercantile and then industrial capitalism? How did they respond 
to British interference in Awadh's internal affairs, and how did they react to 
the 1856 annexation? What role did the Shi`i ulama play in the Awadh revolt 
of 1857-59? These crucial questions appear not to have been posed, much 
less answered. 
The British Impact 
The strategic decision Awadh's rulers made from 1766 to ally themselves with 
the Bengal-based British East. India Company proved fateful. Since their 
treaty with the EIC limited their armed forces, the nawabs had to rely on the 
British for their own external security. The East India Company remained a 
highly ambiguous ally, and the nawabs found themselves riding a tiger. The 
Nishapuris did draw some benefit from the alliance. In 1774 Shuja`u'd-
Dawlah drew the British into helping him annex the Ruhilkhand. Twenty 
years later Asafu'd-Dawlah again mounted a joint venture, the invasion of 
Rampur.[4] On the negative side of the ledger, however, Barnett has 
demonstrated that after 1775 the governor-general's demands on the Awadh 
treasury for tribute grew insatiable. By 1779 the sums demanded quadrupled, 
amounting to half the gross income of the nawabi government. Awadh 
notables responded by hiding revenue locally, resisting further British 
demands.[5] 
At the same time that the East India Company attempted to extract revenue 
from the nawabi government, private British traders sought profits through 
penetrating the region's markets. Early British residents in Lucknow gained 
a monopoly over Awadh's most lucrative export, saltpeter for the 
manufacture of gunpowder. Shuja`u'd-Dawlah, conscious of the Bengal 
precedent, strove to keep EIC and private merchants out of his realm, with 
only mixed success.[6] The Commercial Treaty of 1788 disengaged the 
residents from such enterprises, but opened the way for increased European 
private trade. Private merchants, excluded from the rich Bengal market by 
the com- 
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pany, expanded into Awadh. Merchants trading in textiles or indigo built up 
alliances with local magnates or actually exercised political power in the 
towns that produced the commodities in which they traded. 
Marshall has shown how imports into Awadh from Bengal doubled in the 
period 1786-1796, and Awadh's exports to Calcutta increased about five 
times during the same period to five million rupees. Europeans fostered and 
carried on much of the trade. The value of cheap Awadh piece goods 
exported from Calcutta grew six times in 1786-1796, to three million rupees. 
Raw cotton constituted another important export, and indigo cultivation 
spread into the Doab region of Awadh in this period.[7] High duties and 
frequent local imposts, in addition to the ever-present fear of arbitrary, 
expropriation, often made life miserable for the European merchants 
involved in this rapid trade expansion. They "loudly" complained to the 
resident of infractions against the Commercial Treaty, and of high duties in 
Awadh despite their permits from the Commercial Office.[8] 
Awadh's incorporation into the world market proceeded unevenly. In 1801 
Governor-General Wellesley annexed nearly half of the region from Nawab 
Sa`adat `Ali Khan on the pretext that the nawab's government had fallen 
hopelessly behind on payment of its tribute to Calcutta and only annexation 
could ensure revenues for the British. The move left the nawab "reserved 
territories" surrounded on three sides by the British and on one by Nepal 
and the Himalayas. Wellesley thereby ended the subsidiary alliance, 
disencumbering the British of many obligations.[9] Thirty-five years earlier, 
officials of the East India Company felt too weak to absorb Awadh, needing 
time to consolidate their hold on Bengal. They then found that threats such 
as the Marathas and the Afghans could be dealt with by British and British-
trained arms, and the need for Awadh as a buffer state correspondingly 
declined. Mukherjee has stressed the futility of attempting to separate 
economic and imperial motives in the annexation. Wellesley acted to ensure 
the receipt of huge revenues, as well as for strategic advantages.[10] The British 
probably took too seriously, for example, the threat of an invasion from 
Afghanistan. 
The 1801 annexation left old Awadh not only divided between two states but 
also partitioned into two economies. Awadh under its Indian rulers remained 
a stable agrarian state with successful rainfall-based agriculture producing an 
abundance of grain for local consumption and regional export. 
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The Ceded Provinces, however, underwent rapid and radical evolution. 
Within a year of cession raw-cotton exports to China jumped, and finished 
textile goods slumped as a proportion of the total exports.[11] The class 
structure of the annexed area began to change. British officials insisted that 
large landholders back up their revenue assignments by bank credit, 
strengthening immeasurably the hand of the bankers and moneylenders who 
guaranteed the revenues, and often allowing them to foreclose in bad years. 
This policy transformed some petty tax-farmers into landholders at the 
expense of village holders.[12] 
Peasants began cultivating indigo extensively for export through Calcutta. 
Cheap British broadcloth began to affect the weavers in North India after 
1800, though it hardly wiped them out, and it had a larger impact from 1833. 
In the first decade of the century, increased imports of manufactured cloth, 
twist, and yarn from an England undergoing the Industrial Revolution hurt 
spinners and began to depress the local cotton market. But with the end of 
the Napoleonic wars, European demand for raw cotton rose, and its 
cultivation in the Ceded Provinces spread rapidly, The British gradually 
incorporated the annexed half of old Awadh into the world market as a 
producer mostly of raw materials. Although from 1815 to 1828 such cash-
crop agriculture grew lucrative, it also proved subject to cycles of boom and 
bust. The depressed cotton and indigo markets after 1828 created a crisis that 
drought years like 1833 exacerbated.[13] 
Although nawabi Awadh did not altogether escape the penetration of 
European capital and the influx of cheap British manufactures, it remained a 
far less open market than the Doab. In 1830 the British resident in Lucknow 
lamented the demise of the 1788 Commercial Treaty. Landholders exacted 
imposts on goods passing through their estates, and the government taxed 
British merchandise heavily. Between the British commercial center Kanpur 
and Lucknow, only fifty miles away, a merchant bearing Manchester's textiles 
had to pay taxes to twenty different landlords in addition to a duty charged 
for entering the capital. British goods cost double in Lucknow what they did 
in Kanpur. Still, the demand for English manufactures remained 
considerable.[14] 
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The Response of the Shi`i Ulama to the West 
European domination in North India provoked a severe crisis of identity for 
the Muslim notable classes who formerly ruled the area. Sunni landholders 
and administrators in Delhi watched helplessly as the British extended their 
rule to the former capital in 1803. Religious spokesmen for these classes in 
decline, such as the Sunni Sufi Shah `Abdu'l-‘Aziz Dihlavi, declared in 
exasperation that India had become a Realm of War (daral-harb) for Muslims. 
The commands of the Mughal emperor were ignored, Christians controlled 
taxes and criminal justice, municipal authorities could level mosques, and 
Muslims like Vilayati Begam of Farrukhabad could come to the capital only 
with the permission of the Christian British authorities. In Hyderabad, 
Awadh, and Rampur Muslim rulers had capitulated to the British. Dihlavi 
admitted that the British allowed Friday congregational and holy day prayers 
to be held, but said this alone could not make British India a Realm of Peace 
(daras-salam) for Muslims. Shah `Abdu'l-‘Aziz, in redefining the political 
environment, did not call for holy war against the British, something some 
of his young disciples would later consider.[15] Rather, he seems to have aimed 
primarily at allowing Sunnis to charge interest on loans, which they could do 
in a Realm of War. 
The Shi`i ulama in what was left of Awadh perceived the situation differently. 
First, they continued to see the nawabs of Awadh as Muslim rulers (and, until 
the 1819 declaration of independence, as first ministers of the Mughal 
Empire). The Imami jurists rejected the notion that they were under de facto 
British rule. Lucknow's chief Shi`i ecclesiastic, Sayyid Dildar `Ali Nasirabadi, 
divided the lands of India into three sorts, those under the dominion of the 
Sunni Mughal emperor (including Awadh), those ruled by unbelievers against 
whom Muslims must war (e.g., Punjab under the Sikhs), and those ruled by 
the Christian British. He commended the British for dealing with Muslims 
according to Muslim, including Shi`i, laws. Although this paragraph 
described the actual situation, it might be noted that the three areas 
mentioned conformed to the traditional Muslim legal categories of the Realm 
of Peace, where Muslims ruled, the Realm of War, where defiant infidels held 
sway, and the Realm of Truce (dar as-sulh), where People of the Book ruled 
and were in treaty relations with Muslims. Nasirabadi, however, did not 
explicitly use this last term.[16] 
Since Shi`is believed contact with non-Shi`is to be polluting, the Euro- 
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pean presence in North India presented them with social difficulties. 
Nasirabadi, asked about the propriety of attending a banquet (sur) thrown by 
Christians or Jews, said to avoid it. A believer asked him if one might pray in 
stockings (muzah) brought from Europe. He equivocated, saying that the 
most renowned stance on this issue was that anything received from an 
unbeliever is ritually impure, but he added that the question was not 
altogether resolved. But in another case he ruled that one might buy a cloak 
from foreigners, and might pray in it before washrag it.[17] 
Was it permissible, someone queried, to usurp the belongings of Christians, 
People of the Book, or unbelievers, through ruse and fraud, causing them 
financial damage? Sayyid Dildar `Ali replied that one could not use the wealth 
of others without strong grounds. He said he had seen no evidence for such 
behavior with the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) and other sorts 
of unbeliever in the time of the Imam's Occultation. The Lucknow prayer 
leader's conservative attitude toward private property even overruled his 
conviction of Muslim superiority. 
When Nasirabadi's upper-class friends pressed him for a ruling on the legality 
of working for the British as tax collectors, secretaries, police, attorneys, and 
physicians, he expressed reservations, though he did not absolutely forbid it. 
A man asked him whether it was permitted to keep the company of and enter 
into the employ of Christians. He pointed out that the British surrounded 
and dominated them, and the notables found it difficult if not impossible to 
get along without their favor. Sayyid Dildar `Ali responded that the 
employment must not involve the commission of forbidden acts, such as 
murder or the purchase of liquor or pork. If the work simply consisted of 
performing a service for a Christian, such as writing a book for him or 
tailoring his clothes, it was entirely proper. But he found it difficult to 
sanction full-time salaried employment with a European, owing to the Qur'an 
verse "And God will not grant the unbelievers any way over the believers" 
(4:140). Yet he could not pronounce such employment altogether forbidden 
(haram).[18] 
This answer, given in the first decade of the nineteenth century, demonstrates 
the ambivalence Awadh's Shi`is felt in seeking employment with the East 
India Company. Economic necessity forced many notables and small 
landholders into such a career, particularly after the cession of 1801. Some 
preferred to work for the nawab. The brothers Taju'd-Din Husayn Khan and 
Subhan `Ali Khan collected revenue for the East India Company at Agra in 
the opening years of the nineteenth century, acquiring a knowledge of British 
procedures. Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan requested that Taju'd-Din Husayn 
Khan come to Awadh, where he hired him at Rs. 300 per month. 
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Subhan `Ali Khan, envious, asked some notables at Lucknow to intercede 
with him for the Nawab, who at length offered him a smaller salary of Rs. 
200 per month because he asked for the job.[19] 
The Shi`i families that were clustered in Banaras division and in the upper 
Doab, living under British rule, had more incentive than the subjects of the 
nawabs to establish links with the East India Company. Mawlavi Zakir `Ali 
Jaunpuri (d. 1796) tutored one of the residents in Lucknow. Sayyid Gulshan 
`Ali Jaunpuri (1800-74), trained in Lucknow by Usuli students of Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali, served as a judge in British-ruled Jaunpur, then as a revenue 
collector in the area. He subsequently took a post with the local government 
of the Maharaja of Banaras. He visited Iraq twice, in 1844 and 1864-71, the 
second time serving as the deputy resident for the British in Baghdad. His 
youngest son, Sayyid Muhammad Hashim, went to England to study 
mathematics in 1872, serving for a time as a revenue collector (tahsildar) for 
the British government in Jalaun and Agra.[20] 
Even religiously committed Shi`is from within nawabi Awadh often had 
dealings with the British or emigrated to find employment with them. Mir 
Hasan `Ali (d. 1858) of Lucknow, whose father led prayers in the household 
of Awadh administrator Almas `Ali Khan, taught British officers Arabic in 
Calcutta, then taught Urdu in the Military College, Addiscombe, in England 
in 1810-16, where he married an Englishwoman. They lived in Lucknow for 
a while, then he served as revenue collector for the British in Kanauj. He later 
took up employment briefly with Hakim Mihdi `Ali Khan, an Awadh notable 
who had indigo interests in Farrukhabad. Mir Hasan `Ali's English wife 
divorced him when she discovered that he had another wife. A pensioner of 
the British government, he moved back to Lucknow in 1843, where he 
accepted a post with the Awadh rulers.[21] 
An even more striking example of this phenomenon, S. Muhammad Quli 
Kinturi (1773-1844), derived from a landed family in the small town of 
Kintur in Bara Banki. He traveled widely as a youth, in search of knowledge, 
and trained in Lucknow with Sayyid Dildar `Ali as an Usuli mujtahid. In 1806 
he hired on with the British government of Delhi in the parganah of Meerut 
as a court official. Ultimately rising to principal sadr amin (able to judge 
property disputes up to Rs. 5,000), he gave legal judgments in criminal cases 
accord- 
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ing to Shi`i law—something he could not have done at that time even in 
Awadh. At his peak he earned Rs. 400 per month at the post, retiring in 
1841.[22] 
Shi`i clerics expressed few anti-British sentiments as long as the East India 
Company respected Shi`i law and maintained all alliance with the Shi`i nawab 
of Awadh. In Bengal, ulama teaching at the Hooghly College, in-eluding 
Shi`is, actively sought m attend the government's public audiences (darbars) 
and m receive robes of honor from the East India Company. In contrast, 
Sayyid Dildar `Ali forbade ulama in Awadh m accept robes of honor from 
the nawab's government, claiming that this practice befitted soldiers but 
demeaned the high station of mujtahids, the general representatives of the 
hidden Twelfth Imam.[23] 
Perhaps because of the increasing number of Shi`is who worked for the 
British, one of Lucknow's chief mujtahids gave a ruling in the 1830s that 
strongly justified taking employment with foreigners. Asked to what extent 
one might earn one's living through Christians, he replied that as long as one 
did not become an accomplice m any forbidden act, working on a salaried 
basis for the British in such fields as revenue collection was permitted. (Note 
that Sayyid Dildar `Ali had not sanctioned taking a salary from Christians.) 
The mujtahid ruled that although disapproval attaches to performing even 
permitted acts for unjust rulers (hukkam-i jawr), the disapproval is lifted if one 
does so to aid Shi`is.[24] The attitude of the Shi`i hierarchy on this issue 
changed over time. They originally questioned its propriety, but allowed it in 
the 1830s. 
The religious scholars also changed their position on loaning money on in- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
― 259 ― 
terest to Christians. Someone asked Sayyid Dildar `Ali if he might take 
interest on loans to idolaters (Hindus) and to the People of the Book (Jews 
and Christians).[25] Nasirabadi replied that Shi`i scholars had reached a 
consensus that interest could be taken from idolaters. But they differed over 
whether it could be charged People of the Book. He offered his own ruling 
that the most cautious path was therefore not to take interest from Jews and 
Christians. The influx of British capital into North India, first through private 
traders in 1785-95, and then through the East India Company as well from 
1801, created many opportunities for local bankers and moneylenders. 
British insistence that bank credit secure revenue assignments likewise 
strengthened these classes. 
Shi`i merchants and moneylenders also wished to profit from these 
opportunities, the more scrupulous of them with pangs of conscience. Sayyid 
Dildar `Ali refused to assuage their guilt. Unlike the Shi`i high ulama in Iraq 
and Iran, who had increasingly close ties with the bazaar classes, in Awadh 
the clerical establishment subsisted on the patronage of large landholders, 
responding mostly to their concerns. 
Many Shi`i long-distance merchants regularly lent and borrowed on interest, 
but the practice could cause them problems if cases went to Muslim religious 
courts. An example is the case of Mirza Riza, the son of Hajji Karbala'i 
Muhammad Tihrani, versus the heirs of Hasan Riza Khan, the former chief 
minister of Awadh. In the late 1780s Hajji Karbala'i lent Hasan Riza Khan 
Rs. 228, 436 as part of the Rs. 700,000 Awadh government donation for the 
building of the canal to Najaf. Mirza Riza presented letters in court, appearing 
to be from the chief minister, promising to repay the loan in November of 
1792. Both debtor and creditor died before any further transaction took 
place.[26] Mirza Riza attempted to recoup the loss from the late chief minister's 
estate through the government courts of Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan in 1806. 
He asked the Iranian ruler Fath-`Ali Shah to intervene with Awadh's nawab 
on his behalf, and the Qajar monarch wrote to his fellow Shi`i ruler 
supporting Mirza Riza's claims[27] 
Nawab Sa`adat `Ali Khan turned the case over to the mufti of the religious 
court, probably the Farangi-Mahalli Mawlavi Zuhuru'llah (d. 1840). Mirza 
Riza claimed the principal of Rs. 228,436, in addition to Rs. 150,010 interest. 
The mufti of the court rejected the claim on several grounds. First, he said, 
the dates of the copies of the letters and the replies presented as evi- 
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dence were confused and therefore they were of suspect authenticity. Second, 
the precise kind of money loaned was not specified. Third, the taking of 
interest on loans was prohibited according to Islamic law.[28] 
Especially in the period 1815-30 developments occurred among the 
propertied Shi`is that impelled them to accept interest on loans to 
Europeans, though no Islamic court would have permitted interest charges 
among Usuli Shi`is. The changes in the relationship between the British 
economy and that of India brought about by the Industrial Revolution, 
creating a world-dominating textile industry, strengthened the hand of the 
East India Company. The company, formerly merely a government-backed 
enterprise of circulating merchant capital, evolved into an instrument in the 
expansion of industrial imperialism. The terms of the game changed radically. 
Awadh's landed classes, sensitive to this evolution, began to perceive the 
insecurity of their traditional landholding forms of wealth in the new 
environment. 
At the same time, the East India Company began its costly war in Nepal in 
1814-16. Nawab Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar acquiesced in November of 1814 to 
the company's request for a loan of Rs. 10 million to help defray the expenses 
of the war. Ten individuals or families, mostly relations of the nawab, 
received the Rs. 600,000 in interest payments each year. Four months later 
Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar agreed to second loan of Rs. 10 million on similar 
terms. In 1825 the same ruler responded favorably to the governor-general's 
request for yet another loan of Rs. 10 million at the low rate of 5 percent 
interest, again payable by the resident to notables and relatives of the court.[29] 
These arrangements began the creation of a class of rentiers depending on 
payments from interest to supplement the income from their less stable 
landed wealth (which took the form of jagirs that could be expropriated at 
will by later Awadh rulers). The: British government guaranteed the stipends 
to the recipients and their descendants. The creditors hardly demonstrated 
much business sense by the low, fixed interest rates they charged. The 
recipients, transformed into a strange mixture of Mughal-style nobility and 
new bourgeoisie, passively subsisted on the periphery of the growing world 
market. 
Although Ghaziyu'd-Din Haydar earlier showed no scruples about making 
the loans, in contravention of Sayyid Dildar `Ali's ruling. when Iris treasury 
got low he suddenly evinced pangs of conscience. In May 1826 Lord Amherst 
informed the resident in Lucknow that yet another five million rupees would 
be needed to wind up the Nepal war. Ricketts pledged to open 
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negotiations, warning that drought and recalcitrant landholders (who for the 
first time in years did not have to worry about facing British troops in aid of 
government revenue collectors, owing to a policy change) had impoverished 
the Awadh treasury. Ricketts's talks proved successful, but Amherst felt he 
was doing the nawab a favor in any case. Ricketts wrote on 25 July, "Your 
remark that the money has been drawn from unproductive coffers is strictly 
correct, and so far His Majesty in point of fact is a gainer by the transaction; 
but the Sacrifice of his Religious tenets, which forbid interest being received, 
throws this advantage completely into the Shade in His eyes."[30] 
Later Awadh governments continued the practice of making loans to the 
East India Company, investing the interest received in religious grants to the 
Shi`i shrine cities of Iraq or in public works in Awadh. Muhammad ` Ali Shah, 
whom the British resident placed on the throne by armed force in 1837, 
initiated an ambitious building program. Soon after he acceded to the throne 
he spent Rs. 200,000 to have the Husaynabad Imambarah built not far from 
the Great Imambarah. Fearing that his good deed might fall into disrepair 
after his death, he wished to place the Imambarah and mosque complex 
under the guarantee of the British government so as to ensure the regular 
payment of the religious functionaries.[31] 
Finding the British unwilling to give such guarantees gratis, the king 
proposed to sweeten the deal by putting Rs. 900,000 in a 4.5 percent loan in 
perpetuity. The resident, Lt. Col. Caulfield, enthusiastically recommended 
that the governor-general accept the proposition, the interest demanded 
being so low that it was unlikely to embarrass a powerful state in the future. 
Moreover, part of the interest would go to Muhammad `Ali Shah's sons-in-
law, daughters-in-law, and other dependents and relatives. Caulfield reasoned 
that to have a large number of notables financially dependent on the British 
Government would assure their loyalty and help insure more information 
from the interior of Awadh. Of the interest, Rs. 19,200 would pay servants 
to attend the Imambarah and keep its road in repair, and Rs. 6,000 per month 
was set aside to maintain the canals. With the sums devoted to relatives and 
servants, the total came to Rs. 36,000 per annum.[32] 
The deal was finally concluded, with the terms slightly altered in favor of the 
British. Muhammad `Ali Shah invested Rs. 1,200,000 at only 4 percent 
interest, yielding dividends of Rs. 48,000 per year to be divided between the 
persons named and the Husaynabad Imambarah, Rs. 24,000 being car- 
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marked for the edifice. The king did not name Shi`i ulama as trustees of the 
Imambarah and its mosque, that honor going to the high notables Sayyid 
Imam `Ali Khan and ‘Azimu'llah Khan, and their descendants after them.[33] 
The new forms of wealth available to members or the Awadh ruling class 
had the slight disadvantage of being forbidden by their religion. But they 
apparently felt they had little alternative. The British blocked Awadh's 
prospects of territorial expansion, and social and economic structures within 
the country tended to inhibit both commercial agriculture and new industrial 
enterprises. Most of the soil was unsuited to cash crops like cotton, and tacal-
luqdar, landholders imposed high duties on the transport of goods. Awadh 
notables found making loans at 5 percent interest, however religiously illicit, 
an attractive way of investing the wealth they extracted from Hindu peasants 
and rural landholders. Other Muslim governments in this period, such as 
Egypt, invested state funds in military modernization, state-owned industries, 
and in the expansion of cash-crop cultivation through irrigation works. 
Awadh rulers demonstrated no such dynamism, perhaps because they had 
already been too constricted by the British presence. 
Some few Awadh notables, dissatisfied with being rentiers, sought to enter 
the ranks of the new bourgeoisie. Hakim Mihdi `Ali Khan Kashmiri, from a 
family in Kashmir that came to Delhi early in the eighteenth century and 
married into a clan of Sufi leaders, joined the circle of the new businessmen. 
Mihdi's father went to Faizabad from Delhi in the time of Asafu'd-Dawlah, 
and after his death Mihdi emerged as a renowned physician catering to 
Lucknow's notables. He saved enough money to begin contracting as a 
revenue collector, taking on the district of Muhammadi under Nawab Sa`adat 
`Ali Khan. Growing wealthy in Muhammadi, Hakim Mihdi began taking on 
other districts, including Khayrabad, Bahraich, and Gonda. In 1819 he fell 
out with Ghaziyu'd-Din .Haydar's chief minister, Agha Mir, who ordered him 
from the capital to Khayrabad. He went, fearful of treachery, buying up land 
in neighboring British Farrukhabad and remitting Rs. 800,000 over the 
border. At an opportune time he slipped across, escaping the mulcting he 
would otherwise have faced had Agha Mir deposed and arrested him.[34] 
In Farrukhabad, the indigo market beckoned: 
The prospect of quick profit attracted fortune-hunters. To mention a few 
names, there was George Mercer who had one or two indigo factories in 
Aligarh in 1810. By 1826 Mercer and Co. had extended their general trading 
activities to the districts of 
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Meerut, Agra, Moradabad, Farrukhabad, Bareilly, and Etawah; the total value 
of the assets of this firm was estimated at about a crore [ten million] of 
rupees. In 1820 Harm Mehdi Ali Khan, Nawab of Fatehgarh, formed a 
partnership in the indigo business with William Morton.[35] 
Morton probably brought Hakim Mihdi in as a means of raising money, an 
alternative to simply borrowing it. Mihdi ` Ali Khan also set up a shawl factory 
employing three hundred workers and brought in wool from Kashmir.[36] The 
transformation of this Kashmiri family, over three generations, from Sufi 
leader to physician to tax-farmer to agricultural capitalist and textile magnate 
was so sudden that it left intact many traditional values. The Hakim 
maintained great respect for Shi`i ulama, building a congregational prayers 
mosque in Farrukhabad and giving patronage from 1824 to Shi`i ulama from 
a Kashmiri background.[37] 
Both the move of the ruling class into the role of banker for the East India 
Company and the involvement of some notables in the British-ruled Ceded 
Provinces in cash-crop agriculture created a new economic atmosphere, 
presenting difficulties for the Shi`i ulama who served these classes in 
transition. Sayyid Dildar `Ali, writing before most of these developments, 
had cautioned against taking interest on loans to Europeans. But in the early 
1830s his son Sayyid Muhammad, the chief mujtahid in Lucknow, resolved 
the issue by reversing his father's ruling. Asked if interest might be taken 
from Jews, Christians, Hindus, and Sufi Muslims, Sayyid Muhammad replied 
that interest could be taken from polytheists by consensus and that Sufis 
could be considered polytheists. As to Jews and Christians, he added, jurists 
differed, but the clearest view in his opinion was that they could be charged 
interest.[38] Since most Sunnis were Sufis in Awadh, according to this ruling 
wealthy Shi`is could loan on interest to almost the entire population of the 
country, excluding only a small minority of other Shi`is. 
The ideas about society borne by Shi`i mujtahids were thus neither traditional 
(Usulism was a new school in Awadh) nor static. Like Christianity in Europe's 
own age of commercial expansion, Imami Shi`ism demonstrated an ability to 
adapt itself to modern capitalism. As the patrons of the jurisprudents became 
more bourgeois, so too did the social ideology proclaimed by the clerical 
establishment.[39] 
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Shi`i clerics accommodated themselves to many things Western, but the 
professional clergy rejected modern science. On the other hand, as we have 
seen, upper-class Shi`i intellectuals, such as Tafazzul Husayn Khan Kashmiri 
or Sayyid Muhammad Hashim Jaunpuri, often took an interest in Western 
learning. Some scientific works were translated into Persian, one Mazhar `Ali 
receiving a prize from the Asiatic Society of Bengal for his Persian treatise 
on cosmography, which contained a section on Western, Copernican 
conceptions.  
But one of Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi's sons, Sayyid `Ali Akbar, wrote a 
tract entitled "The Firm Proof in Refutation of the Motion of the Earth," 
which typified the attitude of the clerical establishment. Sayyid Muhammad 
himself felt secular sciences to be secondary, holding the religious sciences 
the most important of all. The attitude of many in Awadh was summed up 
by the Moradabad notable who told Colonel Sleeman that telescopes were 
nonsense if they revealed things contrary to the Qur'an. When in the 1850s 
rumors of the telegraph swept Awadh, the Shi`i ulama openly derided the 
invention as impossible, to their later embarrassment."[40] 
Some Muslim reformers in North India, of course, did accept European 
science. The Sunni reformist thinker Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who began by 
rejecting the Copernican revolution, later in life firmly adopted modern 
scientific views, espousing a thoroughgoing rationalism that opponents 
stigmatized as "naturism." Another of Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi's sons, 
Sayyid `Ali Muhammad "Taju'l-‘Ulama'," vigorously attacked Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan's rationalist Qur'an commentary.[41] 
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Ulama engaged in intellectual contest with the West an another front: 
polemics against Christian missionaries. Most of these polemics, written in 
Arabic or Persian in a rationalist, Usuli style, have yet to be rediscovered or 
analyzed. One incident does shed light on the sorts of encounters Shi`is had 
with Christians in Awadh. The missionary Joseph Wolff in 1833 told Awadh 
king Nasiru'd-Din Haydar that Christ would return in only a few years, and 
that he knew the date (1847). The sovereign arranged a public debate 
between the missionary and Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, in which Wolff 
interpreted the Book of Daniel to show the imminence of Christ's coming. 
Sayyid Muhammad, who knew the Gospels in Arabic, replied that Christ had 
said that no man knew the hour or the day of his return. Wolff cleverly 
retorted that he did not claim to know the hour and the day, only the year. 
Sayyid Muhammad insisted that the phrase denied all such precise 
knowledge. This inconclusive encounter prompted the writing of several 
defenses of Shi`ism from Christianity from a rationalist Usuli perspective in 
the late 1830s that influenced the terms of Christian-Muslim debate for the 
rest of the century.[42] 
In contrast to the fiery anti-British polemics produced by some Muslims, the 
attitude of the Shi`i high ulama in Awadh to the Europeans was one of 
gradual accommodation, Some of those trained in Lucknow as mujtahids 
worked for the British directly as judges or even revenue officers. Even 
official clerics of the Awadh government slowly allowed more interaction 
with the foreigners, legitimizing loans to them and ultimately permitting 
salaried work for them. The families of the high ulama often acquired stock 
in the East India Company, or depended for patronage upon notables whose 
stipends derived from interest on loans to it. They appear to have considered 
the British honorable treaty allies, a view reflecting the policy of state. They 
rejected some British ways and nineteenth-century European science, even 
forbade some kinds of imported manufactures. But the xenophobia of a non-
European clerisy did not extend to the political sphere before the 1840s. 
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The Mujtahids and the British Residents, 1842-1856 
As the Shi`i clerics moved into public office in the 1840s, they became 
increasingly identified with a regime constantly threatened by the 
expansionist designs of mid-nineteenth-century British imperialism. As 
government servants in the judiciary, the ulama came into conflict with 
British administrators who wished either to annex Awadh or to rule it by 
proxy. Many of the high ulama had investments in British government 
securities, and so hardly acted in a consistently anti-British fashion. Their 
disputes with the British focused on structural matters, such as the shape of 
the alliance with Calcutta and the degree of influence the Europeans would 
have over Awadh affairs. 
Under Amjad `Ali Shah the trend was toward decentralization in the 
countryside, where great landholders often rebelled, loyal ta`alluqdars lending 
their private armies to fight the recalcitrant ones.[43] The British perceived this 
segmentary political system as anarchy, but the Awadh elites felt their realm 
to be in good order. Since the British Government of India had set 
limitations on the Awadh army and in any case would make immediate 
demands on any revenue realized beyond the normal, no administration had 
any impetus to attempt to impose more order. 
In some ways Amjad `Ali Shah surprised the British resident, who had heard 
of his fierce Shi`ism. When the resident placed the crown on the new 
monarch's head, he informed the king that past governors-general had 
objected when Awadh rulers proposed to entitle themselves ghazi (fighter for 
the Faith). Low reported that the "King replied, that as he is—and 'he 
thanked God for it' (that, was the expression he made use of) under the 
protection of, and entirely dependent upon the British Gov't, he saw the 
impropriety of his having such a word as Ghazee on his seal."[44] The 
following year the astonished resident, Shakespear, wrote that Muharram had 
passed without major incident, though most in Lucknow had expected a 
clash, given the new monarch's unyielding Shi`ism. On the contrary, Amjad 
`Ali Shah took measures to prevent communal riots.[45] Whatever his personal 
sentiments, he had too often seen governors-general warn the Awadh 
government that they were prepared to take it over to present them with an 
excuse like public disorder in his own capital. 
Amjad `Ali Shah, at first compliant with British wishes, eventually came into 
strong conflict with the resident over policy. At the beginning of his reign he 
offered to put Rs. 1,000,000 into another 5 percent loan to help out with the 
Afghan and Sikh operations. Ironically, the gradual conquest of the Punjab 
caused a diplomatic tiff. The news of the capture of Lahore reached 
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Lucknow on the tenth of Muharram, and the British wished to celebrate with 
an artillery salute. The king objected, but finally gave in.[46] 
The office of the chief minister became a source of contention, with Amjad 
`Ali and the chief mujtahid favoring Aminu'd-Dawlah for the post, and the 
resident opposing him. In 1843 the resident backed the dismissal of Aminu'd-
Dawlah because of revenue shortfalls. He felt that the chief minister had been 
retained on the advice of the king's courtiers and of Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi. Only shortly before the monarch reaffirmed Aminu'd-Dawlah in 
office, "the High Priest's opinion was applied for as to the selection of a new 
minister, five names being sent to him, two of which (Moonawaroodawlah 
and Mooeenoodawlah) were given at length and the other three merely 
denoted by an initial letter."[47] The resident grew so dissatisfied with the 
faults he perceived in the Awadh administration that he bluntly informed 
Amjad ` Ali Shah that he did not intend to be present at the annual coronation 
ceremony that year. The king reacted with shock and asked for advice. The 
resident suggested that he reappoint Sharafu'd-Dawlah to the chief 
ministership, but Amjad `Ali Shah declared that this candidate's adherence 
to the Sunni branch of Islam "was in itself an insuperable bar to his 
reappointment."[48] 
The British resident, appalled at what he perceived as the disorder in the 
countryside and the shortfall in revenue, dismissed the Awadh government's 
innovations in the judicial sphere as a waste of money and a means for the 
deputy chief minister, Sa'idu'd-Dawlah, to mete out summary justice.[49] 
Ironically, the British would later accuse the government of Awadh of lacking 
a judicial system. Awadh certainly possessed a functioning judiciary, however 
colored by communalism, at several levels of its administration. Indeed, the 
mujtahid judges clashed with the resident on several occasions.[50] 
With Sleeman's arrival in Lucknow as resident, conflict with the Awadh 
government reached a high point, and the mujtahids were drawn into these 
disputes. One disagreement concerned the trial of Muhammad Husayn 
Khan, the governor (nazim) of Bahraich. He became indebted to Ramdut 
Pandey, a banker and agricultural capitalist in the district, to the amount of 
Rs. 80,000.[51] What happened thereafter remains murky to this day. The gov- 
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ernor's detractors charged that he lured the Hindu banker to his camp, 
pressed him for more money, and when Pandey refused, killed him to escape 
the previous debt. His defenders said that Pandey himself was in arrears, and 
when the governor pressed him to settle his accounts he became violent and 
had to be killed in self-defense. The inescapable fact of the dead banker in 
the governor's tent, however, forced Muhammad Husayn Khan to surrender 
himself to Lucknow for trial. Reports reaching Sleeman from eyewitnesses 
among the banker's retinue stated that the governor's men cut the defenseless 
Hindu down and that the governor helped finish him off with a sword.[52] 
Any issue impugning the fairness of Awadh's administration immediately 
became grist for the British mill, aiding their quest for more control over the 
country. Vajid `Ali Shah sought to defuse the matter by having Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, with his reputation among Shi`is as a paragon of 
integrity, try the case. Sayyid Muhammad, according to his biographer, 
"repeatedly refused owing to his farsightedness and his friendship for the 
English Government."[53] Kashmiri wrote that only when Nasirabadi received 
informal assurances from the governor-general that the British had no 
objections to his proceeding did he consent to conduct an investigation.[54] If 
true, this indicates that Sayyid Muhammad had his own lines of 
communication to Calcutta, circumventing the resident, and that he felt 
confident any judgment he made would be upheld. 
Sayyid Muhammad, after hearing many depositions, rejected the testimony 
of three eyewitnesses from Pandey's retinue that Muhammad Husayn Khan 
and his attendants murdered the capitalist, on the grounds that they 
contained minor discrepancies. He did, however, order that Pandey's goods, 
plundered after the killing, be returned to his family. Sayyid Muhammad's 
biographer noted that it would have been impermissible to make a believer 
pay blood money for the murder of an infidel.[55] 
Sleeman, furious at the decision, fired off a letter to Vajid `Ali Shah 
demanding custody of the three men accused of murder, saying persons of 
influence had shielded them. He then wrote Governor-General Dalhousie in 
Calcutta, criticizing the acquittal and charging that it had been engineered by 
the chief minister. He noted that "the Mujtahid himself, his son and brother 
hold high & lucrative Offices, and almost all the members of his 
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family enjoy stipends at the pleasure of the Sovereign & his Minister for the 
time being, & the present Minister has certainly been an accessory to this 
murder after the fact."[56] The resident noted (correctly) that even had the 
chief mujtahid found Muhammad Husayn Khan guilty of killing a Hindu, he 
would not have punished him. 
The governor-general replied that he agreed with Sleeman's assessment, but 
since the British Government had itself requested the governor's trial in 
Awadh courts, it could not very well insist on a retrial in the British judicial 
system. Moreover, it seems that Dalhousie had in mind a better use for the 
incident. He instructed Sleeman to protest the acquittal to the king and to 
add "that such acts as these are rapidly filling up the treasure of the King's 
misgovernment, which His Majesty has been already warned must end in the 
entire subversion of his kingly power."[57] Sayyid Muhammad's decision 
assumed a disproportionate importance in that it gave substance to an image, 
already formed in Calcutta, of corruption in high places and tyrannical 
government. Vajid `Ali Shah defended the integrity of the chief mujtahid, 
who he said had passed a death sentence on one of the chief minister's 
servants in a murder case.[58] He neglected to say, however, whether that case 
involved a Hindu as well, or was an inter-Shi`i affair (a quite different matter). 
Sleeman clashed with Sayyid Muhammad on several other issues as well while 
he was resident.[59] 
The Awadh administration in the 1840s and 1850s fought off increasing 
British demands for control. The Shi`i ulama, as judges in state employ or 
clients of notable patrons in government, joined the fray on the side of the 
Awadh monarchs. They lobbied to have their favorites installed in high posts 
and attempted to carry out their judicial duties without the resident's 
interference. The mujtahids' insistence on implementing Shi`i law, despite its 
relegation of non-Shi`is to second-class citizenship, provoked a number of 
clashes with "even-handed" residents. In the last such major conflict, over 
the Hanumangarhi, the Shi`i ulama took the Muslim side against Hindus, but 
the British overruled their policy recommendations. Yet investment in British 
bonds and collection of interest on loans to the East India Company gave 
many Shi`is, including some of the high ulama, reasons to feel ambivalent 
toward the British. 
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Annexation 
British interference in Awadh aimed at securing greater control of the 
country. Some officials of the British Government of India adopted a 
forward policy, aimed at absorbing Awadh altogether. Some thought 
(mistakenly) that a great deal of cotton could be grown in a British-controlled 
Awadh, and others eyed the revenue the province would provide to the 
indebted Government of India.[60] In a letter written on 23 September 1855 
Governor-General Dalhousie, a forward-policy advocate, showed disdain for 
East India Company officials in London who feared Parliament's disapproval 
should he annex Awadh, pointing out that it had acquiesced in other 
annexations. In the same letter he worried that Hindu-Muslim violence, such 
as occurred over the Hanumangarhi, could recur and "spread very wide."[61] 
Dalhousie, knowing he had to retire from his post in favor of Lord Canning 
late in January 1856, pressured the Council in Calcutta to approve a draft 
treaty that would finalize the British take-over of Awadh. The resident, 
Outram, presented the treaty on 30 January to the shocked Awadh 
government, which later rejected it. Nine days later Dalhousie, having 
unilaterally annexed the country, wrote, "So our gracious Queen has 
5,000,000 more subjects and £l,300,0 more revenue than she had 
yesterday."[62] Nishapuri Awadh became British "Oudh." 
The British take-over signaled a new order and heavy reverses for the old 
Shi`i elite. On 7 February Vajid `Ali Shah ordered his subjects to obey the 
British, announcing that he would set out for London to press his claims' to 
the crown before Queen Victoria. He asked Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi 
to engage in divination to determine his chances of success.[63] The last official 
act of the chief mujtahid was not one of learning or moral teaching, but one 
of soothsaying for a fallen order. 
Shi`is from ulama families reacted differently to the annexation. Sayyid 
Muhammad `Abbas Shushtari resigned abruptly from his judicial post, 
although the British offered to keep him on. On the other hand, Mawlavi 
Sayyid I`jaz Husayn Kinturi, head clerk of the chief minister's office, stayed 
on to help reorganize the bureaucracy under the British Judicial 
Commissioner.[64] 
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In many cases, the British offered ulama families no choice of continuing in 
their jobs. They dismantled the Shi`i judiciary system, though the new British 
rulers continued to employ some local muftis. In August 1856, after months 
of consultation, they abolished the Shi`i seminary, on the grounds that it 
benefited only the Shi`i community and could not serve as a vehicle of liberal 
instruction ("its exclusiveness and its worthlessness as a place of education"). 
Worried about permanently alienating the influential mujtahids, however, 
they offered the teaching staff and administrators reduced stipends for life, 
though they excluded some members of the Nasirabadi family with other 
sources of income.[65] 
The British stopped payment for one year, however, of these government 
stipends and those deriving from interest on loans, to investigate and 
reorganize them, and the abolition of many stipends and pensions hit some 
Shi`i ulama hard.[66] The Nasirabadi family, hurt both by the later policies of 
Vajid `Ali Shah and then of the British, desperately applied to the Oudh chief 
commissioner for the continuation of its government stipends: 
The Moojtahid and the other members of his family were constantly setting 
forth their great pecuniary distress and complaining of the indignities to 
which they were subjected from the actions filed against them in the Civil 
Courts owing to their inability from want of means to pay their debts.[67] 
The chief commissioner, with the governor-general's approval, forwarded 
Rs. 5,000 to Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi to hold him and his family over 
until stipends could be regularized. He also approved British government 
continuation of stipends to the mujtahids at Rs. 1,977 per month, and to the 
Sayyids at Rs. 495 per month, noting, "These men are very influential, and 
have been deprived of their bread in a great measure owing to our acquisition 
of the country."[68] The British also hurt many Shi`i families by their 
settlement policies. They scheduled the Nasirabadis' villages to be resumed 
within one or two generations, inducing anxiety about how the office of chief 
mujtahid would continue to be funded.[69] 
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Continued stipends could not salve the wounds inflicted by British 
annexation on the Shi`i ulama. Once the masters of the judicial system, they 
now faced the threat that creditors would drag them into British courts. 
Sayyid Muhammad pleaded with a plaintiff to settle out of court through an 
informal agent, because "now, going to court means going to a Christian 
ruler, and a lawyer (wakil) will be ordered to appear in a European court."[70] 
The loss of prestige, wealth, and power by the Shi`i ulama at the stroke of 
Dalhousie's pen could not help but cause great resentments, despite later 
British attempts at conciliation. 
Shi`is and the Revolt in Awadh, 1857-1859 
An attempt to resurrect Nishapuri Awadh, at first within the framework of a 
resuscitated Mughal Empire, inflamed North India with some of the fiercest 
battles it has ever known. Because the uprising began among Indian troops 
of the British army, it has become known in Western historiography as the 
Sepoy Mutiny—a misnomer, since the revolt drew in the great landholders 
and peasants of North India, as well as the old Awadh notable class, who 
reconstituted their kingdom under Shi`i leadership. The role of Shi`is and of 
the Shi`i ulama in the revolt, although raised, has never been described in 
detail. The accounts given by Shi`i historians after the British victory in 1858-
59, and followed by some writers in English, say that the Shi`is participated 
less vigorously in the revolt because of their conviction that holy war, jihad, 
was illegitimate in the time of the Imam's Occultation.[71] This assertion will 
be tested in the following account. 
It should be said at the outset that the proposition of Shi`i quietism, however 
well founded doctrinally, seems unlikely to be true. Stokes characterized 1857 
as "secondary resistance," and a post-pacification revolt, a second stage on 
the way to modern nationalism between the violent primary resistance to 
colonialism of traditional elites and the organized political parties of a later 
time. It engaged the totality of society, throwing up new forms of leadership 
partially rooted in religious ideology. Mukherjee has recently characterized 
1857 as both a war of religion and a war of restoration, which called upon 
Awadh's Muslims and Hindus to rise against Christian hegemony.[72] Given 
the importance of religious ideology in the revolt, and the leading role 
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played by a revived Awadh nawabate, that most Shi`is showed apathy seems 
an extraordinary proposition, since the British annexation of Awadh, the 
abolition of the seminary, and the abortive 1857 invasion of Iran all affected 
Shi`is directly and adversely. 
Shi`i participation in the failed revolution can best be understood if we look 
at the community according to its social divisions into "orders" (tabaqat), 
rather than monolithically. Tradespeople and laborers (`avamm) in the large 
villages and urban centers, the Shi`i large landholders (ta`alluqdars and 
zamindars) in the countryside, court notables (umara') based in the cities of 
Lucknow and Faizabad, and the Shi`i learned men, or ulama, all reacted 
differently to events. 
The mutiny of the Indian troops began in Meerut on 10 May 1857. These 
troops made for Delhi, where the garrison likewise rose up and massacred 
the British population, placing at the head of their revolt Siraju'd-Din 
Bahadur Shah II (r. 1837-57), the Mughal king the British had reduced to a 
puppet. On 14 May the restored emperor demanded that revenue collectors 
submit their taxes to him. Thereafter the troops downriver along the Ganges 
began revolting, as word spread of the events in Delhi.[73] 
Let us consider first of all the participation of Shi`i commoners in the Awadh 
revolt. The expected conflagration came in Lucknow on 30 May, as Lucknow 
sepoys mutinied all night. The next day a force of five or six thousand 
tradesmen and laborers crossed the Gomti to loot the cantonments in 
coordination with the revolting troops, but, finding that Lawrence's forces 
had dispersed them, the crowd returned to the Husaynabad quarter and ran 
riot. The city crowd, drawn from the poor of the old city, must have included 
both Shi`is and Sunnis as well as Hindus. A firsthand Persian account 
suggests that such mobs typically included some notables and Muslim 
sermonizers who led bands of butchers, weavers, carders, and other 
tradesmen, and the same source says that Shi`i commoners participated 
widely in the revolt. Later, during the siege of the British residency, Gubbins 
often heard the cry of "Ya `Ali" (O `Ali) from the besiegers. Shi`is, the 
partisans of `Ali, were most likely to use this war cry. Therefore, Shi`i 
tradesmen, laborers, and soldiers participated in the revolt without any 
special reservations, and these probably represented the majority of the Shi`i 
community.[74] 
Events in June raise the question of the role of Shi`i rural magnates. The 
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uprising now began to spread into Awadh's interior, though many waited to 
see what turn events would take in Lucknow, where the British reasserted 
control for a few weeks. The troops at Sitapur revolted, and in that and 
neighboring districts the Shi`i great landlords of Mahmudabad and 
Bhatwamau, joined by some Hindu rajas, issued a proclamation including an 
oath to fight against the British, couched in both the Shi`i terminology of 
Karbala and in Hindu symbology.[75] 
On 8 and 9 June the regiments at Faizabad mutinied, forcing Europeans to 
flee. The troops briefly placed at their head Ahmadu'llah Shah, a Sunni Sufi 
leader of the Qadiri order, who had been preaching holy war against the 
British to avenge the martyrdom of Amir `Ali Amethavi (whose ill-fated 
holy-war movement, centered on the Hanumangarhi, had led to his massacre 
and that of his followers seven months earlier). After two days, however, 
other leadership emerged in the Faizabad area, including Raja Man Singh, a 
dispossessed Hindu large landholder, and Muhammad Hasan Khan, a 
governor under the old monarchy.[76] 
On 29 July a vanguard of revolutionaries from Faizabad and Sitapur arrived 
at Chinhat near Lucknow, on their way to liberate the capital; they were led 
by Khan `Ali Khan, the deputy of the Shi`i Raja of Mahmudabad. Lawrence 
rode out with troops to counterattack, but returned in defeat, and was killed 
a few days later. Victorious rebel troops entered Lucknow, looting and 
plundering, and jockeying for leadership began as Ahmadu'llah Shah tried 
and failed to establish his own police network in Lucknow. The British 
retreated to the residency, facing an attack on 2 July, which they drove off 
with heavy fire. Especially after the fall of Lucknow, rural magnates joined 
the revolution in great numbers. Although Hindu rajas dominated much of 
the countryside, some Shi`is played a crucial role. Mihdi Husayn, the 
governor of Sultanpur, emerged as the "key figure, at least in southern 
Awadh, for the organizing of rebel forces in the districts."[77] Shi`i rural 
leaders gave no evidence of holding back because holy war was illegitimate 
during the Occultation; rather, Shi`i ta`alluqdars, such as Mahmudabad and 
Bhatwamau, moved in the vanguard of the rural revolt. 
Two groups, Shi`i urban-based notables and the learned men, reacted in a 
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more complex manner to the revolt, and their behavior gave rise to the 
characterization of Shi`is as quietists. Even they, however, can be shown to 
have supported the war, by and large. Many Shi`i notables at first had 
reservations about a popular revolt, for two reasons: first, they feared for 
their own (considerable) property should order break down, and second, they 
still bore allegiance to the ancien régime of Vajid `Ali Shah, on his way to 
appeal to the queen in England.[78] 
The Shi`i notables did not long enjoy the luxury of equivocation. The 
liberation of Lucknow faced them with a moment of truth, for the 
revolutionaries, rural landholders and their peasants and rebel Indian troops, 
felt a need to establish their legitimacy. They wanted a member of the 
Nishapuri family installed as king, but the main candidate, Ruknu'd-Dawlah, 
was imprisoned in the residency, and others refused. Several of Vajid `Ali 
Shah's harem officials, including `Ali Muhammad "Mamun" Khan, then put 
forth Birjis Qadar Mirza, only ten years old. The son of Vajid `Ali Shah by a 
former courtesan who belonged to the second rank of the king's wives, Birjis 
Qadar had the advantage of being young and malleable. His mother, Hazrat 
Mahall, appears to have actively sought the position of king for her son, 
although other wives of the: king opposed the move as disrespectful or 
endangering to Vajid `Ali Shah, interred in British-held Calcutta.[79] 
The revolutionaries wished to restore an Awadh government under Birjis 
Qadar in a manner consonant with the ideology of the Delhi revolt, which 
proclaimed a resurrected Mughal Empire. They therefore reverted to the pre-
1819 formulas for Awadh rule, proclaiming Birjis Qadar a nawab rather than 
a shah. Shi`is found this move easier because of their widespread conviction 
that Bahadur Shah II had adopted Shi`ism around 1853. In that year the 
powerless king of Delhi had sent a letter to Chief Mujtahid Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi expressing his love for the family of the Prophet and 
declaring as non-Muslims all those who did not love them. He had an 
offering made on his behalf to the shrine of `Abbas's standard, Lucknow's 
holiest Shi`i shrine. A year later he sent an envoy to Tehran, who informed 
Iran's Nasiru'd-Din Shah of the Mughal's adoption of Shi`ism and his request 
for political support. Shi`is probably took Bahadur Shah's subsequent denials 
of his Shi`ism as pious dissimulation (taqiyyah), whereas Sunnis believed 
them, making the last Mughal emperor an ideal rallying point for India's 
Muslims.[80] 
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The child Birjis Qadar was installed as Awadh's ruler on 5 July 1857, with the 
understanding that he would obey the orders of the Mughal emperor in Delhi 
and would give the revolutionary military a say in choosing the cabinet and 
army commanders. The "Zafarnamah" explicitly says that Birjis Qadar was 
made "nawab," rather than shah, and all sources agree that one of the 
revolutionary leaders, Shihabu'd-Din Khan, placed a turban on his head 
(rather than a crown, which had also been brought as a contingency). The 
new government rapidly appointed its chief officers, mostly former Awadh 
dignitaries, threatening recalcitrant candidates with execution for British 
sympathies if they refused to serve. They pressed Sharafu'd-Dawlah into 
service as chief minister, although some Shi`i notables objected to his being 
a Sunni. The Hindu Maharaja Balkishen reluctantly took over the treasury 
department once again. Mamun Khan became overseer of the royal 
household, a powerful post in a patrimonial government with a child ruler. 
The new government rehired displaced bureaucrats and secretaries, and 
issued orders to revolutionary troops to cease looting, regularizing military 
salaries, though plundering continued and the troops retained great power. 
During the next several months, many of the Shi`i notables in Lucknow 
recognized the new government and supported it in one manner or 
another.[81] 
The revolutionary government made major assaults against the British 
residency on 20 July and 10 August, but never succeeded in reducing the 
British stronghold, though by August it held most of Awadh. Outside 
Awadh, the tide began to turn in favor of the British. The help that the 
Indians expected from Shi`i Iran never arrived. Mamun Khan sent an 
emissary to Bahadur Shah, requesting his approval of Birjis Qadar's 
installation, but he arrived after Delhi fell to the British on 20 September, 
and returned to Lucknow. Mamun Khan sought to suppress news of the 
Mughal emperor's arrest, and proclaimed that Bahadur Shah had recognized 
Birjis Qadar as king, having salutes fired accordingly. His regents later minted 
a coin with the couplet: 
The emperor [badshah ] of every body, every eye, Birjis Qadar 
Struck coins in gold and silver, like the sun and the moon. 
This verse indicates that after the fall of Delhi the revolutionary government 
reverted to claims of independent monarchy in Awadh.[82] 
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The Birjis Qadar government failed to prevent the "relief" of the residency 
led by Havelock and Outram in late September, which opened a new front 
at Alambagh, and the assault of Campbell in the winter of 1857-58, which in 
March drove the revolutionaries out of the capital. From the autumn of 1857 
the Lucknow revolutionaries had split into two camps, with the Shi`i and 
Hindu notables supporting Hazrat Mahall and Mamun Khan, the child ruler's 
regents, whereas the Sunni intermediate strata and laboring classes went over 
to Ahmadu'llah Shah, who in Sufi style made grandiose claims to divinity. 
The two camps continued to cooperate in assaulting the British position at 
Alambagh. From Maich of 1858 when the British reconquered Lucknow, the 
competing leadership cliques established themselves in different areas of the 
countryside, still aided by revolting ta`alluqdars and their peasants, which the 
British did not subdue for almost another year. 
What was the relationship of the Shi`i ulama, who once wielded such power 
under the Nishapuris, to the new regime? The younger Nasirabadis, although 
they did not regain their control over the judiciary, joined the government in 
various capacities. Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Nasirabadi Munsifu'd-Dawlah, 
in constant attendence on revolutionary leader Mamun Khan, sought to 
regain the post of chief justice for himself; it went instead to Mir Mihdi, the 
Shi`i tutor of Birjis Qadar. Mir Mihdi, however, did employ Sayyid 
Muhammad Baqir as an intelligence analyst obtaining information on the 
movement of British troops. The revolutionaries also offered him the 
command of a regiment, the `Ali Platoon, which he delegated to his half-
brother `Ali Muhammad Nasirabadi. Sayyid `Abdu'l-Husayn, another son of 
Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, was listed by the British as a "mutineer." 
Sayyid Muhammad Taqi, son of the late Sayyid Husayn Nasirabadi (d. 1856), 
at age forty one of the more prominent Shi`i ulama in Awadh, constantly 
attended at the restored court, praying for Birjis Qadar. At the 
revolutionaries' request he used his knowledge of divination to name the 
fortunate days for attacking the Lucknow residency.[83] 
What of ulama outside the Nasirabadi family? Of twenty-three major Shi`i 
ulama in Lucknow (mostly former teachers, and some students, at the 
abolished seminary) whom the British later investigated, twelve took salaries 
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from or actively served with the revolutionary government, two applied 
unsuccessfully for jobs (one for a command), and nine attended at court and 
prayed for the government's success. Mirza Muhammad `Ali used his 
influence to get for his brother command of the Fath Jang Platoon under 
Husamu'd-Dawlah. Sayyid Asghar Husayn and Mir Khadim Husayn were 
employed in the Najib battalion, and Mawlavi Hakim Hamzah `Ali by the 
assistant to Mamun Khan, as well as by the revenue office. Mawlavi Mihdi 
Shah served in the News/Intelligence Department.[84] Little evidence is 
available about the activities of Shi`i ulama outside Lucknow, but we do 
know that Ja`far `Ali Jarchavi (d. 1896), a renowned Qur'an reciter trained as 
a Shi`i scholar in Lucknow under the Nasirabadis, was arrested with the 
Sayyids of his town in Bulandshahr in 1857 for participating in the 
revolution.[85] 
Some exceptions to Shi`i ulama support for the revolution can be noted. 
Sayyid I`jaz Husayn Kinturi, an employee of the British bureaucracy, helped 
the British despite their tearing down his house near the residency. Sayyid 
`Ali Deoghatavi, Shi`i prayer leader in Faizabad, denied involvement in the 
revolt.[86] 
The most celebrated instance of a major Shi`i scholar keeping his distance 
from the revolutionary government, that of Chief Mujtahid Sayyid 
Muhammad Nasirabadi, deserves a closer look. As was noted, one of his sons 
had a command, another was a "mutineer," and a third served as intelligence 
analyst. Sayyid Muhammad himself "made constant private visits to the 
Begam and Brijees Kudr," bringing along his close students to pray for the 
success of the revolution.[87] The government stationed guards at his house 
to protect him and his great wealth. Yet he refused to call for a holy war, and 
during the British siege in the winter of 1857-58 he expressed disapproval of 
the war. This seemingly contradictory behavior puzzled British intelligence 
agents. 
A chronological approach might help. Sayyid Muhammad often attended at 
court in the summer and autumn of 1857, when his sons took government 
service. With the British siege of Lucknow that winter, however, and the 
increasing power of the Sunni zealot Ahmadu'llah Shah, he may have seen 
the handwriting on the wall. Hindu informers spying on him from November 
1857 to March 1858 reported that he 
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refused to give his sanction to the Rebellion raging around him. He urged when 
called upon to grant his Futwas that this could not be sanctioned by any passage 
or warrant of the Koran, that war against the infidels could only be justifiable 
when waged by an Emam and not otherwise. It was also reported that in his own 
circle the Moojtahid condemned the war as quite unjustifiable and against the 
spirit of the Law as contained in the Koran.[88] 
The British report noted, however, that the chief mujtahid "permitted his 
disciples" to preach jihad, and to enter the revolutionary government's 
service. 
Within the Nasirabadi family, therefore, a generation gap is apparent. 
Younger members of the family preached holy war and took jobs with Birjis 
Qadar's administration. Sayyid Muhammad, not given the sort of power and 
recognition he had in the 1840s, gave less-devoted support to the 
revolutionaries. Since he had given a ruling in the 1830s allowing defensive 
holy war when the lands of Islam were attacked, and since many Iranian 
mujtahids sanctioned Iran's wars against Russia earlier in the century, Sayyid 
Muhammad took an extremely cautious doctrinal position in 1858. Perhaps 
he thereby hedged his bets on whether the British would win, or the 
revolutionaries. Or maybe the "large sums" he held in British Government 
securities divided his loyalties.[89] Finally, in refusing to recognize the struggle 
as a holy war, Sayyid Muhammad may have attempted to distinguish his style 
of religious leadership from that of Ahmadu'llah Shah. A similar conflict took 
place in Allahabad, where Shi`i ulama refused to call for jihad, although the 
Sunni radical Mawlavi Liyaqat Husayn did so.[90] The important point is that 
Shi`is did not need the banner of holy war in order to fight against the British, 
which they almost universally did. 
Given the prominence of Shi`i commoners, ta`alluqdars, and troops of the 
restored Shi`i government in Lucknow, and of the Shi`i ulama in the Awadh 
revolt of 1857-59, one can only wonder how the story of this community's 
ambivalence began. The answer lies in the witch-hunting atmosphere of the 
victorious British raj after March 1858. The British (inaccurately) put primary 
blame for the revolt on Muslims, and Shi`is who wished to keep their lives 
and property had a strong motivation to convince the British of their 
innocence. British troops vindictively defiled the Great Imambarah and the 
Shi`i Friday prayers mosque, turning the complex into a barracks. But the 
refusal of some older Shi`i high ulama to call for a holy war served suddenly 
to differentiate their community from the Sunnis. The British, seeking to 
rebuild their ties with local elites, swallowed the lie about Shi`i quietism with 
alacrity. Although British officials in Lucknow made a rather damaging 
circumstantial case against Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi, the governor- 
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general awarded the chief mujtahid his full stipend from the British 
government: 
That which seems best supported by evidence is that he opposed the 
preaching of a religious war: and this, for the High Priest of Lucknow, is a 
great deal. 
I think it not only just to give him the benefit of this, but politic; and I would 
seize this opportunity of finding a Mahomedan Priest who has practised 
moderation, and dissuaded from bloodshed & fanaticism to mark our approval 
of such conduct.[91] 
Sayyid Muhammad also used pro-British Shi`i friends like Sayyid I`jaz 
Husayn Kinturi to pull strings for him with them.[92] The myth of Shi`i 
quietism thus cynically suited both Shi`i ulama and notables fearful of British 
punishment and British officials seeking a "politic" rapprochement with local 
elites. 
Younger members of prominent ulama families took advantage of British 
willingness to make up. Sayyid Ghulam Husayn Kinturi, former treasury 
official at the Shi`i seminary, became deputy registrar under the deputy 
commissioner in Lucknow, in the chowk bazaar area. His brother-in-law and 
cousin, Sayyid I`jaz Husayn Kinturi, continued to work as a bureaucrat 
(munsarim) for the British government of Oudh. One of Sayyid Muhammad 
Nasirabadi's sons, Sayyid `Ali Akbar, became the deputy commissioner for 
the British in Bahraich. In some ways this move into administration under 
the colonial masters continued earlier trends of Shi`i ulama's becoming 
government judges and officials. 
Conclusion 
The Shi`i ulama seldom showed enmity to the British in the period 1775 to 
1842, gradually accommodating themselves to the presence of this European 
ally of their Shi`i government. At first ambivalent about the ritual purity of 
British commodities, the propriety of Shi`is working for Christians, and the 
legality of lending them money, they slowly came to terms with such 
manifestations of growing European power in the subcontinent, even 
investing in British securities. 
In the 1840s and 1850s they came into conflict with the British government 
for two reasons. First, they became more intimately associated with Awadh 
government policy as they grew more influential and wealthy and as they 
gained control over the judiciary. British attempts to control or absorb 
Awadh became of concern to the ulama in a more direct fashion. Second, 
they opposed British attempts to impose an "even-handed" policy toward 
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Hindus on the Nishapuri rulers, as in the trial of Bahraich's governor or in 
the Ayodhya temple conflict. 
After annexation the ulama at first sought the patronage of the British and 
the continuation from Awadh's new masters of the stipends and perquisites 
granted them by the old. The British attempted to co-opt the ulama by 
granting them the stipends. But they promised to do so only for a generation, 
and their settlement policy of taxing or resuming revenue-free grants hurt 
many Shi`i learned families. The British abolished the Shi`i judiciary and the 
seminary. Worst of all, they consigned the Shi`i state, the source of the 
mujtahids' wealth and power, to oblivion, throwing them into heavy debt. A 
few rupees a month in stipends from the chief commissioner's office could 
never make up lost glory. Thus, the Shi`i ulama, along with most other Shi`is 
of various social stations, by and large joined in the revolt of 1857-58, though 
they later attempted to obscure their participation. Without the Nishapuri 
state the Shi`is formed just a small minority in northern India, with their 
traditional privileges and forms of wealth open to being whittled away by the 
British and by ascendant Sunnis and Hindus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Two major issues have informed this book, both raised by the material itself. 
One, the growth of a hierocracy, has occasioned a concentration on the lives 
and works of the Shi`i clerics. The other, communalism, or social closure on 
a religious basis, led us to examine relations between Shi`is and other 
communities. It is time to discuss the relevance of the two issues to one 
another and to the wider question of Muslim separatism. 
First, some questions about Shi`ism and about the ulama raised in the 
introduction can now be answered. Nineteenth-century Imami Shi`ism, it 
turns out, was hardly intrinsically hostile to states ruled by kings, notables, or 
other nonclerics. To the contrary, preindustrial Shi`is longed for a realm ruled 
by a Shi`i potentate, and their clerics adopted different rules of conduct for 
believers living under a Shi`i ruler than for those laboring under Sunni or 
unbelieving governments. The mujtahids in Awadh demanded the public 
execration of the Sunni caliphs precisely on the grounds that they lived in a 
Shi`i-ruled realm (Dar ash-Shi`ah), where pious dissimulation was 
impermissible. The ulama may have seen the Nishapuri state as ultimately 
unjust, but they did not think it illegitimate, though its legitimacy for them 
derived from customary rather than religious law. They often called the ruler 
the "just king," and since they themselves proclaimed it wrong to practice 
pious dissimulation in a Realm of the Shi`ah, their application to him of this 
epithet has some meaning. 
The question of the Shi`i state's legal status according to the Imami 
jurisprudents is secondary, however, to their actual behavior toward it. Here 
we have abundant evidence that most Shi`i ulama in North India actively 
cooperated with the Nishapuri state, taking gifts, stipends, land grants, and 
posts from it. They served as its prayer leaders, its seminary teachers, its 
charity administrators, and ultimately its judiciary. In the 1840s the mujtahids 
administered Rs. 300,000 per year in charitable taxes paid by the state 
treasury, and received large salaries and perquisites from the shah. No major 
Usuli mujtahids played an oppositional role toward the Awadh state, though 
they did sometimes differ with it over policy. Indeed, the most trenchant 
criticisms of the Nishapuris I found came from the Sufi Shi`i Mawlavi Sami`; 
the Usuli Sayyid Dildar `Ali argued that Shi`is should support the state, on 
the grounds that it favored the Imams and their partisans. 
The financial dependence of the ulama on the state in Awadh may have 
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been greater than in Iran. With a Sunni and Hindu-dominated bazaar, 
Lucknow and Faizabad supported relatively few Shi`i merchants and artisans 
who could, through their religious donations, in turn subvent the mujtahids. 
Moreover, Shi`i endowments were much more numerous in Iran, so that the 
ulama there had greater employment opportunities as supervisors. But it 
should also be remembered that many Shi`i ulama in Awadh were zamindars, 
small landholders who could have lived independently in the qasabahs 
managing their estates. Rather, most of them enjoyed the life of ulama in 
Lucknow and Faizabad, including their contacts or employment with the Shi`i 
court. 
The important point here is not that Shi`i ulama were always adjuncts of the 
Shi`i-ruled state, but that ulama ideology exhibited flexibility over time. Ulama 
in the 1840s were willing to associate themselves with the state in ways their 
fathers or grandfathers in the eighteenth century had not been. Shi`ism began 
as a sectarian movement, and under the Mughals it continued to have sectarian 
characteristics. Those who argue that the Shi`i clergy were in great tension even 
with the Qajar state place them at the sectarian pole, partly on the grounds that 
Shi`i theology and abstract political theory have strong sectarian overtones left 
over from when the primitive movement was one of protest by the 
dispossessed. But the theoretical framework employed in this work would 
allow for movement along a continuum. The Shi`i clergy could become more 
or less reconciled to the state over time, depending on the type of regime and 
society that prevailed. Where there has been a Shi`i, as opposed to a Sunni or 
non-Muslim, government, the Shi`i religious establishment has tended to be 
less sectarian in nature and more integrated into the state. My findings for 
Nishapuri Awadh give support to Willem Floor's contention that the 
revolutionary character of the Shi`i ulama has been exaggerated, and that their 
view of the social structure differed little from that of the secular elites. 
Shi`i religious organization remained relatively amorphous, though the 
authority of the chief mujtahid in Lucknow was recognized all over North 
India. Yet the community's organization increased greatly from the eighteenth 
to the mid-nineteenth century. On a popular level, mourning sessions, poetry 
readings, and public processions created extensive social networks among 
believers. More formally, the prayer leaders, jurisconsults, teachers, and judges 
formed a body of religious specialists differentiated from the laity by their 
training and their reception of monetary rewards for religious work. Shi`i 
literati from the intermediate strata adopted the Usuli school of jurisprudence, 
originally imported from Iraq and Iran, as their ideology. 
Shi`is moved from a group in which lay-clerical differences were slight to one 
in which a vast chasm separated the chief mujtahid from a humble Shi`i artisan. 
In short, Shi`ism underwent the classic transition from sect to formal 
establishment. I have emphasized the key role of the state in defining the sta- 
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tus of religious groups and in aiding the transition from sectarian organization to a 
formal establishment and the reverse. Under the Mughals, Shi`is were sectarian; under 
the Nishapuris, mostly because of the wealth and position the state bestowed. on the 
ulama, they came to have a formal religious establishment. 
I found horizontal stratification a useful tool for analyzing even a preindustrial Muslim 
society and its institutions. Some Shi`i artisans and laborers saw the mujtahids as 
lackeys of the rich. They opposed or ignored Friday prayers, and some held to a folk 
theology that attributed divinity to Imam `Ali or joined antinomian movements, such 
as that led by the head of the body washers in Murshidabad. The Shi`i poor sometimes 
gave allegiance to the Akhbari school once the Usulis became strongly associated with 
the ruling class; some Akhbaris denied the legitimacy of private property in land. A 
conviction existed that the Twelfth Imam would return in A.H. 1260 (A.D. 1844) to 
fill the world with justice and unite all men in one faith, though the date appears to 
have passed without further comment in Awadh. Shi`i tradespeople set up pictures of 
the Imams for supplication and indulged in other practices abhorrent to the 
professional ulama. 
Other groups of Shi`is from different social and economic classes also developed their 
own religious cultures. Some high notables became literate enough in Shi`i sciences 
to be gentlemen ulama, and some of these clung to Akhbarism for a few generations 
rather than recognize the authority of Usuli clerics from a petty landholding 
background. Other notables patronized Sufis or studied mystical metaphysics in 
preference to the books of ritual law and the principles of jurisprudence beloved by 
the mujtahids. High notables, through their salons and imambarahs, created a religious 
culture centered on the recitation of martial religious poetry about Imam Husayn at 
Karbala. Of course, many notables devoted little of their energy to religion of any 
sort. 
The biographical dictionaries seldom mention details like the social background of 
the ulama. Yet the data I have been able to assemble give a strong and consistent 
impression that most ulama came from qasabahs where their families owned just a few 
villages. Others derived from the service classes in cosmopolitan cities, such as 
Faizabad and Lucknow. Some became genuinely wealthy, especially in the 1840s, but 
most appear to have come from the intermediate strata of Muslim society. The 
distinction they often made between the notables (umara ') and the learned (‘ulama') 
generally overlapped, with a distinction between the rich and the moderately well-off. 
What impact did the growth of a hierocracy have on communal relations in North 
India? It seems clear that in the preindustrial west and south of Asia two major sorts 
of religious organization and policy could be adopted. One, the unrationalized, was 
exemplified by the Sufis and the Akhbaris, who for the most part sought communal 
coexistence. Sufi pirs even served as in- 
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termediaries among religious communities, often accepting Hindus or Muslims 
of other sects as their disciples and producing literature of a syncretic nature. 
The major alternative was a rational approach to religious law, such as that of 
strict Hanafi jurisprudents among the Sunnis, and the Usuli mujtahids among 
the Shi`is. Awrangzib and Amjad `Ali Shah opted for the rational juridical 
policy, which was more compatible with state building than were traditional or 
charismatic forms of religion. Yet the drawback to adopting such a rationalized 
religious jurisprudence as the basis for state policy lay in its provocation of 
religious tensions. As cultural intermediators such as Sufi pits were displaced 
in Usuli Awadh, as cultural syncretism became suspect in the eyes of believers 
influenced by the scripturalist mujtahids, communalism grew. Religious 
disputes and riots had long existed, as Bayly has shown. But rational religious 
jurisprudence helped transform diffuse antagonisms into a more organized 
form of social closure. The rise of Usuli rationalism predated the impact of 
modern capitalism, but proved largely compatible with it—differing in this 
respect from the declining Sufi orders. 
The growth of hierocracy, then, promoted social closure on a religious basis. 
Where Akhbaris or Sufi Shi`is made compromises with Sunnis, especially in 
regard to cursing their caliphs, Usulis actively encouraged their public 
execration, even at the risk of violence. Although Usulis sought a political 
partnership with Sunnis, they insisted on a stronger delineation of religious 
boundaries. Usulis also advocated that the Shi`i state destroy Hinduism and 
strip Hindus of all personal status rights, giving them a choice of conversion 
or death. The mujtahids urged Shi`is to avoid the ritual pollution that would 
come from association with Hindus or some kinds of Sunni. By advocating a 
religious closure so strong that the community came to resemble a caste, the 
mujtahids laid the foundation for the emergence of Shi`ism as a political 
identity. 
The Nishapuri period in North India sheds light in two ways on the tradition 
of Muslim separatism and political activism that distinguished the United 
Provinces from southern India. Not only did the Usuli ulama and mourning 
practices promote social closure among Shi`is, but a series of Sunni 
movements arose that sought the restoration of Sunni rule. The Nishapuris' 
break with Mughal traditions weakened their legitimacy among some Sunni 
zamindars in the qasabahs, and some regions suffered economically from tax-
farming and the auction of offices. Moreover, as Nishapuri rule became weaker 
in the nineteenth century because of British restrictions, Hindu ta`alluqdars, 
mystical corporations, and merchants grew more powerful. In neighboring 
British-ruled areas the hand of Hindu moneylenders was strengthened by 
British requirements that revenue assignments be backed by bank credit. Bayly 
has demonstrated a pattern in nineteenth-century North India wherein Hindu-
dominated commercial cities prospered, whereas Muslim 
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qasabahs declined.[1] Sunni families with a tradition of landholding and 
religious learning keenly felt the loss of Sunni grandeur and wealth. 
Ostensibly, the movements of Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi in the 1820s, of 
Amir `Ali Amethavi in 1855, and of Ahmadu'llah Shah in 1857-58 were 
directed against groups other than the Shi`i rulers in Lucknow. But Sayyid 
Ahmad dreamed of overthrowing the Nishapuris after he had defeated the 
Sikhs in the Punjab. Amir `Ali's holy war against the Hindus of Ayodhya 
brought him into a military encounter with Vajid `Ali Shah's troops. And 
Ahmadu'llah Shah ultimately bore as much enmity toward Birjis Qadar as 
toward the British. All three of these movements, drawing their followers 
from the Sunni intermediate strata, practiced what Parkin calls dual closure. 
Just as white unions in South Africa fought both the capitalists above and 
the black laborers below, so these Sunni revivalists fought both non-Muslims 
and the Shi`i ruling class.[2] 
This tradition of dual closure among the Sunni intermediate strata of 
nineteenth-century North India seems unlikely to be irrelevant to twentieth-
century developments. Even the strategic terrain bears resemblances. The 
minority Muslims of Awadh and surrounding territories who wanted to 
establish a Sunni state immediately thought of Peshawar, western Punjab, 
and Bengal as natural demographic bases. The growth of a Shi`i state and its 
hierocracy, along with economic dislocations, presented Sunnis of what 
became the United Provinces with a psychological shock that those living in 
southern India were largely spared. The shock was increased by the British 
annexation of Awadh, which, although Shi`i-ruled, had at least been in 
Muslim hands. In contrast, committed Sunnis living in southern India had 
the option of living in the Nizamate of Hyderabad, which maintained Sunni 
Mughal traditions, right up until 1947. Awadh Sunnis faced both an alien, 
Shi`i ruling class of tax-farmers in the metropole and Hindu rajas in the 
provinces. The longing for a Sunni state among some radicals in the small 
towns of North India goes back rather further than the early twentieth 
century. 
Bayly has argued that roots of communalism lay in social formations created 
by religious communities in the eighteenth century, the Hindu merchant 
class, and the Muslim service gentry based in the qasabahs or in Muslim city 
quarters. Economic, administrative, and political developments were kinder 
to the Hindu merchants than to the Muslim service gentry. "While strong, 
indigenous states retained power, these parallel developments did not 
necessarily presage conflict. But from the 1830s the disintegration of the old 
magistracies and notabilities left broader spaces for contention."[3] Bayly 
makes a case for the relative decline of the qasabahs, economically and 
culturally, which lent urgency to Muslim protestations of increasing 
"backward- 
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ness" at the end of the nineteenth century. These were not, as Brass 
suggested, merely self-serving lies. Under the British from 1859 Muslims 
probably did not do as badly in the new middle class as their leaders argued. 
But the deterioration of their qasabahs filled them with alarm. Even where 
Muslim towns did not decline absolutely, they often witnessed a Hindu 
influx, as the Muslims lost their edge in the rate of urbanization. 
In the British period Sunni activists continued the process of dual closure, 
the formation of a community identity by conflict with both Hindus and 
Shi`is. Freitag has drawn attention to the importance of religious rites and 
riots to the formation of community identity late in the nineteenth century. 
For Hindus, cow protection formed a rallying cry for societies and riots, 
which increased community identity. Among Muslims, Muharram and other 
rites played a similar role. Social closure was aided in this period by the spread 
of Islamic education and the founding of Urdu printing presses that 
published works of the ulama and Muslim scholars. Increasing literacy among 
Muslims made the ideas of ulama and activists advocating a stronger Muslim 
(Sunni or Shi`i) identity more accessible to large numbers of people.[4] 
Shi`i activists also sought to impose their more austere mourning practices 
on all Muslims at Muharram processions. Shi`i preachers insisted on cursing 
the caliphs and proclaiming that `Ali should have succeeded the Prophet 
without any delay. The compromise position adopted by many Muslims, of 
giving special honor to `Ali among the caliphs, was rejected both by Sunni 
hard-liners such as the Ahl-i Hadith and by Shi`i mainstream Usulis. Sunni-
Shi`i conflict broke out in Lucknow in 1906, and Shi`is and Sunnis as a result 
stopped taking their cenotaphs to the same Karbala burial grounds outside 
Lucknow on the tenth of Muharram. This renegotiation of sacred geography 
emphasized the increasing closure of the Sunni and Shi`i communities. 
Thereafter, Sunni-Shi`i violence broke out frequently, drawing the Hindus in 
as allies of one side or another.[5] 
Shi`i ulama and landholders gradually rebuilt some institutions in North 
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India, founding seminaries and training-institutes for preachers. In the late 
nineteenth century graduates of the defunct Asafu'd-Dawlah seminary spread 
over North India and the subcontinent, introducing Shi`i Friday prayers and 
Usuli teaching curricula in Lahore and Peshawar in the north and in 
Hyderabad in the south. Legal rulings for the laity were published in Urdu by 
Usuli exponents of Shi`i Islamization. 
Shi`is and Sunnis never threw up complete barriers between their two 
communities. Many Shi`i notables supported the Khilafat movement in the 
1920s, fueled by the Sunni demand that the Ottoman ruler, which Indian 
Sunnis began accepting as their caliph late in the nineteenth century, be 
protected after the Ottoman defeat in World War I. That movement became 
allied with Mahatma Gandhi's early noncooperation drive, and so was 
involved in the growth of nationalism in the modern subcontinent. Strict 
Usuli ulama m Lucknow at first refused to cooperate in a movement for a 
Sunni caliph, whom they saw as a usurper of rights belonging solely to the 
family of the Prophet. But rumors of British bombardment of the shrine 
cities in Iraq led some of them to join in noncooperation against the British.[6] 
Brass wrote, against the primordialist position, that Muslim ulama did not 
play a leading role in the Muslim League and the movement for Pakistan. 
Robinson insisted in reply that many more ulama were active in that 
movement than has been generally realized.[7] But the important point is not 
that ulama were state builders; Muslim politicians were more important. 
Rather, the religious culture promoted by some schools of ulama laid the 
groundwork for the emergence of a Muslim political identity once the masses 
became politicized. The question of north Indian Shi`i participation in the 
movement for Pakistan cannot be addressed here, since no quantitative study 
has been done. Many Shi`i families emigrated to Karachi, and one can think 
of important Shi`i supporters of the Muslim League, such as the Raja of 
Mahmudabad. Their participation was probably proportionate to that of 
Sunnis, but their numbers were far less (most Sunnis did not emigrate, either). 
The large Shi`i community of nearby eastern Punjab went to Pakistan in its 
entirety. 
Both in promoting Shi`i closure and in provoking Sunnis to dual closure, the 
mujtahids of Awadh created structures conducive to Muslim separatism. The 
compatibility of Usulism with modern Muslim state building is further 
demonstrated in revolutionary Iran after 1978, where some radical Usuli 
ulama took their doctrine that they were the representatives of the Twelfth 
Imam to its logical (though not necessary) conclusion, demanding for the 
 
 
― 290 ― 
first time the right to rule. I pointed to the usefulness in understanding these 
events of Parkin's neo-Weberian conception of social closure, which he 
elaborated largely in the context of apartheid in South Africa. After all, some 
of the same social consequences are apparent in religious closure as in racial, 
and modern states have been built on the basis of both. Both appear so alien 
from the perspective of the ideals of 1789, which demand equal civil rights 
for all citizens, that those in that tradition must make a special effort of 
imagination to understand societies where race or religion define de jure 
second-class citizens. Fear of reduction to such a status, to which they know 
they would reduce others, explains much about religious communalists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY OF ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND URDU 
TERMS 
Language designations refer to usage and transliteration, not to etymology: [A] = Arabic, [P] = 
Persian, [U] = Urdu. 
`Adil : Upright, opposite of morally corrupt. [A] 
‘adalat : Muslim court of law; uprightness. [P] 
ara'ishvala : One who constructed the bright replicas of the Imam Husayn's 
tomb for use in Muharram ceremonies. [P] 
ashraf : The "noble" castes among the Muslims in India, including Sayyids, 
Mughals (Iranians and Turks), Pathans (Afghans), and Shaykhs. [A] 
ataliq : A guardian, tutor, master. [P] 
bharbunja : Grain parcher. [U] 
bay‘at : The oath of allegiance and obedience given by a Sufi adept to his 
master upon his initiation into a Sufi order. [P] 
bid‘ah : A heretical innovation in Islamic doctrine. [A] 
bihishti : A water carrier. [P] 
bi-shar` : A Sufi order of the laboring classes whose members did not observe 
closely the strictures of Islamic law. [P] 
dalil : Evidence for a ruling deriving from the divine Law. [A] 
dar al-harb : The Realm of War, an area where Muslims are not in political 
control. [A] 
darbar : A royal audience where ceremonial offerings are made by inferiors to 
superiors and vice versa. [P] 
daroghah : Head man or superintendent of any office or department. [U] 
dhikr : The Sufi practice of chanting God's name and other religious formulas, 
often with hyperventilation. [A] 
dhimmi : In Islamic law, a Jew or a Christian, protected as a member of a 
recognized religious community under Muslim rule, who must pay a minority 
tax but is exempt from military service. [A] 
fatwa : A legal ruling given by a Muslim jurisconsult, or mufti. [A] 
fawjdar : The chief magistrate of a district, with military responsibilities. [P] 
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hadith : An oral report transmitted by generations of Muslim scholars going 
back to the Prophet or the Imams; complements the Qur'an as a source of 
Islamic law. [A] 
hakim : Physician in the tradition of "Greek" medicine going back through 
Avicenna to Galen and Aristotle. [A] 
handasah : Geometry, draughtsmanship. [A] 
haram : An action forbidden by Islamic law for the commission of which God 
will punish the believer. [A] 
hay'at : Cosmography. [P] 
ihtiyat : Caution, following the most strict of the major positions in any matter 
of law. [A] 
ijazah : A certificate given by a teacher to his student that he has completed 
a certain book or course of study. These were most often given by Shi`i ulama 
permitting the transmission by the student of Imami oral reports. Usuli 
masters sometimes bestowed ijazahs allowing ijtihad . [A] 
ijtihad : The application of reasoned effort to the derivation of a ruling from 
the scriptural text, sometimes involving a limited sort of syllogism or analogy. 
A jurisprudential method rejected by early Imami Shi`is but accepted by 
Usulis from the fourteenth century. [A] 
‘illah : A common term, indicating the reason for which a divine law has been 
ordained, upon which a legal analogy may be based. [A] 
imambarah : In North India, a large building wherein mourning sessions were 
held by notables to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. [U] 
imam-jum`ah : Leader of the Friday congregational prayers. [A] 
Imami Shi`ism: A branch of Islam believing that after the death of the Prophet 
his rightful religious and political successors should have been his son-in-law 
and cousin, `Ali, and the latter's eleven descendants through the Prophet's 
daughter, Fatimah. [A] 
`ishq : Overwhelming, passionate love, used by Sufi mystics to describe their 
highest feelings for God. [A] 
jagir : The assignment of the government share of the produce of a large tract 
of land to an individual in lieu of salary for services rendered [P] 
jahiz : The clothing and furniture that a bride brings to her husband's house. 
[A] 
ja'ir Unjust. In Shi`i jurisprudential thought any ruler other than the Imam is 
imperfect and so ultimately unjust. [A] 
jat (Urdu zat) : Roughly, caste. [U] 
jihad : War for the sake of God and Islam In Imami Shi`ism such a war was 
classically believed to be legitimately led only by an Imam, and after the last 
Imam disappeared the duty to wage it lapsed, except in self-defense. [A] 
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julahah : a weaver of coarse cloth. [P] 
jum`ah : Friday congregational prayers. [A] 
kalam : Dialectical theology, cultivated by the rationalist Usulis but forbidden 
by the Akhbaris. [A] 
karamat : Graces or miracles that Muslim holy men claimed to be able to 
perform. [A] 
kashf : Mystical inspiration from God. [A] 
khabar al-ahad : An oral report transmitted by only one scholar in each early 
generation of the Muslims. [A] 
khanqah : A building where Sufis gathered for chanting and meditation 
sessions. [P] 
khirqah : The patched cloak bestowed upon a Sufi adept by his master upon 
his initiation into a Sufi order. [A] 
khums : A Muslim religious tax of 20 percent on certain kinds of income, 
which, among Shi`is, is distributed to poor Sayyids. Usulis held that half the 
income from this tax should go to the religious jurisprudents. [A] 
khutbah : Formula read at the Friday afternoon congregational prayers, into 
which the name of the ruler was often inserted. [A] 
kotval : A mixture of police chief and urban administrator. [U] 
madad-i ma`ash: Grants of land to Muslim religious functionaries, scholars, 
and mystics for their support. [P] 
madrash : Muslim institution of higher learning, seminary. [A] 
majlis : A mourning session held for the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. [A] 
marja`-itaqlid : A jurisprudent, or mujtahid, who is emulated by laymen in his 
rulings on the religious law. [P] 
marsiyyah-khvan : A reciter of Shi`i elegiac poetry. [P] 
marthiyyah (Persian: marsiyyah): Elegiac poetry mourning the Shi`i martyrs, 
including the Imam Husayn, who died at the seventh-century battle of 
Karbala. [A] 
ma`sum : Sinless: an attribute in Shi`ism of the Prophet and the Imams. [A] 
ma'tam : In North India, self-flagellation in mourning of the martyred Imam. 
[A] 
mawlavi : A member of the Muslim religious learned class. [P] 
minbar : A stairway-like pulpit from which preachers speak in the mosque. [A] 
mu`afi : A grant of land free of tax in perpetuity. [A] 
mufti : A Muslim jurisconsult (English: mufti). [A] 
muhaddith : An expert in the orally transmitted reports from the Prophet (and, 
in Shi`ism, from the Imams), which, along with the written Qur'an, constitute 
Islamic scripture. [A] 
mujtahid : A jurisprudent who practices ijtihad, or legal reasoning. [A] 
munsarim : A manager, administrator, head clerk of a court of settlements. [A] 
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munshi A writer, secretary. [A] 
mut`ah : Temporary marriage, allowed in Shi`i law (Persian: sighah). [A] 
mutakallim A practitioner of dialectical theology, or kalam . [A] 
najis : In Shi`i law, something ritually impure or polluted. [A] 
naqqal : Storyteller, jester. [U] 
nazim : Governor of a large province. [P] 
nazranah : A religious gift or offering to a shrine or a holy man. [P] 
qasabah : A small town or large village, averaging a population of 3,000, often 
with a fort, irrigation works, a water tank, and a tradition of literacy and local 
pride, acting as a seat for small Muslim landholders. [U] 
qat`i : A type of scriptural evidence that is conclusive for a particular ruling. 
[A] 
qazi (Arabic: qadi): Muslim religious-court judge. [P] 
qiyas : The use of analogy or syllogism in jurisprudential reasoning, allowed 
by Usuli Shi`is but forbidden by Akhbaris. [A] 
rawzah-khvan : A reader of prose laments for the Shi`i martyrs at Karbala. [P] 
sadaqat : Voluntary pious contributions to the poor. [A] 
sanad : A document certifying the grant of land or a perpetual stipend. [A] 
Sayyid : A descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, owed special status among 
Muslims. [A] 
shari`ah : The divinely ordained system of laws in Islam. [A] 
Sunni Islam : The majority branch, which recognizes four orthodox successors 
to the Prophet, elected by an oligarchic council of the Quraysh tribe, 
including Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and `Ali, and which takes a generally 
positive view of the Muslim monarchies that thereafter arose. [A] 
suz-khvani : The soulful chanting of elegies for the Imam Husayn. [P] 
ta`alluqdar : A large rural landholder in Awadh. [P] 
tabarra ': The Shi`i practice of publicly cursing the first caliphs, whom they 
believe to have wrongfully usurped the leadership of the Muslim community 
from the Imam `Ali. [A] 
tahsildar : A revenue collector for the government. [P] 
taqiyyah : The Shi`i doctrine that a believer must lie about his branch of Islam 
should he feel his life to be in danger. [A] 
taqlid : Emulation; in Usuli Shi`ism, the practice of laymen obeying the 
religious rulings of mujtahids, or expert jurisprudents. [A] 
tariqah : An order of Sufi Muslims, which met together for group chanting 
and meditation, with a vaguely hierarchical structure within which many sorts 
of social relations existed, not only mystical ones. [A] 
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tavalla : Praising and blessing the Prophet and the Twelve Imams whom Shi`is 
believe to be his legitimate successors. [P] 
tava'if : Courtesan or prostitute. [U] 
ta`ziyah-khanah : A small structure where the martyrdom of Imam Husayn 
was commemorated, as differentiated from the larger imambarah . [P] 
‘ulama ': Muslim religious scholars (English: ulama). [A] 
umara ': High notables. [A] 
‘urf : Customary law, as differentiated from the divinely revealed Islamic law. 
[A] 
va`iz : A preacher of sermons at a mosque. [P] 
vujub-i `ayni : A religious duty incumbent on each believer. [P] 
vujub-itakhyiri : An obligation of preference. [P] 
wahdatal-wujud : The doctrine, adhered to by Muslim mystics, or Sufis, that 
existence is ultimately monistic in nature, rather than plural. Opponents of 
the doctrine branded it pantheistic. [A] 
wajd : A state of mystical ecstasy. [A] 
waqf : A pious endowment, alienating property for religious purposes in 
perpetuity. [A] 
zakat : A Muslim religious tax for the poor. [A] 
zamindar : A small or middle landholder in Awadh. [P] 
zann : In jurisprudence, a considered opinion: differentiated from certain 
knowledge (`ilm) based on conclusive evidence. [A] 
zarih : A replica of the tomb of Imam Husayn, also called in northern India 
a ta`ziyah . [P] 
ziyarat : Religious visitation or pilgrimage. [P] 
zuhd : Continence, asceticism. [A] 
zuhr : Daily noon prayers. [A] 
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usages of, attacked by Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi, 236 
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relationship with Shi`is, 224 -29; 
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Jaunpuri, Sayyid Gulshan 'Ali, 257 
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Muharram rites: Lahore observance of, 25 -26; 
in Delhi, 83 ; 
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and Hakim Mihdi 'ali Khan Kashmiri, 262 
Muzaffarnagar, 77, 90, 182 
Mysticism, See Sufis 
N 
Nadir Shah, 28, 32, 36, 41, 45 
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Najafi, Sayyid Muhammad an-, 168 
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urges persecution of Hinduism, 226 ; 
urges public cursing of Caliphs, 231 ; 
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criticizes notables as corrupt, 215 ; 
on teaching infidel children, 227 ; 
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Nadir Shah defeated by, 28 ; 
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Shaykhs dwell in, 83 ; 
Pathans in, 84 ; 
Muslim landlords employ Hindus in, 86 -87; 
Usuli ulama from, 182, 208 ; 
Naqshbandi Sufism in, 234 ; 
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Qizilbash, 28, 45, 82 
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Riza Khan 'Ali-Jah Bahadur, 208 
Ruhihilahs, 45 -46, 48, 49, 60, 65, 133 
Ruling classes: role of, in spreading Shi`ism, 34 -35; 
and formal religious establishment, 126 ; 
called tyrannical, 155 ; 
Shi`i, sought cachet of Hidden Imam, 177 ; 
ulama form subordinate part of, 183 
Rumi Darvazah, 94 
Rustamnagar, 99 -100, 111 
S 
Sa'adat 'Ali Khan: and tutor, 53 ; 
put into power by East India Company, 54 ; 
cedes half of Awadh, 71 ; 
confiscates revenue-free holdings, 76 ; 
and Sayyids, 80 ; 
marries daughter of Madaru'd-Dawlah, 83 ; 
and shrine to Hazrat 'Abbas, 99 ; 
observance of Muharram by, 102 ; 
appoints Sunni judges, 140 ; 
mistakes date of Holy Day, 141 -42; 
despotic rule of, supported by S. Dildar 'Ali, 155 ; 
bestows stipends instead of land, 179 ; 
tomb of, 205 ; 
hires Shi`i administrators, 256 -57; 
and case of heirs of Hajji Karbala'i Tihrani vs. heirs of Hasan Riza Khan, 259 -58 
Sabzavari, Sayyid Najmu'd-Din, 77 
Sadiq, Imam, Ja'far as-: legal reasoning of, 16 
Safavids: Shi`i state, 5 ; 
conquests of, 13 -14; 
Afghan defeat of, 27 ; 
Shi`ism promoted by, 14, 22 ; 
Usulism accepted by, 19 ; 
held up as example to Awadh shahs, 210 
Safdar Jang, 45 -47, 51 -52, 82 
Saharanpur, 236 
Sakm-i sadat, 80 
Sa'idu'd-Dawlah, 267 
Salamu'llah Khan, 53 
Salon, 42, 147, 236 
Samanpur, 76 
Sami', Mawlavi, 154 -56, 224 -25, 230 
Sandila, 46, 77, 80, 139 
Sasani, Abu'l-Qasim, 182 
Sawda, Rafi'u'd-Din, 97 
Sayyids, 71, 73 -81, 199 -200, 202 -3, 231 
Sect, variety of meanings, 3 ; 
defined, 7 ; 
and Shi`ism in eighteenth-century North India, 123 -27, 142 -44; 
and Indian Akhbarism, 178 ; 
transition from, to formal establishment, 213, 284 -85 
Seminary (madrasah), 182, 204 -9, 217, 272, 289 
Sermon, Friday. See Khutbah 
Shahjahanpur, 49, 60 
Shahji, 158 
Shahristani, Muhammad Mihdi, 34 n 
Sharafu'd-Dawlah, 267, 277 
Shaykhism, 185 -89 
Shaykhs (caste), 71, 77 -78, 83, 231 
Shaykhzadahs, 41, 45, 46 
Shi`is, Imami or Twelver: riot against Farangi-Mahall, 49 ; 
receive stipends from Asafu'd-Dawlah, 57 -58; 
social origins of, 69 -91; 
undercounted in census, 86 ; 
distribution in Awadh, 90 ; 
folk practices of, 99 -101; 
women of, forbidden to marry Sunnis, 232 ; 
and Faizabad temple dispute, 244 -49; 
mujtahids forbid, from working for British, 256 ; 
mujtahids allow, to work for British, 258 ; 
and the taking of interest on loans, 259 -63; 
during the 1857 Revolt, 272 -81 
Shi`ism, Imami or Twelver: early history, 4 -5, 16 -19; 
theocracy in, 5 ; 
popular-class support for, 34 -35; 
sling-class support for, 34 -35; 
Sayyids often sympathetic to, 74 -81; 
influence among artisans, 85 -89; 
Friday prayers in, 127 -37; 
zakat and khums in, 199 -200 
Shiraz, 31, 32 
Shuja'u'd-Dawlah: reign of, 47 -50; 
supports Shi`i rioters, 49 ; 
and Tafazzul Husayn Khan Kashmiri, 53 ; 
and Shi`i physicians, 54 -55; 
tums against Qizilbash, 82 ; 
strives to keep EIC out of Awadh, 252 
Shustar, 22 
Shustari, Nuru'llah, 25 
Shustari, Sayyid Muhammad 'Abbas, 206 -7, 211 -13, 243, 270 
Sialkot, 53 
Sihala, 43, 248 
Sindh, 62 
Sitapur, 82, 274 
Sleeman, W. H., 202 -3, 242, 267 -69 
State building, 1 -2, 46 -50, 142 -44, 171 -72, 289 
Status groups, 72 -73, 79, 183, 216 -17 
Stratification, social: relative importance of horizontal and vertical, 3 -4; 
remains important during community rites, 117 -18; 
significance of, in religious leadership denied, 154 ; 
and differing religious ideologies, 158, 169 -72; 
secondary variable 
 
― 326 ― 
Stratification: (Contd .) 
in defining church and sect, 219 -20; 
based on religious community, 233 -34; 
and Sayyid Ahmad Rai-Barelavi's movement, 234 -38; 
and Faizabad temple dispute, 248 -50; 
and 1857 Revolt, 273 -81; 
and the study of Awadh Shi`ism, 285 
Subhan 'Ali Khan, 158, 165, 231, 256 -57 
Sufis: persecuted by Safavid ulama, 21 ; 
favored by eighteenth-century Awadh nobility, 127 ; 
and Shi`ism, 89 -90; 
and Friday prayer issue, 129 - 36, 148 -51; 
lands endowed for, by Asafu'd-Dawlha, 147 ; 
and Shi`ism in Lucknow, 147 -48; 
and polemics with Usulism, 152 -59; 
cursed and ostracized by Usulis, 156 -59; 
levy contributions on bazaar, 158 
Sulayman Shah, 21 
Sultan Husayn, Shah, 27 -28 
Sultanu'l-'Ulama'. See Nasirabadi, Sayyid Muhammad 
Sunnis: Safavid persecution of, 28 ; 
Burhanu'l-Mulk's expropriation of, 42 ; 
insecurity of, under Shuja'u'd-Dawlah, 48 -50; 
receive stipends from Asafu'd-Dawlah, 57 ; 
observance of Muharram, 115 ; 
violence between, and Shi`is, 115 ; 
attacked in Shi`i sermons, 156 ; 
former, turned Shi`is avoid cursing ancestors, 157 ; 
poor, embrace Shi`ism for alms, 200 ; 
exclusion of, from being qazis urged, 210 ; 
polemics of, with Shi`is, 229 -33; 
militant movements among, 234 -38, 244 -49; 
communal barriers between, and Shi`is, 238 -44; 
and Muharram rites, 240 ; 
reaction of, to British conquest of Delhi, 255 ; 
militants among, practice dual closure toward Shi`is and Hindus, 287 ; 
desire for separate state among, 287 -90 
Suz-khvani, 107 
Syllogism. See Qiyas 
Syncretism, 115 -17, 224, 236 
T 
Ta'alluqdars, 75, 103 -4, 266, 274 
Tabarra ', 108, 240 -42 
Tabataba'i, Sayyid 'Ali, 34, 62, 134, 138, 163 -64 
Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad Mihdi, 34, 64 
Tafdil, 231, 236 
Tahsin 'Ali Khan, 226 
Tahsin 'Ali Mosque, 205 
Tahmasp I, 19 
Tahmasp II, 28 
Taj, Sayyid, 75 -76 
Taju'd-Din Husayn Khan, 158, 165, 256 -57 
Tanda, 85 -86 
Taqiyyah (pious dissimulation): forbidden under Safavids, 20 ; 
controversy over, in Awadh, 141 -42; 
led to forbidding music, 154 ; 
forbidden in post-1819 Awadh, 242 
Taqlid (emulation), 18, 162 
Taxes, religious, See Kharaj ; Khums ; Zakat 
Tehran, 32, 64, 164 
Tihrani, Hajji Karbala'-i Muhammad, 139, 259 
Tikaitganj, 94 
Tiloi, Raja of (Mohan Singh), 41 Traditional authority, 145 -46. 159 -67, 169 -71 
Turanians, 47 
Turner, Bryan, 3, 126 
Twelfth Imam, 5, 17, 100, 192 
U 
Ulama, Shi`i (Indian): subordinate to physicians in Faizabad, 55 ; 
attracted to Lucknow, 59 ; 
scholarship inhibited under Mughals, 59 ; 
in Najaf and Karbala, 62 -64; 
forbid flagellation, 108 ; 
allow flagellation, 114 ; 
relations with Sa'adat 'Ali, 140 -42; 
bureaucratization of, 142 -44; 
and professional closure, 144 ; 
legitimate Awadh monarchy in Khutbahs, 176 -77; 
sources of patronage for, 178 -83; 
controversy among, over drinking and gambling, 182 -83; 
and zakat and khums, 198 -204; 
become high notables, rentiers, 202 -4; 
and seminary, 204 -9; 
intermarry with high notables, 206, 209 ; 
maintain distinct style of life, 216 ; 
collaborate with state, 216 -17; 
intolerant of Hinduism, 224 -29; 
attitude to Sunnism, 229 -49; 
forbid taking of interest on loans, 258 -59; 
allow taking of interest on loans, 263 ; 
reject modern science, 264 ; 
role of, in 1857 Revolt, 278 -81; 
support Shi`i state, 283 -84 
Ulama, Shi`i (Iranian): scriptural authority of, 5 -6; 
social role of, 5 -6; 
ideology of, 6 ; 
opposition to Iranian state, 6, 18, 21 ; 
state-employed, 18, 21 ; 
distrusted by laity, 
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21 ; 
persecute Sufis, 21 ; 
displaced by Afghan conquest of Iran, 29 ; 
expropriation of, 29 ; 
response to Safavid fall, 29 ; 
emigration to Awadh, 141 -42, 183 -85 
Urdu language, 24, 97, 107, 110, 187, 288 
'Urf. See Customary law 
Usulis: proxies for Imams, 5 -6, 18 ; 
early rationalists, 17 -18; 
emulation of, by laymen required, 18 -19; 
dominant in shrine cities in 1779, 64 ; 
promote Friday prayers in Awadh, 127 -37; 
S. Dildar 'Ali's students become, 138 ; 
polemics of, with Sufism, 152 -59; 
curse and ostracize Sufis, 156 -59; 
polemics of, with Akhbarism, 159 -69; 
incite mob against Mirza Muhammad Akbarabadi, 164 ; 
polemics of, with Shaykhism, 185 -89; 
polemics of, with Sunnism, 229 -49; 
and communalism, 286 -90 
'Uyuz, Mulla, 52 
V 
Vajid 'Ali Shah: criticized by British for paying zakat, 202 ; 
ceases paying zakat, 203 ; 
less proclerical than father, 203 ; 
usurps slave-girl, 216 ; 
circumvents inheritance 'law, 216 ; 
estrangement from ulama, 217 ; 
stops payment for seminary, 217 ; 
forces conversion to Shi`ism of munshis, 243 ; 
and Faizabad temple dispute, 244 -49; 
and trial of Muhammad Husayn Khan, nazim of Bahraich, 268 -69; 
deposed by British, 270 ; 
interred in Calcutta, 276 
Valiyu'llah, Shah, 226 
Vilayati Begam, 181 
W 
Wahdat al-wujud, 147, 149, 152, 154, 156, 235 
Wakils, 17 
Waqf (endowment), 96, 147, 202, 207 
Water-carriers, 87 
Weavers, 85, 254 
Weber, Max, 3, 72, 123, 145 -46, 189 
Wellesley, Governor-General, 253 
Wilson, Bryan, 3, 124 
Wolff Joseph, 265 
Z 
Zakat, 198 -204 
Zamindars, 75, 78, 137, 182 
Zand, Karim Khan, 28 
Zands, 28, 34, 37 
Zangipuri, Sayyid 'Ata' Husayn, 50 
Zangipuri, Sayyid Hasan Riza, 181 
Zayd b. 'Ali, 56 -57, 74 
Zaydpur, 76, 248 
Zuhuru'llah, Mawlavi, 140, 242 
 
 
